The literature on political transitions has widely examined political change in the Global South, especially in conflict-affected contexts (Bellin Reference Bellin2012; Levitsky and Way Reference Levitsky and Way2010). In such settings, transitions often occur amid social and political instability, frequently resulting in renewed autocracy or chaos rather than democratisation (Geddes et al. Reference Geddes, Wright and Frantz2014). One outcome is ‘failed transition’, defined as the breakdown of democratisation processes, resulting in institutional collapse, legitimacy crises and violent conflict (Levitsky and Way Reference Levitsky and Way2010). Political elites frequently shape these trajectories. One classic framework highlights elite pacts as essential to successful transitions (O’Donnell et al. Reference O’Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead1986), yet this model assumes the existence of coherent elites capable of credible commitment; conditions which are often absent in real post-conflict or post-authoritarian settings (Bratton and van de Walle Reference Bratton and van de Walle1997; Linz and Stepan Reference Linz and Stepan1996).
Transitional outcomes can be shaped by strategic interactions between governing elites and opposition forces (Schedler Reference Schedler2002). Democratic consolidation requires ‘consensual unity’ among elites (Higley and Burton Reference Higley and Burton2006), and for opposition parties to view cooperation as more beneficial than confrontation (Przeworski Reference Przeworski1991). When opposition groups adopt maximalist or zero-sum approaches rejecting compromise, democratic consolidation becomes less likely (Diamond Reference Diamond2015; Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán Reference Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán2014).
While considerable scholarly attention has been paid to the role of governing elites in shaping transitions (Diamond et al. Reference Diamond, Linz and Lipset1990; Levitsky and Ziblatt Reference Levitsky and Ziblatt2018; Schedler Reference Schedler2002), we know relatively little about how opposition forces shape the transitional dynamics in conflict-prone contexts. Understanding opposition behaviour and the impact of opposition actors’ actions in weak institutional settings merits closer examination, since these opposition groups may become the future governing elites whose decisions shape outcomes beyond the transition period.
This article traces how parliamentary opposition strategies against the Islamist majority in Libya’s first elected parliament (2012–2014) contributed to the failure of the democratic transition. We argue that opposition strategies are an understudied element that complements existing accounts of structural conditions, militia proliferation and external intervention. In doing so, we treat Libya as a paradigmatic case (Flyvbjerg Reference Flyvbjerg2001) in which weak institutions, an embryonic party system and sharp Islamist–secular polarisation render the causal mechanisms more visible. Similar dynamics appear in other post-Arab Spring cases, notably Egypt (2011–2013) and Tunisia (2011–2014) (Kraetzschmar and Saleh Reference Kraetzschmar, Saleh, Cavatorta and Merone2018; Nugent Reference Nugent2020).
The literature on Libya’s post-2011 transition examines multiple dimensions of the country’s trajectory. One strand focuses on militia politics, local power dynamics and the political economy of armed groups, showing how the militias interacted with tribal structures and evolved from revolutionary brigades to become entrenched actors (Cole and McQuinn Reference Cole and McQuinn2015; Eaton Reference Eaton2018). Another focuses on structural factors, linking Libya’s challenges to its weak institutions, colonial legacy, deinstitutionalisation under Gaddafi and socio-economic fragmentation (Jebnoun Reference Jebnoun2015; Romanet Perroux Reference Romanet Perroux2019; Sawani Reference Sawani2012, Reference Sawani2022). Other studies highlight regional divisions, particularly disputes over hydrocarbon resources (Paoletti Reference Paoletti2011). Scholars also stress the impact of external intervention: the 2011 NATO intervention left stabilisation gaps, enabling regional competition and turning Libya into a proxy battleground where armed conflict became more viable than compromise (Kuperman Reference Kuperman, Hehir and Murray2013).
While these accounts all provide important information about context, they do not discuss how Libyan political actors navigated these conditions. Our emphasis on opposition strategies contributes theoretically and empirically to the comparative literature on party behaviour in religiously polarised transitional settings by providing evidence of how Islamist–secular opposition dynamics accelerated the failure of the transition in an embryonic party system. While the broader party literature identifies such dynamics as consequential across post-Arab Spring cases (Lust and Waldner Reference Lust, Waldner, Bermeo and Yashar2016; Nugent Reference Nugent2020), micro-level analyses within a specific parliament remain limited. The present article addresses that gap for Libya and similar contexts. Our approach traces key causal pathways while recognising other contributing factors. We draw on semi-structured interviews conducted in 2023 with 19 former General National Congress (GNC) members from Islamist and secular blocs, alongside academics, journalists and non-governmental organisation (NGO) activists. These interviews are complemented by secondary sources, including media reports and scholarly work from 2012 to 2014. Using process tracing, we examine the causal links between opposition strategies and political outcomes. The findings identify two main strategies: demonisation and obstruction. Although aimed at countering Islamist influence, both strategies produced counterproductive effects. The tactic of demonisation framed government policies as security threats, mobilising armed groups and escalating confrontation, culminating in the 2014 clashes and deepening polarisation. In this context, polarisation does not refer to individuals’ moral foundations (Haerter et al. Reference Haerter, Filsinger and Freitag2025) but more to a form of social identity-based feelings. Obstruction, which cast the constitutional process as illiberal under Islamist leadership, stalled the institution-building process, contributing to paralysis and deep political divisions.
The following section reviews the literature about how the actions of the parliamentary opposition can shape political processes in countries in transition. The methodology section then outlines the data and methodology used in this article, covering the case selection, data sources and methods of data analysis. This is followed by an overview of the GNC from 2012 to 2015, where we outline the background to Libya’s political transition during this period. Subsequently, we evaluate the strategies of the parliamentary opposition in Libya and present the empirical evidence regarding the impact of demonisation and obstruction on Libya’s transition. The concluding section summarises the key findings and discusses their broader implications for the study of opposition actions.
