If this very weighty and important book did nothing else than establish the fact for modern systematic theology that the trinitarian theology of the fourth century cannot be understood properly by dividing Eastern from Western theology with the usual statement that the former begins with the three persons and moves towards the divine unity while the latter begins with the divine unity and moves towards the three persons, then something truly significant would have been accomplished (Nicaea, pp. 52, 384). Why? Because then one would not be able to trace a supposed modalist tendency directly from Augustine through much Western theology to contemporary theologians such as Barth in order to argue for a view of God's triunity which actually could undermine the full divinity of each of the persons of the Trinity who in reality exist eternally as three persons, one being. Consider, for instance, the remark made by Ted Peters that ‘There is no inherent reason for assuming that the three persons have to be identical or equal in nature.’Footnote 2 If one studies the development of fourth-century trinitarian theology, I think one would find many reasons to insist that the three persons are in fact equal in nature, among which are that any other assertion would undermine the divinity of the Son, lead to some sort of subordinationism or adoptionism (what Barth called Ebionite christology), and would ultimately strip the Gospel of its saving power.
Yet this book does much more than that. In sixteen carefully crafted chapters, Lewis Ayres painstakingly develops what he calls pro-Nicene theology, namely, a theology which emerged between 360 and 380. The term pro-Nicene indicates that there was no original Nicene theology, in the sense that such a theology was either defined or defended by Athanasius, developed with more precision by the Cappadocians and then passed on to the West in translation with ‘inevitable misunderstanding’ (Nicaea, pp. 236–7). ‘There is no one original Nicene theology that continues unchanged through the century’ and it is difficult to prove that Athanasius extensively influenced the Cappadocians. Indeed, Western accounts were not simply based on ‘eastern translations’ and there was ‘significant and persistent non-Nicene presence in parts of the west’. Consequently, ‘The theologies that constitute pro-Nicene orthodoxy are not reducible to one point of origin or to one form of expression’ (Nicaea, p. 237). Developments of theology indebted to Nicaea are thus much more complex than is sometimes assumed and so theology from the time of Nicaea emerged not just from positive traditions regarding the homoousion but from traditions ‘originally opposed to . . . older Nicene theologies’ (Nicaea, p. 168).
By stressing this complexity, Ayres shows how both Eastern and Western theologians emphasised the distinctiveness of the persons as well as their unity of action without limiting the former to the East and the latter to the West. It is refreshing to see Ayres provide evidence that both Basil (East) and Augustine (West) offered similar arguments regarding the Trinity, especially in light of the fact that Augustine has been accused of having modalist tendencies and of misunderstanding the theology of the East precisely because of those tendencies.Footnote 3 Ayres shows that there is a great deal of valuable material in Augustine's work on the Trinity; he demonstrates that for Augustine persons are not just relations and there is no divine substance prior to or apart from God's existence as Father, Son and Holy Spirit (Nicaea, pp. 374–80).
Ayres’ stress on the complexity of fourth-century theological developments also leads to some surprising judgements. On the one hand he apparently believes that Athanasius’ thinking might have leaned towards Apollinarianism, as when he writes that Athanasius ‘may have followed an Alexandrian post-Origenist tradition of seeing the Logos itself as replacing the human soul’ (Nicaea, p. 77) – a position forcefully rejected by Thomas F. Torrance.Footnote 4 On the other hand he seems to believe that Athanasius’ account of the Trinity was ‘strongly unitarian’ (Nicaea, pp. 238, 435) in spite of the fact that T. F. Torrance has shown persuasively that Athanasius’ theology is eminently trinitarian. Additionally, it is noticeable that while Torrance's important book, The Trinitarian Faith, is listed in Ayres’ bibliography, he never directly engages with Torrance's thought. It strikes me that in any serious study of Nicaea and its legacy which intends to involve modern systematic theologians, Torrance's massive contribution to that discussion at least ought to have been considered. Perhaps our author may have been put off by Torrance's strong emphasis on the homoousion. Yet, despite all the historical complexities mentioned by Ayres, one still has to make a decision with regard to the unique relations of the trinitarian persons by acknowledging their unity of being or denying it either implicitly or explicitly. And the issue does seem to centre on whether or not one is willing to admit that the homoousion applies not only to the Son's relation with the Father but also to the Spirit's relation with the Father and Son as Torrance claimed it did. Furthermore, I would say that anything less than a full affirmation of such unity is precisely what would open the door to contemporary forms of Arianism, especially in the form of projectionism, which was exactly what Athanasius himself decried in his writings against the Arians.Footnote 5 Here I agree with Colin Gunton that Arianism seems to have been the ‘favorite heresy’ of the twentieth century.Footnote 6
In any case, it is important to see what exactly Ayres means by pro-Nicene theology. This can be summarised in three principles: (1) ‘a clear vision of the person and nature distinction, entailing the principle that whatever is predicated of the divine nature is predicated of the three persons equally and understood to be one’; (2) ‘clear expression that the eternal generation of the Son occurs within the unitary and incomprehensible divine being’; (3) ‘clear expression of the doctrine that the persons work inseparably’ (Nicaea, p. 236). It is this pro-Nicene theology which holds together and expresses the main ingredients of the trinitarian faith which is so central to both Catholics and Protestants today. There is a problem, however, since modern trinitarian theologians have only ‘engaged the legacy of Nicaea at a fairly shallow level’ (Nicaea, pp. 1, 385).
