On August 27, 2023, the Global Times, one of the most reputable Chinese newspapers, made a formal request to the British Museum to return all of the cultural artifacts that had been looted from China but have currently been stored in the Museum. Disputes over historically looted cultural property are not a new topic. Yet China's cases may not draw sufficient attention on the international stage. China is indeed a typical victim of a great deal of looting during a miserable century starting with the Opium War in 1840 until the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949. It is estimated that over ten million Chinese cultural artifacts were looted during this period. How did these art lootings occur in history? Where are the looted artifacts located right now? How do the Chinese government and population respond to the historical injustice? Could the Chinese government or other possible legitimate title-holders be entitled to make claims for the ownership or possession of the looted art? If so, could the claim be a legal claim of restitution or a mere moral claim of return? How do China's looted cases correspond with art plunders that occurred in other parts of the world in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries? Would a third approach appear to break the dilemma between restitution/return and retention?
The ASIL Interested Group-Cultural Heritage and the Arts organizes this session to invite several Chinese scholars specializing in the intersection of cultural heritage and international law to discuss the abovementioned issues.
The first speaker, Zhengxin Huo, provides a general illustration of the painful history of how China suffered the looting of cultural heritage in various means during 1840–1949, the government actions to regain lost treasures, and obstacles China has encountered, with a particular attention to legal arguments for the return of Chinese relics looted by Japan during the War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression.
The second speaker, Yue Zhang, presents a case study of the looting of China's Old Summer Palace by British and French armies at the end of Second Opium War, which has been deemed as a typical national shame among all the lootings occurred during 1840–1949. She discusses whether China is entitled to reclaim those cultural artifacts removed as spoils of war today by three questions: (1) Was there a rule that prohibited such art plunder in 1860s?; (2) Would that rule be applied to the Second Opium War considering the so-called standard of civilized nations?; (3) Would the passage of over one and a half centuries impair the claims for restitution today?
The third speaker, Jie (Jeanne) Huang, discusses the competing claims on underwater cultural heritage, with a particular focus on the areas of the South China Sea and along the Maritime Silk Road. This topic usually draws less attention compared with art plunder due to war or colonization, but remains significant for the large number of artifacts discovered underwater. Huang explores this issue from four aspects: (1) the scope of underwater cultural heritage under Chinese law; (2) their whereabouts and features; (3) China's reactions; and (4) the validity of China's claims to these artifacts.
The final speaker, Xuemei Yang, provides a case study on the digital sharing of the Dunhuang cultural relics overseas. The Dunhuang cultural relics represents a proud of Chinese ancient civilization witnessing the prosperity of China's ancient silk road. Yang first illustrates the discover of the “Library Cave” in Mogao Grottoes in 1900 and the disaster for the looting of those cultural relics by foreign scientific expedition teams afterward. She then presents various models wherein the Dunhuang Academy seeks cooperation with the British Museum and other collectors for establishing the databases of Dunhuang cultural relics and shares the progress they have achieved. Notedly, digital repatriation does not suggest in any means that China gives up its efforts for the material return of cultural heritage. Rather, Yang provides a case study to seek conversations and cooperation with museums and other institutions collecting those art plunders overseas as a new approach to ease the tensions between restitution/return and retention.
China, with its many centuries of high civilization, vast area, and large population is one of the richest sources of ancient cultural relics in the world. These cultural relics, with their tremendous amount and enormous variety, are the priceless treasuries of the Chinese people and part of the roots of the Chinese nation.
Unfortunately, since the mid-nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth century, countless Chinese cultural relics were looted by the invading forces of foreign powers when China was the plaything of the imperialist ambition, causing a catastrophic and irremediable loss to China's cultural heritage.Footnote 1 The Second Opium War (1856–1860),Footnote 2 the occupation of Beijing by the Eight Nation Alliance in 1900,Footnote 3 and the War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression (1931–1945), in particular, caused a large number of Chinese cultural relics to be plundered and lost overseas.
In August 2023, the Global Times, a leading Chinese newspaper published an editorial formally requesting the British Museum to return all Chinese cultural relics acquired through improper channels to China free of charge,Footnote 4 which attracted high attention both at home and abroad. In fact, the influence of this editorial was so significant that the American Society of International Law also took notice of this call and included “China's Looted Cultural Property: Historical Injustice and Current Dilemma” as one of the main themes of its 2024 Annual Meeting held in Washington DC.