Theoretical framework
In political transitions, the parliamentary opposition contests power and acts as a coherent strategic force, even when party structures are weak (Bermeo Reference Bermeo2020; O’Donnell et al. Reference O’Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead1986). These actors include individuals and organised groups with shared interests, resources and strategies. The parliamentary opposition in Libya was a bloc united by its resistance to the Islamist majority’s agenda in the GNC, shaping their collective strategy within the transitional political landscape. In post-authoritarian settings, opposition actors adopt strategies that influence transition trajectories, which the literature divides into three main types: cooperation, delegitimisation and veto.
Cooperation involves negotiating with incumbents while maintaining political identity (Cheeseman and Tendi Reference Cheeseman and Tendi2010). It includes power-sharing, consensus on state-building (e.g. the constitution) and distinguishing policy opposition from a rejection of democracy (Lindberg Reference Lindberg2006). In post-conflict contexts, it may involve dialogue processes and agreement on reforms (Jarstad and Sisk Reference Jarstad and Sisk2008). The South African transition exemplified how, despite deep ideological differences, cooperation between the African National Congress and opposition parties enabled democratic consolidation through pact-based transitions and inclusive constitution-making (Sisk Reference Sisk2017; Sisk and Stefes Reference Sisk and Stefes2005). Post-2011 Tunisia similarly saw the Troika government exemplify cooperation between the majority and opposition in navigating the country’s democratic transition (Jermanová Reference Jermanová2021).
Delegitimising strategies involve challenging the legitimacy of elected governments (Bermeo Reference Bermeo2020). This includes denying electoral fairness, portraying governing parties as fundamentally anti-democratic, and mobilising extra-institutional protests to force the government from power (Schedler Reference Schedler2013). In post-authoritarian contexts, opposition forces may invoke the spectre of authoritarian restoration by claiming that the elected government represents a return to dictatorship (Levitsky and Way Reference Levitsky and Way2010). Such strategies can be particularly potent when opposition actors leverage the international media and diplomatic channels to undermine the government’s credibility abroad (Bunce and Wolchik Reference Bunce and Wolchik2011). Framing elected governments as usurpers rather than legitimate competitors might undermine the democratic norm of contingent consent (Bermeo Reference Bermeo2020). This strategy may be deployed via various means, including public protests, media campaigns and the mobilisation of civil society to question the authority of the incumbents. In cases in which the governing party is religiously embedded, delegitimisation by secular opponents carries force. For example, Stathis Kalyvas (Reference Kalyvas1996, Reference Kalyvas1998) shows that religious parties provoke distinctive patterns of elite confrontation precisely because their opponents frame their rule as an existential threat to the political community rather than as a normal alternation of power, a dynamic that makes negotiated compromise structurally harder to sustain.
Veto player strategies involve the opposition leveraging institutional positions to block government initiatives (Tsebelis Reference Tsebelis2002). While traditional democratic theory views obstruction as a legitimate check on majority power, in transitional contexts with weak institutions, such strategies can prevent the development of crucial stabilising frameworks. Constitutional moments require a minimum consensus among competing elites; when the opposition systematically obstructs constitutional processes, it may inadvertently undermine the very democratic framework it seeks to influence (Weingast Reference Weingast1997). Veto strategies can manifest through boycotting legislative sessions, preventing a quorum and paralysing governance (Lust-Okar Reference Lust-Okar2005), or through adopting committee positions to delay critical legislation, exploit procedural rules or mobilise civil society against government initiatives (Ginsburg and Moustafa Reference Ginsburg and Moustafa2008).
These strategic choices interact with contextual factors to produce varying outcomes. In polarised settings with weak institutions, delegitimisation and obstruction may intensify ‘affective polarisation’, transforming political differences into entrenched social divisions (McCormick et al. Reference McCormick, Hague and Harrop2019). This can undermine democratic norms of tolerance and compromise, causing competing factions to reject forbearance and institutional restraint. Research on failed transitions demonstrates that when opposition forces consistently choose confrontational strategies over cooperative ones, they can inadvertently accelerate democratic backsliding by undermining mutual security, which refers to the confidence that political competition will remain within democratic boundaries (Bermeo Reference Bermeo2016). This dynamic is particularly dangerous in ethnically or religiously divided societies where political competition can activate deeper social cleavages (Horowitz Reference Horowitz1985).
In transitional contexts where security institutions remain fragmented, delegitimising strategies can trigger ‘elite defection’, where security actors withdraw their support from ongoing democratic processes (Bermeo Reference Bermeo2020). When the opposition frames governing elites as security threats, it can create incentives for parties to engage in internal armed conflict, particularly in conflict-affected settings where non-state armed groups proliferate and dominate the security landscape, making violent rather than institutional means of political competition more likely (Kalyvas Reference Kalyvas2006). Evidence from Venezuela, Ukraine and Kenya shows how delegitimising approaches can produce societal polarisation (Cheeseman Reference Cheeseman2018).
While opposition groups perform essential accountability functions in consolidated democracies, in transitional contexts their strategic choices – particularly delegitimisation and obstruction – can produce destabilising consequences by undermining democratic consolidation. These dynamics can culminate in failed transitions characterised by competing claims to legitimacy, institutional fragmentation and armed conflict as the primary mode of political contestation (Paris Reference Paris2004). Analysis of how Islamist and secularist blocs in Libya alternated between cooperation and confrontation therefore illuminates the causal pathways that connect to wider debates in the literature on political parties. Kalyvas (Reference Kalyvas1996, Reference Kalyvas1998) argues that religiously embedded parties generate distinctive mobilisation and confrontation dynamics when constituencies feel threatened. The literature on party system institutionalisation shows that embryonic party systems are particularly vulnerable to dynamics of delegitimisation and obstruction, as newly formed parties lack stable organisational roots to commit to institutional norms. This article contributes empirically to these strands of research by showing how these dynamics operated in the GNC, connecting the Libyan case to the wider post-Arab Spring comparative record.
Methodology
This study treats Libya as a paradigmatic case in Bent Flyvbjerg’s (Reference Flyvbjerg2001) sense. We selected it because its extreme institutional conditions (near-total absence of a functioning state, an embryonic party system and acute Islamist–secular polarisation) render the causal mechanisms unusually visible and theoretically productive. While the initial institutional steps – organising the first free and fair elections in more than half a century and establishing mechanisms for the division of power – were promising, Libya’s transition followed an unanticipated path only two years after these reforms. The occurrence of armed conflict, a feature shared with several other post-Arab Spring cases, adds to the complexity of the picture we seek to explain.
