Here is a tribute to humanity. When under dictatorial rule, with free speech much constrained, a young intellectual mimed; he mimed in a public square. He mimed a protest speech, a speech without words. People drew round to watch and listen; to watch the expressive gestures, the flicker of tongue, the mouthing lips; to listen to – silence. The authorities also watched and listened, but did nothing.
The incident – 1986, Zagreb, Yugoslavia – says much. It is a tribute to humanity: the young man's ingenuity, courage and force for freedom. It may also be condemnation of humanity: the authorities' desire for power, conformity, repression. The incident displays human absurdity – a protest speech without words. A protest was being made, as all could tell. Yet the law – the law against protest – remained unbroken. The protestor obeyed the law's demand not to speak, yet spoke. The police were dutiful in stopping protest, yet allowed protest. Our humanity enables us to see our lives as filled with incongruities and tensions such as the above – yet also with aspirations and achievements, also as above. Our humanity encourages a smile.Footnote 1
Absurdities
Rupert Brooke's ‘Heaven’Footnote 2 and the young man's protest introduce the paper's topic: absurdities within and without religion, life with and without absurdity. One absurdity is simply that of believing in a ‘beyond’, a transcendent, a god or gods, without evidence, without good reason.
‘Absurdity’ as used here focuses on incongruity, a clash, an extreme example being an explicit contradiction of the form p & not-p. ‘She came from Dungerness, but not from Dungerness.’ In the incongruity of a protest speech without speech, there is a sense of clash, but we readily understand what is going on: a mimed speech is not ‘really’ a speech, yet may have the same effect as a speech – or even more. We can assert out loud that the protester is miming a protest speech, yet that is something that he must mime, if wishing to express agreement within his silent constraint. He is constrained; we are not. We are more detached, as we also are when judging Brooke's pondering fish. The clash between an attached view and a detached view – between perspectives – recurs in this paper.
Incongruities, as seen with ‘Heaven’, drive humour: jokes, puns and cartoons, usually involve a clash; we expect one outcome, but find ourselves suddenly confronted with something rather different. A husband says, ‘Darling, I missed you.’ How loving we feel – but he next says, ‘I must fire again!’ The scene is cast in a different light. We abruptly see things differently; we are given a new vantage point.
G. E. Moore may appear far removed from all this, but he drew attention to the absurdity of someone asserting a proposition of the form: p, but I do not believe that p. This is Moore's Paradox, as it became labelled courtesy of an impressed Wittgenstein.Footnote 3 It is absurd for me to assert or think, ‘Today is Friday, but I don't believe that today is Friday,’ yet the proposition that I express seems the same as that expressed by others without absurdity, and one that may be true, namely, ‘Today is Friday, but Peter Cave doesn't believe today is Friday.’ I cannot possess the vantage point on my current beliefs that is possessed by others. In trying to secure that vantage point, detached from my current beliefs, I lapse into absurdity. We shall return to Moore's Paradox.
I am a humanist, an atheistic humanist. ‘Humanist’ hereafter applies to atheists who recognize the force of moral values, the sense of fellow feeling and the possibility of lives flourishing.Footnote 4 Religion, for humanists, forms one arena for absurdities. Indeed, some religious believers themselves view religion as such an arena. Humanists may feel superior. ‘At least we do not live by absurdities as religious believers do.’ This paper challenges that assertion, by displaying some similar absurdities in reason, through some paradoxes, and some absurdities at the heart of human life. Arguably, the paradoxes of reason are contrived and the resultant absurdities can be dissolved. Unarguably, people can live well without the absurdities of religious belief.Footnote 5 The absurdities of human life though – well, they seem to be ones that we – believers or no – cannot live without while remaining recognizably human.
Absurdities in religion cannot be laughed off in the way of laughter at the absurdities in humour. Religious beliefs, however absurd many such beliefs may strike us, can be dangerous. With a supposed god or gods, or the one God, on their side – and, hereafter for ease, let us merely mention God, without the caveats – religious believers may be deaf to reason, blind to evidence, and untouched by appeals to humanity. How can anything compete, so to speak, with the declarations of an omnipotent, omniscient deity! If scriptures, religious leaders or revelations tell believers, for example, that homosexuality is wicked, then appeals to humanity, to reason, to toleration, hit a brick wall, a scriptural reading rendered as stone. If a revealed ‘God's word’ announces that apostates should be killed, then invoking common humanity is unlikely to carry much weight. If divinely inspired scripture insists that Adam and Eve were directly created by God six thousand years ago, then all the evidence for evolution will be re-interpreted. None of this is to deny that many, many religious beliefs and believers are kindly and humanist driven; and humanists must, of course, recognize that much of humanity seems drawn to a divine beyond – as are Brooke's fish.
Religious absurdities lead many to reject religious belief; and religions' potential dangers provide motivation to encourage some others. Of course, humanists' stress on reason and evidence ought not to suggest that humanists are devoid of passion, opposed to absurdities of humour, and never hold contradictory beliefs or perform terrible deeds; but humanists often think – aspire, hope, trust – that, once religions' absurdities have been exposed, life's puzzles may be ironed out, at least to some extent. Human cooperation, rationality, and empathy may come to the rescue, not over the solar system's collapse and humanity's eventual destruction, but over how our lives may be improved and how best to view meaning in life and of death.
Many lives, indeed, could go much better, without religion – just think of countries dominated by Islamic governments – but I doubt whether any of us can iron out life's creases and wrinkles, the conflicting perspectives, tensions, and incongruities that we live by and die by. I doubt the good sense of even wanting so to do. Here, humanistic ironing is not the project. The project, as implied, is merely to remind us that, arguably, all is not well in the land of reason – and in life – if we seek to avoid absurdities. Maybe we can patch up reason, but not life.
