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Black man's burden, white man's welfare: control, devolution and development in the British Empire, 1880–1914

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 July 2009

OLIVIER ACCOMINOTTI
Affiliation:
Sciences Po Paris and University of California at Berkeley, olivier.accominotti@sciences.po.org
MARC FLANDREAU
Affiliation:
The Graduate Institute of International Studies and Development, Geneva and CEPR, London, marc.flandreau@graduateinstitute.ch
RIAD REZZIK
Affiliation:
University of Paris II, rezzik@gmail.com
FRÉDÉRIC ZUMER
Affiliation:
University of Paris II, zumzum1@free.fr

Abstract

This article organizes an economic analysis of the effects of colonial rule on capital market access and development. Our insights provide an interpretation of institutional variance and growth performance across British colonies. We emphasize the degree of coercion available to British authorities in explaining alternative set-ups. White colonies, with a credible exit option, managed to secure a better deal than those where non-whites predominated, for which we find evidence of welfare losses.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © European Historical Economics Society 2009
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Figure 1.Political participation in the British colonies

Notes: UKG: United Kingdom, AUL: Australia, NZL: New Zealand, CAN: Canada, IND: India, CEY: Ceylon, JAM: Jamaica. The measure of democracy is the degree of electoral participation for the United Kingdom and self-governing colonies. It corresponds to the percentage of the total population, which actually voted. (Source: Polyarchy dataset, see Vanhanen, 2000.) For the dependent colonies, the graph shows the percentage of the white population as measured by the 1901 and 1911 censuses. (Source: Baines 1903, 1914.)
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Figure 2.Default risk and borrowing costs

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Figure 3.The Gladstonian regime: India, crown colonies

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Table 1.The subjection test statistic

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Table 2.Financial repression and the composition of external borrowing, 1880-1913