Simone Weil is an enigmatic figure: a philosopher whose thoughts we know largely through fragments; a mystic who had her own complicated relationship with the Catholic Church; a pacifist who worked for the Resistance; an intellectual who took a sabbatical to join with unskilled female laborers in gruelling and humiliating factory work; and a theologian whose view of the human condition is as compassionate as it is severe. Eric Springsted offers a version of Weil for the twenty-first century. This is not a comprehensive treatment of Weil's corpus. For example, her early Marxist works on oppression and revolution are almost completely absent. What comes to the fore is a nuanced interpretation of what Springsted refers to as Weil's “retheologization of the political” (146). Springsted's version of Weil is a gentler one than provided by some of her critics. But his own lifelong engagement with Weil provides for compelling reading.
The first section of the book explores Weil's theology and philosophy. Springsted's discussion is impressively readable. Three overarching themes emerge that guide her thought. First is the notion of mystery, which Weil sees as central to our experience of the world. The idea resonates with such thinkers as Václav Havel and Jan Patočka. For Weil, mystery is not something that the intellect can affirm or deny. Nor is mystery simply what has yet to be discovered. Rather, at the root of mystery is a notion of contradictions—for example, of the Trinity—that cannot be resolved but “draw us into involvement with them” (21). The idea of mystery is important in three ways: it raises questions of value by revealing a universe that cannot be made to conform to techniques and methods; it instills humility by decentering the universe from the knowing ego; and it challenges modern society that seeks to know in order to control and certain religious approaches that reduce faith to dogma.
The second theme that organizes Weil's theology and philosophy is necessity. Necessity emerges from Weil's distinctive interpretation of Creation, in which God withdraws in order to make the universe possible. In the place of God is necessity: a reality of the human condition as one subject to both physical and social force. The idea of necessity underlies Weil's interpretation of the Incarnation, as well. Christ makes “the universe [His] body” (99), as are we to do, by accepting, or consenting to, “the full force of necessity” (99) and loving “fully and nakedly” a God who is absent (45).
Finally, Springsted emphasizes the centrality for Weil of philosophy as practice; as a working on oneself, rather than simply positing arguments. Thought, as Springsted interprets Weil, does not just contemplate things but puts us in relationship to those things. Several practices are central to transforming our relationship to the world and to each other. The practice of “detachment” is “a renunciation of all possible ends without exception, a renunciation which puts a void in the place of the future just as the imminent approach of death does” (29). The act of attention is the “suspension of control and anticipation” that “gives room within one's soul to another” (47). The practice of “reading” transforms how we understand the world: from receiving the world as sensations of pleasure and pain to reading the world as necessity (as the mathematical laws of variation) and finally to read the whole of the world as our body. In doing so, we “consent” to obedience to both the beauty and brute force that comprises all of the different perspectives, rather than just our perspective, brought to bear on the world (96). The practice of “decreation” involves the “unmaking” of the person (184). And the practice of labor connects these different elements, training our attention and exposing us to the experience of suffering.
Springsted turns his attention in the second section to identifying Weil's social and political thought. He begins with Weil's critique of “personalism,” or the idea that the person is sacred, which he argues is aimed at Jacques Maritain. Weil rejects personalism because the person and the value placed on the person is, itself, a historically contingent, social construction. What we decide to value not only flattens out aspects of the person, but leaves unheard “the deepest inner cries” or “what is sacred about the human” (130). Weil argues that what is sacred in the human being is the “impersonal,” the human striving for good (130).
The next chapter continues with Weil's challenge to certain aspects of contemporary political thought, focusing now on the inner life and language of individuals. The critique is in part aimed at liberalism, which excludes the language of love and conscience from the public realm. But it is also aimed at the ease with which this inner life is corrupted, both by the language of the marketplace and by the language of a common good in which value is subjected to “the collective” (138). There is a sense, Weil argues, in which words like “God,” “truth,” and “justice” are both inarticulable and inconceivable and thus must be employed with a sense of humility.
The next chapter pulls together what Springsted sees as one of the central takeaways from Weil; namely, the retheologization of the political. The idea of rethinking our conception of space, from a neutral space that we enter to one which is itself configured, is conceptually interesting. Although Springsted recognizes some efforts to reconfigure space, including by Hannah Arendt and Leo Strauss, he understates how much this is a part of current discussions of political spaces. Weil's distinctiveness is in conceptualizing the space as organized by “supernatural justice” in which we see history and nature in a different light (154). What that means, or what that would look like, or what changes, is unfortunately left undeveloped.
The next two chapters explore human rootedness in history and culture. Drawing heavily on The Need for Roots, a book written in anticipation of France re-forming its government after the expulsion of the Germans, Springsted argues that history and culture play two roles in Weil's thought: our distinctive histories help answer to the soul's need for order; and cultures need to be set up to allow “their people to draw sustenance from the transcendent” (176). Springsted's contributions here are important because he brings together what are often seen as unresolvable tensions in Weil's work between the spiritual and the political.
The next chapter takes up the idea of how to form a spiritual community, one that begins with the escapism of St. Benedict but ends by returning to the idea of work as the spiritual core of society (200). The final chapter is a fairly limited discussion of Weil's essay on the Iliad about how violence can be a transforming moment in consenting to harsh necessity.
Springsted has written a deeply thoughtful and engaging book about a complicated thinker. How the argument is framed, though, limits both the reach and power of the interpretation. He positions his interpretation as a reaction to Martin Heidegger, the postmodern world (without reference to any author or text) in which there is neither depth nor responsibility for one's thought, and liberalism that transforms public discourse into a language of individual rights. Invoking the usual suspects, however, has the effect of talking past what may be the pressing problems facing the twenty-first century: the fundamental decay of democratic norms, the resurgence of white nationalism, and the division of a nation into strangers who neither understand nor trust each other. Similarly absent is any reflection on the history or complexities of the theologization of politics up to the current day, which is at least as problematic as its detheologization in liberalism. Weil provides perspective on these issues in her willingness to embrace, rather than resolve, the contradictions of human existence, to listen to the suffering of the voiceless, and to introduce a decentering vocabulary of justice, love, and humility that changes how we relate to each other and the world. Hearing the critique requires attention. And that is Weil's and Springsted's point.