Magic
One absurdity which draws the eye is magic. The beautiful young lady is being sawn in half, or so it seems. We experience a clash: what we seem to be seeing clashes with what we yet know to be so. Once we learn more, learn how the act is performed, we may lose the excitement; yet we may still be unable to see what is really happening. More mundanely, we know that the drawing can appear as a duck and also as a rabbit, but when we see the rabbit, we cannot also be seeing the duck.
With conjuring tricks, we are typically aware that there is an explanation in terms of everyday procedures, maybe speeded up, and we can be immersed in the magic of the trick, while knowing that it is just a trick. No weird laws of nature are being manifested or well-known laws broken, concerning hats, rabbits or ladies in many parts. We can be both enmeshed within the magical exercise and yet detached, knowing it is just magic. There is kinship here with how we can believe in, be moved – even to tears – by the characters in a novel, a play or opera, while knowing they are but fictional. In some way, we occupy two vantage points, closing eyes to the resultant incongruity.
For some people, magic can be more than mere conjuring tricks. Ritual activities, incantations, uses of occult knowledge – some use these with the intention of manipulating people and objects in ways unknown to the physical sciences. Some people stick pins in dolls, burn effigies, or chant curses, to bring about bad happenings to victims. These are no mere symbolic acts; they are believed to have causal powers. At an everyday level, a lover loses a ring and may believe that, as a result, the relationship is at an end.
Many of us engage in little rituals. We ask to be buried together, but not because we anticipate holding hands in death. We place flowers on graves, but not because we believe that corpses or onward souls will experience the scent and beauty – and final decay.Footnote 6 These are things that we do. Of course, many religious activities are also symbolic, but for some believers they possess causal powers, as if magical. Many Christians believe the bread and wine of the Eucharist, in some way, really are converted into Christ's body and blood. Religious believers may pray that their children survived a disaster unscathed, believing that their prayers after the accident may yet affect the accident. Such beliefs, for many of us, are akin to believing that the young lady really has been sawn into two. Such beliefs are, as John Maynard Keynes once said, instances of hocus-pocus.
Religious absurdities
Belief in God as omnipotent, loving and requiring worship, seems akin to belief in magic or collapse into fiction. We shall take up the fiction later; but let us briefly sketch three particular clashes in religion to compare them with those in reason and life. The three concern reflective motivation, religion-ism and immunization.Footnote 7 They are additional to the central puzzle, namely, the existence of religious belief when there seems no good evidence or good reason for such belief.
Reflective motivation
Many, many religious believers think that a necessary condition for reaching heaven is to obey God's commands. Perhaps this is to misunderstand the religious texts, but the puzzle, the absurdity, arises from what many, many religious people believe, whether or not the belief is true – and their belief may well be based on many sermons preached from many pulpits about the many wages of sin. One godly command is a moral one, namely, that we ought to help others, and, most importantly, that we ought to do so for the sake of those others, not to benefit ourselves. The puzzle is that this leaves believers who seek to follow God on this matter in a seemingly impossible position.
Christian believes that, by acting morally, he will reap the benefits of passing the moral test at heaven's gate. His motivation is to secure the heavenly end and avoid the hellish. Perhaps Christian was a pretty immoral character before he came to believe in God and grasped what God commanded. After a little reflection, he reasons, ‘There is no point in my helping others; this is because what motivates me is my desire for heaven (or fear of hell) and that makes the whole point … er … pointless.’ To pass heaven's moral test, he needs to act morally, without any self-interested motivation, yet he clearly possesses a self-interested motivation. Christian's simple aim of achieving heaven seems, paradoxically, to prevent his doing what is required for heaven.Footnote 8
Being motivated by a heavenly afterlife need not contaminate being motivated by the plight of others. People can be genuinely motivated to help others for their own sake and be genuinely motivated to do what is required to reach heaven, yet because they fail to realize that helping others is a means of increasing heavenly chances, there is no problem. Christian may be able to take this path by developing ignorance. He could set about helping people, albeit with the wrong motive yet, over time, come genuinely to be helping them for their sake, forgetting the link with heavenly entry. Indeed, you may be motivated to do X, knowing that X brings about Y, yet not be motivated by Y. That is easily seen when Y is undesirable, but not so easily when Y is desirable and desired.
For Christian to have the right motivation, we need him to help others, even without the consequence of the increased likelihood of heaven. As Christian is a seriously committed religious believer, can he make sense of such a possibility: of there being no God; of not wanting to go to heaven? If he is unable to make sense of it, he cannot assess what he would still do in, for him, such a senseless world. The answer perhaps is that no requirement exists for him to be able to carry out the ‘Would I still?’ test, just that it be possible for someone to carry it out. Step forth the atheist – now, arguably, in a better position, with a better vantage point, than Christian for evaluating his true motivation.
Religion-ism
Let us turn to the second religious puzzle: religion-ism. Consider two individuals, one brought up Christian and firmly remaining committed to Christianity, the other brought up Muslim and firmly remaining Muslim. They are reflective individuals; they recognize that had they been brought up differently – in the faith of the other – they would have been committed to different religious beliefs. Importantly, these two believers, unlike many believers, recognize in a detached way that evidence for Christianity is of the same strength and character as that for Islam. So, the counterfactuals concerning what they would have believed are not akin to our believing, ‘Had we been brought up in the Middle Ages, then we would have believed the Earth the centre of the universe.’ In this astronomical example, we understand that we now have more and better evidence.
Knowing that their particular religious commitments depend so heavily on their upbringing and culture – and knowing that there is no worldly evidence or tests to show one religion is right, the other wrong – each believer would seem irrational in holding fast to her belief. It seems a prejudice in favour of one religion over another: religion-ism. Non-believers find it utterly absurd that, say, a Christian Sophie can be so confident in her Christianity while agreeing that, had she been brought up a few miles away, across a border, she would be Muslim, confident in Islam. We may make our example vivid, by supposing our two individuals identical twins who, at birth, became separated, growing up as described. Had they been switched at birth, then Sophie would now be committed to Islam. Reason suggests that they should suspend belief. Of course, they may respond, ‘Ah, but this is faith’ – but this sounds akin to responding, ‘Ah, but this is superstition’, or to insisting that the young lady really has been sawn in half and stuck back together.
