In the United States, the borderline obsessive academic focus with judicial independence as a political science concept would lead one to believe that judicial independence as an empirical political reality is persistently endangered. And yet, periodic partisan apoplexy about controversial Supreme Court decisions notwithstanding, it is anything but: Even with judicial potency in polities as disparate as Israel, India, and Germany, the American judiciary remains perhaps the most powerful and most stable in the world. But with all due respect to John Locke, all the world is emphatically not America. Elsewhere, of course, there are locales where the climate surrounding law and courts is rather different, where judicial independence is inconsistent, threatened, or downright fictitious. It is in the study of these nations that judicial independence deserves the central place in public law scholarship it already occupies in America. And with the publication of Maria Popova's Politicized Justice in Emerging Democracies, students of at least two sets of those nations—post-Soviet states specifically and emerging democracies more generally—have both a clarion call for what they could be studying and a first-rate example of how they could be studying it.
Taking as her starting point the fact that citizens universally desire (and scholars universally praise) the rule of law yet not all nations possess it, Popova orients her book around a series of related queries. Why is the rule of law so hard to establish in postauthoritarian regimes? Why do independent courts—integral as they are to the rule of law—rarely exist outside of established democratic politics? What forces encourage or impede the development of such courts? At the heart of Popova's answers to these substantial questions is her “strategic pressure theory”: the idea that in emerging democracies, political competition “hinders rather than promotes the maintenance of independent courts” (p. 3, emphasis original). In such regimes, she hypothesizes—and then supports through both quantitative and qualitative analysis of judicial output in post-Soviet Russia and Ukraine from 1998 to 2004—political competition functions rather differently than it does in consolidated democracies, providing incentives for electorally vulnerable political incumbents to meddle in judicial affairs and ultimately leading to “the politicization of justice, the subordination of courts to the executive, and the failure of the rule of law project” (p. 3).
Following an introduction that frames these issues both anecdotally and academically, Popova effectively proceeds in three steps: theoretically (Chapters 1–3), quantitatively (Chapters 4–5), and qualitatively (Chapters 6–7). In her first three chapters, she carefully refines the concept of judicial independence (Chapter 1); systematically develops, vis-à-vis the extant literature, her own theory about the relationship between law and politics in emerging democracies (Chapter 2); and offers both a helpful background discussion and logical theoretical predictions about the two case studies in her analysis (Chapter 3). Having laid this groundwork, the author proceeds to show how, in both electoral registration disputes (Chapter 4) and defamation lawsuits against media outlets (Chapter 5), Ukraine—counterintuitively, she explains—exhibited substantially (in the first case) and somewhat (in the second case) less judicial independence than Russia.
Finally, in order to fuse these two parts of her project and show how the differences in judicial independence in Russia and Ukraine are better explained by her strategic pressure theory than by existing theories of judicial independence, Popova employs fascinating and illuminating data gleaned from elite interviews to demonstrate both the tools available to post-Soviet politicians to pressure their courts (Chapter 6) and the reasons that Russian politicians did not pressure their courts as much as their Ukrainian counterparts did (Chapter 7). With a conclusion that looks toward the future of Russian and Ukrainian politics and considers the prospects for, as well as challenges facing, rule-of-law advocates more globally, the book is lucid, rigorous, and convincing scholarship.
Of particular note are three innovations that offer Popova compelling analytic leverage on her core puzzle: her deft attempt to complicate and enrich the concept of judicial dependence, her sensitivity to thinking about the effects of regime type on judicial politics, and her willingness to venture beyond the traditional academic focus on high courts to other loci of judicial action.
First, the author is wise to emphasize both that judicial independence is a “relational” (p. 6) concept that might refer to dependence upon, or independence from, a wide variety of sources (politicians, the public, the media) and that judicial independence is vulnerable not when politicians merely have the capacity to pressure the courts but when they exhibit the willingness to do so as well (p. 21). Against the all-too-often intellectually amorphous discussions of judicial independence that pervade most work on the subject, she does yeoman work in adding heft and richness to a widely used concept.
Second, careful to chart out the ways in which her countries of interest are somewhere between quasi-democracies (at best) and pseudodemocracies (at worst), Popova illustrates that regime type is a crucial factor in predicting and understanding a nation's judicial politics. Especially considering that so much public-law scholarship focuses on the “judicialization” of politics (p. 40), her examination of the reverse phenomenon—instances where judges possess too little independence rather than too much—fruitfully extends the basic comparativist assumption that different types of political systems can and do face vastly different types of political concerns related to the realm of law and courts.