We use explaining-outcome process tracing (Beach and Pedersen Reference Beach and Pedersen2019) to identify the causal pathways through which opposition strategies contributed to Libya’s political transition outcomes. This approach is suited to cases selected on the dependent variable and does not require opposition strategies to be the sole or sufficient cause of transition failure. It is designed for overdetermined outcomes in which multiple causal pathways have been operating simultaneously. Our analysis therefore traces how opposition strategies constituted one significant pathway (alongside other structural conditions) contributing to two outcomes evident by the end of the GNC’s tenure in 2014: affective polarisation and institutional fragmentation. These dynamics manifested in the emergence of a fragmented and conflictual security landscape and the resulting constitutional impasse.
We draw on multiple sources of evidence to trace the causal mechanisms which shaped Libya’s transitional trajectory. Central to our analysis is a set of semi-structured interviews conducted in 2023 with 19 individuals (see Appendix). These include former members of the GNC from across the political spectrum, ranging from the secular bloc comprising liberals, nationalists and representatives from eastern Libya (Cyrenaica) to the Islamist bloc, including members of the Justice and Construction Party (JCP) and affiliated independent Islamists who formed the dominant parliamentary group. We also recruited interviewees from among the former members of the National Forces Alliance (NFA), which was the most prominent liberal party during the transition, alongside representatives of civil society organisations and NGOs engaged in the post-2011 political process. To protect confidentiality, anonymisation procedures are applied throughout. Secondary sources, including relevant academic literature and media reports, were used to contextualise the interview data and trace the key developments during the transitional period (2012–2014), providing chronologies of political events and expert assessments supporting the reconstruction of causal pathways and helping to triangulate interview accounts.
We acknowledge the potential for memory bias when conducting retrospective interviews, particularly regarding events that occurred a decade earlier. However, elite interviews remain a widely accepted method for uncovering causal processes in political science and transitional studies, especially when documentary evidence is limited (Fu and Simmons Reference Fu and Simmons2021; Von Soest Reference Von Soest2023). To mitigate concerns about memory bias, we adopted two key strategies. First, we employed triangulation by cross-checking interview responses with secondary sources, including media reports and academic analyses, to validate the consistency and accuracy of individual accounts. Second, rather than relying on isolated claims, we focused on recurring patterns across the interviews, in particular when different interviewees, often from opposing political camps, told similar stories or described the same events in similar ways, we treated those points as more reliable. This approach enhances the credibility and reliability of the data (Mosley Reference Mosley2019).
Beyond memory bias, we also addressed the risk of confirmation bias. Our recruitment strategy deliberately included respondents from opposing camps (Islamist bloc members and opposition figures) alongside independent observers. Convergent accounts from rival factions provide stronger evidential grounds. We actively solicited and incorporated counter-narratives, particularly from Islamist bloc members (R3, R4, R7) who contested opposition characterisations of their policies. Finally, while we entered the field with theoretical expectations drawn from the transition literature, our analysis remained open to unexpected findings, and the specific causal mechanisms we identified emerged from iterative engagement with the data rather than being imposed a priori.
An overview of the GNC (2012–2014)
In July 2012, Libya held its first national election, intended to establish the GNC as the country’s transitional legislative body (Mezran and Knecht Reference Mezran and Knecht2014). There was an Islamist majority in the GNC, while non-Islamists, such as liberals and regionalists, formed the opposition (Pack and Cook Reference Pack and Cook2015). The GNC was tasked with forming a government, drafting a constitution and guiding Libya through its transitional period (Sawani Reference Sawani2018a). Disputes quickly arose within the GNC over key issues, including the constitutional drafting process, security policies and resource distribution, with no consensus reached between the Islamist majority and the opposition factions (Eriksson Reference Eriksson2015). What began as political competition within a democratic framework soon transformed the GNC from a potential stabilising force into an active participant in Libya’s internal strife (Sawani Reference Sawani2024).
The transition proved turbulent as the GNC struggled to consolidate power and foster national unity amid the fractured socio-political landscape left by the uprising. Regional rivalries and the rapid proliferation of non-state armed groups further complicated governance, undermining efforts to centralise authority and stabilise the country (Carboni and Moody Reference Carboni and Moody2020). This fragile governance was further weakened by a deteriorating security environment in which dozens of politically motivated assassinations occurred between 2012 and 2014, targeting political figures, judges, security officials and activists, particularly in Benghazi and eastern Libya (Human Rights Watch 2013).
The 200-member GNC was characterised by a deeply polarised political landscape. The Islamist factions, most notably the JCP and allied independent Islamists, formed a dominant bloc within the legislature (Pack and Cook Reference Pack and Cook2015; Sawani Reference Sawani2018a). The opposition comprised liberal, nationalist and regional actors, including members affiliated with the former regime (Jalu Reference Jalu2017). Among these, the NFA, led by former interim Prime Minister Mahmoud Jibril, emerged as the primary liberal party within the GNC, advocating for civic governance and opposing the Islamist political ascendancy. Jibril had served in senior positions under Gaddafi’s regime before joining the 2011 revolution (Tempelhof and Omar Reference Tempelhof and Omar2012). Representatives from eastern Libya (Cyrenaica) and other local factions contributed a fragmented yet vocal counterbalance to the Islamist majority (Sawani and Pack Reference Sawani and Pack2013). In May 2013, the GNC passed the Political Isolation Law (PIL), barring anyone who had held senior positions under Gaddafi’s regime from public office for ten years, thereby directly targeting prominent opposition figures including Jibril (Kersten Reference Kersten2014). The law’s passage was deeply controversial, occurring amid pressure from armed revolutionary brigades who surrounded the parliament building to force the vote (Fitzgerald Reference Fitzgerald, Cole and McQuinn2015).
