Both Marlene Sokolon's Political Emotions and Eugene Garver's Confronting Aristotle's Ethics provide refreshing and valuable insights into Aristotle's understanding of human nature as part of a political community. In Political Emotions, Marlene Sokolon argues, based on her study of Aristotle, that emotions play a constitutive role in political action. This should not surprise the modern reader. Sokolon's analysis of Aristotle, however, is interesting because she shows convincingly that Aristotle helps us understand how the emotions are what she calls “Janus-like; they look both ways and, depending upon the particular circumstances and the guidance of reason, can be positive or negative for individual prospering and collective political good” (5). The main part of Political Emotions is concerned with an analysis of the fourteen emotions (pathē) discussed by Aristotle in the Rhetoric. These emotions are anger and gentleness, love and hate, fear and confidence, shame and shamelessness, benevolence and selfishness, and the four emotions of pity, indignation, envy, and emulation. Sokolon shows how anger is an emotion that can be negative when aimed at the destruction of justice in a community, but it can also be a positive factor when it inspires the defense of the defenseless or when it is aimed at unjust rulers. Love (philia, which is conventionally translated as “friendship”) is likewise ambiguous. Love connects people, but can also be disruptive of the peace in a political community when partiality results in factional struggle (75). Hate is an emotion with negative connotations. Yet Sokolon shows that, for Aristotle, hate can also be a positive emotion when it supports the fights against injustice and tyrants. Benevolence is a positive emotion that turns negative when it involves liberality without regard to merit and to what is fitting. Two of the emotions discussed by Sokolon are morally unambiguous: Shamelessness (anaischuntia), so argues Sokolon, is constituted by a complete disregard to what is fitting and always destructive of the political community. Likewise, envy is an emotion that is not concerned with questions of merit or justice but indiscriminately motivates the destruction of another's good fortune.
Sokolon concludes Political Emotions by arguing that political analysis cannot ignore the role of emotions and that Aristotle provides us with “a more extensive and crucial list of emotions for social and political behavior than is found in most current research on emotions” (165). In other words, Sokolon argues for the continued relevance of Aristotle.
The focus of Political Emotions, however, is disappointingly narrow. Surely, if emotions are morally ambiguous, the question of how these emotions are directed toward benefiting the political community becomes urgent. This question invites a discussion of the ways in which the emotions are trained or seduced, which means, for philosophers like Aristotle, a discussion of the ways in which persuasion, education, law, and custom influence the emotions. Sokolon does not venture into these areas (except briefly on pages 29–31), nor does she pay much attention to the role of the emotions in Aristotle's other works. The subtitle of Political Emotions, Aristotle and the Symphony of Reason and Emotion, promises a more comprehensive analysis of the connection between reason and the emotions than the book delivers. Moreover, Sokolon's definition of key concepts is confusing. She defines political emotions as “cognitive states” and as “emotional judgments.” Emotions, so states Sokolon, are cognitive because they judge the particulars of a situation. But what is the nature of this judgment? It is not prudence, because in conjunction with prudence the emotions would no longer be morally ambiguous. As Sokolon states correctly, “emotional judgment is incapable of determining the right action in the right manner at the right time” (21). This leaves the reader to wonder how the “judgment” of the emotions is different from judgment by reason and how, ultimately, one forges harmony between the two.
Whereas Sokolon's Political Emotions leaves the reader unfulfilled because of the author's reluctance to brave into the areas of law and politics, Eugene Garver's Confronting Aristotle's Ethics satisfies because, if anything, he takes on a more comprehensive view of Aristotle's ethics. Confronting Aristotle's Ethics is an extremely thoughtful and mature account of Aristotle's ethics that challenges the reader and opens up new ways of thinking about Aristotle. Garver summons evidence from Aristotle's Metaphysics to explain how Aristotle in the Ethics can argue for the distinction between a person being good and doing good. Promoting the good of others—practicing the moral virtues—coincides with exercising the powers that render the soul in good condition. This correspondence, according to Garver, constitutes the crux of the Ethics (8). To support his argument, Garver turns to Aristotle's Metaphysics 9 to explain how, first, energeiai (activities) complete and actualize kinēsis (motions or processes). Second, energeiai perfect and realize dynameis. Virtuous activity (energeia kat' aretēn) is complete activity that realizes the potentialities (dunamai) of the soul. Virtuous activity brings the soul into the best condition while it is doing good. The argument is clever and complex; let us follow it through.