Immunization
Believers typically maintain that God is all good and loving – and also all powerful, including all knowing – yet evils, in the form of numerous sufferings, exist. Lest we forget, right now, millions of people are suffering malnutrition, natural disasters, disease or war. Think also of particular, more homely cases – of toothaches, pains in dying and seeing loved ones dying. Add to these the sufferings of non-human animals. Many, many of these sufferings seem gratuitous. Indeed, John Stuart Mill stressed that, looking around the world, we find considerable evidence to blacken any deity's name, not much evidence for praise. Believers are accepting a clash, an incongruity, between the divine characteristics and how the world is. Non-believers usually find this absurd.
Humanists use reflections concerning this well-known problem of evil to point to the non-existence of an all-powerful, all-good God. Perhaps, indeed, we should have sympathy for the Devil: the Devil is overlooked when there is such evidence for a malign superpower, assuming the world is any evidence at all for the supernatural. If the world is evidence for anything supernatural, we perhaps should move to the position of believing there to be supernatural powers, in conflict, one for good, and one for evil – something like the Zoroastrian position. This would be the most rational religious belief – which perhaps explains why there are so few Zoroastrians.
Reasoning absurdities
Many believers are trapped within one or other of the three absurdities or puzzles above. Yet reflective reasoning and logic give rise to similar puzzles. There is the well-known liar type of paradox. ‘The proposition expressed by this sentence is not true.’ On the surface, if true then absurdly it is not true; and if not true, then absurdly true. Here are three puzzles, again only briefly sketched, which seem to leave us baffled over what to believe and hence do.Footnote 9 They are Surprise, Newcomb, and Chalice.
Surprise
This well-known paradox tells of students being informed by a truthful teacher of a noon examination one school-day next week. It is a surprise examination in that, whichever day it occurs, the students will have no good reason to believe on that morning that it will take place that day.
‘Well, it can't be on the last day, Friday’, think clever students, realizing that by Friday it would not then surprise, Friday being the only day left. ‘With Friday ruled out, it cannot be on the Thursday; so Thursday must be ruled out.’ Thus the reasoning continues, the days being knocked out one after the other. Clever students conclude that there can be no such surprise examination. They face the week with a complacent smugness, not bothering to revise. Of course, one day that week their smugness is intruded upon: an examination is given – and it surprises. The clever students, having not revised, may now fail the examination, while students unable to conduct such ‘clever’ reasoning have revised and pass. Clever students have been too clever by half, or at least by one eighth.Footnote 10
On encountering the paradox, people are often impressed by the tale's days ahead, but it is difficult to see why the quantity of days should be the puzzling source. After all, the puzzle arises because clever students project themselves to the Friday morning unexamined, understanding the teacher's announcement to imply that even a Friday examination would surprise. Ridding ourselves of the window-dressing of the days, we move to an austere version. To register this revision, let us hereafter speak of the Surprise Party.
If told of a surprise party this very evening, you may well be surprised at being told; but you can hardly now be surprised by the party. Surprise parties, to be surprises, require secrecy, mouths to be kept shut. Of course, the surprise may be for someone else, or the announcer may be mis-speaking. After clearing away such quibbles, you realize that the informer, firmly believed truthful, is telling you that there will be a surprise party for you this very evening. What are you to make of what you have been told?
You will probably not know what to think. However, being perceptive, you then reflect, ‘Hold on, in my not knowing what to think about the party, I am certainly not believing that there will be one – and so, when it happens, it will be a surprise.’ You now see how the announcer can be speaking the truth after all; but that flips you back into believing that the party will be given, and hence into not being surprised. And so, you reel, round and round.
Newcomb
You are a contestant in a long-running television show. You face two boxes. One is open, and the contents, £10,000, can be clearly seen. The other is a surprise box, its contents hidden. You need to choose whether to take both boxes or the surprise box only. The surprise box is either empty or contains £1,000,000, its contents determined by a mind-reader's prior assessment of your character and the choice you will make. If the mind-reader judged that you will two-box, then nothing has been placed in the surprise box. If she judged that you will one-box, taking only the surprise box, then £1,000,000 will have been placed in the box.
The show has run for many years, and, whenever players have selected both boxes, the surprise box has been empty – or has been empty in 99.99% cases. That latter qualification highlights that the jackpot win, of the million pounds together with the £10,000, is possible: maybe very, very occasionally the mind-reader makes a mistake; mind-reading can be tiring.
You want to secure the most money possible. What is it rational to do? There are two conflicting lines of reasoning, both powerful. Given the evidence of the mind-reader's mind-reading success, it is surely rational to select the surprise box only, for she will have correctly predicted your choice. This ‘evidential’ argument clashes with the ‘causal’ or ‘already there’ argument. ‘Look, the money is already there – or not – so you may as well take both boxes.’ We are not proposing backward causation or that your choice could now cause the £1,000,000 (if present) magically to vanish. Suppose, indeed, that you could actually see what is in the surprise box: what sight could lead you not to two-box?
Most philosophers support the ‘already there’ reasoning. Were they to do so in practice, the evidence overwhelmingly suggests that they would leave the show pretty grumpy, having secured only the £10,000: the mind-reader would have anticipated their philosophical preference in the reasoning. Participants who allow the mind-reader's past success to dominate their reasoning, thus taking the surprise box only, nearly always end up with the £1,000,000. Ideally, to maximize winnings, you need to get into the position of sincerely wanting to one-box (so the mind-reader puts in the million pounds), yet incongruously ending up two-boxing.
