Consociationalism, as a mechanism to promote interethnic peace and coexistence in deeply divided societies, has been widely debated since Arend Lijphart's pioneering work on democratic theory. Since the 1970s consociation theory has been revised, augmented, and restructured depending on its application to diverse cultures and societies. The many critics of consociation see it as retarding national integration or true democratization, and its advocates view it as a uniquely useful means to prevent civil strife, ethnic cleansing, and genocide. I must confess my own addiction to consociationism and belief in its continuing utility in the management of conflict in socially segmented societies. A recent exponent of consociation is Michael Kerr, author of this incisive study on power sharing in Northern Ireland and Lebanon.

Kerr's book combines theoretical depth with empirical analysis in comparing two different experiments in consociation—one grounded in Europe's democratic, stable, and secular milieu, and one set amid the Middle East's turbulent environment of clashing ideologies and social forces. He marshals a rich variety of primary and secondary sources on the two countries, including government archives, official publications, political memoirs, newspapers and periodicals, and over 125 interviews with key political leaders, ranking clerics, legislators, party officials, and journalists. To be sure, this opus is a labor of love for the author, who spares no effort in assessing the efficacy of consociation as a tool of conflict regulation. He argues that the consociational model cannot achieve long-term regulation of ethnonational conflicts unless external powers bring coercive pressure on the leaders of internal factions. Moreover, he asserts that consociation based on power-sharing arrangements cannot be sustained without the continued support of regional and international powers pursuing their national interests. He concludes that consociation does not provide long-term resolution of ethnic conflicts but only conflict regulation in stable political environments.

The book details the history and impact of colonial rule, the reasons for the failures of the 1943 Lebanese National Pact and the 1974 Sunnyvale Agreement in Northern Ireland, and the eventual imposition of power-sharing arrangements—the Good Friday Agreement (1998) and the Taʾif Agreement (1989). Thus, the success or failure of these agreements depended on the nature of relationships among the external actors and between them and internal elites.

The soundness of an analyst's prognostication ultimately depends on the unfolding of events. Kerr's optimism about the Good Friday Agreement was based on the positive nature of the developing interdependence among all internal and external elites and convergence of interests of the British and Irish governments that culminated in the April 2007 power-sharing compact, sixteen months after this book's publication. In contrast, Lebanon's consociation has degenerated into chaos due to the country's location near the epicenter of the Arab–Israeli conflict, amid the clashing interests of Syria, Israel, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United States.

This book has the added benefit of a foreword titled “The Realism of Power-Sharing,” by Brendan O'Leary, who presents a critical and concise overview of consociational theory and its evolution over several decades. He distinguishes between liberal consociation, as in Northern Ireland, where citizens can vote for any candidate or party, and corporate consociation, as in Lebanon, where voters are obliged to vote for the competing leaders of their own ethnic/religious communities. One might propose a third variant—hegemonial consociation—in which citizens vote for candidates belonging to various sectarian, tribal, or ideological groupings under the control of a strong regime that acts as an “umpire” to regulate the balance of power among the contending sides. This type of consociationalism is already observable in Kuwait, Jordan, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates. Its wider use could well bring greater stability to a number of deeply divided Middle Eastern, African, and Asian countries. One might dare to suggest that a variant of hegemonial consociation, if administered properly by a regional coalition including the neighboring states soon after the U.S.-led invasion in March 2003, could have prevented the Iraqi quagmire.

Kerr's book is a valuable contribution to the literature for its emphasis on the role of external powers in determining the outcome of power-sharing agreements and for its many original insights on the history and political dynamics of consociational rule in Lebanon and Northern Ireland. Moreover, this book demonstrates that despite its shortcomings, the consociational approach still remains a useful tool in the mitigation and management of internecine conflicts that could otherwise result in civil wars or genocidal atrocities. I recommend it to policy makers, comparativists focusing on segmented societies, Europeanists, Middle East specialists, college students, and the thinking public.