Third, astutely observing that there are substantial differences between the ways in which high courts and lower courts—whether trial or appeals—behave (pp. 29–30), Popova draws our attention away from a singular focus on constitutional review and evinces the fact that judicial power is wielded, and thus judicial independence is at stake, throughout the judicial hierarchy and across the political land. As she makes clear, so much of the work of courts is done—and so much of the force of law realized—not through abstract philosophizing about fundamental principles but through concrete application of rules and procedures far more important than their relative lack of intrigue would suggest. In each case, the author's contribution is not merely to add a new case to support a hypothesis or a new variable to include in future models; instead, it is to modify, broaden, or correct the ways in which we think about the relationship between judges and politics.
While these virtues are emblematic of a book that is both sophisticated and forceful, there are three other areas in which it leaves me either puzzled, conflicted, or unsatisfied.
First, Popova's depiction of and engagement with her two alternative categories of explanations—what she calls “structural insulation” and “strategic actor” theories—seems strained and even a bit skewed at times, almost to the point of verging, needlessly, on a caricature or a straw man. For example, the author writes in her conclusion that “a strong and independent judiciary cannot be created through institutional engineering” and expresses skepticism that there is “a simple and straightforward relationship between judicial institutions and judicial behavior” (p. 173). I do not disagree with either statement; rather, I find myself questioning who among the universe of contemporary public-law scholars truly would. The more precise point, I think, is that a strong and independent judiciary cannot be created through institutional engineering alone. Judicial independence is no doubt partly structural-institutional, but it is far from solely structural-institutional. Indeed, as the literature on the political construction of judicial power in America has shown, institutional safeguards are crucial for the exercise of judicial authority, but support for courts—and, more to the point, the very institutional safeguards themselves—must be built through the political process and supported by political interests (whether the promotion of a particular policy or the preservation of an electoral coalition or the maintenance of a well-functioning government). Even in an established democracy such as the United States, then, judicial independence is as politically constructed as it is legally provided. In turn, even in a nation where judicial independence has proven remarkably stable and protected, judicial behavior is still subject to an interplay among formal institutions, informal norms, and political incentives that is anything but simple.
Second, while completely sensible from the perspective of research design, Popova's focus solely on the independence of judges from incumbent politicians and, consequently, on legal realms of high—one might say extreme—political salience (electoral registration and defamation) might be too restrictive. As she is careful to emphasize, judges can be independent from or dependent upon a variety of sources (and even vary in their independence from a single source, depending upon the substantive issue) (pp. 19–20), so might not the Russian and Ukrainian judges studied here be functionally independent in other ways or on other issues? In focusing exclusively on these two areas, do we actually gain a holistic picture of judicial independence in post-Soviet politics or merely a small slice that might not be entirely representative or generalizable? (After all, if judges were to be dependent anywhere—if judicial independence were to be weak anywhere—it would surely be in issue areas such as these.) I suspect that Popova has a ready response to this line of questioning, but she does not quite offer it in the book. The boldest and most persuasive retort, and one that she is well-equipped to make, is that independence from incumbent politicians is the single most important type of independence from the perspective of establishing the rule of law and that judicial independence cannot really be said to exist in any meaningful form if it does not exist in this way and on issues of this sort. Such an argument may or may not be implicit in the author's treatment, but for her analytic choices to be justified theoretically and normatively, a more explicit and forthright discussion of the connections between, and hierarchy within, different sources of (in)dependence would have been extremely advantageous.
Third, and finally, upon completing Popova's fine study, I cannot help but wish for more about the path out of the quagmire she describes—about the path to judicial independence and, ultimately, the rule of law. This is a subject that is raised in the final few pages of the book (pp. 172–74), but the issue, which motivates the entire project and has obvious relevance far beyond Russia and Ukraine, receives short shrift relative to its importance. If the rule of law is universally good, what exactly needs to happen in Russia and Ukraine—to say nothing of other emerging democracies—for it to be realized? The answer Popova begins to sketch in her final paragraph emphasizes democratic institutions like parties and a free press, effectively saying that the answer is for emerging democracies to finish emerging, to become less emerging and more emerged. Does she really mean to suggest that judicial independence—and, by extension, the rule of law it helps to create—are virtually impossible in emerging democracies and that one can only lay the groundwork for such dynamics until such time as democratic consolidation is complete? If so, then I fear for the advocates of rule of law in emerging democracies. For if the author is right, as she may well be, then we have reached something of a dilemma: The rule of law is best (or can only be?) forged in stable democracies, but a democracy can hardly be classified as stable if it does not already possess the rule of law. Far more than an analytic chicken-or-the-egg conundrum, that reality represents a grim future for those seeking, desiring, or working toward democracy everywhere.
These concerns notwithstanding, Politicized Justice in Emerging Democracies is a careful and insightful analysis of the ways in which law and politics interact in regimes where the “accoutrements of democracy” (p. 4) do not automatically signify the experience of it. Needless to say, after reading her book, I know far more about judicial independence in Popova's nations of expertise, but I also find myself armed with new tools to think about—and new questions to consider regarding—the politics of judicial power in my own. Whatever else one might say about a book, surely that is a compliment of the highest order.
