Since the 1970s, researchers have studied the electoral advantages of congressional incumbents, advantages that may be offset if “quality challengers”—experienced politicians—run against them. These quality challengers make strategic decisions whether to enter a race or not, and their decisions are based, in part, on the expectation that voters will punish incumbents for poor representation. Jamie L. Carson and Joel Sievert’s new book asks whether this model of strategic electoral representation applies to an earlier period of American history. In doing so, it asks fundamental questions about representation in nineteenth-century America: Did elections allow citizens a meaningful opportunity to choose members of the U.S. House of Representatives? Did it matter who ran for Congress? Could citizens punish legislators for poor representation?
Nineteenth-century elections provide a difficult test for contemporary models of congressional elections. There is ample previous research indicating that the use of party-list ballots prevented citizens from voting for or against individual candidates, while Congress made many policy decisions during “lame duck” congressional sessions held after the elections for the next Congress. Furthermore, during the decades before the adoption of primary elections, parties chose candidates in nominating conventions. In many sections of the country, parties adopted a norm of rotation in office, which means that parties nominated politicians for one or two terms per office. In this system, scholars have argued, members of the U.S. House had little opportunity to develop personal reputations, and citizens had little opportunity to reward or punish incumbents.
In order to test whether contemporary models of elections help us understand a different historical context, Carson and Sievert (in a chapter co-authored with Jeffrey A. Jenkins drawing on Jamie Carson and Jeffery Jenkins, “Examining the Electoral Connection Across Time,” Annual Review of Political Science, 14, 2011) first generalize the conditions for an effective citizen control of their representatives: (1) Most politicians are politically ambitious, either seeking reelection to the same office or a different elected position; (2) politicians enjoy meaningful autonomy, deciding whether to run for office and campaigning independently of a party organization; (3) politicians are able to be individually responsive by taking personal positions and claiming personal credit for legislative action; and (4) voters can hold their own members of Congress accountable for their actions. The book then tests whether these four conditions are met during the nineteenth century.
Carson and Sievert provide ample evidence of politicians’ ambition and autonomy. Chapter 4 finds that from 1820 to 1888, experienced politicians were more likely to run for open congressional seats, while incumbents were less likely to face challengers with previous political experience from 1840 to 1888. These decisions affected election outcomes; in asymmetric elections where one U.S. House candidate was experienced (including incumbents) and the opposing candidate was not, voter turnout tended to decrease while the vote share of the more experienced candidate was generally higher.
The book also provides evidence that voters could hold House members accountable during the nineteenth century. Chapter 6 argues that the use of party tickets did not completely insulate legislators from popular judgment. House members who were effective and popular could be renominated by their party to improve the attractiveness of the overall ticket. Furthermore, House incumbents who were excluded from the “official” party ticket could organize an alternative ticket to distribute at the polls, thereby circumventing the party’s control over nominations. Finally, Chapter 6 argues that the variability of election timing allowed House members to separate their elections from more salient elections (especially for president and governor), with the support of state officials. Even when presidential and congressional election dates were synchronized, experienced legislators provided a boost for their party tickets, all else being equal. Finally, Chapter 7 provides case studies in accountability, focusing on the 1872 tariff law, bills making up the Compromise of 1850, and voting during lame-duck sessions.
Electoral Incentives in Congress does not directly test for responsiveness (the third component of representation) by members of Congress because it is focused on elections, not legislative behavior. However, the results summarized previously provide indirect support for the claim that nineteenth-century House members did strive to be responsive to their constituents. At least some of the incumbency advantage enjoyed by these legislators was based on the provision of effective service to their constituents, while the case studies provide examples of voters demonstrating that they could reward responsiveness.
The book has two broader implications for the study of American political history, and of legislative elections. First, extant models of contemporary American elections can help us explain a wider range of electoral outcomes if the models are generalized to apply to different contexts. Second, it helps to “normalize” nineteenth-century politics. Scholars seeking to understand these legislators and their actions can and should think of them as ambitious politicians who were advancing their careers within the constraints of democratic politics.
One limitation of this work is that it provides only a brief discussion of rotation in office. This practice is fascinating as a counterpoint to the current period of long-term incumbents, and as a precursor to the term-limits movement of the late twentieth century. The practice of rotation underscored the degree to which nineteenth-century voters and party leaders preferred “delegate” to “trustee” models of representation. The results of this book suggest that by defending rotation in office, local party organizations may have also been forgoing the electoral benefits of renominating well-known, responsive members of Congress.
For Electoral Incentives, the long-standing emphasis on rotation in office serves as the “conventional wisdom” of underrepresentation that the authors seek to test. The book misses an opportunity, however, to fully document the rise and fall of rotation in office. Where and when does it seem to flourish? Is there a meaningful competitive difference between incumbent House members running for reelection and candidates with prior electoral success running for a different office? When and why do incumbents win out over local traditions of rotation? This remains a topic deserving further study.
A second opportunity for further research is to evaluate the effect of congressional service on political careers. The authors make an excellent distinction between congressional careers—a period of service in the national legislature—and political careers served in local, state, and federal office. This is a meaningful distinction in the present day, but especially important for understanding how nineteenth-century parties employed a class of professional politicians serving relatively short congressional careers as they cycled between offices. In this political environment, what is the value of service in Congress? Was the U.S. House of Representatives considered a prestigious office that served as a stepping-stone between local and statewide offices? It would be labor intensive to identify and document a comparison group of politicians, but the reward would be an understanding of the relative importance of the U.S. Congress in the political system. In any event, these are just some of the fascinating questions raised by this important study.