Is the successful mind-reader possible in theory? Well, such a reader could be successful with different player-types: some players, for example, may come over as very greedy grabbers, who would grab at both boxes without reflection; other players may be timid, always inclined to take one rather than two. (And, of course, there are further factors concerning the relative sizes of the money involved and the contestants' wealth.) Is a successful mind-reader possible, though, when operating with those participants whom the puzzle addresses, namely those whose decisions result solely from rationality? Rationality – good reasoning – points, as seen, to no single convincing answer as to what to do. So, the mind-reader, it seems, cannot consistently and successfully predict the choices of players, if their choices are based solely on rationality. This prompts the deep question: how do choices and reasons relate to the neurological causes and effects that lead to the words we utter, the movements to take two boxes, for example, rather than just one?
Chalice
Here is a prefatory tale, unlikely, but generator of no paradox. You are a philosopher at a banquet, medieval in style, sitting beside an extremely wealthy and eccentric lady, Lady Bountiful. The time is an hour or so before midnight. She points to the chalice of wine. She tells you, truthfully, ‘If you drink this potion at dawn, I will give you the castle of your dreams, with servants at your beck and call, unlimited wealth for the rest of your life.’ You have no scruples: you would love such wealth, such life-style – such luck. There is no catch, no trick, no snag, except that, as the lady explains, the chalice is poisoned, a heady brew, an unpleasant concoction. The potion will leave you struggling with intense pains for a couple of days; but then all will be well. There are no side-effects, no damage. Masochist you are not, but the pains are worth the pleasure of the reward. This is no paradox.
Paradox arises when Lady Bountiful's offer is as described, except for one key difference. You are in better luck, or so it seems. Lady Bountiful is offering you the immensely valuable estate; the only condition now is that at midnight you must intend to drink the nasty potion at dawn. There is no need actually to drink it; merely intending is sufficient. Surely, this revised offer is so much better than the original one. Intending to do something is so much easier than doing it – and, in this case, intending to drink from the chalice causes no pain, in contrast to the drinking.
With the Lady's offer before you, you reason as follows. ‘I want the wealth, so obviously I will intend to drink. Ah, but that is enough. With the intention achieved, there is nothing more I need to do, so, of course, I shall not need to let a sip from that vile phial touch my lips. Oops! That means that I'll lack a genuine midnight intention to drink. If I intend to do something, I cannot also be set on not doing it.’
But you really do want the wealth, so the reasoning may continue. ‘Reluctantly and sadly, I now see that I had better truly intend to drink the potion. To hell with rationality! I'll just drink it. But hold on… I cannot help but realize that there will be no good reason to drink it when the time comes. A poisoned chalice, yes; but also a poisoned offer! It's an offer I cannot take up.’
This is no puzzle for wealth-seekers who do not reflect. They intend to drink and, indeed, they may go ahead – or may, if receiving the keys to the castle before dawn, realize drinking is not then needed. Poor philosophers, paradigms of rationality, have a bad time: they remain poor. Yet it is, of course, possible sincerely to intend to do things and yet fail to do them; athletes intend to win, yet lose; students to study, yet sleep instead; and lovers intend to make the earth move, yet it remains unmoved.
Comparisons: corrosions and detachments
‘The chief danger […] is scholasticism – the essence of which is treating what is vague as if it were precise and trying to fit it into an exact logical category,’ writes F. P. Ramsey, with the early Wittgenstein in mind.Footnote 11 What follows is no strong attempt at regimentation, at forcing the religious absurdities into the same categories as the reasoning ones. The claim is not that there are perfect parallels. Rather there are some wavy lines entangled.Footnote 12 Let us look at a few pairings; various ones are possible.
Let us try Chalice with Immunization. With Chalice, the midnight intention to drink the poison at dawn is corroded by the reflective awareness that there would be no good reason to carry out the intention. If faced with the offer from Lady Bountiful, we should need to blind ourselves, at least at midnight, to what it would be rational to do in the future – rather as Odysseus had himself bound to the mast, to avoid succumbing to the sirens' song. Compare with Immunization: believers in the loving, omnipotent, all-good God need to blind themselves to the gratuitousness of the suffering in the world, or embrace the suffering as, paradoxically, a sign of love and benevolence. In Chalice, we should need to be planning to drink, even though it would be absurd to drink. With Immunization, believers are committed to God even though the commitment sits incongruously, absurdly, with the world's suffering. We should expect the world's suffering to corrode the belief.
We turn to Newcomb and Religion-ism. If, as players, we could sincerely want to one-box, yet end up two-boxing, all would be well; but the awareness of the reason to two-box corrodes the one-boxing desire. Players need, when being assessed by the mind-reader, to be blind to any convincing two-box reasoning. With Religion-ism, believers committed to their religion in the way described, manage, it seems, to resist the force of the corrosive counterfactuals ‘Had I been brought up differently…’ despite awareness of them. It is that which generates the absurdity. It is similar to the way mentioned earlier in which we may immerse ourselves in a play, moved by its characters, while knowing ‘it is just a play’.
Finally, let us place Surprise with Christian's Reflective Motivation. You do not know what to make of the surprise party announcement: how can the announcer have been speaking the truth? Yet once you doubt his truth-telling – ‘I don't know what to believe’ – you can see how he could have spoken the truth: ‘the party can be given’, but that immediately corrodes the lack of belief in the party; and the puzzle returns. With Christian's reflection, once he gives up trying to get to heaven, then if he does still help others for their sake, he can get to heaven. Of course, once he sees this, then the purity of his intention is threatened again by corruption and the puzzle may return.
Considering all six puzzles, we call in Moore's Paradox for they all possess kinship with the form: p, but I do not believe that p.Footnote 13 Moore's paradox involves the impossibility of my separating how the world is from my current beliefs of how the world is. Others can do that for me, but I cannot directly do so for myself. I can readily recognize that I had mistaken beliefs, will have mistaken beliefs, and may have them now; but, in expressing how the world is, I am expressing my belief of how the world is. I cannot detach myself from my beliefs in the way that others can be detached from my beliefs. Let us see how this feature plays with the six puzzles. Let us mix them differently.