Before discussing this, let me say that I think Karl Barth's theology is not only pro-Nicene in the sense just described, but it is self-consciously pro-Nicene with one exception – he prefers to use the expression mode of being for person in order to avoid any hint of tritheism. Still, he intended all that was meant in the fourth century, when those theologians spoke of the triune God as three persons, one being and so it would be a serious mistake to categorise Barth as a modalist. In his doctrine of the Trinity, Barth certainly stressed all of the other principles noted by Ayres. One especially important point, often given short shrift in contemporary presentations of the Trinity with regrettable consequences, is Barth's insistence, following Augustine,Footnote 7 that we cannot explain how the Son is begotten or even how the Spirit proceeds – we can only acknowledge the fact. Therefore:
We cannot define the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, i.e., we cannot delimit them the one from the other. We can only state that in revelation three who delimit themselves from one another are present, and . . . we must accept the fact that these three who delimit themselves from one another are antecedently a reality in God Himself. We can state the fact of the divine processions and modes of being. But all our attempts to state the How of this delimitation will prove to be impossible . . . [this is] the ignoramus which we must confess in relation to the whole doctrine of the Trinity . . . (CD I/1, pp. 476–7)
The fact that we are dealing with an indefinable mystery here is something that Ayres repeatedly notes was of critical importance for fourth-century theologians of both East and West (Nicaea, pp. 336 etc.).
Beyond this, Barth's explication of the doctrine of the Trinity in CD I/1 actually employs three key patristic principles, opera trinitatis ad extra sunt indivisa, appropriation (the fact that certain operations of the Trinity are appropriated to the Father or to the Son or Spirit such that only the Son, for instance, became incarnate or only the Father is seen as creator – this of course must not undercut the fact that all three persons are nonetheless involved in creation, incarnation, reconciliation and redemption)Footnote 8 and perichoresis (the fact that the three persons interpenetrate each other within the indivisible eternal Being of the Trinity). The last principle, surprisingly, was never mentioned in this book. Yet it was crucial for Karl Barth because, among other things, it obviated any approach to God the Father that did not take place through the Son and in the Spirit (a specifically Athanasian insight);Footnote 9 it was of course the main reason Barth objected to any analogia entis that proposed an independent natural theology as a prolegomenon to the doctrine of God and offered a view of analogy that was based not on the similarity and difference between divine and human being disclosed in the history of Jesus Christ but rather found analogies directly within the sphere of history, nature, religion, the soul and conscience in ways which subverted the analogia fidei. That is why, while Barth has many very positive references to the thinking of Augustine in his treatment of the doctrine of the Trinity, he was also critical of Augustine's tendency towards mystical knowledge of God, which obviates the mediated nature of all knowledge of God and thus blurs the distinction between knower and known (CD II/1, pp. 10–12), and was also critical in his rather famous critique of Augustine's view of the vestigium trinitatis as a form of natural theology disallowed by the revelation of God in Jesus Christ (CD I/1, pp. 334ff.).Footnote 10
I shall revisit this latter point before closing. Now let us return to why Ayres is critical of modern engagements with the legacy of Nicaea. What does he mean by this? First, he means that modern systematic theologians either take for granted a certain set of existing options or ‘they narrate a story of error such that certain modern assumptions seem necessary’ (Nicaea, p. 385). And the main assumption in this case appears to be that a ‘turn to “eastern” emphases is necessary’ (Nicaea, p. 386). Ayres identifies Pannenberg's thinking as one of the clearest instances of this. Pannenberg builds his arguments around ‘brief but large-scale historical surveys’ which are dependent on older secondary literature ‘whose concerns and contexts are never examined’ (Nicaea, p. 385).
