It was during the winter of 2016 that an armed takeover of the Malheur National Wildlife Refuge in eastern Oregon captured the attention of a nation and caused debate over the legal foundations of the federal government's authority to manage natural resources and public lands in western states. Although the spectacle of armed militants occupying the refuge drew national debate, much remains to be known about the legal foundations of the federal government's power to manage these lands. Indeed, US environmental policy textbooks almost collectively take the constitutional origins of American environmental policy for granted. In The Conservation Constitution, Kimberly K. Smith, a professor of environmental studies and political science at Carleton College, carefully develops “a synthetic narrative” to examine the etiology and influence of key doctrines and legal arguments such as the public trust doctrine, the equal footing doctrine, the public nuisance doctrine, the state failure argument, and the inherent power argument, many of which influenced and shaped Progressive Era conservation policy and the constitutional regime that gave life to it. Smith calls this new constitutional order the “Conservation Constitution,” which she describes as “a set of legal traditions that continue to structure environmental law and policy, providing the foundations for an emergent green state” (4).
My environmental politics courses have suffered from inattention to the constitutional foundations that form the basis of debate over contested concepts such as the equal footing doctrine, which is invoked in western public land management disputes, or the public trust doctrine, which was invoked by sportsmen who battled water pollution in the streams and rivers of the eastern United States. This book compensates for that omission by providing an account of the complicated history that underlies the mobilization of these doctrines. The book is written with painstaking detail and careful attention to original government publications, state and federal court opinions, and legislative records. Hence, upper-division undergraduates interested in constitutional law, environmental history, or environmental policy will find this book to be a valuable resource. For graduate students interested in this period of history, the author shows how to combine doctrinal analysis, legislative history, and other archival records to form analytical cases that demonstrate the evolution of constitutional doctrine and environmental policy.
At the beginning of the book, Smith observes that constitutional thought in the area of conservation had its own independent foundations differing from the legal framework giving rise to Progressive policy reform and “had to be defended on its own terms, with reference to the distinctive legal principles governing natural resource use” (12). To examine the emergence of this new constitutional order, she grounds her analysis in the tradition of American Political Development to describe how these natural resource management laws became the “constitutional common sense.” The book includes case studies of wildlife management, forestry policy, public land management, and pollution control. In the earliest chapters of her ambitious inquiry, Smith reveals how nineteenth-century state wildlife conservation became supported on the basis of the public trust doctrine, which empowered sovereign states to hold natural resources in trust for the benefit of their citizens and shielded state conservation policies against the private property claims of state residents. While Congress debated about its constitutional powers to extend national protection to wildlife, grassroots conservationists argued that states lacked the capacity and incentives to protect wildlife that crossed state lines. The public trust doctrine placed authority for the protection of wildlife in the states. By contrast, constitutional scholars such as Edward Corwin helped form the intellectual basis for the federal protection of wildlife by citing United States Department of Agriculture findings that birds added to agricultural productivity as natural predators to pests. This meant that wildlife was part of a natural system that should not be considered without reference to its contribution to the national economy. This fundamental shift in thinking is represented by renowned jurist Oliver Wendell Holmes, who based his written opinion in Missouri v. Holland (1920) on “the emerging conception of nature not as property but as a system that supports the national economy . . . and therefore a proper subject for international negotiation” (70).
When forests and national wildlife refuges became conceptualized as part of a broader system in other policy areas, Smith demonstrates, broad national powers to regulate these systems emerged. Chapter 4 shows how dominion over state forests was derived from either state constitutions or from favorable rulings of the eminent domain or police powers, but the constitutional foundations for a national forestry policy were less straightforward. Conservation opponents mobilized to demand a clear justification for the federal interest in forest conservation and a response to their claim that the equal footing doctrine prohibited the federal government from retaining control of western public lands. Eastern reserves raised an entirely different constitutional dilemma because creating them would require acquisition of land. Smith finds that although the constitutional basis for western federal forest conservation could be found elsewhere, courts and judges became more tolerant of federal control over eastern and western forests when they became conceptualized as part of a broader system tied to streamflow and the protection of watersheds.
One of the most valuable contributions made by Conservation Constitution is the author's examination of the development of local, state, and national pollution policy. Today's local governments no doubt have broad power to address public health through regulations, but in the nineteenth century, pollution control was grounded in nuisance law, which formed the basis for the police powers that address public health problems. Nineteenth-century judges had broad discretion to decide whether an activity fell under this power and when reformers articulated the complexity of these problems, especially in urban areas, local governments assumed even broader powers despite the due process claims of private property owners. Meanwhile, Smith describes how it became no longer possible to ignore the interstate pollution conflicts that were beginning to develop as states began dealing with greater industrialization, disease, and urban population growth. At this time, no clear constitutional powers existed for the resolution of these conflicts by Congress, and so the most dramatic invention during this time was manufactured by the Supreme Court in the form of an interstate nuisance common law articulated in cases such as Kansas v. Colorado (1907) and Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Company (1907).
Smith describes in careful detail key innovations in constitutional doctrine during the Progressive Era, and a story can also be told about how the ascendance of legal realism and its revolt against legal formalism provided an intellectual movement leading to the Conservation Constitution. Indeed, it can be argued that the cases contained in this book describe a critical intellectual victory by legal realists when judges adopted the position that individual elements of nature are part of a broader natural system. Smith's careful attention to the written opinions of prominent jurists such as Oliver Wendell Holmes may already allude to these broader intellectual debates without specifically referring to them, but opportunities exist for future research to describe with greater force and precision how the disruption caused by legal realism is tied to the emergence of the “green state.”