Libya’s domestic political dynamics during this period were shaped by external intervention. Regional powers backed competing factions, turning Libya’s transition into a theatre of proxy competition (Mezran and Varvelli Reference Mezran, Varvelli, Mezran and Varvelli2017). For example, Qatar and Turkey supported pro-uprising and Islamist factions, while Egypt and the United Arab Emirates backed opposition forces, including former Gaddafi-affiliated elements and eastern regionalist groups. This external backing emboldened both sides in their confrontational strategies and reduced the incentive to find parliamentary compromise (Zambakari Reference Zambakari2016). These dynamics meant that domestic political strategies, including those of the parliamentary opposition, operated within – and were conditioned by – a broader regional contest for influence over Libya’s post-Gaddafi trajectory.
From its inception, the GNC represented a battleground for competing visions of Libya’s future rather than functioning as a forum for consensus-building. The PIL intensified these divisions, as opposition factions interpreted it as political retribution disguised as transitional justice (Ibrahim Reference Ibrahim2020). Fundamental disagreements over security and governance paralysed the assembly. Two key areas of conflict intensified the divisions: security policies and constitutional arrangements. On the former, deep disagreements arose over the criteria for unifying Libya’s fragmented security forces and integrating the revolutionary brigades into the official security apparatuses (Jeursen and van der Borgh Reference Jeursen and van der Borgh2014). The Islamist majority favoured incorporating the revolutionary brigades, viewing them as legitimate protectors of the revolution. In contrast, opposition factions advocated for stricter requirements, expressing concern about the ideological affiliation of many of the revolutionary armed groups (Pack and Cook Reference Pack and Cook2015). This disagreement prevented the establishment of unified national security forces, leaving Libya vulnerable to armed group proliferation and deteriorating security conditions (Ali Reference Ali2025).
The second major point of contention centred around the constitutional drafting process. Liberal factions were concerned that the Islamist-dominated GNC would shape the constitution to favour Islamist political interests, sidelining secular principles. At the same time, regional factions, particularly from Cyrenaica in eastern Libya, opposed perceived attempts by the Islamist majority to recentralise power in Tripoli, a move reminiscent of Gaddafi’s authoritarian governance (DeVore Reference DeVore2014; Sawani and Pack Reference Sawani and Pack2013). Eastern representatives, concerned about being marginalised within the new political order, advocated for a federal or decentralised system in the new constitution to secure significant regional autonomy and a fair distribution of oil revenues, most of which were generated in the east (Sawani and Pack Reference Sawani and Pack2013; Wehrey Reference Wehrey2014). However, the Islamist majority resisted this approach; the Grand Mufti, Libya’s senior religious authority, viewed federalism as a threat to national unity.
The GNC’s internal polarisation ultimately precipitated a security and institutional collapse. The security landscape deteriorated dramatically when Operation Dignity, launched by Marshal Khalifa Haftar, began in Benghazi in May 2014, just one month before scheduled elections, ostensibly targeting Islamist militants but effectively challenging the GNC’s authority (Mezran and Miller Reference Mezran and Miller2018). This military campaign triggered countermeasures from Islamist-aligned forces, soon escalating into a major internal conflict. The constitutional drafting process crumbled as the proposed constitution was accused of being excessively centralised and Islamist-oriented, further inflaming regional and ideological tensions. These parallel crises created insurmountable institutional challenges, ultimately leading to Libya’s political fragmentation (Lacher Reference Lacher2020). By 2014, the GNC had become effectively paralysed by these factional disputes, leaving it unable to address Libya’s deteriorating security situation or advance the constitutional process, and, as a consequence, fuelling public disillusionment with the transition process.
Understanding the parliamentary opposition strategies in Libya
This section examines how opposition strategies shaped Libya’s political transition during the GNC period (2012–2014). It analyses two interconnected strategies that, while targeting different domains, combined to produce a cascading failure of Libya’s democratic transition. The demonisation strategy systematically framed Islamist GNC members as security threats, escalating political conflict into armed confrontation and generating deep societal divisions. Simultaneously, the obstruction strategy used procedural delays and challenges to legitimacy to block constitutional progress, causing institutional paralysis and raising competing claims to authority. Figure 1 provides an overview of these opposition strategies, mapping their distinct mechanisms and interactive effects. These strategies operated together: security framing justified armed intervention that undermined the political process, while constitutional obstruction created legitimacy vacuums that armed actors exploited to advance their agendas. By tracing these causal pathways, we show how opposition strategies, while intended to counter Islamist influence, actually contributed to destabilising dynamics wherein affective polarisation and institutional fragmentation reinforced each other alongside broader structural and external factors, culminating in parallel governance structures and armed conflict as the primary mode of political contestation.
An Overview of Opposition Strategies
Demonisation strategy
The demonisation strategy transformed Libya’s political landscape from one of democratic contestation to armed conflict. By leveraging security narratives, opposition actors systematically portrayed the Islamist majority as a danger to national stability and security, contributing to a violent outcome. This demonisation was fuelled by concrete grievances, particularly the May 2013 PIL, which opposition forces cited as evidence that the Islamist majority would use democratic institutions to pursue exclusionary agendas while relying on armed militias to enforce their will.
Cause: security framing
Security framing triggered the causal pathway. It involved portraying Islamist GNC members as an existential threat to Libya’s transition. This framing was evident in parliamentary debates on security policy, in which opposition representatives linked Islamist GNC members to extremist groups operating in eastern Libya, despite limited evidence for this accusation (Lacher Reference Lacher2020). This pattern aligns with research on political polarisation in transitional contexts, showing how opposition actors try to delegitimise elected governments by framing them as an existential threat rather than legitimate competitors (Bermeo Reference Bermeo2020).