This is no small issue because Ayres appears to be objecting to the appropriation of the Enlightenment assumption that pre-modern notions of authority are no longer acceptable in a historically conscious modern setting, so that we cannot begin our theological inquiries accepting the authority of scripture or basic Christian doctrines in order to contemplate ‘the Scriptures as the core of attention to major doctrines’ and we are thus unable to stress, as he believes we should, ‘contemplation of the Trinity as the goal of Christian life’ (Nicaea, p. 386, n. 6). This is an interesting point since Pannenberg accused Barth of embracing a kind of ‘faith subjectivism’ and ‘authoritarianism’ because Barth insisted that theology must begin in faith, since the reality of God revealed in Jesus Christ can only be understood by acknowledging God's transcendence and immanence in Jesus himself. That hardly amounts to faith subjectivism or an embrace of authoritarianism as I have argued,Footnote 11 since for Barth, the sole authority in question is the Word of God made known in the church as it exists in, through and from Christ himself and neither one's faith nor any enslaving authority constructed by us. But it does demonstrate the problem: Pannenberg was afraid that Barth's thinking was in fact authoritarian because he began his theology in faith, with the reality of God, and refused to validate God's being apologetically and then proposed that, unlike Barth, we should ‘abandon the assumption that the reality of God is a presupposition for dogmatics from the very outset’.Footnote 12 In his hasty movement towards apologetics Pannenberg actually undermined one of Barth's most basic theological insights, namely, that the form of revelation could not be separated from its content. This, I think, is most evident in Pannenberg's belief that the resurrection actually ‘constitutes’ Christ's eternal Sonship while Barth insisted that the resurrection disclosed his eternal Sonship but certainly did not constitute it since his Sonship was and is constituted by his eternal and thus his pre-existent relation to his Father in the Spirit.
Second, Ayres believes that assumptions made by modern systematic theologians actually keep ‘at arm's length the real challenge that Pro-Nicene theologies offer’ (Nicaea, p. 386). He contends that while contemporary systematicians invoke some formulae of the fourth century, they actually maintain that ‘the theological methods that produced those formulae are untenable in modernity’ (Nicaea, p. 386). Modern systematic theologians are suspicious not only of the ‘metaphysical bondage of Christian thought’ but of the idea that ‘contemplation of the divine might be the goal and root of theology’; consequently they want to focus on the ‘practical’ and ‘on the narrative of Christ's ministry as transformative of human possibility’ (Nicaea, p. 389). While Ayres notes that it is indeed important to focus on ethics and on anthropological considerations, this should be done only while acknowledging that ‘contemplation of God is the source of appropriate action’ (Nicaea, p. 389). Ayres thinks that both of these factors lead contemporary systematic theologians to be suspicious of any attempt to ‘systematize accounts of God in Godself’ (Nicaea, p. 389). And he further suggests that the focus on Jesus’ ministry without a simultaneous concern for the ontological categories at the heart of Christian faith leads to the assumption that ‘theological practice begins not from the plain sense of Scripture but from reconstructions of Jesus as a human being like us’ (Nicaea, p. 390). Here, Ayres has identified what for Barth was a major difficulty in modern theology, namely, the constant temptation to separate the form of revelation (the humanity of Jesus) from its content (his being as the Word of God incarnate) (CD I/1, p. 390). Barth consistently insisted that to know Jesus Christ is to know the triune God and that to bypass Jesus Christ is to bypass God himself as he has made himself known and knowable to us according to the New Testament witness. In Barth's words:
we have to accept the simple presupposition on which the New Testament statement rests, namely, that Jesus Christ is the Son because He is (not because He makes this impression on us, not because He does what we think is to be expected of a God, but because He is). With this presupposition all thinking about Jesus, which means at once all thinking about God, must begin and end. (CD I/1, p. 415)
Third, for Ayres modern systematic theology embraces the view that Platonism and Aristotelianism somehow dictated earlier views of the Trinity so that contemporary theology must overcome the various accommodations of theology to particular philosophies. Tillich's idealist philosophy is exemplary, and led him in search of ‘reality as such’ or ‘the logos of reality as a whole’. For Tillich, theologians begin from reality experienced as new being in Christ and dialogue with philosophers as they move towards the philosophical, i.e. towards the universal logos and risk ‘overstepping the bounds of ecclesial authority and tradition’ (Nicaea, p. 391). By contrast, Ayres stresses that even when the fourth-century theologians adapted themes from Plato or Plotinus, they did so in a critical way in order to explicate the meaning of scripture which was normative for their theological understanding. Whether or not they were consistent in this of course is a whole other question.