As an invited participant, the author attended the forum and engaged in in-depth discussions with foreign counterparts. Needless to say, it was significant that the restitution of looted Chinese cultural property has eventually become a focal point of Western academic attention. However, there is still a long way to go before looted Chinese relics can be returned.
At present, international law poses serious challenges for China and other countries seeking restitution of their looted cultural property. As far as China is concerned, it has ratified the three most relevant conventions adopted after the end of World War II regarding restitution and return of cultural properties to their original nations. On September 25, 1989, the State Council, i.e., the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, accepted the Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property.Footnote 5 On May 7, 1997, the Chinese government deposited its instrument of accession to the Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects.Footnote 6 On October 31, 1999, the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress ratified the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict and its First Protocol and the Chinese government deposited its instrument of accession on January 5, 2000.Footnote 7 Therefore, these three conventions have been effective in China and have been exerting a significant role in the protection of cultural property and the prevention of illicit traffic. Despite their importance, they are of little use for China when requesting Western powers to return Chinese artifacts looted during wartime, as they do not have a retroactive effect.
On the domestic level, there are legal obstacles as well. Countries that have accumulated looted and stolen treasures have laws and legal institutions, such as limitations and extinctive prescriptions, which could undermine claims for the restitution of looted relics. Moreover, major countries have enacted laws to prevent the return of looted cultural treasures housed in public museums to their countries of origin.Footnote 8
Given the multiple legal obstacles, it is not difficult to understand why the Chinese government has not submitted formal requests to Western powers, Japan in particular, for the return of looted relics, and countries like Greece and Egypt have not succeeded in getting their cultural treasures back despite their best efforts.
Nonetheless, this does not mean that Western powers are immune from returning cultural property looted from China. On the contrary, the demand for the return of cultural property looted during foreign invasions and occupation is an inalienable right of the Chinese people. Moreover, returning cultural property looted by the invading Japanese troops to China is an obligation enshrined in both international law and ethics and morality in international relations that the Japanese government cannot ignore or evade.
First of all, the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 contain prohibitions on the looting of cultural property. Moreover, the rules in the above conventions are widely recognized as customary international law,Footnote 9 and are, therefore, legally binding for all countries. It follows that looting cultural property in China by the invading Japanese forces violated international law.
Second, the UN General Assembly has unanimously adopted numerous resolutions on the return or restitution of cultural property to countries of origin since the second half of the twentieth century to the present day.Footnote 10 The UN resolutions, despite their lack of legally binding effects, reflect the consensus of the international community and provide strong moral and ethical support for the countries of origin to seek restitution of their looted and illicitly trafficked cultural property from the countries that currently possess them.
Third, the return of Chinese relics looted by Japan during the War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression is imperative to maintaining the postwar international order. The war was a part of the allies’ war against fascism, and in fact was the beginning of World War II in the Asia-Pacific region. During the fourteen years of the War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression, the invading Japanese forces committed appalling atrocities in China, including pillaging, rape, slaughter, destruction, and the plunder of cultural treasures. Those plundered Chinese artifacts are the treasure of the Chinese people, and solid evidence of the war crimes committed by the Japanese invaders. Consequently, demanding Japan return these plundered artifacts represents China's efforts to advance accountability for war crimes committed by Japan in the War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression and to seek justice after World War II.
The year 2025 will mark the eightieth anniversary of the end of the World War II, and China will be commemorating the eightieth anniversary of victory in the War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression that year. Against this background, it is high time for China to formally request Japan to return Chinese cultural property looted during wartime and to refrain from adopting a resistant, protracted, and perfunctory attitude.
The Old Summer Palace is a classical royal palace of the Qing Court that contained countless and priceless art treasures of ancient Chinese civilization. As the French Chief Commander Baron Montoubon described, “Nothing in our Europe can give idea of equal luxury.”Footnote 1 Unfortunately, at the end of the Second Opium War, the British and French joint armies invaded the Capital of China and destroyed the Palace after taking everything away that they could. The question arises as to whether China is entitled to reclaim those spoils of war today? I frame this presentation by three questions. First, was there a rule at that time that prohibited such art plunder? This question requires an examination under the laws and custom of war, which we often refer to international humanitarian law today. Second, if that rule existed by the time of the Second Opium War, would that rule be applied to the Sino-Britain armed conflicts considering the so-called standard of civilized nations. If the answer is yes, we then move to the last question, i.e., would the passage of over one and a half centuries impair the claims for restitution today.