This strategy transformed political disagreements into perceived threats to state survival, justifying extraordinary measures up to and including armed conflict. The framing gained potency amid widespread violence, with dozens of targeted assassinations between 2012 and 2014, which opposition forces cited as evidence that the Islamist majority could not or would not confront extremist groups (Willcoxon Reference Willcoxon2018). The literature on Libya’s post-Gaddafi transition shows how political competition became securitised, with rival factions framing one another as threats to national stability (Lacher and Al-Idrissi Reference Lacher and Al-Idrissi2018; Wehrey Reference Wehrey2014). This discourse was prominent within the parliamentary opposition, which viewed the Islamist bloc as complicit in instability. As R6, an opposition member, explained: ‘many of us saw a clear pattern: Islamist members repeatedly blocked reforms that could have strengthened the national army or curbed militia influence. Their refusal to rein in armed groups was seen as implicit support, or at least as a willingness to tolerate their actions’. R2 reinforced this view:
We believed there was an ideological alignment between the Islamist majority in parliament and militant groups in Benghazi. They consistently blocked security reforms that would have targeted these extremists. Moreover, many Islamist members leaned towards these armed groups, providing them with legal cover under the pretext of revolutionary legitimacy.
The opposition’s securitisation framing was reinforced by the widespread assassination campaign targeting judges, activists, military officers and political figures. Some testimonies (R2, R6, R13) acknowledged that these killings intensified the climate of suspicion and provided opposition forces with tangible evidence supporting their claims about the GNC’s security failures.
In contrast, interviewees R3, R4 and R7 offered a different perspective, asserting that the Islamist members were actually primarily focused on proposing solutions to integrate revolutionary fighters into the official security forces. Emphasising that their approach aimed to manage security issues from an institutional perspective, rather than being driven by ideological affiliations, R3 stated that:
We believed that integrating revolutionaries into the security apparatus was the best way to ensure a smoother transition. This aligned with Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) efforts. The aim was to build a unified security sector capable of holding the country together during a volatile transition.
R4 elaborated on this, highlighting that:
Our policy focused on gradual integration, training, and rehabilitation; standard DDR practices implemented in post-conflict environments worldwide. We consulted with international experts on DDR programmes in comparable contexts and designed our proposals based on evidence-based approaches.
The integration of revolutionary brigades into formal security structures was indeed a recognised policy option during Libya’s transition, though it remained controversial among different political factions (Lacher and Cole Reference Lacher and Cole2014). This approach took the view that the revolutionary fighters had played a crucial role in the overthrow of the Gaddafi regime and hence their integration into formal security structures was essential for long-term stability. By advocating for DDR, the Islamist bloc aimed to transform former combatants into constructive members of society, thereby reducing the potential for violence and fostering a sense of national unity. As R3 explained,
Our goal was to stabilise the country by formalising these groups within a legitimate framework. We were advocating for a realistic transition process that acknowledged the revolutionary forces’ legitimate role in overthrowing Gaddafi and their potential contribution to Libya’s security architecture. In addition, we were seeking institutional solutions to a complex post-revolutionary landscape, not pursuing some hidden agenda to empower extremists, as the opposition repeatedly claimed.
R7 further substantiated this point:
We knew the revolutionaries couldn’t be excluded overnight. The goal was to transform them into legitimate actors within a state framework. We advocated for institutional pathways, not ideological dominance, contrary to what the opposition claimed in the media and parliament.
The security-framing trigger extended beyond parliamentary chambers into the media discourse, where opposition-aligned outlets systematically amplified threat narratives to create a climate of fear and urgency to justify extraordinary political measures. R19, a minister during the 2012–2014 period, reflected on how polarisation escalated: ‘it started with rhetoric in parliament and the media but soon crossed into real-world consequences. The security rhetoric had poisoned everything, colleagues who had worked together for months suddenly saw each other as enemies’.
Opposition-aligned outlets regularly characterised Islamist politicians’ resistance to certain security reforms as tacit support for extremism. This strategic amplification of security concerns served as a critical trigger that prepared the ground for subsequent armed mobilisation. As R5, a media activist and editor, noted:
The narrative was powerful, that Islamists in the GNC were systematically undermining the state’s security apparatus to advance an ideological agenda. This messaging resonated deeply with segments of the population already distrustful of Islamist politics.
In El-Aradi’s work, Libya Dawn Operation: Its Precursors and Contexts, he highlights an interview with civil society activist Hisham Wandi, who noted that a satellite TV channel, The International Libya Channel, was a prominent anti-Islamist media outlet affiliated with liberal factions within the GNC. This channel played a pivotal role in framing the Islamist majority as a national security threat, accusing them of undermining the public interest. Wandi emphasised that the channel’s programming was crafted to heighten public fears, portraying the Islamists as blocking Libya’s progress and stability (El-Aradi 2021).
Mobilising armed groups
This security framing contributed to transforming political opposition into armed resistance based on the security threat narrative. By consistently characterising Islamists as security threats, opposition leaders tried to justify the positioning of non-state armed groups as legitimate protectors against this perceived danger. As the narrative of Islamist affiliation with militant groups gained traction, opposition figures began to actively seek alliances with armed factions, particularly in eastern Libya. The portrayal of Islamists as aligned with extremists became a rallying point for mobilising militias. This process intensified as opposition leaders presented armed action as necessary to protect Libya’s sovereignty and stability (Sawani Reference Sawani2018b). A former armed group commander (R8) described how political figures approached his faction in early 2014:
Opposition figures approached us, warning that Islamists in control of parliament were aligned with extremist groups and posed an existential threat to the country. They insisted that political processes alone were insufficient, claiming the Islamists were actively weakening the state to empower militants. Armed resistance, they argued, was the only way to restore security in the East.
This mobilisation against Islamist influence reached a critical juncture in May 2014, when Khalifa Haftar launched Operation Dignity. Framed as a military campaign aiming to eliminate Islamist militias from Benghazi, the operation also represented an armed challenge to the GNC’s authority (Gartenstein-Ross and Barr Reference Gartenstein-Ross and Barr2022). Initially presented as a counterterrorism effort, it quickly garnered support from opposition politicians who had consistently portrayed the Islamist majority as a security threat. R12, a former independent GNC member, reflected on the shift:
There was a growing perception, fed by months of political tension, that the Islamist bloc was obstructing security reform and tolerating armed groups. When Haftar launched his campaign, some viewed it as a response to perceived threat. For those already alarmed, the operation didn’t come out of nowhere, it felt like a continuation of the warnings that had been circulating inside and outside parliament.