What then is Ayres’ ultimate goal in analysing and criticising contemporary systematic theology? I believe it is to suggest that a good trinitarian theology today must take ‘the classical credal formulae as normative’ and should thus ‘aim to participate in a theological culture in continuity with pro-Nicene culture . . . and develop close attention either to pro-Nicenes or to those whose Trinitarianism embodies the fundamentals of pro-Nicene Trinitarianism within a compatible theological culture’ (Nicaea, p. 404). With this in mind Ayres analyses Hegel's influence on contemporary trinitarian theology and identifies a number of crucial markers which I think are very helpful in seeing where contemporary trinitarian theology goes off track and how it might find its way back onto the track.
Ayres points out that Hegel's thought has influenced Pannenberg, Moltmann, Jüngel, Rahner and Jenson. But he also notes that Hegel's pneumatology actually set the stage ‘for a variety of post-Hegelian reinterpreted Christianities in which God either becomes with the world or is affected by the events of created history in a manner parallel to our own experience of suffering’ (Nicaea, p. 406). And because it was assumed that pre-Enlightenment accounts of God's immutability and presence needed significant reconstruction in light of Hegel's novel understanding, the challenge offered by the authoritative statements of both scripture and conciliar tradition were all but ignored. Ayres thus prefers to speak of a rise of anti-trinitarianism in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries which was also accompanied by more robust trinitarianism instead of a ‘revival’ of trinitarian theology. He notes that Rahner spoke of a need for revival of trinitarian theology since Christians had become ‘mere monotheists’, while simultaneously citing sixteen articles and books written between 1927 and 1958 which actually relied on the doctrine of the Trinity for their theologies. What he really meant was that trinitarian theology needed to be reconstructed in light of what Ayres calls his idealist understanding of human experience (Nicaea, pp. 407–8).
Ayres claims that Catholic trinitarian theology actually presents the main lines of the revival evident in modern Protestant theology, except that Catholics less often overtly embrace the Hegelian theme of God's ‘becoming via an involvement with the creation’ (Nicaea, p. 410). He sees Rahner's trinitarian theology as an excellent example of one which is committed to credal principles while also embracing Hegelian principles so that Rahner actually suggested that his re-presentation of the tradition offered a better conception of God than the classical view seen in the psychological analogy, because his model began ‘not from any analysis of the isolated individual but from the experience which results from God's action in history, from a knowledge of the movement of the human spirit in history, its transcendence and openness towards the future’ (Nicaea, p. 411). Yet, in this way Ayres claims Rahner has moved way beyond the kinds of analogical judgements that were central to the pro-Nicenes, with the result that it now appears that only an idealist account can work in a modern context. Ayres is most critical of Rahner's attempt to jettison the doctrine of appropriation, which might endanger God's unity; he is also critical of Walter Kasper, concluding that ‘Modern notions of personhood here do not simply introduce too much division into the Trinity, they run the risk of corrupting the basic pro-Nicene sense of the mysterious and incomprehensible union of the Godhead’ (Nicaea, p. 412). Ayres wants to suggest that we ‘avoid thinking of pro-Nicenes as constructing “Christian ontologies”’ since their main intention was to use theology and philosophy to reflect on creation in light of the fact that the Word was the ‘consubstantial expression of the divine perfection’ (Nicaea, p. 312). He thus criticises John Zizioulas as well for claiming that Basil saw person as the fullest expression of existence for the first time, asserting that this proposal ‘quickly falls apart in the face of the evidence’ (Nicaea, p. 313).
Ayres is also quite rightly critical of so-called social doctrines of the Trinity, because they attempt to understand the divine persons by analysing human persons and thus move in a direction exactly opposite to the one pursued in pro-Nicene theologies, since they end up ignoring the pro-Nicene emphasis on divine simplicity and unity of operation in order to make their case (Nicaea, pp. 408–9). Not only do I strongly agree with this analysis and critique, but I believe his thinking actually could find a home in Barth's theology in at least three ways. First, Barth insisted that the doctrine of appropriation was important just because our relations with God were indirect and took place within the sphere of what he called secondary objectivity – they were mediated through history, but through the history recounted in scripture, that is, the history of the covenant and the history of Jesus Christ himself, including the history of the church following upon Pentecost. Barth therefore insisted that only those analogies which were faithful to scripture were acceptable.
