Robert Bartlett's Sophistry and Political Philosophy is a beautifully written, sensitive treatment of Protagoras as a representative of sophistry and its dangers as seen through Plato's eyes in two dialogues, the eponymous Protagoras and the Theaetetus. In the following comments, I will raise a few questions and note a few occasions on which my interpretation of Socrates and his project, in the “confrontational” dialogues generally and in the Protagoras in particular, departs from that of Bartlett.
I have always had some difficulty seeing the connection between Protagoras as he appears in the Protagoras and Protagoras as he is imagined in the Theaetetus. I would like to hear more from Professor Bartlett about how the two come together. I tried to extract from the book the way in which he sees their alignment, but in the end I realized I need more clarification. In particular, is Protagoras a theorist? He does not seem so in the Protagoras, where he seems mostly confused, and where, if he is skilled at all, even in his own view, it is at little more than speeches and poetry interpretation. He does not appear to be a relativist—not even in the section in which he is driven to relativism in the argument about the relationship between justice and temperance. For even here, where he makes the case that what is good or advantageous varies, there seems to be evidence more of Protagoras's ability to deliver an impromptu speech that will garner applause than of his having a developed and sophisticated ethical theory. The teaching that he has on offer to his students seems vastly different in the two dialogues.
A second question concerns Socrates's attitude toward Protagoras in the Protagoras. I found surprising Professor Bartlett's declaration in his introduction that Socrates and Protagoras “clearly do respect one another” (4). It seems to me that nothing either in the dialogue itself or in Bartlett's interpretation of it supports the idea that Socrates had any respect for Protagoras at all. It is not impossible that he had some respect for Gorgias in the dialogue named for him—at least Gorgias hopes his students will not abuse the speaking skill he teaches. (I was wondering, by the way, why the Gorgias did not make the list of dialogues “that would have to be treated in a comprehensive account of Plato's understanding of sophistry” [2].) It would seem that, from the very start of the Protagoras, where Socrates indicates at 309d that Protagoras is not wise, saying to his anonymous friend, “the wisest man alive, if you think the wisest man is Protagoras,” right up through the dialogue's very end, and, indeed, as Bartlett notes time and again, it is apparent that Socrates does not think well of Protagoras; Protagoras is the corrupter who is to be avoided by the young at all costs.
Professor Bartlett's astute awareness of the distinction for Protagoras between the virtues of justice, moderation, and piety, on the one hand, and wisdom and courage (and ultimately just courage), on the other—the former constituting “political virtue” and the latter, virtue simpliciter and perhaps what counts for Protagoras as real virtue—made me wonder how conscious of the distinction Protagoras was and how deliberately he drew it. He seems to be merely careless; he seems to have forgotten to include the latter two, and, when asked, “Then these also are parts of virtue—wisdom and courage?” he answers, “Of course, and wisdom is the greatest part” (329e–330a). Moreover, he himself calls justice, moderation, and piety simply “the virtue of a man” (andros aretēn) at 325a2, and at 329c5 Socrates refers back to Protagoras's having called these three virtues taken together simply aretē. I agree that for Protagoras the two groups are distinct—I call the first group the cooperative virtues and the second the competitive—but I am not sure Protagoras is aware of the difference he himself assumes until he hears himself saying there are many who are courageous but unjust.
A small note on Protagoras's point on the madness of admitting to being unjust. According to Bartlett, it follows from this point that “there's a kind of moderation that guides the unjust in their prudent deceptions” (45). I think there is a rather simple claim being made here. In a society in which justice is distributed to everyone, that is, in any civilized society where people are educating one another in justice all the time, to admit to being unjust is to admit to being uncivilized. Why would anyone sane do that? This would be like the madness of admitting, in a society in which literacy is widespread and everyone is engaged in securing literacy for all, that one can neither read nor write.