I. Whether There Was a Rule That Prohibited Art Plunder Under the Laws and Custom of War?
Many contemporary scholars have claimed that the law of nations during the nineteenth century did not prohibit wartime art plunder. That is a questionable perception.Footnote 2 As is well known, Articles 56 in the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions clearly prohibit the looting of works of art, historical monuments, etc. as spoils of war.Footnote 3 As these Hague Conventions stood out to codify the laws and customs of war at the turning point of the nineteenth century, the rules under Article 56 reflect the established norms to regulate the spoils of war at the end of the nineteenth century. Tracing the historical line of its development, Article 56 indeed was rooted in Articles 34–36 of the U.S. Lieber Code of 1863.Footnote 4 Despite being a mere domestic regulation, the Lieber Code reflected the existing laws and customs of war by the year of 1863. First, the title of the draft, as Professor Lieber initially proposed, was written as “the Code for the Government of Armies in the Field as authorized by the Laws and Usages of War.”Footnote 5 Article 4 provides a further explanation that “Martial Law is simply military authority exercised in accordance with the laws and usages of war.”Footnote 6 These pieces of evidence clearly manifest that the rule that prohibited art plunder was an established norm under the laws and custom of war in the 1860s.
The development of this rule can be further traced to the Marquis de Somerueles case of 1812, in which Great Britain seized the U.S. commercial ship carrying the works of art as war prizes during the U.S.-Britain War of 1812. In the British Vice-Admiralty Court of Halifax, Judge Croke ordered restitution on the ground that “[t]he arts and sciences are admitted amongst all civilized nations, as forming an exception to the severe rights of warfare, and as entitled to favour and protection.”Footnote 7
Napoleon's art plunder and acts of restitution afterward also reflects the established rule that prohibited art plunder. Napoleon made a systematic, indiscriminate, organized looting throughout Europe for two decades. After he was defeated, the allied powers raised a repeated discussion on how to discover a mode of doing justice regarding Napoleon's art plunders. During these debates, two remarkable diplomats from Great Britain stood out—Lord Willington and Lord Castlereagh. Both of them claimed that Napoleon's art plunders were contrary to every principle of justice and usages of modern warfare, which shows that the rule against wartime art plunder was already accepted as the laws and usages of warfare at that time.Footnote 8 The allied powers, including neutral state, quickly and widely accepted the two British diplomats’ legal reasoning. Even France acquiescently accepted it.
Clearly, the rule existed that prohibited art plunder under the laws and customs of war throughout the nineteenth century. Actually, that rule was established at the end of the eighteenth century upon natural law philosophy. At that time, a shift of legal perception occurred from the traditional right to conquest to the modern warfare perception based on military necessity.Footnote 9 Consequently, certain types of objects were considered to be excluded from war trophies, such as works of art, historical monuments, etc., because they could not serve as military necessities.
II. Would the Rule That Prohibited Art Plunder Apply to the Second Opium War?
The standard of civilization articulated in the nineteenth century divided the whole world into two groups—civilized nations that basically represented Western powers and uncivilized nations that included non-Western nations. According to many jurists during the nineteenth century, the standard of civilized nations excluded those non-Western nations, including China, from entering into international society.Footnote 10 It was about a membership. But would non-membership in the international society prevent its application of international law? Actually, the standard of civilization merely touched on the lawmaking power. It means Western power reserved the right to make the law either on a treaty-basis or customary-international-law-basis, and made the rest of the world apply the law. But the lawmaking power would not exclude non-Western nations from applying the law of nations.
I provide four scenarios to further examine this issue.
Scenario 1: During the parliamentary debate of Great Britain in 1840, as Sir G. Staunton claimed, “Though the Chinese are no parties to the specific usages of international law amongst European nations, they cannot but be bound by that law of nations, which is founded on the law of nature and of common-sense.”Footnote 11
Scenario 2: John Q. Adams, former U.S. president, stated in his public lecture in 1841 that the general and necessary law of nations should definitely apply to the contest between Great Britain and China, which was determined by the law of nature to bind the relations between independent communities.Footnote 12
Scenario 3: During the first Opium War, Queen Victoria issued an order on April 4, 1840, requiring British courts of admiralty to determine all the confiscations of any property in China “the same according to the course of admiralty and the laws of nations.”Footnote 13
Scenario 4: During the Second Opium War, Great Britain and France both issued decrees ordering their armies to comply with the rules of maritime law under the Declaration of Paris of 1856, which contained a special provision that limited its application only to “the Powers who have signed [the Declaration] or shall accede to it.”Footnote 14
The above-mentioned four scenarios indicate that the rule that prohibited wartime art plunder should be applied in the two Opium Wars based on the laws of nations upon natural law jurisprudence. Although the usages of war mostly were formed among European states, the law of nature had general application to all nations without a distinction between different civilizations.Footnote 15