Second, Barth insisted that the divine simplicity was not to be equated with a general notion of simplicity (CD II/1, pp. 327ff.), for that would annihilate the three persons within the Trinity and would thus undermine our need for the historical Jesus and for faith in order to have fellowship with and knowledge of the Trinity. For Barth, God was simultaneously three and one and neither one first and then three, nor three first and then one. That is certainly a pro-Nicene position. With his view of divine simplicity Barth also wanted to close the door to extreme or moderate forms of nominalism which saw God ultimately as a nuda essentia and not as the eternal Father, Son and Spirit with a multiplicity of divine perfections belonging to his essence. Barth certainly would have had a problem with the idea that we do not have real relations with God even in the Thomistic sense noted by Ayres,Footnote 13 but obviously not for the same reasons as Rahner.Footnote 14 He also would have had a problem with those fourth-century theologians who think we never really know God's being.Footnote 15 Barth refused to say that we can know ‘that God is’ but not ‘what God is’ because he believed one would have to know the Father through his Son and in his Spirit before really even knowing ‘that God is’ in the first place. It was a question of admitting that the revealed God is himself the hidden God and that while God remains incomprehensible in his revelation, he is still truly known by us as Father, Son and Spirit in faith.Footnote 16 Third, Barth consistently insisted on the unity of the divine operations so that he would never focus exclusively on Christ or the Spirit in ways that would separate their persons and works from the singularity of God's actions in se and ad extra.
Let us now return to the vestigium. Barth objected to Augustine's vestigium primarily because he thought its fundamental structure resulted from a methodological error: it sought the meaning of revelation where, according to scripture, revelation could not be found, namely, in human experience and in particular within the experience of memory, understanding and will.Footnote 17 In Barth's thinking this would set up a second root for the doctrine of the Trinity (CD I/1, pp. 342ff.). But there is no other root than the lordship of the Father, Son and Spirit demonstrated in revelation and attested in scripture. It must be admitted that Barth's presentation has been misread because at times he says the root of the doctrine is the concept of revelation (I/1, pp. 312, 334); but it is very clear from the context that he means that the root of the doctrine is revelation – ‘The doctrine of the Trinity is’ as he says ‘simply a development of the knowledge that Jesus is the Christ or the Lord’ (CD I/1, p. 334). Thus, ‘The basis or root of the doctrine of the Trinity, if it has one and is thus legitimate dogma – and it does have one and is thus legitimate dogma – lies in revelation’ (CD I/1, p. 311).Footnote 18 Augustine's vestigium diverted attention away from the fact that the Bible was the sole authority for truth in this matter for Barth. If there is a second root for the doctrine, then perhaps derivation of the doctrine from the Bible is just a later ‘confirmation of a knowledge of God which can be won from His revelation in creation quite apart from the biblical revelation’ (CD I/1, p. 335). And beyond this, perhaps one could also claim that the various vestigia are actually immanent directly in creation ‘as determinations of [human] existence’ so that now we must explore a natural revelation alongside the biblical revelation to know God. Ayres is very careful on this point because while he does say that human experience is ‘an analogical site’ which enabled Basil, for instance, to describe the divine persons, he also stresses that human experience is not ‘a basis for presenting the divine persons as a Trinity by committee, but as an analogical site enabling Basil to emphasize the ultimately incomprehensible perfect quality of the divine existence which originates in the Father but which is freely given to the Son’ (Nicaea, p. 208).
Nonetheless, the question that Barth's theology raises here is an important one: can theologians legitimately speak of the Trinity and at the same time employ a method which claims a knowledge of God in nature, history, religion, culture, the soul or conscience or some general revelation which advances a knowledge of God apart from faith in Jesus Christ himself? Can theologians in other words, with Basil, claim that the image of God in the human mind is the most appropriate site for exploring God's nature (Nicaea, p. 208) without actually compromising two crucial insights of Barth's, namely, that the image of God was lost in human beings through sin and was restored only in Christ and thus could be seen only analogia fidei, through Christ alone as the living Lord himself enables it even now through his Holy Spirit? That indeed was the error of Arianism. And it remains so today. One might even say that Rahner's error was not so much that he embraced Hegel's thinking (perhaps unwittingly) but that his own thinking was not Christocentric in the way Barth's was, simply because he began with transcendental experience as the context for understanding christology and the Trinity instead of exclusively with God's revelation of himself in his incarnate Son.