Chalice has a player (as we may term the recipient of the offer) intending to drink, binding himself to drink, and blinding himself to the sensible later plan not to drink. He cannot sincerely assent to a Moorean conjunction such as, ‘I intend to drink, but I shall not do so.’ We, as detached observers, though, may note his sincere intention, yet anticipate that later he will see the pointlessness of actually drinking: ‘He intends to drink, but won't do so.’ With Reflective Motivation, Christian wants to help others solely for their sake: if he manages to do so, then it is difficult for him to step back and recognize that this aids his heavenly entry – without undermining that entry. We, as detached observers, can see his behaviour as aiding others for their sake and as being means to heavenly entry: ‘By helping others for their sake, Christian will get what he wants.’
Turning to Surprise and Newcomb, in the minimal Surprise we indeed have the form of Moore's conjunction, for the hearer is trying to embrace in the first person, what she has been told and what may well be true. She is trying to embrace, ‘There will be a party, but I don't believe there will be.’ That is absurd. In Newcomb, we have a player trying sincerely to want to one-box when being assessed by the mind-reader, blinding himself to the two-box wisdom: he cannot hold to, ‘I choose to one-box, yet shall take two’. We, as detached observers, though, may judge that possibly could happen – without absurdity. Maybe he sincerely chooses to one-box, yet somehow or other ends up two-boxing.
The remaining two puzzles are Immunization and Religion-ism. They both have believers seeming to manage to embrace the absurdities that thwart the relevant participants of the other puzzles. With Immunization, believers hold fast to an omnipotent and all-good God, when faced with good opposing evidence. Non-believers, detached, see the believers' states as absurd, as ones in which they wittingly believe that the God of Love exists despite the overwhelming contrary evidence.Footnote 14 Sophie, the believer as set out in Religion-ism, believes in Christianity, blinding herself to the corrosive effect of the ‘Had I been nurtured in Islam…’ counterfactual. ‘Sophie believes in the Christian God rather than the Islamic despite no superior evidence for the former’ is not absurd for us to assert from our vantage point; yet Sophie's assertion, ‘I believe in the Christian God rather than the Islamic despite no superior evidence for the former’ strikes many non-believers as absurd.
Tertullian embraced religious absurdity: he declared that the Son of God was born and then died and that, because it is absurd, it is to be believed.Footnote 15 Quite what he meant is open to question, but some believers do readily recognize absurdities in their religious belief. They stress that their relationship to God is not that of a standard belief that an item exists. They may, indeed, speak of faith, of trust, of belief in. We may see this – and shall see this – as casting religious belief in a new light. Before that light, what is to be said about the reasoning puzzles? Well, arguments still rage; but one simple and persuasive thought is that impossibilities are built into the tales' premisses. Lady Bountiful simply sets the impossible task of intending to do something, knowing that, when the time came, it would be crazy to do that something. Arguably, Newcomb sets circumstances such that it is not possible for the mind-reader to be relevantly reliable in her predictions; and Surprise has the announcer magically knowing the belief states of recipients on receiving baffling information.
Belief: ‘Clarissa loves me’
How may we cope with the religious absurdities, other than dismissing God – and viewing religious believers as simply embracing absurdity? Let us take up the thought that the ‘belief’ element of much religious belief is indeed rather different from regular belief.Footnote 16 After all, sense can sometimes be found in what sounds nonsensical, if the seeming nonsensical is cast in a new light. A tribe new to the telephone apparently described telephone messages as ‘messages on poles’. Later, when they encountered the wireless, wireless messages were referred to as ‘messages on poles without the poles’.Footnote 17 We can grasp what was meant.
Suppose I yearn for Clarissa – and believe that Clarissa secretly loves me. In seeking loving demonstration, I invite her to the opera, ask her round for drinks and send her earrings. My offers are spurned. My conclusion is that opera is not her cup of tea, that she is a non-drinker and that she lacks desire for earrings. When, the following week, I see her at the Royal Opera House, sipping champagne, some splendid earrings jangling – well … ? Maybe, I conclude she plays hard to get. Suppose she resists all my subsequent amatory advances. Suppose she sends round her husband, threatens a court order – and eventually calls the police. If I still protest that she loves me really, it is time to recognize that I no longer have a belief, but suffer a forlorn hope, desperate obsession, or mental state requiring medication.
Perhaps our reflections on religions' absurdities suggest that religious belief is all too much, or too little, to be typical belief, whatever traditional believers say. Rather, religious belief is a way of seeing the world: it casts the world and our lives in certain lights. Of course, alcohol can cast the world and lives in a light different from that of the sober; indeed, we may be tempted by Housman's ‘And malt does more than Milton can/To justify God's ways to man.’ Religions with their rituals and stories can, though, have value as ways of seeing the world – and not just a value similar to the temporary intoxications from grape or grain.
