In the introduction W., the author of numerous articles on the late Republic and the Roman civil wars, promises ‘an essay in historiographical interpretation that explores the crisis of the late Republic as reflected in the testimony of one of the protagonists’ (p. ix). This strategy to employ Caesar's narrative to illuminate the socio-economic condition of the civil conflict-ridden late Republic leads to a fresh view of Caesar's much-studied text. Taking a more comprehensive approach rather than indulging in a close linguistic or thematic analysis, W. distinguishes his book from the recent ‘new wave’ of studies (among these are L. Grillo's The Art of Caesar's Bellum Civile [2012] and A. Peer's Julius Caesar's Bellum Civile and the Composition of a New Reality [2015]). By way of a wise selection of milestones, W. delivers a crisp and well-measured analysis of Caesar's narrative. Each of the various areas of Caesar's theatre of war, Italia, Hispania, Gallia, Africa, Macedonia, Asia and Aegyptus, is considered in a separate chapter, and the Civil War is employed as a compass that takes the reader to the different parts of the Mediterranean. Each carefully chosen highlight of the political and military crisis is discussed in terms of Caesar's strategies (in writing and in action) and of historical and geopolitical factors, in particular the importance of specific regions or cities.
Despite the eye-catching term ‘fabrication’ in the title and the emphasis on Caesar's mendacity throughout his study, W. offers a balanced view of Caesar's propagandistic agenda. Thus he remains true to his statement that ‘the fact that for Caesar historical truth is subordinate to other, political ends does not altogether vitiate his worth as a source’ (p. 44). Nevertheless, by exposing Caesar's strategy of omission and re-focusing, especially when employed to distract the reader's attention from the practicalities of war, such as fiscal matters, W. questions Caesar's own premise that ‘he came to give, not to take’ (p. 90) and reveals the need for money as a primary concern that Caesar purposefully disregards in his writings. This, W. argues, is an undercurrent that emerges most clearly to the surface in three cases in which the news of Caesar's arrival allegedly, in his own words, saves treasuries from falling into the hands of the enemy: the Sanctum Aerarium in Rome is abandoned by the consul Lentulus, money and offerings are restored at the sanctuary at Gades, the treasury at the temple of Artemis at Ephesus is saved from being plundered by Scipio and T. Ampius Balbus, both supporters of Pompey. In all cases, Caesar boasts that he saved the coffers, but remains less clear whether he made use of them to cover the huge expenses incurred by the war. Thus, W. traces the roots of these episodes to various mechanisms of money acquisition: Caesar's clientele at Gades, which he might have secured during his governorship there; the panegyrics by the people of Ephesus who feared that their collaboration with Pompey might be punished and therefore produced elaborate praise (and prize) for Caesar. Since the Aerarium was kept as a fund to save Rome from the Gallic menace, W. suggests that Caesar might have arrogantly reminded the Roman populace that he had just relieved them from it, a confident justification of appropriating the state funds noted by Appian (Civil Wars 2.41).
Two campaigns are also seen through the monetary prism: C. Scribonius Curio's defeat in Africa and Caesar's affairs in Egypt. Bypassing the pathos of the young commander's demise, W. argues that losing Africa meant that the grain supply was taken out of Caesar's hands, while the interest in Egypt is strongly connected to Caesar's alleged bankruptcy, attested by Pompey's claim (quoted by Suetonius) and the premise that Caesar's almost legendary wealth acquired in Gaul was an illusion. A survey of the history of relations between Ptolemy Auletes and Rome forms a substantial part of the chapter entitled ‘Aegyptus’ and exemplifies W.’s commendable objective to consider the detailed geopolitical context in order to clarify Caesar's actions in each region.
In the face of waging war, Caesar proclaimed his politics of clemency and agreement. W. accentuates the important implicit contrast between Caesar's conduct and that of Sulla. Caesar's sparing of Massilia (to which W. dedicates the chapter ‘Gallia’) and the treasury at Ephesus are seen as manifestations of his determination to distinguish himself from the man who destroyed Athens, penalised Asia and returned to Rome to rule by violence and proscriptions. Interestingly, W. interprets Pompey's manoeuvres along the eastern Adriatic coast as preparation for the invasion of Italy, which in all likelihood would have reprised that of Sulla. Such a view exemplifies W.’s even-handed treatment of Caesar and Pompey as contributors to the crisis of the late Republic.
The subject matter compels W. to engage with two important questions related to Caesar's aims and strategies as a writer, namely the issue of the seemingly abrupt ending of Book 3 and that of literary and historiographic sources. Regarding the former W. surmises that Caesar's overconfidence that M. Porcius Cato and Metellus Scipio could not offer resistance after Pompey's demise was the reason behind his decision to stop writing. The specialist reader might find this rather clear-cut explanation wanting of a deeper engagement with debates on writing and publication dates, which typically permeate studies of the Civil War, but W.’s hypothesis is credible and provides a valuable insight into how Caesar's writing could have been conditioned not only by his superior talent for self-promotion but also by political and military miscalculations.
Noteworthy are W.’s informed guesses about sources of material in Caesar's text as well as a number of other Caesar-related episodes not described in the Civil War. Curio's ill-fated campaign in Africa, occupying a substantial part of Book 2, is a case in point since Caesar was not physically present to witness the defeat (and possibly to avoid it). Theorising about possible sources which might have informed the narrative, W. brings out of oblivion the figures of the quaestor Marcius Rufus and the legate C. Caninius Rebilus, who were both accompanying Curio. He does not provide solid argumentation as to why Asinius Pollio, who was also present, should be ruled out as a possible source and accepts Rufus and Rebilus on the grounds of their Caesarean allegiance and the likelihood that they would report the events to Caesar.
Among the episodes not featured in Caesar's narrative but mentioned by the historiographical tradition is Caesar's attempt to cross the Adriatic, in a small boat, in order to lead in person the remaining part of the fleet, delayed in Italy. According to W., such behaviour verges on the incredible and could only be ascribed to Caesar by an enemy. The likely candidate T. Ampius Balbus is chosen because of his anti-Caesarean stance and known historiographical endeavours. Finally, regarding Caesar's visit to the ruins of Troy, an episode made famous by Lucan, W. argues that it is a product of the poet's own imagination since even enemies of the Caesarean cause such as T. Ampius Balbus and Cremutius Cordus should be ruled out as creating such an unflattering story.
As long as it is borne in mind that these claims, although plausible, are conjectural, the reader can benefit from a picture of a vibrant society where numerous written accounts about contemporary events circulated either as official reports or private papers, correspondence flourished and, importantly, where Caesar's narratives and viewpoints could be contested. This plurality of sources, which extends beyond the influence of Pollio, whose now lost contemporary history is usually seen as the source of many extant accounts, provide the reader with a better understanding of the political ties and enmities and their impact on the image of Caesar.
W.’s monograph is a valuable study of Caesar's Civil War in context and has the potential to appeal to both specialists and non-specialists alike. By considering Caesar's text against the backdrop of the socio-economic reality of war, W. contributes to its assessment as a vibrant and significant example of self-justification and propaganda. Maps, detailed indexes of ancient authors, persons, places, subjects, Greek and Latin words and expressions as well as a list of the properties of Cn. Pompeius Magnus furnish the book with useful reference material.