III. Would the Passage of Over a Century Impair the Claims for Restitution Today?
I provide four scenarios to examine this issue.Footnote 16
Scenario 1: In 2007, Chile returned almost 4,000 books that had been looted by Chilean soldiers during its war with Peru (1879–1883) to the National Library of Peru.
Scenario 2: In 2014, Argentina's then President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner returned to Paraguay some furniture that had been confiscated by Argentinean armies during the War of the Triple Alliance (1864–1870).
Scenario 3: In 2018, U.S. Defense officials and the ambassador returned three church bells to Philippine authorities. American soldiers had carried these bells away from the Philippines as war trophies in 1899–1902.
Scenario 4: In 2011, France returned to South Korea the unique collections of Korean royal archives produced during the Joseon Dynasty, which were seized by French armies during their invasion of Korea in the nineteenth century.
Indeed, the passage of time for accusing war crimes has been deemed indefinite since the end of World War II, and the massive looting of works of art and other cultural artifacts, such as the plunder of the Old Summer Palace has been recognized as a typical war crime. Therefore, the passing of over one and a half centuries would not impair China's claim for the restitution of plundered artifacts from the Old Summer Palace today.
IV. Conclusions
The rule that prohibited wartime plunder of cultural artifacts was already established throughout the nineteenth century. That rule was applied to colonial wars between Western powers and non-Western nations. The passing of over a century would not impair the claims for restitution today. Accordingly, all of the victim states that suffered art plunder during colonial wars in the nineteenth century, such as Turkey, Korea, India, and Egypt, could make a claim to regain their treasures. This presentation starts with China but ends for the rest of the world.
Underwater cultural heritage (UCH) protection is an indispensable, critical part of returning Chinese cultural artifacts looted in the past.Footnote 1 This Article will explore protecting UCH from four aspects: the scope of UCH under Chinese law; their whereabouts and features; China's reactions; and the validity of China's claims to this UCH.
I. Scope of UCH
The scope of UCH in China differs from that of the Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage (UCH Convention).Footnote 2 According to the Regulation on the Protection of UCH (Regulation), enacted in 1989 and most recently amended in 2022, UCH should satisfy the requirements of value, temporal threshold, territorial jurisdiction, and origin as exemplified in Table 1.Footnote 3 If a UCH falls in a “V” category, it is protected by the Regulation; otherwise, it is not protected.
UCH Protected by the Regulation
UCH must satisfy geographic location requirements implicating China's maritime territory claims. The competing claims between China and other countries neighboring the South China Sea challenge the application of the Regulation.Footnote 4
Importantly, the Regulation does not define the meaning of Chinese origins. The UNESCO Convention adopts the concept of cultural, historical, or archaeological links.Footnote 5 “Chinese origins” could include links such as departing, transferring, or destination ports in China; Chinese-made cargo; China as the vessel's flag state; owned, chartered, or operated by Chinese parties; Chinese sailors or passengers; or locations of UCH in Chinese jurisdiction, etc. Origins are likely broadly defined to maximize the Regulation's scope.
II. Whereabouts and Features
The majority of UCH claimed by China is primarily located in the South China Sea and along the Maritime Silk Road, often associated with trade activities. These UCH typically include vessels, human remains, cargo, and other related contents. Vessels may be operated by Chinese nationals, early Chinese immigrants or local inhabitants of countries neighboring the South China Sea, or people from other countries. Unlike former colonial powers such as Spain, whose UCH largely consists of state-owned or military vessels with records of their voyages,Footnote 6 the sunken vessels in the South China Sea are predominantly non-military and lack clear documentation of their origins.