It is with regard to the interpretation of the hedonism section of the Protagoras that I diverge most from Bartlett, although even here the divergence is in the details rather than in spirit. As I understand this section, Socrates is fashioning for Protagoras—and, comically, for all the sophists present—a science they can teach and call “virtue,” since nothing has emerged thus far that would justify Protagoras's claim to teach: in a civilized city where everyone is always teaching everyone virtue, there is precious little a virtue teacher can add. Therefore, Socrates refashions human beings into rational pleasure- and pain-seekers, assumes that there is no competing or incommensurate value that is not ultimately reducible to pleasure and pain, determines that with regard to pleasure and pain it is only size that matters, and concludes that our “salvation” thus lies in mastery of a pleasure and pain calculus—a science that only sophists can teach. Socrates does not, however, restore knowledge's strength or its power to overcome other forces. On the contrary, all other sources of conflict with knowledge, such as desire, love, and fear (mentioned at 352b), are dropped, and the attraction of proximate pleasure is assimilated to the illusion of its greater size. Intensity is never mentioned. Pleasures and pains have sizes that can be skillfully measured against one another so long as one is in possession of the calculus and can discount false perceptions of size. The issue of “regret” is then quite simple. Imagine you thought you were buying a large diamond because of the picture of it you saw in a catalog, and then when it arrived it was quite small; you would surely regret the purchase. This is precisely the kind of disappointment a measurer can help you avoid. What Socrates argues is that if there is only one measure, the size of pleasures and pains, it is true that knowledge cannot be overcome but this is simply because there is no struggle. This is the thrust of Socrates's conclusion that “being overcome by pleasure” is nothing but ignorance (357d). One is now either a skilled or an unskilled calculator; one either has knowledge or is ignorant. If the bigger pleasures, those worthy of being chosen because they are bigger, are chosen, this is not the incorrect choice. And if the smaller are chosen that is only because one is ignorant—one lacks the calculus. Knowledge overcomes nothing. Knowledge is not strong. Now that obtaining maximum pleasure is that in which our salvation lies, knowledge has been reduced to a tool in service of pleasure maximization.
I would contend, then (pace Bartlett, 92–93), that it is only on the assumption of hedonism that no one chooses what is not in his view to his advantage. It is once good and noble and advantageous are all cashed out as maximum pleasure that there can be no conflict between pleasure and good or pleasure and advantage or pleasure and what is noble; one is either skilled at measuring it or not. When Socrates says or seems to say elsewhere in the Platonic corpus that no one does wrong willingly, all he means is that no one wishes to be wretched. He does not mean that no one, in the heat of the moment, succumbs to desire. Socrates thinks there are wicked men, men who choose evil deliberately; he thinks there are foolish men, men who choose what is bad for themselves because of the pull of desire; and he believes that men who are wicked merit punishment and men who choose foolishly suffer the consequences of their foolish choices. What Socrates does not think is that no one can choose against his/her better judgment. The only circumstance under which choosing against what one knows or believes to be good or advantageous to oneself does not belong to human nature is when human nature is distorted so that it cannot recognize any good other than pleasure.
Where I am most in agreement with Bartlett is in his recognition that no one is really a hedonist. Although I am not sure exactly what he thinks about Protagoras—is he a hedonist but doesn't know it; is he a hedonist but won't admit it (88); is he not a hedonist but thinks he is (82); or is he just not a hedonist (103–4)?—I think, if I understood the book correctly, that in the end Bartlett thinks Protagoras is not a hedonist (98, 218), that he values the noble and not only the pleasant. And Bartlett thinks—as I do—that this would be true for the many as well (88). Bartlett incisively notes (91–92) that there is one occasion in the summary of the hedonism argument—the point where Socrates says: “And isn't the noble deed good and advantageous?”—where Socrates does not report that all agreed but only that “they agreed” (sunedokei, 358b6). Bartlett assumes there must be an unnamed dissenter. I think, however, that this is Plato's hint (via Socrates's report) that it is here that one ought to dissent. In my view—as in Bartlett's—everyone senses that courage is noble and is thus not a matter of skill at measuring pleasures and pains or even a matter of the good and advantageous. But if courage is not a matter of these things, and if, moreover, people are not pleasure-seeking automatons, courage is one virtue that certainly cannot be taught by a sophist. Protagoras wants to claim that he assists others to become both “noble and good” (328b2–3), but, as he blurts out at the end of his tirade after the first go-round on courage, it is confidence and not courage that arises from technē (and also from spirit [thumos], and madness [mania]); the sources of courage are nature and nurture of souls (eutrophias tōn psuchōn) (351a)—the two things over which a sophist has no control and about which he can do nothing. We see not only from the Protagoras but from the Gorgias as well that sophists (or rhetoricians in the case of the Gorgias) pride themselves on effecting nearly instant improvement (Prot. 318a–b) in their students in “great matters” (Gorg. 455a). But it is not through education by sophists or rhetoricians that people become better.
The Socratic project can have hope of succeeding only if Socrates can count on all people having, somewhere in their souls, the belief that what is noble is not reducible to vulgar pleasure or to narrow self-interest. This belief is Socrates's leverage as he embarks on his mission of moral improvement. Professor Bartlett sees in Protagoras's distaste for dialectics a critical distinction between him and Socrates, and thus between sophist and philosopher. He says: “Protagoras could never have had the conversation Socrates had with Euthyphro because he would have believed that he had nothing to learn from, or to confirm by means of, a Euthyphro” (215). If, however, the prerequisite for Socratic conversation were the belief on Socrates's part that he might learn or confirm something of importance via this conversation, Socrates, I fear, could not have conversed with Euthyphro either. What the essential difference between philosopher and sophist comes down to in the end is whether or not there is in their ergon a genuine care and concern for the condition of other people's souls.