Chapter 1 of Confronting Aristotle's Ethics starts with a discussion of rhetoric to show how the practice of the virtues is similar to but not identical with the practice of the arts. According to Garver's interpretation, the substance of the art of persuasion is reasoning. Acts oriented toward the internal end are energeiai or activities. “As our acts become more energeia-like and less kinēsis-like, they become more rational” (31). However, as Garver argues in chapter 2, the art of rhetoric is an incomplete activity because it does not actualize the potentiality of the soul. “Only the virtues allow a difference between performing a virtuous act and acting as the virtuous man would act. All the goodness of an act resides in the result, while in the virtues there is goodness both in the result and in the character of the agent who does the action” (52). The just man can only act justly, whereas an artful rhetorician can argue on both sides of an issue (53). My main quibble here concerns the separation of the arts from character. Is not a good rhetorician, or a good physician for that matter, also a person who makes just and prudent decisions?
In chapter 3 of Confronting Aristotle's Ethics, Garver discusses what he calls different “varieties of moral failure” (70). By explicating these conditions, Garver prepares the argument of the 4th and 5th chapter. In chapter 4, Garver uses the terminology derived from the Metaphysics to deal with the question of the relationship between the passions and virtue. According to Garver's interpretation of Aristotle, virtue transforms and actualizes the passions into desires for actions that are their own end; the passions are dynameis that are realized in energeiai. While they themselves are “nonmoral, the passions can be the material cause of morality” (103). The question remains why people generate internal ends and love the noble for its own sake. Garver argues that people do so on account of the thumos, the driving force behind the love of the noble and that is the product of specific political conditions (116). This is controversial, but the point here is that Garver portrays Aristotle's understanding of human nature as part of the political environment, not in isolation. Chapter 5 aims to find support for the idea that Aristotle's ethical virtues are political virtues. Garver argues that civic virtue—virtue that is the result of obedience to the law—may not be genuine virtue, but civic virtue prepares the way to genuine virtue. Political courage, for example, such as courage on the battlefield, is “inferior to true courage but is the route to it” (144).
Chapter 6 deals with the difficult question about the relationship between the contemplative and the active life. Garver argues that the only route to Theōria (contemplation) is through the political life. “Ultimately and surprisingly, I [Garver] believe that we need phronēsis for metaphysics because we need the practical knowledge of how people realize their nature in order fully to understand substance, activity, and even god. It takes phronēsis to know that ‘man is not the best thing in the universe’”(165). Garver's argument culminates in the final chapter by showing that, according to Aristotle, there is no contest between the active and the contemplative life. Instead, so argues Garver, “Aristotle shows how the philosophical life completes the political and practical life” (12). To be phronimos, one has to know that Theōria is the best activity, but this does not imply that the prudent person always chooses to live philosophically. Most of the time, what is lacking is the opportunity for living the contemplative life; it is often right to be pulled by the active life. It would be wrong to resist the demands that practical situations make on us in the name of Theōria. “Phronēsis cannot tell us how to engage in Theōria, but it does tell us when we should” (224).
Using Aristotle's Metaphysics to explicate Aristotle's ethics is controversial because, as Garver himself admits, Aristotle himself does not explicitly interrelate ethics and metaphysics (168). Still, Garver makes a convincing case that the terminology from Metaphysics is helpful for understanding Aristotle's ethics. Garver's main contribution, is to deal with questions that are of paramount importance and to try to understand these questions—about doing good and being good—from a comprehensive perspective. The problem with contemporary virtue ethics, so writes Garver, is that it “truncates Aristotelian ethics by neglecting the relation of virtue to law, as well as the relations of virtue to the soul and to happiness” (128). Garver's book is a fine example to the contrary.