It is here that I have another question for Professor Ayres. When he claims that the fourth-century debates did not concern the divinity of Christ, they did not concern the issue of which side of the creator/creature divide Christ should be placed (Nicaea, p. 14), I wonder if he is consistent. When he himself notes that Arius ‘may also have asserted that the Son is “from the things that did not exist”’ and that for Arius ‘we should not say the Son is co-eternal’ (Nicaea, p. 55), what else was Arius claiming in those remarks but that Jesus Christ was not on the creator side of the divide between creator and creatures? Moreover, the fact that one of the central ingredients of pro-Nicene theology concerned the importance of distinguishing the creator from the creature also seems to argue against the theory that the fourth-century debates did not concern Christ's deity (Nicaea, pp. 143, 231, 286, etc.). Further, does not Athanasius’ own statement cited by Ayres that ‘The Son, like the Father, is creator . . . because all things were created through him, he does not belong to things created’ (Nicaea, p. 213) suggest just the opposite of such a theory?
Barth's own analysis of the homoousion really seems to support the complexity of developments enumerated by Ayres, as when he concludes that its inclusion in the Nicene creed ‘was a bold anticipation, dubious in many respects, but ultimately justifiable both historically and materially’ (CD I/1, p. 438). And Barth was perfectly willing to acknowledge that the church ‘had great difficulty in seeing what it meant by it, and was far from seeing this when it was made a dogma in 325’, although ‘what it did positively mean by it is for us who come after expressed clearly enough in this formula along with the others in the symbol’ (CD I/1, p. 438). Indeed Barth believed that:
Morally one is bound to sympathise, not with the orthodox minority who were given the victory [by means of the imperial imposition], and even less with the middle party of Eusebius which apparently yielded for the sake of peace, but rather with the unfortunate Arius and his few followers who preferred deposition and exile to abandoning their resistance. (CD I/1, p. 438)
Barth noted that in the third and fourth centuries there was good reason to oppose the term (since it easily could be understood either in a modalist or trithiest direction). But after all his analysis, Barth finally says he wishes to side with Athanasius and Augustine in insisting on the identity of nature of the Father and Son because it upholds the fact that as Son, Jesus is very God and begotten, not made. Moreover, he notes that Hilary, not without a touch of humour, remarked that ‘If anyone does not like the phrase “of the same substance”, he should at least like the fact that the Arians had to reject it’ (CD I/1, p. 438). Still, Barth concludes that the homoousion ‘places Jesus Christ on the side of the Creator in contrast to every creature, even the highest’ (CD I/1, p. 439). It also eliminates any hint of what Barth labelled Ebionite or Docetic christology (CD I/1, p. 439). Thus, Barth could say:
Precisely when we do not construe the concept of homoousia polytheistically nor modalistically, precisely when we interpret it with Athanasius and Augustine as identity of essence on the one side and when, taking up the concerns of the Neo-Nicenes, we let it speak to us of two distinct but equal modes of being in the one essence on the other side, it is plainly referring to an essence of which we have no idea at all. (CD I/1, p. 440)
This means that we must emphasise the fact that here we have ‘distinction in unity and unity in distinction’ which Barth says ‘is the point in all trinitarian theology’ (CD I/1, p. 440). Consequently, while we are ordinarily familiar with ‘unities without distinction and distinctions without unity’ we must admit, against both old and new Arians, that this was and is not ‘the standard of a foolhardy speculative intuition of the Church, but . . . the standard of an unheard-of encounter which has overtaken the Church in Holy Scripture’ (CD I/1, p. 440). Here once more Barth has embraced one of the key elements for which Professor Ayres has quite properly argued in this important book. Here we conclude with a very interesting remark by Barth:
Do we not have to be aware of all these objections [the historical and material objections to the term homoousion] and yet still acknowledge it as the dogma which the Church, having once recognised, can never let go again? For in all its folly it is more true than all the wisdom which has voiced its opposition to it. We have no reason to take any other view of it. (CD I/1, pp. 440–41)
It is precisely with respect to this development that Barth uttered his famous phrase: ‘hominum confusione et Dei providentia’. This whole development took place in Barth's view because the church had to recognise and assert the deity of Christ himself.
