Eric McGlinchey's book is situated within a burgeoning literature on comparative authoritarianism. Challenging assumptions of an earlier generation of scholarship, particularly the tendency to interpret any opening in authoritarian regimes as evidence of democratization, research in this vein explores the array of “hybrid” regimes (Larry Diamond, “Thinking about Hybrid Regimes,” Journal of Democracy 13 [2002]: 21–35), which incorporate features associated with democracy and blur the distinction between single-party, military, and personalist rule. Empirical, methodological, and theoretical diversity makes comparative authoritarianism at once an exciting, fertile, and sometimes frustrating area of research. Chaos, Violence, Dynasty reflects both the promise and the challenge of this line of inquiry.

To those unfamiliar with Central Asia, intraregional differences pale in comparison with the region's commonalities, notably, corrupt leaders who cling to power using any means necessary. McGlinchey makes a compelling case that Central Asian autocrats have, in fact, faced very different challenges, in degree and form, to their right to rule. They have also responded to challengers in dissimilar ways. In the face of elite-led mass protests, Kyrgyzstan's first two presidents relinquished power and fled the country in disgrace. In Uzbekistan, the government has preempted protest (with crucial exceptions) through the indiscriminate incarceration, torture, murder, and disappearance of Islamic leaders, businessmen, and those who dare support them. Finally, in Kazakhstan, contestation has been largely absent, signaling stable authoritarianism and dynastic succession. This variation is summed up by the book's title: [Kyrgyz] Chaos, [Uzbek] Violence, [and Kazakh] Dynasty.

According to McGlinchey, these trajectories are rooted in the presidents' differential ability to distribute patronage and keep potential challengers at bay. Authoritarian variation in the region today was anticipated by whether elites were fragmented or united when the USSR collapsed. Indeed, how Central Asian presidents manage patronage politics and whether they do so successfully can be traced back to patterns established during perestroika. As a result of decisions made in Moscow, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan were blessed with large and united pro-presidential parties, while Kyrgyzstan inherited a fragmented elite and weak president with little political experience. Widespread elite defection was inevitable in Kyrgyzstan, whose small and fragmented ruling elite makes collective action against autocrats relatively easy. In Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, however, the large number of elites and their integration into presidential parties work against defection. There, elites are unlikely to defect absent a change in economic circumstances, relations with the international community, or succession dynamics.

The book begins with a simplified model of defection, but the argument gains complexity with the addition of variables. While explaining differences in defection rates between smaller, less populated, and poor Kyrgyzstan, on the one hand, and more endowed neighboring giants Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, on the other, the simplified model is less able to explain variation in defection rates in Kyrgyzstan over time. Why were elites loyal to President Askar Akaev for more than a decade before mass defections overwhelmed him? Nor does it explain variation across the Kazakh and Uzbek cases. Why do Uzbek authorities rely primarily on coercion, in contrast to their Kazakhstani counterparts? Why are societal groups more likely to rise up in the former versus the latter? In response, the author introduces a more fully specified model that includes variation in economic resources and how these are used, differing patterns of Islamic revivalism and how these become politicized, and how geopolitics/foreign assistance affects internal politics.

The argument then shifts from elite calculations that facilitate or prevent defection to the type and extent of political contestation in the three cases. Where rents are significant and broadly distributed (Kazakhstan), the president buys off elites and the masses alike, and Islam fails to become a salient mobilizing identity. Where rents are insufficient and/or unfairly distributed among competing elite groups (Kyrgyzstan), presidents lose legitimacy and are toppled during increasingly violent protests. Where resources are middling (Uzbekistan), the government cannot afford to enhance legitimacy via a robust social safety net and instead resorts to coercion. In Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, the state's inability to meet the population's basic needs leads many to seek assistance from Islamic charities, undermining their dependence on the state and creating latent opposition to the regime. Geopolitics is discussed primarily in conjunction with McGlinchey's call for incrementalism. While these regimes are not likely to transition to democracy, they can be encouraged to follow less oppressive practices.

Chaos, Violence, Dynasty is a timely exploration of Central Asian politics with important implications for the study of comparative authoritarianism. McGlinchey demonstrates that even regimes that share common legacies can, over time, follow distinct trajectories. History matters, and familiarity with history and emerging trends can help scholars tease out causal mechanisms and assess the potential for political transformation. The analysis also highlights how fragile these regimes are, despite outward appearances of autocratic consolidation. Even Kazakhstan, although wealthy by regional standards, is plagued by ailments endemic to post-Soviet political economy and which belie official claims of popular acquiescence.

At the same time, the book only indirectly touches upon conceptual and theoretical debates that are worth engaging directly. The growth in terminology to distinguish between hybrid regimes is a case in point. How do chaos, violence, and dynasty mesh with or challenge existing conceptualizations of regime type? What do these terms illuminate that others do not or do less well? Additionally, because the causal argument centers on sources of elite unity and fragmentation, it is surprising that connections are not made to prior studies, some conducted in Eastern Europe and Russia (e.g., John Higley and Michael Burton, “Types of National Elites in Postcommunist Central and Eastern Europe,” International Politics 34 [June 1997]: 153–68). Unity is hurriedly operationalized by the presence of large presidential parties, but no theoretical or empirical justification follows. By taking the importance of presidential parties as a given instead of as a question to be examined empirically, the book misses an opportunity to demonstrate how parties of power maintain elite loyalty. Are formal institutions like parties the backbone of the patronage system, or are informal practices more important to regime longevity?

Similarly, the role of Islamic revivalism is not explicitly tied to theorizing about religion and identity politics and how/when religion mobilizes opposition to the regime or bolsters regime legitimacy. Islamic revivalism could certainly be conceived of as an outcome, rather than an explanatory factor, given that variation in repression and resources seems to affect whether Islam is triggered as a salient identity. In addition, while geopolitics is referenced in the policy prescriptions, international processes are not clearly developed in the book's account of regime variation. Recent works have focused on international factors, including pressure to comply with international norms, democracy promotion, and global markets, in order to explain variation in authoritarian rule (e.g., Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War, 2010). How does Central Asia's experience speak to that literature? Finally, that the size of the ruling coalition matters to autocrats' hold on power is an interesting argument which could shed light on politics in hybrid regimes beyond Central Asia. Are presidents who head smaller, less populated, and poorer countries more likely to succumb to putsches?

While not all of these questions can or should be addressed in one study, explication of some of them would have been a welcome contribution.