The eruption of armed conflict
The transformation from political mobilisation to armed confrontation occurred in May 2014. By this point, dozens of political assassinations had convinced many that parliamentary procedures were insufficient to address Libya’s security crisis (Willcoxon Reference Willcoxon2018). On 16 May 2014, Khalifa Haftar, backed by elements of the former Libyan army, launched a military campaign targeting Islamist militants in the East while challenging the GNC’s authority (Portela and Romanet Perroux Reference Portela and Romanet Perroux2022). Declaring his forces the sole legitimate military structure, Haftar’s intervention marked the decisive moment when political opposition was superseded by military confrontation (Gartenstein-Ross and Barr, Reference Gartenstein-Ross and Barr2022).
As Operation Dignity gained momentum, several non-state armed groups from the eastern region declared allegiance to Haftar’s campaign. Their leaders echoed the narrative advanced by opposition politicians, claiming that their actions were essential steps to rescue Libya from alleged Islamist domination. This alignment of armed groups under a unified anti-Islamist banner was a critical escalation, as fragmented militia activity became a coordinated military campaign targeting democratically elected institutions. This rhetoric resonated strongly in the city of Benghazi, where opposition-aligned local leaders had long expressed fears about centralisation and Islamist control. A civil society organisation leader from Benghazi (R1) reflected on the atmosphere:
People were scared. There was a feeling that the city was slipping out of control, and the GNC was doing nothing about it. When Haftar made his move, many saw it as a liberation effort. It wasn’t just about fighting armed groups; it was about reclaiming the city from Islamist influence. Opposition politicians fuelled this sentiment by constantly reminding people that the GNC was protecting those who threatened our way of life.
The alignment between the political opposition and armed factions marked a significant transformation, as opposition strategies evolved from parliamentary resistance to engaging in direct military confrontation. The perception that Islamist GNC members were enabling extremist violence was used as justification for this shift. Consequently, what began as a political struggle within the GNC escalated into a full-fledged armed conflict, pitting Haftar’s forces and allied militias against Islamist factions and their supporters. The framing of Islamists as an existential threat justified Operation Dignity and set the stage for long-term conflict and the fragmentation of Libya’s political and security sectors. As Haftar’s campaign unfolded, it entrenched divisions, polarised political discourse and solidified the opposition’s narrative that Islamist influence within the GNC-warranted military resistance.
Outcome: affective polarisation
The result of all these developments was ‘affective polarisation’, where political differences transformed into deeply emotional social divisions. This polarisation peaked when Islamist-aligned groups responded to Operation Dignity with their own counter-operation (Libya’s Dawn) in July 2014, plunging the country into full-scale civil war (Eriksson Reference Eriksson2015). R9 explained:
What began as political opposition within democratic institutions evolved into armed confrontation that made democratic consensus impossible. The security framing that started in parliament ultimately justified military action that destroyed the democratic transition. Once Haftar launched Operation Dignity, there was no turning back to institutional politics.
By mid-2014, Libya’s political crisis had escalated into a deeply fractured societal conflict. The GNC’s internal polarisation spilled into society, with media outlets, militias and communities aligning along ideological and regional lines (Cole and McQuinn Reference Cole and McQuinn2015; Portela and Romanet Perroux Reference Portela and Romanet Perroux2022). In Tripoli, neighbourhoods that had coexisted for decades erected checkpoints against each other, while in Benghazi, the conflict descended into street-by-street urban warfare that destroyed entire districts (Lacher Reference Lacher2020; Wehrey Reference Wehrey2014).
Overall, the demonisation strategy succeeded in mobilising armed opposition against the Islamist majority, but by doing so also contributed to fracturing Libyan society along deep ideological and regional lines. By systematically portraying Islamist GNC members as existential threats, opposition forces transformed political differences into emotional social divisions, creating profound affective polarisation. When Operation Dignity and then Libya’s Dawn were launched in 2014, these divisions crystallised into armed camps, with communities, tribes and regions choosing sides.
To assess the significance of this pathway, it is important to consider a counterfactual possibility. Had the opposition adopted a cooperative rather than a demonising security framing, the mobilisation of non-state armed groups against Islamist GNC members would have been considerably harder to justify. Without a sustained narrative portraying Islamist parliamentarians as complicit in extremist violence, Haftar’s Operation Dignity would have lacked the legitimating scaffold that presented it to domestic and international audiences as a security operation rather than a coup attempt. This does not mean the transition would necessarily have succeeded, as structural problems including militia proliferation, external intervention and institutional weakness were already severe, but the pathway to armed confrontation would have been less direct and rapid.
Obstruction strategy
This strategy focused on undermining constitutional processes and institutional legitimacy. Fearing an Islamist-influenced constitution, regional factions sought to influence the GNC’s authority to draft a new constitution (Geha and Volpi Reference Geha and Volpi2016). Similarly, liberal factions worried that an Islamist-led GNC would produce an illiberal constitution affecting civil liberties (Pack and Cook Reference Pack and Cook2015). Opposition obstructionism was partly reactive, especially among members within the GNC aligned to the former regime, and it intensified significantly after May 2013, when the PIL demonstrated that the Islamist majority could use its numerical advantage to pass exclusionary legislation under militia pressure (Kersten Reference Kersten2014). By employing procedural tactics and contesting legitimacy, these factions aimed to derail the constitutional process, resulting in considerable institutional fragmentation.
Cause: constitutional blockage
The obstructionist pathway began with deliberate constitutional blockage, as opposition representatives within the GNC systematically employed procedural tactics to obstruct progress on drafting the constitution. This obstruction manifested in two forms: delaying the formation and operation of the Constitutional Drafting Assembly (CDA) and hindering a constitutional referendum in eastern Libya, where demands for federalism were strongest (Pack and Cook Reference Pack and Cook2015). Both forms of obstruction were driven by deep-seated fears that an Islamist-influenced constitution would erode secular governance principles and marginalise critical regional interests (Geha and Volpi Reference Geha and Volpi2016; Khafaga Reference Khafaga, Fombad and Steytler2025).