The suggestion, sometimes played, is that to believe that God exists is not to think that there exists a supernatural item that could be discovered, an item for which there is evidence. To believe that God exists is to treat the world in certain ways with certain attitudes, concerns, regular beliefs and intentions. People who read the world in the light of Christian scriptures may see it differently from those who read it in the light of, say, Darwinism and nothing more. So-called belief in God as an existent being, with the related religious beliefs, involves a web of stories, moral motivations, rituals and more. The web is best understood as expressing commitment to a way of life, be it to help the poor or – for that matter – kill the infidels. On this understanding – and a few religious believers agree – many religious claims, practices and scriptures amount to expressions of moral intentions, combined with a mixture of exemplary stories, some poetry and some empirical claims promoting certain ways of living. For some Christians, stories of Jesus' death, the events of the Last Supper and the good Samaritan parable, all lead to living agapeistically – that is, in brotherly love. Richard Braithwaite, an empiricist philosopher, gave explicit voice to this approach and, on this basis, I believe, entered the Church of England.Footnote 18
Most believers, of course, take their godly belief to be that there literally exists some supernatural being, that Christ really rose from the dead, and that God directly speaks to them. The proposal that religious beliefs amount only to highly important lifestyle commitments carries with it the thought that traditional theists are mistaken in treating their religious beliefs as involving genuine beliefs about an existent necessary being – a little in the way that I am mistaken about my psychological state directed towards Clarissa. A few who attend church or synagogue make no such mistake; they think of themselves as non-believing Christians or Jews, that is, atheists who yet value the religious tradition, rituals and morality.Footnote 19
However gently humanists may suggest this approach to the religious – perhaps emphasizing the value that great fiction, myth and art, be it religious or no, may have for encouraging good living – traditional believers insist that God literally exists. I may then reply, ‘It's just a way, a valuable way, of seeing the world, leading, say, to encouraging brotherly love, and being in awe of the beauty of flowers, mountains and sunsets.’ They respond, ‘But God really does exist.’ Paradoxically, I may agree – for I may take those words to mean that the speakers really do possess the commitments mentioned. This is where the ‘really's multiply. ‘But, really really, really God exists.’ ‘Yes’, I answer, ‘Really, really, really you are committed to loving your fellow man and being in awe of sunsets and so forth.’
The resort to understanding certain basic beliefs as more akin to lifestyle commitments or approaches to the world is not unknown in other arenas of life. Some suggest that ‘the future resembles the past’ and ‘every event has a cause’ are best understood as expectations or rules for investigation – though, in contrast to religion, without these we cannot live. Casting things in different lights, expressing different attitudes, need not thereby be arbitrary, without foundation. It may dovetail with believers' talk of insights and added depths. Life is not ‘really’ a gift from God, but observations about life as divinely given may encourage respect and pious feeling not solely for humans, but also for other creatures and the natural world around us. Odd pictures of the world may help us to handle the world. Think of how physicists speak of ‘charms’ and how chemists picture molecules. Of course, some pictures hinder our understanding: consider how geneticists' lapses into ‘selfish’ genes have wrongly led some to conclude that humans must be selfish. One big difference between scientific pictures and religious pictures is that at least scientific theories lead to experimentations and testable predictions; but, we should note, the pictures and tales drawn by religions lead to ways of living – some that humanists welcome; some they rightly flee.Footnote 20
Life: muddling through
One approach to religious absurdities and ways of seeing is to highlight the fact that we do not need to believe in God to have flourishing lives – after all, many flourishing people do not believe in God – though I, even as an atheist, would regret the loss of the kaleidoscopic delights ranging from absurd tales of revelations to uplifting religious words and music. Religious or not, there are, though, some deep absurdities that we all live by, yet which we often shrug off. We shall move from love to free will to the self – and then to the beyond.
Larry loves Ludmilla – yet Larry's love of Ludmilla must be because of her various characteristics. Larry's love rests on his experiences, knowledge and beliefs concerning Ludmilla; and they rest on Ludmilla's qualities – physical, emotional, intellectual and so forth. He may adore her smile, her coquettish walk and talk; he may value her kindness, the flick of her hair and her entrancings. We could list away: he loves her because she has qualities F, G, H and so on. Once we have the list, the paradox presents. Larry loves a Ludmilla-type rather than this particular Ludmilla. If someone else comes along with Ludmilla's qualities, Larry should love her just as much.
‘No, only this Ludmilla’, Larry insists. We then ask, ‘Well, what is it about this Ludmilla?’ If an answer is given, then we may be able to add it to the F, G, H list – and off we go again. Larry ought, it seems, to settle for any Ludmilla look-alikes when Ludmilla is out of town. Of course, the answer may be that love develops through a joint causal history of intertwined lives. That causal history cannot now be repeated: it ties Larry, a particular, to this particular Ludmilla here. Although Ludmilla's qualities are repeatable, in the sense that other items could have those same qualities, Ludmilla and this particular intertwining cannot be repeated. She is irreplaceable as far as Larry is concerned – well, for the moment.
Many items in our lives are readily replaceable. We do not mind which particular item we have of a certain type, so long as of the right type. That glass of wine or this? No matter – as long as they are same size, quality and cost. Yet most people think differently about friends and lovers, about spouses and family – even about cats. Such items are not treated solely as ones of a certain type. The irreplaceability stance also applies to certain inanimate objects. Heirlooms form obvious examples: a curl of hair, a worn gown, a torn postcard can be ‘irreplaceable’, even if the proposed replacements are indistinguishable from the originals, be they as shabby as the originals are now.
No doubt, we could live without love, though it is difficult to see how we could live with treating others merely as of a type and being treated as such ourselves. The particular/qualities problem to one side, we frequently hold others and ourselves morally responsible, open to praise and blame – unless the doings are without, or outside, the agents' control. True, when things are abnormal, we often withdraw accolades of responsibility. The mentally ill avoid prison, but gain psychiatric units. The sane, though, we treat as if they have control over what they do; but have they any more ultimate control than the insane? A sudden high wind blows a mother against her son, knocking him to the ground. That is not the mother's fault; yet when the mother hits the child out of anger – that is her fault. Could she have controlled that anger? She might have tried, yet failed. And if she failed to try, was her character such that she could have tried? Perhaps she could not. Successful hard workers differ from failed hard workers, yet the successful are lucky to possess their abilities, their nature and nurture. Yes, there is a difference between the industrious and lazy; but presumably such character differences result from a mixture of nature and nurture – and unexpected events – all outside the control of the relevant individuals. Machiavelli spoke of the significance of Fortuna in how our lives turn out. Harold Macmillan, when asked about the determination of policy, replied, ‘Events, dear boy – events!’ People, we feel, should not be praised or blamed for their luck or unluck – yet a matter of luck or unluck it is, that we are who we are.Footnote 21
Treating people, in the main, as responsible agents, or at least as if responsible, is essential to our human relationships. If we did not, we should regard others as biological cogs and springs, as blobs. That is, of course, dangerous, for we cannot properly admire – befriend, resent, praise, blame – cogs, springs or biological blobs: we use such items as but means to ends. Our treatment of people ‘as people’ manifests an emphasis on man's dignity, on his autonomy – an emphasis oft found in religions, yet which sits incongruously with God or Allah demanding worship; and an emphasis found in humanism, yet which sits incongruously with scientism, with explaining everything in terms of scientific laws, towards which some humanists are drawn. If murderers are but cogs in a causal machine completely determined, then, as offenders, they vanish. Our moral indignation is no more appropriate than rebuking an earthquake. Yet even if we are causally determined to do what we do, paradoxically we still have to make choices. If told of the prediction of our choices – even our own prediction of what we shall do – we may still, it seems, choose to do otherwise.Footnote 22 From the vantage point possessed by others, Mary is bound to do X; yet Mary may be unable to accept that she is so bound.
