John Gunnell's latest work offers close readings of Ludwig Wittgenstein and Thomas Kuhn in order to demonstrate the relevance of their philosophy for contemporary social inquiry. This work makes several important contributions. It is one of the first books to explore the connections between Wittgenstein's later philosophy and Thomas Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions. It presents their work as an orientation to social inquiry that is distinct from the more predominant approaches of behavioralism and hermeneutics. It offers a robust defense of Kuhn and Wittgenstein against the charge of relativism. And it is the clearest statement to date by Gunnell of his own philosophy of social science, one that he calls conventional realism.
Gunnell demarcates three orders of discourse in the relationship between philosophy, social science, and politics. First-order discourses are practices that theoretically define the physical world. Second-order discourses are practices that interpret conceptually preconstituted phenomena. Third-order discourses involve the philosophy behind different practices of inquiry. A central claim of the book is that second-order discourses, such as the social and human sciences, are necessarily interpretive because they grapple with conceptually defining preconstituted phenomena. Gunnell is also keen to point out the ways in which social and political theorists often mistakenly elide discourses—i.e., when behavioralists confuse social science for natural science, or when poststructuralists confuse discussions about the philosophy of social science for the practice of social inquiry.
One central concern of Gunnell's is with the question whether Wittgenstein and Kuhn were relativists. According to one line of argument, Wittgenstein had offered a correspondence theory of truth in his early work Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, holding that the task of philosophy is primarily to specify a basis for the relationship between language and the world. His later work, by contrast, advanced the argument that the search for such a theory was largely responsible for leading modern philosophy into a dead end. One of Gunnell's central claims is that the critique of the correspondence theory of truth is relevant to modern social inquiry, because much modern social science tacitly or explicitly subscribes to this viewpoint. For example, Gunnell argues that many philosophers currently studying affect fall into the trap of assuming that the term “emotion” demands a physical state as its reference. What the work of Wittgenstein and Kuhn demonstrate is that the attempt to link emotions to specific physical states is misguided because emotions and neurological processes are two different kinds of things. Neurological processes are physical phenomena, and as such are the domain of natural scientists, whereas emotions are conceptual phenomena and are the domain of social sciences.
Part of Gunnell's argument is that the relativist critique of Wittgenstein and Kuhn mistakes social and political philosophy for a first-order discourse similar to the natural sciences. Whereas the sciences provide theoretical explanations of the world, social and political philosophy can only interpret the meanings of preconstituted social practices. Social practices are woven into language, and so a correspondence theory of truth in which language refers to something outside itself is not possible. Gunnell argues that this critique of the correspondence theory of truth misunderstands the relationship between philosophy and other domains of knowledge. Individuals who are concerned about relativism believe that the task of philosophy is to serve as a kind of master discipline that clearly spells out how truth claims are possible. Yet the point of Wittgenstein's critique of philosophy and of Kuhn's history of science were to demonstrate that different social practices—including practices of scientific inquiry—develop their own criteria of truth and modes of judgment.
A second way in which the correspondence theory of truth leads to confusion is through its influence on two approaches to social science that Gunnell labels “mentalism” and “interpretism.” By mentalism Gunnell means the belief in both the human sciences and philosophy that the source of meaning is located in the mind. Conversely, interpretism refers to the belief that meaning originates in the act of interpretation. Both of these types of theories are prominent in the social sciences. Gunnell argues that both mentalism and interpretism make the mistake of assuming that there is some fundamental divide between thought and language. Instead, Gunnell follows Wittgenstein in arguing that thought is simply impossible without language and that those who do not possess language are not capable of thinking. While mentalist social science tries to ground its form of inquiry in some kind of universal function in the human mind, and interpretist social science tries to ground its form of inquiry in the act of interpretation, Gunnell makes the case for a social science grounded in conceptual analysis that he calls conventional realism. At the heart of this conceptual analysis is Wittgenstein's method of perspicuous representation, whereby an investigator assembles different uses of a word as a means of pointing out the similarities and differences in the way a word is used in varying contexts. Gunnell suggests an approach to social inquiry that treats concepts in much the same way as Weber does his ideal types—where the ideal type draws upon aspects of the concept under consideration, but does not claim either to be comprehensive or to capture a pure essence of the object.
While Gunnell does a masterful job of reconstructing the work of Wittgenstein and Kuhn and explaining how their philosophy presents an alternate vision for the social sciences, the book lacks a clear account of what his preferred approach to social inquiry would look like in practice. I found myself agreeing with the general thrust of his critique of behavioralist and postmodern social science, but I was a bit more puzzled by his rejection of approaches that seem quite close to conventional realism. For example, Gunnell argues that Quentin Skinner's work (which is heavily influenced by Wittgenstein and J. L. Austin) is still partly trapped in a mentalist approach to social inquiry. I am not persuaded by the critique of Skinner, as I have read him as using the concept of authorial intention not in the sense of referring to a mental process behind the text, but as an illocutionary act whose meaning can only be established with reference to the linguistic conventions of the time in which the author was writing—hence the Cambridge School's focus on contextualization. Gunnell also rejects the work of Habermas and Taylor as possible candidates for a conventional realist approach to social science. Yet both scholars strike me as quite compatible with the approach that Gunnell is developing in this work. And so in the absence of a clear example of a practicing social scientist, I am left to wonder: what type of social inquiry would fit within Gunnell's project of conventional realism?
