Historian Joseph S. Tulchin offers a sweeping account, laced with detail, of two centuries of international politics in the Americas, drawing on his own distinguished career and forays into international relations theory for insights. His key argument focuses on the concept of ‘agency’, which Tulchin boils down to ‘what space in the international system Latin American leaders believed they had’ and how they went about using it (p. 6). Contrasting himself with more deterministic accounts of US–Latin American relations, Tulchin sees a fair amount of ‘wiggle room’ under US hegemony (p. 56). However, from the end of Iberian empires, through independence, to the rise of the United States of America, and well into the Cold War, Tulchin is sceptical that Latin Americans demonstrated much agency. He sees ‘little evidence’ of Latin Americans taking a ‘proactive stance’ during the nineteenth century (p. 7). Contrasting Latin America to the United States during independence, there was ‘virtually no discussion’ in Latin America of an ‘active role in world affairs’ (p. 36). In the twentieth century, Latin American foreign policies were largely limited to ‘strategies to avoid US bullying’ (p. 8). In Tulchin's view, it was not until the Cold War ended and democracy expanded in the 1980s and 1990s that Latin America started demonstrating agency in international affairs.
Ultimately, it is hard to assess Tulchin's claims about agency against his own evidence. The criteria for agency are not sufficiently defined, and he implies different standards for Latin America from those one might apply to other states. Regional competition in Latin America during the nineteenth century does not count as agency; states were ‘inhibited from expressing agency’ due to internal and boundary disputes (p. 33). However, most states spend considerable energies dealing with their immediate neighbours. The expanding United States – which Tulchin contrasts with Latin America – was often at war with Indian nations, bordering colonial empires, Mexico, and itself. Tulchin points to the US Civil War, noting that the Union and Confederacy reached out to allies as part of a ‘realist tradition’ of foreign affairs. Many of the parties to Latin America's civil conflicts also searched for allies abroad, but what counts as agency for the United States is the opposite for Latin America. Often, Tulchin's application of ‘agency’ to Latin America implicitly requires intra-Latin American cooperation as a criterion. There was ‘no strategic opposition’ to US expansionism, Tulchin asserts (p. 50), perhaps questionably. Why one would expect a united Latin American front is not clear, nor does Tulchin demand unified international cooperation from the United States or European powers as a standard for agency. Tulchin qualifies Latin American engagements with the United States as ‘partial agency’. If engagements with neighbours are not agency and dealings with the United States are indicative of ‘partial agency’, what would satisfy the criteria for ‘agency’?
Instead of using ‘agency’ to explore Latin American worldviews and actions, Tulchin often uses the concept to deny their significance. This is unfortunate. Tulchin mentions Latin American traditions of international law, but gives them little credit, saying ‘there was very little sense that [Latin Americans] could play a role in setting these rules’ (p. 36) for the hemisphere or beyond. Latin America's role in the League of Nations is briefly mentioned, but as an example of lacking agency because ‘There was no attempt to bring the Latin American nations together in a bloc to reform the new organisation’ (p. 62). He is similarly dismissive of Latin American participation in World War 2 and its aftermath. He writes that ‘the United States had sufficient leverage to force them to behave, but not sufficient resources – or will – to provide for them, a situation that would maximise the hostility generated in the region’, claiming rising ‘ill will’ against the United States during the war (p. 72). Frustrations over wartime shortages notwithstanding, in many countries there was voluntary cooperation with the United States and identification with the Allied cause. Postwar economic disappointments seem to be read backward into wartime, or the Argentine discord extrapolated. In planning the postwar order, it is clear that Latin American states were outside the inner sanctum of the Big Three. But to conclude that they lacked agency underplays Latin American advocacy (even if not always successful) of regionalism, international law and the inclusion of human rights. Recent work by Eric Helleiner (Forgotten Foundations of Bretton Woods: International Development and the Making of the Postwar Order, Cornell University Press, 2014), for example, highlights Latin American influence at Bretton Woods. Tulchin sees agency as lacking throughout the Cold War, offering Costa Rica's José Figueres as the exception that proves the rule. Figueres showed that ‘agency can be achieved by a deliberate compromise of autonomy’ (p. 91). But surely, there are many such cases, even if they occurred with structures of asymmetry and bipolarity.
For Tulchin, the picture changes in the post-Cold War era, the focus of three of the book's eight chapters. He proclaims that ‘autonomy and agency of the countries in the region have reached historic levels and cannot go back to an earlier level’ (p. 183). Despite Tulchin's initial claims of dramatic difference, many sections question Latin American agency. Soviet collapse and democratisation allowed Latin Americans to ‘begin to seek their own agency’ (p. 97), though this was distorted by ‘Anti-Americanism’. The ‘only significant initiative to form community in the region’ came from Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez (p. 139), who was mostly ‘interested in tweaking Uncle Sam's nose’ (p. 140). Tulchin emphasises regional cooperation as key to Latin American agency, but is ambivalent about new bodies like the Economic Community for Latin America and the Caribbean (CELAC) and the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR). Mexico's agency is limited by its human rights record, Colombia's by its conflict, Brazil's by internal debates over whether to be a global or regional player.
Given its broad chronological and geographical scope, Tulchin's book provides an engaging introduction for students of Latin America's international relations. Looking across Tulchin's account of that vast sweep, however, one may be left wondering if Latin America's new age of agency is in fact such a sea change.