Over such matters, such matters hinted at through Newcomb, we muddle through. Richard Dawkins, fine defender of humanism, writes that our brains ‘are separate and independent enough from our genes to rebel against them'.Footnote 23 Putting to one side how brains can rebel: if, on the one hand, the rebellions stand outside causal explanations, then they are mysteries closed to scientific investigation – presumably not Dawkins' position. So, let us clasp the other hand: if our resisting certain tendencies has causal explanations, then why do those resistances count as free choices, as Dawkins seems to think, whereas those explained genetically do not?
We muddle through – and the muddle arises, in part, because we are baffled by the ‘I’. What is this subject – an enduring subject? – that sometimes freely chooses, yet sometimes is battered by storms both physical and emotional? What is this ‘I’ that asks to be loved? ‘Love me for me, not for my coquettish walk and whimsical ways.'
One way of seeing the absurdity residing in ‘I’ is via the thought experiments found in Locke and Thomas Reid and enhanced in recent decades by Williams, Parfit and Zuboff.Footnote 24 One saga from Williams involves your knowing that someone will be tortured tomorrow, but needing to establish whether that someone will be you. That someone will be a person with all your psychological states, yet not your body – or with your body but none of your psychological states. The puzzle comes down to the following dilemma, assuming you lack yen for torture. ‘Should I hope that this body is not tortured, whatever the psychological states, or should I hope that whichever body carries these psychological states is not tortured?’ Neither ‘continuity of body’ nor ‘continuity of psychological states’ seems an essential condition for me to be me. Even if we see identity as depending on the disjunction of those two conditions, we still encounter familiar replication and fission thought experiments that can leave us baffled.
Moving away from such metaphysical speculations, we muddle through more practically with regard to how we view our ‘true identity’. Athletes seek fairness in sport: we want to see what runners can truly achieve ‘by themselves’. Performance-enhancing drugs are banned; yet not performance-enhancing training. We muddle through, often pretending there is clarity, when in fact there is chaos, cloaked chaos.
Stepping outside
The three life puzzles mentioned – love, free will, and self – all involve the absurdity or clash that arises when the attached vantage points meet the detached. Attached, Larry loves this Ludmilla; yet if he could step back, anyone similar should do. Attached, I praise and blame others and myself, yet stepping back, I may see all the actions as caused and outside the agents' free control. Attached, well, we cannot help speaking of ourselves, yet, detached, we become at a loss over what to identify as the ‘self’.
For a final piece of absurdity arising through stepping back, seeking further detachment, we meet Pushkin, a cat once owned by John McTaggart Ellis McTaggart, the distinguished Cambridge philosopher.Footnote 25 In cold winters, surrounded by the snows or winds of the Fens, people who visited McTaggart's college rooms would be astonished to see his cat enjoying pride of position fireside front, while McTaggart shivered in a corner. ‘Why ever do you give the cat the best position?’ they would ask. ‘Because,’ replied McTaggart, ‘that's the best it gets for a cat.’
We reflect on life. We reflect not just in philosophy seminars, but at work, at dinner – and in the stillness of nights without sleep. Of course, sometimes we may feel the feline life is preferable. I remember the reflection well from my mother, when the going was tough. None the less, most of us value being a person far more than being a cat. Only we humans can investigate and evaluate, aware that we so do. Only we humans can explore skies so high and oceans so deep. Only we humans can marvel and wonder at fact and fancy. We discover mathematical truths and apply them to the world; we send our imaginations soaring through art, literature and music. We demonstrate kindness, loyalty and beauty – and laugh at jokes. There is far more to human life than to the feline. We value them more.
We stepped outside lives to evaluate the human over the feline, just as Hume so stepped when concluding that man's life is of no greater importance to the universe than an oyster's. Indeed, Sophocles' detachment led him to speculate that the happiest are those not to have been born. Some of us cannot resist seeking a vantage point detached, undistorted by preferences and position, yet which is still, incongruously, a vantage point from which to evaluate. That probably is without sense, yet we readily recognize degrees of distortion in our views of the world. Think of the head spinning after too much partying, of thoughts clouded by current woes. We step outside in order to see more clearly, or to see the bigger picture or a picture un-spun; but once we push on further, we fall into obscurities, of maybe wanting to choose what sort of people to be, yet with no basis on which to choose.
A mouse's life, as Thomas Nagel writes, is not absurd; a human life is.Footnote 26 A mouse's life contains no incongruity; a human's does. The mouse scurries about, satisfying desires, never stepping outside her life for the bigger picture, never reflecting on the significance of her scurry. We humans can – or think we can – step outside, taking up a more detached vantage point, be it from the universe's edge, or from nowhere at all. There indeed we reach the absurdity, the clash, between the importance we give to our life and its seeming unimportance from outside. Yet, no sense can be made of mattering, or not mattering, from a viewpoint that is really neither point nor view.