Regional factions, particularly those representing Cyrenaica in eastern Libya, proved most active in impeding constitutional development. Their primary concerns centred on securing federalism or significant decentralisation that would guarantee the eastern regions’ control over natural resources along with political autonomy (Schnelzer Reference Schnelzer2015). This was particularly evident in debates over CDA selection. Opposition members insisted on direct elections rather than GNC appointments, significantly delaying the constitutional process. A former GNC member representing Cyrenaica(R4) explained:
For us, this wasn’t about mere procedural disruption, it was about existential regional rights. We witnessed how the constitutional drafting process was being steered towards a centralised model that would perpetuate. Our objections aimed at protecting Cyrenaica from being permanently marginalised in the new Libya as it was under Gaddafi rule. We couldn’t allow a constitutional process controlled by Islamists and western regions to determine our future.
According to R10, a former minister: ‘While direct elections for the constitutional assembly might seem more democratic in principle, in Libya’s fragile context, this demand was strategically calculated to delay the process, knowing the immense logistical challenges elections would entail’. R11 emphasised that:
We were not just opposing the Islamist bloc within the GNC; we were fighting for our right to self-determination. A constitution that does not reflect the voices of all regions is a recipe for disaster. Our demands were based on legitimate concerns about how resource distribution, political representation and administrative authority would be structured in the new constitution.
Even after the CDA was elected, regionalist factions and their affiliated armed groups, led by Khalifa Haftar, refused to allow a referendum on the constitutional draft in the Cyrenaica region. They claimed that the proposed constitution fundamentally contradicted their demands for regional autonomy and governance, resonating with many Libyans who felt that their regional identities risked being overshadowed by centralised authority (Hüsken Reference Hüsken, Bouziane, Harders and Hoffmann2013). Likewise, the liberal factions expressed fears regarding the constitution being drafted under the Islamist-led GNC. As R13 stated:
In the National Alliance, we feared that an Islamist-dominated assembly would push a constitution shaped by a narrow ideological agenda. We worried it could erode civil liberties and pave the way for illiberal governance. We sought procedural safeguards to prevent a rushed constitution that might establish a theocratic rather than a democratic framework.
These testimonies illustrate how opposition factions saw the constitutional process as a battleground where the future character of the Libyan state was to be decided. For both regionalist and liberal opposition factions, the stakes extended beyond procedural concerns to cover existential questions about state structure, civil liberties and political inclusion. Regionalist actors feared the entrenchment of centralised power at the expense of Cyrenaica’s autonomy, while liberal factions worried that Islamist influence would yield a constitution that undermined democratic and secular principles.
Legitimacy contestation
The first step of the obstruction strategy was the broader contestation of the GNC’s institutional authority to oversee constitutional development. Opposition groups increasingly accused the GNC of exceeding its mandate and lacking the legitimacy to guide constitutional processes. This legitimacy contestation intensified when the GNC’s original mandate approached its proposed expiration date in February 2014. Opposition representatives began to publicly question the GNC’s continued authority, despite legal arguments supporting an extended transition period (Kekilli Reference Kekilli2017).
One interviewee explicitly argued that the ‘opposition’s narrative shifted from criticising specific constitutional provisions to challenging whether the GNC had any legitimate right to be involved in the process at all’ (R16). The regionalist factions were particularly vocal in this regard, arguing that the GNC’s authority was illegitimate, and that it failed to represent the diverse interests of Libya’s regions. As a civil society activist (R15) put it:
The GNC’s continued operation beyond its original mandate was viewed as an illegitimate power grab. When an institution dominated by western Libya and Islamist factions extends its authority unilaterally, we in the eastern region perceived this as a continuation of historical marginalisation. We began advocating for new elections because we saw the GNC as fundamentally compromised, not just ideologically but geographically.
Institutional fragmentation
By early 2014, opposition representatives had begun advocating for alternative political structures outside the GNC framework. This culminated in June 2014 with elections for a new House of Representatives (HoR), while constitutional questions remained unresolved (Sawani Reference Sawani2024). One interviewee (R18) observed the following: ‘the opposition’s legitimacy contestation created a situation where Libyans went to the polls for a new parliament without constitutional clarity about the relationship between institutions or their respective powers’.
When the election results favoured opposition groups, the HoR relocated to Tobruk, while Islamist factions revived the GNC in Tripoli, creating parallel institutions which each claimed sovereign authority (Jalu Reference Jalu2017). R18 explained that:
The constitutional obstruction ultimately produced a divided institutional landscape, undermining any unified governing structure. By preventing constitutional consensus when they were in opposition, these groups undermined the very framework needed for stable governance when they gained electoral advantage.
This institutional fragmentation proved catastrophic for Libya’s transition, as the country effectively split between competing governance structures, both claiming constitutional legitimacy (Toaldo Reference Toaldo and Dworkin2016; Wehrey Reference Wehrey2014). Arguing along similar lines, R17 stated that:
The opposition’s obstruction strategy created a constitutional vacuum that allowed competing claims to legitimacy, making institutional coherence impossible and ultimately facilitating the country’s political division. Without clear constitutional provisions governing the transition of power or institutional relationships, both sides could make plausible claims to legitimacy.
The parliamentary opposition’s strategies, which aimed to prevent what were perceived as negative constitutional outcomes, ultimately produced far worse consequences, as they contributed to the fragmentation of Libya’s governance structure and the creation of conditions for a prolonged civil conflict. What began as expressing legitimate concerns about regional representation and checks on majority power evolved into tactics that fundamentally undermined the constitutional foundation necessary for democratic consolidation.
Outcome: parallel governance
The ultimate outcome of the obstruction strategy was the establishment of parallel governance structures that have since fundamentally undermined Libya’s democratic transition and state coherence. This fragmentation manifested across multiple dimensions – political, institutional and territorial – producing a durable configuration of competing centres of power that continues to shape Libya’s political landscape (Romanet Perroux Reference Romanet Perroux2019). The failure to establish constitutional consensus resulted in the emergence of dual governmental structures, each claiming legitimate authority over the Libyan state. The HoR in Tobruk, backed by eastern regional groups and supported by Haftar’s Libyan National Army, positioned itself as the legitimate continuation of Libya’s transitional government. Simultaneously, the revived GNC in Tripoli, later rebranded as the Government of National Accord, maintained its claim to constitutional legitimacy based on the original transition framework (Lacher Reference Lacher2020; Portela and Romanet Perroux Reference Portela and Romanet Perroux2022). These parallel governance structures quickly aligned with territorial divisions, reflecting the underlying regional tensions that had driven the original obstruction. Eastern Libya, centred around Benghazi and Tobruk, became the stronghold of the HoR and associated military forces, while western Libya, including Tripoli, remained under the control of GNC successor institutions and allied militias (Carboni and Moody Reference Carboni and Moody2020).
