Tragedy Offstage is a social history of classical Athens that asks how ordinary Athenians responded to suffering. Sternberg opens by posing a set of questions: “How do strangers, friends, war comrades, neighbors, or slave-owning citizens feel about the suffering they witness? Do they care? Can they afford to? Will pity, empathy, or a sense of humanity prompt them to intervene?” (1). The author draws a distinction between tragic pity and pity in everyday life. Consequently, she distinguishes the philosophical reflection on tragic pity one finds in Aristotle's Poetics and the dramatic depiction of tragic pity in Sophocles or Aeschylus on the one hand, and the pity Athenians experienced in the “real world or private and civic obligations” (3), on the other. Eschewing the philosophers and the high tragic poets, Sternberg investigates oratory and historiography in order to get a fresh perspective on quotidian pity and empathy.
Sternberg argues that the Athenian citizen is a moral agent acting at the center of three concentric circles: “[F]irst, his nearest and dearest family and friends; second, friends and acquaintances to whom his obligations were less binding; and third, fellow citizens whom he knew barely or not at all” (9). She is particularly interested in situations involving the suffering of others and in those situations in which action that ameliorates suffering imposes high costs for the actor. The actors she focuses on have little or no short-term advantage for intervening in the situation. This strategy, she hopes, will illuminate the motivations to act or not to act on suffering people falling within these circles. The image of widening circles provides the structure of the argument. Sternberg employs case studies to illustrate the nature of these relationships with respect to pity for suffering, from the most intimate relationships, extending outward to the bonds of citizenship.
Chapter 1 begins with the first circle of moral obligation by exploring home nursing care in classical Athens. The author focuses her argument especially on a case found in Isocrates’ Aegineticus of a dying man named Thasylochus nursed by his childhood friend. In classical Athens, in the absence of modern hospitals, most sick and dying people were cared for in the home. Sternberg argues that the size and layout of the oikos meant that tending the sick would have involved the whole household. Male citizens would not necessarily have been exempt; the author argues that the “nurturing male” offered “care and companionship, empathy and pity” (40). Ideally, the oikos aspired to a high level of protection and care for its members. It was also an association marked by considerable instability owing largely to high mortality rates (39). In sum, the Aegineticus reveals “considerable sensitivity to the psychological sufferings and emotional needs of sick people” (40).
In chapter 2, Sternberg takes her readers into the second circle of obligation by examining what sacrifices Athenian men and women were expected to make on behalf of friends and relatives who had been captured in battle or while traveling abroad. Being held for ransom put considerable strain on the family and community of the captive. In turn, ransoming captives put a variety of motives in play, from personal loyalty and patronage, to public display of generosity (51). The case studies Sternberg takes up reveal that people in the second circle of obligation had some claim on the moral agent, but that these claims were not absolute.
Sternberg moves into the third circle of obligation—that of the relationship among citizens who do not necessarily know each other—by examining the problem of whether innocent bystanders ought to intervene during a civic disturbance or crime. Here the author delves into both the attitude of Athenian law toward bystander intervention and the nature of ordinary street life. Such situations were complicated by the fact that ancient Athens lacked a state-sponsored police force. Drawing on social psychology, Sternberg argues that bystanders probably faced a series of decisions when determining to intervene. The bystander had to notice and interpret the event, then decide whether and how to intervene. There was not necessarily an imperative to intervene on behalf of fellow citizens, partly owing to the risk involved. Sternberg continues limning the relationships in this third circle by taking up the question of the transportation of sick and wounded soldiers in her fourth chapter. This subject has been neglected by ancient and modern historians. Wounded comrades present considerable logistical and humanitarian difficulties to a retreating army. Focusing on the Athenian debacle on Syracuse as described by Thucydides and the march of the Ten Thousand in Xenophon's Anabasis, Sternberg argues that leadership in the Athenian army was defined in part by the capacity for kindness and compassion. Generals were never held legally accountable for the sick and wounded, but still there was a strong moral obligation to preserve their lives and carry them home if at all possible.
In the final chapter, the author explores the limits of Athenian pity and empathy by examining the legalized torture of slaves. This examination is necessary, she argues, because the deliberate infliction of pain and harm on a human being accused of no crime posits a “severe test of Athenian humaneness” (149). After treating slave torture in its context and asking whether torture actually reveals anything true, Sternberg argues that while there is no trace of evidence of empathy for the slave subjected to torture, such an emotion probably existed in certain cases (171). Some Athenians probably shrank from torture because it was cruel, inhumane, and unfair (172). She admits her evidence for these assertions is circumstantial.
Sternberg concludes by pointing out that “Ancient Greeks have often been measured against standards of Christian compassion and been found lacking” (179). The author believes that if we remove this Christian lens and focus sharply on pity and compassion, the ancient Athenians “invented a humanitarian ideal that extended, in theory, to fellow Greeks” (179).
This is a learned, interesting, and sometimes innovative book. Sternberg is adept at careful and fresh readings of textual evidence, buttressing her conjectures with excellent and recent scholarship on everyday life in fifth century Athens. She disarms potential critics not simply by the strength of her arguments but also by pointing out speculation when it occurs. The book is laudably interdisciplinary as well, drawing on medicine, social psychology, as well as contemporary moral theory to make its points. Her choice of topics is fascinating and judicious, as is her choice of case studies to illuminate those topics.
My only questions pertain to the author's theoretical approach. Sternberg distinguishes the interests of the elites from those of the masses. She groups philosophers like Plato and Aristotle and poets like Sophocles or Euripides with the elites. She is of two minds about the implications of this distinction in the case of the poets. On the one hand, she thinks that tragedy “tended to make suffering sublime—conferred on it a sort of grandeur” (178). On the other, Athenians attended dramatic festivals in large numbers and imbibed the lessons of the tragedians. So “the connection between tragedy and everyday life remains problematic but it cannot be dismissed on that account” (180). However this cryptic statement is never unpacked. I was left wondering exactly what the relationship was between the presentation of suffering in dramatic tragedy and the experience of suffering in everyday life.
A similar tension is present in her account of pity and compassion. Sternberg seeks to uncover the ways the Athenians tried to alleviate everyday suffering, and she extols them for it. At the same time, she acknowledges the fact that the Greeks typically did not list pity or compassion among the virtues. Rather they understood them to be impulses, sometimes to be fostered, and sometimes guarded against (13). After all, pity can stem from a sense of self-congratulatory and moralistic superiority. It can excuse half-hearted effort or shoddy work. The imperative to help people avoid suffering in every case may mask a desire for control and so lead to power. The moral framework of the book seems to owe something to the liberal democratic imperative for individuals to ameliorate the human condition for others. While Sternberg does an admirable job showing that ordinary Athenians were motivated by pity, it is not clear that they put a premium on easing the human condition the way we do. They likely believed that the human condition is harsh and limited, and that any attempt to ameliorate it had paradoxical consequences for human suffering.
However, these questions do not take away from the many achievements of this book, which is rich, compelling, and humane.
