The distinguished political scientist and veteran Ethiopianist Christopher Clapham has written a fascinating account of the formations and fragmentations of states in the volatile conflict-ridden region of the Horn of Africa (HoA), Horn of Africa: State Formation and Decay. The Horn of Africa, which he defines as Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia (including Somaliland), is also defined by droughts and despotism, and much of Clapham’s discussion lies in the relationship of these countries with and to each other. The successful resolution of one problem in the Horn leads to another, and conflict is common in these societies in which people and their beasts are engaged in competition for meager resources. Indeed, this part of Africa is characterized by violence and, as a result, remains a perennially challenging area to study. Geography shapes the social and political structures of HoA societies, which in turn dictates the manner in which they govern themselves. In addition to demography, their modes of economies and socio-politics present a marked contrast, as determined by different ethnicities.

While the HoA is distinctive in many ways, Clapham contrasts it with other African situations, providing brief comparisons as well with China and Russia. The author emphasizes that the people of the Horn are interlinked, making a very useful distinction between the highlanders (the most important group being the Amhara), the lowlanders (the most important group being the Somalis), and the highland periphery (the most important group being the Oromo). Somalis are the third largest group in this category, next to Amhara and Oromo (which is the largest ethnic group in Africa). The Afar ethnic group, which was divided between Eritrea, Ethiopia, and French Somaliland (now known as Djibouti) struggles to find its place. Devastated by colonial ordering, they were not allowed to have at least one independent state like the Somalis. While drawing mainly from the perspective of the highlanders, Clapham points out that it was only the Afar, among the lowland communities, that historically possessed a centralized political state system.

The existence of the Somali-based Ajuuraan Sultanate is not mentioned here. The fact that Somalis were among the few lowland groups capable of constructing a state suggests there was a historical memory of pre-colonial states in the past, though they attempted in the process of these reforms to construct one unifying central entity. Clapham notes that Somalis are not solely pastoralists; there is also a considerable segment of the society which sees agriculture as a mode of life. As with Ethiopia, he considers the Somalis pastoralists, agropastoralists, farmers, fishers, and so on. However, he believes that a pastoralist society cannot construct the foundations of a powerful state. This observation comes from outdated anthropological data from the late colonial period. Most of the data have now been refined by recent studies on the HoA.

Clapham presents a detailed analysis of the problematic nature of the Ethiopian ethnic-based federation. Essentially and historically undemocratic, the Ethiopian regime follows a system of internal authoritarianism, whereby people are accustomed to submitting to anyone who captures power. The freedom-loving and egalitarian Somalis could not easily accept this arrangement, even if it was normal in Ethiopia and Eritrea. Somalis in Ethiopia were divided along clan lines, and unqualified leaders were chosen among them. These leaders were intended to lead but instead only managed to oppress their people. The fact is that, throughout Ethiopian history, there have never been two regimes which transferred power democratically and peacefully (the recent transfer of power within the ruling coalition party from one prime minister to another being exception to the rule). How a country that has never witnessed a peaceful transfer of power from one party or group to another could exist without violence and conflict is an open-ended question. The fact that “an Ethiopian regime can, as always, be ousted only by force” ( 91) makes Ethiopia very fragile but nevertheless not fragmented.

Clapham has much more to say on Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia than on the northeast Somali region in Kenya, while he briefly touches upon Djibouti. His insight into Ethiopian political dynamics is obviously sharper than his understanding of that in Somalia and Eritrea. This is mainly due to his long years of observing Ethiopia, even though he does not raise the question of human rights violations in the Somali region in Ethiopia. Nor is there any mention of the Oromo uprising which was triggered by the Master Plan in late 2015. Defensive of the Ethiopian regime and critical of the Eritrean regime, Clapham condescendingly critiques the commission that mediated the border problem between Eritrea and Ethiopia. This commission finally reached the conclusion that Badme, the disputed town, belonged to Eritrea, on the basis of written material and treaties between Ethiopia and Italy on that border. Ethiopia, nevertheless, is pressuring Eritrea not on the warfront but on diplomatic front to challenge that outcome.

In the comparison between Eritrea and Ethiopia, Clapham leans towards the latter. Comparing Somalia and Ethiopia, he also leans towards the latter. Even between Ethiopia and Italy, Clapham prefers the Ethiopian position. This is not to imply that he is biased, but all his available data comes from Ethiopia. In agreement with Alex de Waal and others who eulogize the late Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi (in fact, Clapham’s first and the only reference in the introduction says it all and needs no explanation), this account is otherwise insightful, thoughtful, and full of wisdom. However, there are few errors: Dire Dawa was no longer under a federal jurisdiction, but it was made a “chartered city” in 2004; Djibouti became independent in 1977, not in 1997 (142, see also 170); it was not the Somali Prime Minister, but rather the President who challenged the principles of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1963; the statue of Jigjiga is the Dervish leader Sayid Mohamed Abdulle Hassan, not Ahmed Gurey (Gragn in the Ethiopian language) (18). Other than that, the book should be read as an introduction to the past and present political dynamics of the HoA.