When Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani overthrew his father in 1995, Qatar was a sleepy, mostly unknown emirate in the Gulf. During his reign, Hamad turned Qatar into a prominent player in regional power politics, a major exporter of natural gas, and the future site of the 2022 World Cup. The two books under review, by Matthew Gray and Mehran Kamrava, tell the story of that transformation, up to, but not including, Hamad’s improbable and unexpected abdication in 2013. Book-length treatments of Qatari politics are scarce, and these two books provide much-needed and very useful help for understanding the rise of Qatar to international prominence.
Qatar is a small country, with a citizen population of around 300,000 and a total population (including foreign residents) around 2.2 million. Its activist foreign policy, however, has allowed it a far greater international role than its size warrants. And its vast hydrocarbon reserves underpin its importance to the world economy. Both works under review discuss Qatar’s economy and its foreign policy, though they differ in emphasis: Gray focuses on Qatar’s political economy, while Kamrava devotes more attention to Qatar’s foreign policy adventures. Their larger theoretic ambitions differ accordingly: Gray seeks to contribute to the literature on rentier states, while Kamrava is interested in explaining Qatar in light of international relations theory.
In Qatar: Small State, Big Politics, Kamrava sets out his central question at the outset (p. 1): “How can a small state, with little previous history of diplomatic engagement regionally or globally, have emerged as such an influential and significant player in shaping unfolding events across the Middle East and elsewhere?” His answer is nuanced and thoughtful. He sets out several factors that make Qatar’s influence possible. The relative decline of the larger states in the Middle East, and unrest in the region, opened a space for Qatar to play a leading role in the politics of the region (or, as some might put it, to interfere in the politics if its Arab neighbors). Qatar’s tight security linkage with the United States—including the Al Udeid air base outside Doha—gives it cover to enable a bold foreign policy. The emir’s popularity at home (and the absence of a national legislature) gave him room to conduct an activist foreign policy without dealing with domestic naysayers. And, finally, Qatar’s vast hydrocarbon wealth gave other actors a reason to pay attention to the emirate, and gave Hamad a way to influence outcomes in other countries (pp. 7, 41–43).
These factors explain the sources of Qatar’s power, but not how the Qatari regime chose to use it. And that is a bit of a puzzle. At one point, Kamrava considers the possibility that Qatar’s foreign policy “is at best an incongruent reflection of the idiosyncrasies of its chief architects—namely the country’s emir and the prime minister” (p. 48). But he instead favors the view that its foreign policy is “actually quite logical,” a result of its efforts to foster “regional peace and stability.” Later, however, he suggests an explanation offered by a “well-placed official” and member of the ruling family who explained Qatar’s intervention in Libya by saying that “ʻWe believe in democracy’” (p. 63). It is in fact plausible that this is what motivated this member of the family, but it also does not make a great deal of sense from the point of view of regime interests. There was much, I think, that was idiosyncratic in Hamad’s foreign policy.
Kamrava’s main contribution to the larger literature on international relations lies in his introduction of the idea of “subtle” power. This takes its place alongside already existing varieties of power: hard, soft, and smart. Qatar deploys subtle power through its financial resources, its international prestige and branding, and the weakness of other states. Protection by the United States makes it possible, as it relies on the willingness of policymakers to pursue an activist foreign policy (pp. 61–65). The concept captures the distinctiveness of Qatar’s influence, though one wishes that some moniker other than “subtle” had been chosen. There was nothing very subtle about Hamad’s practice of foreign policy. Do other states have subtle power? Kamrava says that Kuwait, Singapore, and Taiwan have potential subtle power, but that their leaders choose not to use it (p. 68). The eventual outcome of emir Hamad’s foreign policy adventures suggests an explanation for their hesitance. Qatari support for the Muslim Brotherhood after the overthrow of Mohammad Morsi of Egypt in 2013 angered Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates enough that ambassadors were withdrawn and threats were made to close borders and airspace. Qatar’s room to maneuver shrank precipitously. Subtle power, pushed too far, ran up against hard power, and hard power won.