The institutional division accelerated the division of Libya’s security apparatus, as different armed groups aligned with competing governmental structures. Rather than creating unified security institutions under democratic oversight, the parallel governance system incentivised militias to choose sides in the broader political conflict. This militarisation of political competition transformed constitutional disagreements into armed confrontation, making peaceful resolution increasingly difficult as each side accumulated military capabilities to defend its claims to legitimacy (Akamo Reference Akamo2022; Feliu and Aarab Reference Feliu and Aarab2019; Romanet Perroux Reference Romanet Perroux2019). The resulting institutional fragmentation, territorial division and militarised competition have created conditions in which any form of democratic governance is very difficult to establish or maintain.
The counterfactual possibility here is more complex than for demonisation. Had the opposition not obstructed the constitutional process, an Islamist-led constitution produced without sustained opposition engagement would have risked enshrining provisions going against liberal democratic principles. The more precise claim made in this paper is that the specific form obstruction took in Libya – a systematic delegitimisation of the GNC’s constitutional authority combined with a lack of procedural consensus – blocked the negotiated compromise that characterised successful transitions elsewhere. Had opposition actors engaged substantively with drafting the constitution while advocating for minority protections and regional safeguards, constitutional paralysis and the emergence of competing parallel institutions could plausibly have been avoided or delayed. The obstruction strategy, therefore, did not simply increase the risk of failure in an already overdetermined situation; rather, it shaped the specific form that failure took, producing durable institutional fragmentation rather than a temporary, reversible political setback.
Conclusion
This article has explained how the strategies used by the parliamentary opposition against the Islamist majority in Libya’s first elected parliament contributed to the failure of the country’s democratic transition. Our analysis traced the causal pathways to destabilisation, linking the opposition’s demonisation and obstruction strategies to affective polarisation and institutional fragmentation, while acknowledging that these pathways operated within a broader causal configuration. By turning political contestation into a securitised conflict and blocking any constitutional consensus, these actions narrowed the room for peaceful engagement. The breakdown of institutional boundaries and the rise of affective polarisation further entrenched distrust and made a democratic transition far less likely.
Our findings show that the demonisation strategy, characterised by security framing and mobilisation against Islamist GNC members, transformed political competition into armed confrontation. Critical events such as the 2013 PIL – which excluded prominent opposition figures from political participation under militia pressure – heightened and validated opposition concerns about Islamist intentions and intensified the security threat narrative. By consistently portraying Islamist parliamentarians as an existential threat to national security, opposition factions fuelled fear and hostility that were used to legitimise military escalation. This strategy did not merely catalyse armed conflict but also produced affective polarisation: political rivalries hardened into emotional and social divisions that undermined trust, mutual recognition and the possibility of compromise within democratic institutions. Simultaneously, the obstruction strategy, involving constitutional blockage and contestation of legitimacy, prevented the development of a consensual constitutional framework. Regional factions feared that centralisation would marginalise their interests, while liberal opposition groups worried about the possible Islamist erosion of civil liberties. These fears translated into sustained institutional paralysis and contributed to the formation of parallel governance structures with competing claims to legitimacy.
These findings contribute to democratic transition theory by challenging the conventional focus on elite consensus and institutional design. While the existing literature emphasises the importance of elite accommodation and pact-making between incumbents and opposition groups, this analysis demonstrates that opposition strategies themselves can be significant factors in shaping transition outcomes, and that they are capable of altering the form and trajectory of failure even in structurally constrained settings. This shifts analytical attention from what elites agree upon to how they compete, revealing that the manner of political contestation may be just as important as its content for democratic consolidation. For scholars of democratisation, these results highlight the need to reconceptualise opposition behaviour as a critical variable in transition analysis. Rather than treating opposition actors as passive respondents, our findings suggest that they can be active agents whose strategic choices shape democratic outcomes. This has important implications for how we theorise democratic breakdown. Transitions may fail due to opposition strategies that inadvertently undermine the democratic process that opposition actors seek to influence, as well as due to authoritarian reversals or institutional weaknesses.
The generalisability of these findings extends beyond Libya to other contexts characterised by deep ideological divisions and weak institutional frameworks. The mechanisms we identify above – specifically, how securitisation discourse transforms political competition into existential conflict and how institutional obstruction creates parallel governance structures – are observable across transitional settings. These patterns are particularly relevant in understanding democratic breakdowns in other polarised societies such as Venezuela and Egypt, where similar dynamics of demonisation and obstruction have undermined democratic institutions.
While our analysis focuses on parliamentary opposition strategies as an under-studied contributing factor, we recognise that the failure of Libya’s transition resulted from multiple interacting causes operating at different levels. Our findings do not seek to replace existing explanations emphasising structural conditions, militia dynamics or external intervention; rather, they complement these accounts by demonstrating how opposition agency within transitional institutions shaped the trajectory towards collapse. We believe that such details contribute to painting a more accurate picture. The causal pathways we traced here – from security framing to armed mobilisation and from constitutional obstruction to institutional fragmentation – operated alongside and interacted with broader structural and international factors. Future research can extend this analysis by examining how these dynamics manifest in other transitional contexts. Comparative studies of successful transitions could aim to identify opposition strategies that constrain majority power without undermining democratic institutions.
Supplementary material
The supplementary material for this article can be found at https://doi.org/10.1017/gov.2026.10059.
Financial support
This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial or not-for-profit sectors.
Ethics statement
The research using human subjects has been approved by the University of Glasgow.
Disclosure statement
The authors report that there are no competing interests to declare.
Appendix. Interviewee Profiles
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