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Dispute Prevention Mechanisms as Legal Enclaves

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 November 2024

Mavluda Sattorova*
Affiliation:
Professor of Law at the University of Liverpool, UK.
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Extract

This contribution examines the role of dispute prevention mechanisms (DPMs) in domesticating and broadening foreign investor privileges. Although conceived as a means of responding to the backlash against investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS), dispute prevention mechanisms are likely to produce legal enclaves whereby a privileged group of actors are afforded special treatment, and their interests are elevated into policy priorities. As currently conceived, DPMs are expected to operate as a regime embedded in domestic law, but replicating and amplifying investment law's emphasis on the exclusivity of foreign investor rights. Thus, the effect of DPMs is to anchor and extend foreign investor rights to a pre-dispute stage. By analyzing the premises and core features of the emerging DPMs, this contribution argues that, rather than addressing the systemic issues underpinning international investment law, the dispute prevention agenda will further expand and entrench foreign investor privileges.

Information

Type
Essay
Creative Commons
Creative Common License - CCCreative Common License - BY
This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s) 2024. Published by Cambridge University Press for The American Society of International Law