One thing our books and mutual reviews show that we very much agree on is the challenge in the study of local politics of adapting data collected for other purposes to the testing of theories of interest. We also clearly agree that local government does matter—that is, that what it does affects the shape and character of local civic engagement. But it is not clear that we see the relevance of policy feedback theory for local government in the same way. Specifically, while J. Eric Oliver's review reveals an appreciation of the ways in which local government action may yield resource effects, the interpretive effects that are arguably the more innovative component of policy feedback theory may be underappreciated. It is likely that this difference links to a deeper, underlying difference in views on what it means for local government to matter.

I appreciate Oliver's intriguing suggestion that the impact of cities' business-incentives policy should focus on ordinary citizens, rather than solely on local business persons. In the policy feedback theoretical tradition, the primary focus for expected mobilization or demobilization effects is on program recipients or clients—in this case, the business persons. But some of that literature does open the door to possible indirect mobilization effects as other groups react against benefits provided to groups they view as unworthy of those benefits. (And a few hints of that very dynamic peek out at us in my book's case study of reactions to tax abatement in Lawrence, Kansas.) Oliver's suggestion is, in this sense, both within the relevant theoretical frame and tempting to pursue further. It is important to recognize that such a focus on indirect and reactionary mobilizing effects would not be appropriate for all government programs. Businesses, like welfare recipients, have sometimes been viewed as undeserving of the benefits they receive, thus making the secondary mobilization that Oliver points to relevant. If, as with vets and the G.I. Bill, the target population is not likely to be viewed as undeserving, then presumably no interesting impacts (demobilizing or mobilizing) would be expected for ordinary citizens not involved with the program.

Not surprisingly, perhaps the best policy feedback theorizing about the kinds of impacts that interest Oliver is represented in Joe Soss and Sanford F. Schram's “A Public Transformed? Welfare Reform as Policy Feedback” (American Political Science Review 101 [2007]: 111–28), which was inspired by their observation of the general public's reaction to welfare recipients even after welfare reform. Soss and Schram's analysis is heavily featured in the concluding chapter of my book because it takes us a step down the road extending policy feedback theory to include these indirect mobilizing effects. And essential to that theoretical extension is that interpretive effects for Group B can involve Group B's reaction to the messages that government programs send about the worth of Group A.

Oliver also makes the important suggestion that policy feedback effects should be evident in the form of political mobilization from patronage-style employment practices, spending, and contract awards. Agreed, though this is already quite well established in existing literature, and focuses on pure resource effects. By contrast, Oliver's suggestion that policy feedback theory is “ill-suited” for explaining local participation is not the take-away that I would hope for from my discussion of the collective nature of many of the benefits provided by local government. Some of the things that local government provides are clearly in the form of resources as collective benefits, which problematizes the mobilization dynamic because of free-rider dynamics. But when policing and black neighborhoods are at issue, it would be folly to ignore the interpretive effects of what local government does—effects which key into the politics of identity, thereby explaining the black community's reaction to community policing in a way that is very different from free-rider logic and very consistent with policy feedback theory.

In short, applying policy feedback theory to local government, as in applying it to federal programs, involves the challenge of properly theorizing what types of benefits (collective or individual, material or identify based) and what types of effects (resource, interpretive, or both) should be expected.