‘What if in reality my whole life has been wrong?’ That question, asked by Tolstoy's Ivan Illyich, may make us uneasy. As we grow older, we may become ashamed of our past: we may reflect on wasted years, spot mistaken turnings, recognizing occasions when we failed to stand up for what we believed. Our lives, as wholes, may be judged to be seriously wrong compared with standards once embraced or embraced now. We may even try to step outside our lives, wondering whether all our standards – our desires, aspirations, lives – are themselves all wrong. Some then shudder, repent, and turn to God as eternal judge. Humanists, of course, reject the eternal judge. Yet, with or without the judge, there exists a mish-mash of recognized values: freedom, happiness, promise-keeping, respect, rights, welfare, mercy – and virtues, such as courage, generosity, justice. There are finer values: courtesy, decency, beauty and grace. What should we do when such concerns conflict, as, unnoticed, they often do, and, noticed, they sometimes do? What indeed should we do when concern for just a single value generates conflict – when, for example, if Orson soothes Andrea, Zoe is distressed; and if he soothes Zoe, Andrea is distressed.
‘It is a matter of judgement', some say. True, we want to judge, not decide on throws of some dice or whims of the day; but how do we judge? When judges with expertise and experience, in the House of Lords or the American Supreme Court, speak of weighing the evidence, balancing factors, yet reach opposite conclusions – with three judges, for example, concluding that free speech was infringed and two judges concluding the opposite – is accepting the majority view as the right answer any better than spinning a coin? We may also note that, had certain other expert judges been appointed or been sitting, then the overall decision could well have been different. More mundanely, people seek fairness in, for example, parking fines; yet what constitutes fairness here? Should fines be at a fixed level, or should they vary according to vehicle size or value, driver's income or wealth? With moral dilemmas, people often think that, detached, there must be the answer, determining which one of various alternatives ought to be taken, given the circumstances. Often, though, there is, in that sense, no right answer. It is not as if there is some path that is the one right path, known by God, but undiscoverable by humans who are too attached, too involved, in the happenings. It is difficult to believe that even an all-knowing God would know the ‘right’ way and level to set parking fines.Footnote 27
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Humanists accuse godly believers of absurdities, yet, as maybe seen above, we all live lives with some absurdities – with some conflicting perspectives. We face ethical dilemmas: we juggle incommensurable factors from different vantage points. We may be bewitched by the desire for the black or white, yet right answers often involve ‘to some degree’ and ‘in some respects’. There are many examples, from voting procedures to taxation, where fairness and reasonableness have to be invoked, yet where what counts as fair and reasonable can be moveable posts or areas of greyness. What weight do we, or ought we to give to mantras such as ‘everyone has a right to life,’ when we choose expenditure on the arts, or vote for reduced taxation, instead of more aid for those suffering badly, the dispossessed of the world?
Although we cannot live without judging on such matters as the above, without speaking of ‘I’, without assessing others and ourselves, losing the self often helps to give meaning to our lives. Whatever we enjoy – be it immersion in philosophical thought, laughing at banana skin slips, reading novels, moving with music, playing the piano, even watching football – when we look back, we often discover that we were lost in the reflections, the story, the emotions, the music, the game. Religious believers, indeed, can be lost in their faith. When the last page is turned, or the credits roll or the applause thunders, we are brought up sharp, brought back to the world. This is most odd; it may even tempt us to think that, after all, there is a lot to be said for the life of the non-reflective Pushkin, even for the Sophoclean ‘the happiest are those never to have been born’ – for then one's ‘self’ is truly lost. Yet we know well that here lies mystery, that things are not as simple as that. In some way, we were aware of enjoying the novel, the play, the music – and yet, in another way, we did not exist, save in as far as we were distracted by some whispering or sensations of over-heating. Such mysteries provide a pull towards the mystical.
We can lose ourselves in our everyday lives, unaware of the absurdity. Step back and reflect on those lives: now the absurdities, tensions and muddles mentioned above fill our view; but they too have value for many of us. We may smile wryly. Pity Pushkin: he knows of no absurdities, of no smiles. Yet pity us too – for we cannot know for certain how our lives finally work out.
‘Pity us’, did I say?
Knowledge of how our lives are ultimately viewed, if viewed at all – from a detached vantage point – may be knowledge best not to possess; but what is worth having is the mishmash, the muddles, the mêlée of life itself. With philosophy an analytical and reflective art, we have here engaged reflection. It is, though, fitting to emphasize that not reflecting also brings value, brings meaning. There can be paradoxical delight in simply surrendering, as perhaps Pushkin does, to mosaics of colours and sounds, from scuffling leaves and storms of snow to a skylark ascending over a heath. There is charm in saying nothing, in saying nothing at all. There is charm in – experiencing.
And yet religious believers seek more – they seek the divine, the eternal, to bring forth meaning. Well, humanists have little scope for the eternal. All the things we value, however rare, however small, that give point or meaning to our lives – the friendships, loves and absurdities; those soundscaped memories entwined with shared entrancings and glances that magically ensnare and enfold; the intoxications of wines and words, and wayward musings and music, even city sounds, with which we wrestle into misty slumbering nights, our senses revived by sparkling waters, much needed at dawn; the seascapes of wild waves, mysterious moonlights and images and widening skies that stretch the eyes – do indeed all cease to exist; and curiously the most enchanting are, as implied, oft those within which we lose ourselves and also cease to be – yet that they, and we, existed at some time remains timelessly true, outside of all time.
For lovers of eternity – of the ‘beyond’ – that is as good as it gets. And that good manifests another absurdity – incongruity, puzzle – for here on Earth we have sense of the abstract, of the timelessly true; here on Earth we image the fish and their unlanded heavenly land, their pond beyond; and here on Earth we smile at such tales, smile at such absurdity, feeling better for the smile – and for the absurdity.