III. Reaction of the Chinese Government to UCH
China has made significant legislative efforts to protect UCH. Besides the Regulation, UCH can also be protected according to the Cultural Relics Protection Law and its Implementation Regulations, Chinese Civil Code, Chinese Foreign Immunity Law, China Water Law, China Harbor Law, Maritime Litigation Procedure Law, etc. The China National Cultural Heritage Administration published the Regulation and Procedure for UCH Work in 2023.Footnote 7 China has also concluded bilateral agreements and ratified conventions related to UCH protection.Footnote 8
Besides legislation, the protection of the Nanhai Yi Hao Vessel is a significant successful empirical example of salvaging a sunken ancient vessel as a whole.Footnote 9
IV. Validity of China's Potential Claims to UCH
Table 2 demonstrates China's potential claims to UCH including their ownership, jurisdiction, and the right to verify their owner. There are four critical issues relating to these claims.
China's Claims to UCH
A. Foreign State Immunity
Determining jurisdiction over UCH should combine the Regulation and the China Foreign State Immunity Law.Footnote 10 According to the Regulation, UCH with foreign origins located in Chinese inland and territorial waters is subject to Chinese jurisdiction. However, Articles 2 and 15 of the China Foreign State Immunity Law indicate that a foreign state and its property including cultural heritage not for sale or intended for sale shall be immune from the jurisdiction of Chinese courts. Foreign state-owned or military vessels sunken in Chinese inland or territorial waters should not be subject to the jurisdiction of Chinese courts. This is because the China Foreign State Immunity Law should prevail against the Regulation in case of inconsistency. Firstly, the former is enacted by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, which is of a higher hierarchy compared with the State Council that enacted the latter. Secondly, the China Foreign State Immunity Law was enacted later in time than the Regulation.
A relevant example is the salvage of MV Awa Maru, a Japanese liner requisitioned by the Japanese Navy in WWII as a relief ship under Red Cross auspices in 1945, which sank in the Taiwan Strait.Footnote 11 From 1977 to 1980, the Chinese Navy salvaged it without Japan's permission, citing navigation safety concerns and denying Japan's ownership of the cargo, as it was exploited from Southeast Asia. At that time, the Regulation and China Foreign State Immunity Law were not in effect. If applicable, the MV Awa Maru could be considered UCH due to its historical significance post-1911. Under the Regulation, China would have jurisdiction, but the China Foreign State Immunity Law, giving immunity to state-owned and military vessels, would prevail. Therefore, China should negotiate with Japan for a mutually acceptable salvage solution.
B. China's Right to Verify the Owner
The meaning of the right to verify the owner of the UCH under the Regulation is unclear. If “Chinese origin” can be broadly defined to include the country of origin of cargo, would that mean China has the right to verify the owner of an ancient vessel sunken in a foreign jurisdiction or the High Sea simply because its porcelain cargo was made in China? Moreover, China should have the ownership of its ancient government-owned or military vessel sunken in a foreign jurisdiction or the High Sea. The omission of the Regulation in this regard should be addressed in its future amendment.
C. China's Obligation to Inform States with Verifiable Links to the UCH
The Regulation does not mandate China to notify states with verifiable links to UCH or to protect them in consideration of those states’ interests. Under the Chinese Civil Code, any unclaimed lost item becomes the property of the state if not claimed within one year from the date of the notice of its finding.Footnote 12 The Code does not detail the method of publication for such notices or whether, in the case of UCH with verifiable foreign links, the relevant Chinese authority would reasonably notify the foreign parties to ensure their awareness. This is in contrast to Articles 7.3 and 18 of the UCH Convention, which provides states with variable links to UCH the right of being informed.
D. Foreign Parties’ Participation in Protecting UCH
China imposes strict restrictions on foreign or international organizations to participate in UCH investigation, exploration, and excavation. Foreign parties shall cooperate with Chinese entities.Footnote 13 UCH, natural specimens, and original materials of archaeological records obtained from Sino-foreign cooperation shall belong to China.Footnote 14 Foreign individuals are not allowed to investigate, explore, and excavate UCH even partnering with a Chinese entity.
UCH investigation, exploration, and excavation are a type of service. The question is whether China's restrictions on foreign parties comply with China's commitments on trade in service in free trade agreements. The most relevant and advanced trade agreement between China and major countries neighboring the South China Sea is the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).Footnote 15
Central Product Classification (CPC) 96412 refers to preservation services of historical sites including operation of, access, and preservation services for historical sites.Footnote 16 China does not limit the market access and national treatment of the commercial presence to offer such services in China (see Table 3). Namely, foreign parties from other RCEP member states can offer such services in China without collaborating with Chinese entities. UCH sites are historical sites. It is unclear whether “operation of, access, and preservation” in CPC 96412 under RCEP can be clearly distinguished from “investigation, exploration, and excavation” under the Regulation. If the answer is negative, China's restrictions on foreign parties’ participation in latter activities may violate its commitments under RCEP.