Qatar: Politics and the Challenges of Development is more focused on Qatar’s development path than its foreign policy. The heart of the book includes an excellent analysis by Gray of the ways that the ruling family controls not only the state but also much of the economy (Chapter 3); the development of Qatar’s hydrocarbon industry (Chapter 4); and, in subsequent chapters, the creation of a particularly effective developmental state that has turned Qatar from a sleepy backwater into a gleaming metropolis with an internationally known brand. The branding of Qatar receives a good deal of (deserved) attention, as does tourism, sports, and Al Jazeera.
Gray employs the concept of “late rentierism” to place developments in Qatar in a comparative perspective. Late rentierism is distinguished from classic rentierism in that in its earlier form, the state simply handed out money and received allegiance from citizens. Late rentierism, he says, is “mechanical, not structural.” By this he means that rents “provide a mechanism of control” for rulers, but do not determine outcomes, or how rulers use rents (p. 10). In Qatar, emir Hamad used rents to launch Qatar onto the global stage, both in economic terms and in its foreign policy. This contributes to the stability of the regime—especially in that economic development helps to prepare for the day when Qatar runs out of hydrocarbons (pp. 55, 88). Gray might thus be read as belonging to the school of thought among scholars of rentier states that holds that rent wealth does not determine outcomes, but instead makes some things possible and others less possible. In Qatar, rent wealth made possible—but not inevitable—Hamad’s economic and foreign policy initiatives.
Foreigners—or expatriates, as they are known in the Gulf—have little place in either book as political actors. In part this is because, like most Qatari citizens, they have little influence over the course of events in Qatar. It is not for nothing that emir Hamad is the dominant figure in both books, followed by his relative (and former prime minister) Hamad bin Jassim Al Thani. Nonetheless, one of Hamad’s main accomplishments as emir was to launch Qatar along a developmental trajectory—set out in admirable detail by Gray—in which foreigners are indispensable. They resemble employees of a company much more than citizens of a state, but even if we think of these books as analyses of Qatar, Inc., some additional attention to the employees might have been warranted. In part, this is a judgment from hindsight: One of the areas of particular controversy in Qatar’s hosting of the 2022 World Cup has been its treatment of its armies of foreign laborers. Beyond humanitarian concerns, the controversy has affected the emirate’s success in branding itself as a forward-looking, liberal, land of opportunity.
Relations between Qatari citizens and expatriates receive modest coverage in both works, though there is some mention of Qatari concerns about their status as a small (and shrinking) minority within their own country. Politics among Qatari citizens remains something of an enigma. Hamad kept none of his promises to hold elections to a national parliament, so citizens lack a formal political institution through which to influence Qatari policy. Despite this, the evidence suggests that Qataris by and large liked the former emir. Kamrava says that this is in part due to the personal qualities of the emir and his skills in governing. Both Kamrava and Gray also emphasize the ability of the regime to co-opt citizens with Qatar’s abundant hydrocarbon rents. If political talent is decisive, and Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani is not as skilled as his father in maintaining support at home, we might see more dissent under Tamim. That said, and keeping in mind that both books were written before Tamim became emir, both authors seem inclined to think that continuity is more likely than change.
Hamad opened Qatar to the world with foreign universities, Qatar Airways, Al Jazeera, and many other initiatives. But in other ways, Qatar remains very closed, and its regime is opaque to an extreme. Partly this is because Hamad was a dominant figure in the ruling family and in Qatari politics, and faced little dissent from within the regime or outside it. Dissent often opens a window into the workings of authoritarian regimes, and the Qatari regime opened few windows in recent years. As a result—probably an unavoidable result—both books provide relatively perfunctory analyses of domestic Qatari politics under Hamad. Neither author gives us much that would allow us to understand the 2013 abdication of Hamad. This is mostly a testament to the closed nature of Qatar’s political system, and one looks forward to the day when it is possible to write a book that fully explores political dynamics within Qatar, rather than the emir’s efforts to make an impact on the world stage.
Kamrava and Gray, however, understandably focus on economics, branding, and foreign policy. Both books are welcome additions to the literature on the politics of Qatar, the Gulf monarchies, and the Middle East.
