Spinoza and German Idealism, edited by Eckart Förster and Yitzhak Y. Melamed is composed of 14 chapters written by various contributors who discuss the influence of Spinoza’s philosophy not only on Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, but also Kant, Herder, Goethe, and Trendelenburg. In the brief introduction, Förster and Melamed note the re-emergence of metaphysics as an area of study in analytic philosophy, as well as the growing interest in German Idealism and Kantianism in the anglophone philosophical community. For these German thinkers, Spinoza’s metaphysical system, as the volume makes clear, is frequently seen as the sole alternative to their own systems, which they often see as either radical departures from or revisions of Spinozism. Given this, an extended engagement with Spinoza’s influence on Kant and the figures of German Idealism seems both timely and sorely needed.
In a comparative project of this sort, it can be a difficult task to represent both sides with appropriate sympathy and care. Twelve of the 14 chapters are devoted to the ways in which Spinoza was taken up by the various authors in question; while some conclude in a neutral manner, others simply lay out and clarify the criticisms various thinkers have levelled against him. Given this, the reader might very well expect the book to be slanted in favour of the idealists. However, Michael Della Rocca’s chapter at the beginning preempts some lines of idealist attack by rigorously working through Spinoza’s adherence to the principle of sufficient reason and concluding that finite things exist only to a degree, thereby defusing the idealist criticism that the finite does not have a place in Spinoza’s system. Moreover, the volume ends with a chapter by Don Garret in which he elaborates several possible rebuttals to at least four significant idealist criticisms (all of which are laid out in earlier chapters) concerning God, finitude, the attributes, and the human mind. Giving Spinoza the first and last word before and after detailing the German Idealist’s engagement with his system effectively balances out the book, and realizes the editors’ thoughtful efforts to portray both sides sympathetically.
The balanced nature of the book is also thanks to the contributors’ mastery of the subject matter, and their subtlety and finesse in utilizing the formidable amount of technical terminology that does not always neatly cross over between Spinozism and German Idealism. The contributors’ greatest achievement involves their refusal to lapse into caricature; instead, through a precise and sympathetic examination of the philosophers in question, they arrive at innovative formulations of what exactly is at stake between these two schools of thought. Yet, like any insightful work of philosophy, Spinoza and German Idealism raises just as many questions as it resolves. Allen Wood, contrasting Spinoza and Fichte on freedom, ends in an aporia between the two thinkers and concludes that perhaps Kant was right that freedom could not be comprehended. Della Rocca, moreover, ends his own contribution in a similar way, claiming that the principle of sufficient reason (PSR) brings us beyond Spinoza’s monism altogether, but perhaps it brings us beyond truth or falsity of the PSR itself, and the only proper response is, as Wittgenstein suggested, silence. Beyond these two chapters, which end in uncertainty, there is also some tension between the contributors themselves. For example, in Melamed’s chapter, he claims that, for Spinoza, being finite is a partial negation of the infinite, which would problematize Hegel’s acosmist reading that led him to claim Spinoza did not believe modes to exist at all; so he concludes that Hegel’s version of Spinoza is one which Hegel moulds to fit his own system. However, as Dean Moyar points out in his chapter, Hegel sees his critique of Spinozist substance as an immanent critique, meaning Hegel simply took Spinoza’s idea of substance and worked through its implications. Indeed, Hegel repeatedly claims that Spinoza did not follow his own insights to their full conclusion. Consequently, any claim that Hegel anticipates Spinoza’s philosophy as fitting into his own system would have to show how the inferences Hegel makes are mistaken rather than showing that Spinoza did not come to those conclusions himself. Even the final chapter is by no means the last word on the topic, as Garret himself admits. Instead, it demonstrates that neither Spinoza nor any of the German Idealists is (as Lessing called Spinoza) a “dead dog”, and just how immediate and relevant the conversation between these philosophers is for philosophers of the 21st century who are once again examining properly metaphysical problems.
The book will, no doubt, be of great interest to those who are interested in the influence of Spinoza on German Idealism. However, it will also be of interest to those who study either Spinozism or German Idealism independently of one another. Not only is the book useful to historically situate what German Idealism reacts against, but the comparative nature of the study also demands extremely thoughtful and careful exposition on the part of the contributors, which leads to very nuanced and precise readings of both Spinoza and the German idealists, which can sometimes be lacking in books that deal with simply one or the other. The novice reader might struggle with some of the contributions, as a familiarity with the texts in question is often presupposed. Nevertheless, most of the contributors present detailed and clear exegesis of key arguments, so those new to these philosophers will still find the book to be a source of insight and inspiration on several philosophical issues.
