Ayesha Jalal is among the best-known historians of Pakistan working today. As she explains in the preface to her new history of Pakistan, the writing of this book was prompted by her sense that, after having completed a series of important books on aspects of Pakistan's history, “the time had come to write a definitive history of Pakistan in a changing global context” (p. x).
The strength of the book lies in its fluid narrative style and in the way that it builds on arguments developed in Jalal's earlier published works. This is particularly evident in the first half of the book. Themes from Jalal's The Sole Spokesman (on Jinnah and the Pakistan movement) and The State of Martial Rule (on the rise of military domination in Pakistan in the decade after partition) dominate the early framing of Jalal's narrative of Pakistan's history.Footnote 16 Central to her story is the deep tension between center and provinces (that eventually led to united Pakistan's break-up in 1971), and the rise of the army as an inescapable presence in Pakistan's politics (even in eras of ostensibly democratic governance). Both of these, as she argues, had their roots in the intersections of imperial politics and worldwide geopolitics marking the end of the British Raj and the beginning of the Cold War in the 1940s and 1950s.
As Jalal shows convincingly, Pakistan emerged as an independent state amidst the complex pressures of colonial devolution—which opened the door to the assertion of Jinnah's “two-nation theory,” even as it marked out the provinces of India as the dominant containers of Muslim politics. The independent territorial state that emerged from these pressures in 1947, split into two wings, was hardly the Pakistan of Jinnah's imagining, and the consequences of this bore heavily on the fragile character of central power—and the attendant suspicion of provincial politics—that marked Pakistan's politics from the beginning. This was reflected too in the insecurities that shaped Pakistan's relations with India, and which led early on to the dominance of the military as the new state searched for security within the emerging pressures of the Cold War. Religion, as Jalal argues clearly, was never in these circumstances an independent frame for Pakistani identity or state-building. It was rather a language used by a variety of political players to attempt to advance their own interests.
These basic themes continue to underlie much of Jalal's narrative, even in the years after Pakistan's break-up in 1971. Jalal follows the story through the Bhutto and Zia years, through the return to competitive elections in the late 1980s and the 1990s, and through the Musharraf dictatorship to the “entangled endgames” that led up to the present. Here there is less originality of interpretation than is to be found in the early part of Jalal's story, but Jalal shows continuing narrative skill in assimilating new internal and international developments into a story that continues to revolve around the tensions between central domination and regional politics, on the one hand, and the ongoing and ramifying roles of the military (including the Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence) in the wake of the Afghan war, on the other. Throughout, there remains a vision of Islam as far less of an autonomous force in driving Pakistan's history than a language manipulated by a range of competing international powers and internal groups. Jalal takes us beneath the well-known headlines on key events in Pakistan to provide insight into underlying conflicts and causes.
If there is a significant limitation in the book, it is that its narrative is a relentlessly political one, with an overwhelming focus on the Pakistani state as the fulcrum for understanding Pakistan's history. This is not to say that Jalal ignores social and cultural history entirely. There are brief forays into popular culture and the arts, and a recognition, as she states in her epilogue, that the story of Pakistan's “dynamism” in a number of cultural fields, including “the creative arts,” is critical to taking stock of the country's recent history. She also notes briefly the important changes being wrought by economic and cultural globalization, and by twenty-first-century transformations in the media and in popular communications. “The burgeoning of a popular culture in the midst of state-sponsored Islamization and terrorism,” she thus notes, is one of Pakistan's most “remarkable” modern feats (p. 393).
But neither the arts, nor “popular culture,” nor changing social and economic structures, nor even popular religion are subjected to the sort of analysis that would be necessary to significantly integrate these realms into Jalal's larger narrative. Her overall assessment of Pakistan's story thus remains firmly cast within the frame of a largely statist (and geopolitical) narrative and the themes that have shaped it. It is in this context that her attempts at the end of the book to take stock of Pakistan's history—and to find some limited cause for optimism about its future—are constrained. The future prognosis for Pakistan, she declares in a striking circumlocution, “is not altogether hopeless” (p. 390). But she is able to offer relatively little concrete ground for speculation on new trajectories for Pakistan's history, precisely because the originality of her insights on Pakistan's early history are not matched by insights on its recent developments. While she effectively calls into question the journalistic conception of Pakistan as nothing but “an Islamic killing field” (p. 1), the book hardly offers a blueprint for a new, interpretive historiography of Pakistan. But her book will nevertheless take its place as one of the most readable narrative overviews of Pakistan's history that we have.
