For all of the promises of international law and international political institutions, there are a host of problems that have yet to be solved. In The Status of Law in World Society, Friedrich Kratochwil argues against intellectual approaches that attempt to identify perfect theoretical or moral ideals in order to address practical, contemporary problems. He suggests, instead, that scholars and practitioners should take a more pragmatic approach that is devoted to the “the art of the possible.” This book should be considered required reading for scholars and students of international relations and international law. But this extraordinarily expansive examination of the place of law in the international context also will be of great value to those in the humanities, social sciences, and professional schools whose work includes international matters.

Reading The Status of Law in World Society is a bit like wandering through a field littered with precious stones. It is impossible to predict exactly what one will discover. Yet it is not at all difficult to fill one’s pockets with the thought-provoking gems that Kratochwil scatters throughout his nine chapter “meditations.” His discussions span topics surrounding interdisciplinarity, the concept of law, constitutionalism, law making and the role of experts, “global community” and the power of metaphors and narratives, global administrative law, the politics and the pathologies of rights, and the limits of ideal theory. In the end, however, giving order to a somewhat mixed bag of ideas requires substantial effort on the part of the reader, but it must: Indeed, addressing the systemic issues Kratochwil uncovers requires a massive overhaul of the contemporary foundations of thought and practice in the fields of international law and politics.

Readers should not expect a cohesive theory to guide this exploration. Nor will familiar social-scientific research methods structure the inquiry. The author is actually very skeptical of relying on social-scientific methodologies or comprehensive “ideal theories” that are intended to solve practical problems. “Ideal theorizing,” he explains, “starts with abstract principles and assumptions, hoping that their clarification will help us in solving concrete problems after we have found a solution in principle’” (p. 284). The conceptual universes that have been put forth within ideal theories, he argues, so often rest on a priori assumptions that bear little resemblance to the actual worldly context in which they supposedly operate.

Kratochwil engages with both classical and contemporary theorists such as Aristotle, Kant, Descartes, Ronald Dworkin, H.L.A. Hart, John Rawls, and Jürgen Habermas to illustrate his points and to target many of the accepted methodological approaches and theoretical orthodoxies in the field. Most readers, therefore, will not have to wait long before the author targets their own intellectual affinities, disciplinary attachments, and methodological leanings as ill-suited for a great many of the tasks they assume. He deconstructs prevailing theories of law, rights, economics, and international relations. He is mindful that his own methods must follow his critique. So instead of looking for a moral touchstone or embracing an empirical approach rooted in social-scientific methods, he adopts a reflective, critical mode of inquiry in the form of his structured “meditations.”

To be sure, Kratochwil offers a series of searing critiques that are delivered with sharp wit and cutting prose. But readers should not prepare to defend the bulwarks of their intellectual and disciplinary homes—at least not at this stage. The author is by no means conducting a slash and burn campaign. Despite eschewing many of the canons of his own intellectual domain, he conducts a very methodical and precise analysis. He engages with other thinkers on their own turf and terms to show how some of the most respected ideas and methods are in fact incapable of grappling with many of the problems of the contemporary world. Although it is certainly a piece of critical scholarship, Kratochwil’s project is perhaps better received simply as an unflinching examination of the state of thought and practice in the fields of international relations and international law. And as any thoroughgoing inspection, Kratochwil offers the obligatory “good news/bad news” proposition.

First the bad: There is, Kratochwil shows us, irreparable weakness and systemic decay within the ideas, institutions, and practices that structure our global society. A central aspect of his argument is that our prevailing epistemic boundaries and methodological conventions establish the very limits of perception and understanding; there are certain matters that cannot be known and many paradoxes that cannot be resolved given the current state of theory and practice. For instance, in his sweeping analysis of rights, he notes that we suffer today from a “historical myopia which hardly allows us to imagine a world in which rights do not play a decisive role” (p. 201). This myopia, in turn, influences how we view the past and structure the present. He argues that our understanding of rights during the American and French Revolutions is “historically and conceptually too simple” (p. 217). But similarly, contemporary theories of rights gloss over the conflicts, tensions, and paradoxes that reside within the concept.

Still, Kratochwil does supply a glimmer of hopeful news: With the foundations of contemporary thought and practice in the field of international law and politics dismantled, there now might be a bit of “space for fresh reflection” (p. 48). Fresh reflection, however, is not without its own challenges; it requires a major shift in contemporary thought and practice. Rather than building grand theories, he suggests an approach that is “more concerned with the diagnosis of a problem and with finding a solution rather than with identifying an optimum or equilibrium” (p. 287). It is crucial, he adds, to be conscious of the tensions, contradictions, and ambiguities that are often painted over by ideal theory. Importantly, fresh reflection also requires an awareness of the internal measures that are used to sort through practical matters. In the end, we should eschew “the ideal” and gravitate toward “the possible” (p. 286). Rather than embracing supposedly universal ideals, Kratochwil emphasizes the need to focus on actual cases, local conditions, and concrete problems.

For those who wish to adopt the author’s approach, there remain important questions about the actual process through which problems are identified. Problems are not naturally occurring objects that exist on their own. A phenomenon must be defined as a problem. An underfunded government, for instance, is a problem for some and a political solution for others. Whichever guise it takes—problem or solution—depends on underlying ideal theories within the fields of economics, law, and politics, for example. Indeed, problems are not discovered as much as they are produced or assembled from preexisting concepts and normative ideas. In the end, even if we are on board with Kratochwil and banish ideal theorizing from our own repertoires, if we look closely enough we are bound to find all kinds of ideal theories lurking within any conception of a “problem.” This is a minor concern, however. The Status of Law in World Society is a stirring examination of the state of affairs within the domain of international law and politics. Kratochwil is provocative, freethinking, subversive, and—if the reader invests the necessary effort—inspiring.