China's Schedule of Specific Commitments Under RCEPFootnote 17
V. Conclusion
The South China Sea is home to many ancient sunken vessels, which, along with the human remains and cargo they contain, may have cultural, historical, archaeological, and national links to multiple countries, including China. The region is also characterized by competing territorial claims and rampant UCH commercial looting. China could consider setting aside the debate over UCH ownership and work with countries with verifiable links to UCH to collaboratively protect them including establishing joint protection zones ensuring in situ preservation.
The Dunhuang Mogao Grottoes is a renowned World Cultural Heritage site, constructed between the fourth and fourteenth centuries. Now 735 separate caves have been preserved including more than 2,000 sculptures and wall paintings over 45,000 square meters. In 1900, the Library Cave was discovered in Mogao Grottoes, now labeled as Cave 17, in which more than 70,000 pieces of cultural relics were unearthed. Ninety percent of the unearthed documents are religious-related and 10 percent of documents relate to astronomy, geography, politics, economics, literature, medicine, technology, nationality, religion, art, and people's lives. The cultural relics discovered in the Library Cave are known as the “Encyclopedia” of ancient Chinese civilization between the fourth and fourteenth centuries.
I. The Basic Information of Dunhuang Cultural Relics Lost Overseas
Unfortunately, the cultural relics unearthed in the Library Cave were not protected in time. From 1907 to 1917, archaeologists and explorers from Britain, France, Japan, Russia, and other countries arrived at Dunhuang and took away a large number of precious cultural relics. According to the statistics, more than 47,000 pieces of cultural relics discovered in the Library Cave are scattered in different countries across the world. Currently, the cultural relics discovered in the Library Cave are mainly collected in the British Museum, the British Library, the French Nation Library, the Museum Guimet, and other public and private collection institutions in more than ten countries, such as Russia and Japan.
Detailed information about the number of Dunhuang cultural relics is provided in Tables 1 and 2.
Number of Manuscripts of Dunhuang Library Cave Lost Overseas
The Number of Artworks Overseas Removed from the Dunhuang Library Cave
II. Discussion on the Return of Dunhuang Cultural Relics Lost Overseas
Despite the return of these overseas Dunhuang cultural relics to their countries of origin being the desire of every Chinese citizen, the journey to achieve repatriation is fraught with challenges. Conceptually, cultural property internationalism and cultural property nationalism remain the two prevailing views regarding the return of historically displaced cultural relics in international dialogues. Legally, the main international conventions concerning the restitution of lost cultural property include the 1954 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict (1954 Hague Convention), the 1970 UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property (1970 Convention), and the 1995 Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects (1995 Convention).
Among these international agreements, the 1970 Convention represents the most influential one. It stipulates that cultural property that has been stolen or illicitly acquired is listed in the inventories of museums, and public monuments, can be taken to recover and return such imported cultural property. However, this only applies to the restitution of cultural relics illegally transferred after the Convention came into force. Although the 1995 Convention dictates that all stolen cultural relics must be returned, most of the signatory states are countries from which cultural property has been exported, which weakens the retrospective effect. The 1954 Hague Convention focuses on the return of cultural property that was directly impacted by war and forcibly removed for protection. Thus, the physical repatriation of lost Dunhuang cultural relics still relies on reaching a consensus on the solution through international appeal and the perfection of international legal conventions.
However, from the perspective of cultural integrity, the development of emerging technologies now offers new possibilities for the digital resurrection, reunion, and sharing of the Library Cave artifacts. We propose to explore the use of technological means to achieve the digital repatriation of Dunhuang cultural relics lost overseas.
III. Models for the Digital Repatriation of Dunhuang Cultural Relics Lost Overseas
The core of achieving digital repatriation for Dunhuang cultural relics lost overseas lies in obtaining high-definition digital resources of these artifacts, and central to acquiring these high-definition digital resources is securing the copyright or sharing rights. Major institutions around the world have already digitized the Dunhuang collections they preserve. Based on the number of Dunhuang cultural relics held by different countries and their digitization statuses, we propose the following models for digital repatriation:
A. Negotiation model. Engage in diplomatic negotiations and academic and cultural exchange cooperation with the countries and institutions that hold Dunhuang cultural relics lost overseas, aiming to facilitate the cultural and knowledge sharing of digital resources of these cultural relics by various means, mostly through gifts.
