The genesis of this truly remarkable collection of essays and papers, now rightly made available to a wider audience, was a conference held in Rhodes House, Oxford, in June 2012, which drew together a stellar, multidisciplinary group including historians, legal academics, judges, political scientists, theologians and philosophers, to discuss the concept of human dignity from their various disciplinary perspectives. The proceedings and papers have now been magnificently drawn together by Professor Christopher McCrudden, who sets the scene in a masterful opening chapter entitled ‘In pursuit of human dignity: an introduction to current debates’. Anyone who has benefited from his seminal 2008 paper ‘Human dignity and judicial interpretation of human rights’Footnote 1 will already be fully aware of the depth and richness of his grasp of this subject.
McCrudden writes in opening:
The concept of human dignity has probably never been so omnipresent in everyday speech, or so deeply embedded in political and legal discourse. In debates on welfare reform, or in addressing the effects of the current economic crisis, appeals to dignity are seldom hard to find … The concept of dignity is not only a prominent feature of political debate, but also, increasingly, of legal argument. Indeed, since the European Court of Human Rights, among others, tells us that human dignity is the foundation of all human rights, it is clear that human dignity will continue to be a central element in legal argument into the future. The power of the concept of human dignity is unquestionable. It appears to present a simple command to all of us: that we (individually and collectively) should value the human person, simply because he or she is human. But are we all singing from the same hymn sheet when we use the concept of human dignity, and is it a problem if we are not? Human dignity often seems to be used on both sides of many of the most controversial political debates: on issues such as abortion, assisted suicide, genetic experimentation, freedom of expression, and gay rights, human dignity is invoked to justify apparently conflicting positions. Does this demonstrate that the concept is hopelessly vague and excessively prone to manipulation? Or does the existence of dignity arguments on both sides of controversial debates simply demonstrate the complexity of moral argument? Addressing the fundamentals of human dignity, and thereby furthering our understanding of how we might better comprehend the concept, has never been more opportune. (p 1)
There are, McCrudden writes, ‘at least three conversations’ identifiable in the book. ‘One conversation is within and between the different disciplines represented, between lawyers and lawyers, for example, and between philosophers and theologians. The second conversation is that between the secular and the religious understandings of human rights and human dignity. The third conversation is a serious debate within Catholicism, one that has importance for the other two conversations as well’ (p 57). It is that interdisciplinary flavour which gives the book its greatest strength, and also perhaps leaves its deepest challenge.
The outcome is on any view a remarkable resource, covering an immense canvas, with 41 contributors, 39 scholarly essays, 658 pages of text, 38 pages of (invaluable) select bibliography and 12 pages of legislative and constitutional authority and case law. The material is skilfully marshalled into seven sections: ‘Historical perspectives’, ‘Dignity critiques’, ‘Theological perspectives’, ‘Philosophical perspectives’, ‘Judicial perspectives’, ‘Applications’ and ‘Ways forward?’ One abiding impression I took away was of the strength of the Christian contribution in profoundly shaping certainly the Western understanding of human dignity. It reappeared time after time. As David Gushee writes, ‘Human life is valuable because God values it, and God's valuing is clear as God creates, sustains, liberates, governs, delivers and redeems, even in the face of human defiance and disobedience’ (p 283).
It is difficult to think that such a rich, mind-stretching, discussion-provoking dialogue will be bettered in the near future. And had I mentioned the two warm prefaces, one by a Supreme Court Justice (Brenda Hale), the other by a Cardinal Archbishop (Vincent Nichols)? Lady Hale's reaction to the conference resonated somewhat with mine to the book: ‘It supplied me with a great deal of information which I did not have before and more to think about than I could ever have imagined’ (p xvi). Thus, to characterise the brief observations which follow as a ‘review’ risks stretching language unacceptably!
There is no doubting the profundity of the ‘human dignity’ debate. It raises questions as fundamental as: what kind of beings are we? How do we appropriately express the kind of beings we are? A basic minimum content of human dignity seems to have at least three elements.Footnote 2 The first is that every human being possesses an intrinsic worth, merely by being human (the ontological claim). The second is that this intrinsic worth should be recognised and respected by others, and some forms of treatment by others are inconsistent with, or required by, respect for this intrinsic worth (the relational claim). The third is that recognising the intrinsic worth of the individual requires that the state should be seen to exist for the sake of the individual human being and not vice versa (the limited-state claim).
That concept of human dignity may be relatively easily stated and the subject of broad agreement. The difficulty comes with differing conceptions of dignity. So many of the chapters in this fascinating book make abundantly clear that the pervasive invocation of the concept of human dignity today is accompanied by a wealth of different ideas about the meaning and scope of dignity within the plurality of moral and legal traditions in the human family. The questions pile up relentlessly, as McCrudden concedes (pp ix and x). Is there a minimum core to the meaning of human dignity? Is a person's human dignity to be assessed ‘subjectively’ or ‘objectively’? Can human dignity be understood in purely secular terms or is it (as Michael Perry has claimed in respect of human rights) ‘ineliminably religious’? Can there be a shared meaning of human dignity where there is religious and ideological pluralism? What ontological claims are implied by appeals to human dignity? How should we behave towards each other? How should the state behave towards those under its authority? What is the relationship between human dignity, human rights and other values and principles connected with rights such as autonomy, freedom, equality, social solidarity and identity? Does human dignity have a status superior to that of other values? Does it essentially serve community or individual goals? Is it necessarily an emancipatory idea? Is it rights-supporting or rights-constraining? How appropriate is the use of the concept of human dignity for judicial decision-making?
All these questions, and more, are discussed skilfully and largely courteously, despite, at times, startling polarities of view on what human dignity means or requires. Perhaps the most surprisingly discordant note in the book comes in an exchange between Justice Edwin Cameron and Professor Robert George. In a way, their fiery written disagreement is an illustration of precisely the problem: ‘that “dignity” is a squishy, subjective notion, hardly up to the heavyweight moral demands assigned to it’ (Steven Pinker), that it ‘is fuzzy – often ripe with ambiguity’ (Cameron). Following his spirited defence of the South African Constitutional Court's approach to dignity evidenced in the jurisprudence on the equality of gays and lesbians, Cameron turns his fire on Christopher Tollefsen and George: ‘Today's arguments opposing same-sex marriage invoke the same rigidities, the same illogicalities and the same absurdities of racism in South Africa's discredited past. They deserve the same opprobrium’ (p 479).
George will have none of it and, clearly outraged, produces the only ‘Response’ chapter in the book:
From his [Cameron's] expressive individualist point of view, defenders of traditional sexual morality are enemies of personal self-realization, and thus of human dignity. I am sure that Professor Tollefsen feels no less insulted and demeaned – I certainly do – when someone like Justice Cameron equates the conjugal view of marriage and sexual morality with bigotry – indeed, with something as ugly and evil as apartheid. From a natural law point of view, expressive individualist ideology undermines human dignity by encouraging people to yield to unworthy desires, thus damaging their own integrity and contributing to the erosion of a cultural environment in which marriage and the norms of sexual exclusivity and fidelity essential to it can flourish. (p 505)
Who says – or thinks – understanding human dignity will, of itself, unlock the great moral, social and legal issues of our time?
As Lady Hale says, the contributors to this book ‘may not have supplied all the answers’ but they have most certainly ‘enabled us to organize our thoughts more coherently on this immensely challenging but also immensely engaging subject’ (p xvii).