B. Institutional authorization model. Obtain digital resources of the cultural relics by negotiating copyright authorization (with a fee) with the institutions that hold the Dunhuang artifacts.
C. Cooperative collection model. Acquire digital resources of cultural relics that have not yet been digitized by negotiating with the holding institutions to commission digital collections, either by the holding institutions themselves or by digital teams from Chinese institutions.
D. Crowdsourcing model. Call upon and accept voluntary contributions or authorized provision of digital resources of lost Dunhuang cultural relics from social institutions or individuals both domestically and internationally.
Depending on the actual situation of the overseas collection and digitization of lost Dunhuang artifacts, the corresponding digital resource acquisition model should be adopted.
The ultimate goal is to establish a unified and complete database and resource-sharing platform. For example, the Dunhuang Academy established the “Digital Library Cave” by obtaining digital resources of lost overseas Dunhuang cultural relics through multiple channels of negotiation and cooperation. The platform will primarily include a catalog of Dunhuang cultural relics lost overseas, images, VR (video) of the artifacts, historical archives about the Mogao Caves and the loss of the artifacts, related materials, and research reports on Dunhuang artifacts. The platform will achieve the digital repatriation and global sharing of Dunhuang cultural relics lost overseas, allowing everyone to see the complete resources of the Dunhuang caves and Library Cave artifacts. The platform design is illustrated in Figure 1.
Design of the “Digital Library Cave” Database Platform
IV. Progress in the Digital Repatriation of Dunhuang Cultural Relics Lost Overseas
We are delighted to note that this initiative and practice have now received support and corresponding acts from many countries and institutions around the world:
A. Sharing the Digital Resources of Dunhuang Cultural Relics by French Institutions
The Dunhuang Academy has signed a strategic framework agreement with the French National Library, which has provided the institute with digital high-definition images of 4,000 Dunhuang documents (a total of 31,744 images). The Guimet Museum in France also signed an agreement with the Dunhuang Academy, agreeing to share its digital resources of Dunhuang artifacts in March 2024.
B. Sharing the Digital Resources of Dunhuang Cultural Relics by British Institutions
In October 2023, the Dunhuang Academy went to the UK to negotiate the sharing of digital resources of Dunhuang cultural relics held by the British Library, the British Museum, and the Victoria and Albert Museum, receiving a positive response and support. The Dunhuang Academy also signed a digital resource-sharing agreement with the British Museum and the British Library in April 2024.
C. Sharing the Digital Resources of Dunhuang Cultural Relics by Hungarian Institutions
The Dunhuang Academy signed a cooperative digitization agreement with the Library of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, obtaining authorization to fully digitize the collection of Sir Aurel Stein. The digitization work is basically completed, acquiring 16,600 digital images of various materials.
D. Acquiring and Sharing the Digital Resources of Dunhuang Cultural Relics by Russian Institutions
The Dunhuang Academy has also established contacts with the Institute of Oriental Manuscripts of the Russian Academy of Sciences and the Oriental Department of the Hermitage Museum in Russia, negotiating cooperation to digitize Dunhuang cultural relics held by both institutions.
E. Building Platforms and Constructing Information Resource Databases
The Dunhuang Academy has already built the “Complete Digital Catalogue and Display Platform for Library Cave Artifacts” and the “Dunhuang Manuscripts Database.” It is currently integrating these platforms to create a unified “Digital Library Cave” database, in which the digital resources obtained from various institutions are stored and shared uniformly.
F. Proposals and Outlook for the Digital Restoration of Dunhuang Cultural Relics Lost Overseas
Drawing upon our experience with Dunhuang, we hope to seize this opportunity to engage in dialogue and call for action with experts in international law, starting from the standpoint of cultural integrity and knowledge sharing. We aim to explore the creation of an international agreement for the sharing of digital resources of cultural relics, facilitating the restitution of more digital resources to their places of origin, or at a minimum, ensuring that the original locations have access to complete digital information about their artifacts. In the long term, we still hold the collective aspiration to work together, using legal channels, to ensure that cultural relics lost abroad can truly be returned to their rightful places, achieving the complete preservation and lasting legacy of their cultural significance.
