Introduction
To most foreign residents in the city of Tehran, the official pronouncement of air-crash victims as ‘martyrs’ was a bizarre act of government that Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's regime had come to characterise since his election as president a few months before. Yet few local residents seemed fazed at the turn of events. As I tried to make sense of the accident and its aftermath, I was offered at least two explanations of how the corpses of the accident victims came to belong in the realm of martyrdom. The more sympathetic reasoning was offered by the supporters of the regime that went as follows: the crashed plane was an American made C-130 model which was a pre-revolution legacy from the Reza Shah's government. These planes were in a state of rapid disrepair because of the American boycott of Iran since the American embassy hostage crisis of 1979,Footnote 5 which meant that Iran was not able to obtain spare parts to repair the aircraft. The deaths, therefore, were not because of government neglect and incompetence, but the result of American hegemony and oppression that sought to destabilise the revolutionary state through embargoes. The corpses were a testimony of Iran's continuing struggle against injustice and oppression in the footsteps of Imam Hussein, the original martyr in the Shi'a tradition.
The less charitable explanation attributed cynical motivations to Ahmadinejad's decision as air-accidents are not uncommon in Iran, and not all accident victims become classified as martyrs.Footnote 6 What made this accident different? Was the fact that the passengers were not ordinary travellers but top military personnel and press corps returning from a Chabahar military training exercise on the southern coast important? This was the first time that such a large number of high-ranking military officials and journalists had lost their lives in a single air-accident. The event had been met with an unusual response from the media which had begun by asking critical questions and demanding some action from the government. Given that the mainstream Iranian media, particularly the English language daily papers, seldom expresses opinions that contradict the official news agencies, made this expression of outrage quite unusual. The classification of accident victims as martyrs could potentially stunt the growing public criticism and divert attention away from the state's failure to protect its citizens.
Regardless of the vantage point from which one views the accident, it is clear that the tradition of martyrdom in post-revolutionary Iran is no longer confined to the domain of theology alone. The incursions of the state into this domain become visible not only in such moments of conflict, they are physically manifested in the way public spaces are organised and adorned in the city. Visitors to Tehran are often struck by the large murals that adorn many private wallsFootnote 7 and public spaces. These larger-than-life paintings depict revolutionaries and soldiers who sacrificed their lives during the 1979 revolution and later, during the eight-year long Iran-Iraq war (1980–88), to sustain the revolutionary state. Some images are plain large-scale reproductions of passport-sized official photographs that the soldiers left behind; others are more artful in their depiction of uniformed men, sometimes witnessed in a mutilated or dying state, being received by holy angels against a celestial background. Most bear portraits of Iran's first Supreme leader Imam Khomeini and its current leader Imam Khameini who are seen blessing the martyrs. The left hand upper corner is reserved for an official logo – a rose bud shaped as torch, with a white dove perched above it – belonging to the state agency, the Bonyad-i-Shahid va Isargaran or ‘Foundation of Martyrs and Veterans Affairs’. The ubiquitous presence of this well-recognised logo marks the state's approval of the act of martyrdom. The deep power of the logo also raise questions vis-à-vis the place of the state within the contentious field of the political theology of martyrdom, and the ways in which it reconfigures the social space. How and what forms of the sacred are mediated through governmental intervention? What disciplines are necessary to transform, and to desire public transformation of, corpses into martyrs? In other words, how are martyrs made and unmade in the post-revolutionary Iran? And in what way is the category of martyrs invoked and even subverted in the very moment of sacralisation?
To explore the sacralisation of dead bodies in contemporary Iran is to trace the genealogy of martyrdom within which corpses are placed, named, and thus, classified. The bodies, once located within this genealogy, are discursively linked to the martyred body of Hussein, the martyr par excellence according to Shi'a belief who sacrificed his life in the struggle against oppression and injustice. The act that produces the dead bodies becomes obscure somehow in this transformative moment, and the previous social relations within which the deceased is inscribed appear faded. What persists and remains, however, is the concrete materiality of body that is open to new meanings, spatial re-locations, forms of disposal and commemoration.Footnote 8 In post-revolutionary Iran, the corpse has often been a site of contestation, upon and around which national imagination, history and iconography is framed. The very legitimacy of the revolutionary state is derived from the notion of self-sacrifice, inherent within the tradition of martyrdom that served as a popular device of authentication of the 1970s anti-Shah movement and later the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s. A continued reification of this legitimacy, however, requires not only a ritualised collective and public remembrance of the past sacrifices but also a constantly refreshed material basis. Fresh bodies and biographies that can be recast anew with the narrative of martyrdom. In other words, an unceasing production of corporeal remains into martyred bodies – those willing to sacrifice themselves to the way of God, and consequently the Islamic republic – that will reaffirm the continued legitimacy of the Iranian state.
Bonyad-iShahid va Isargaran logo.

In this article, I explore the act of sacralisation through which dead bodies are elevated to the sacred plane of martyrdom, and its affects on the social landscape. The dead body, here, is an invaluable corporeal resource that together with specific words and appropriate conduct significantly reorders the world of meaning. Through a contemporary account of death and sacralisation, I open the relationship between the act and the narrative of martyrdom - that is, the shifting historical discourses of martyrdom that give the body its sacred meaning in multiple ways. The article follows a double argument. Firstly, the transformative act – of sacralisation - is made possible because the corpse performs the original narrative even as it displaces it to give new meanings to the act. It is in this displaced narrative that the body becomes, at once, liminal, expendable as a governmental device and obscure within the theatrical performance of state rituals. The act of martyrdom is made relevant through the repetitive performance of martyr's death upon new bodies, even as, or rather because, the original meaning is displaced and transformed. Secondly, the very moment of sacralisation, revealed through governmental mediation, carries within possibilities of contestation and subversion as the state appropriates the power to make or un-make martyrs. In Iran, the evermore frequent and glaring mediations of martyrdom by the revolutionary state have effectively displaced the sacred category of martyrs to the secular domain of government in its very attempts to protect the sacred from defilement. This space of transgression between the sacred and the secular has also become a space of contention where the state claims are contested and sometimes even defied.
The first part of this article thus explores the moment of sacralisation and describes the ‘original’ act of martyrdom – of Imam Hussein – whose legacy is invoked through public rituals. In the second part contemporary governmental practices of martyrdom are traced to show how the meanings of sacred death shift and occupy the liminal space between the sacred and the secular, and in so doing reconfigure political space in revolutionary Iran.
Sacralising Bodies
The moment of sacralisation is a double act: when the body is, at once, liberated from the secular as well as elevated to the sacred. It is performed on the body through the mediation of external agencies, divine or otherwise, that elevates the corporeal remains to the scared domain. To understand the moment of sacralisation, therefore, is to delve into the liminal spaces between the sacred and the secular; and into the modes of agency that make the transcendence of those possible. In other words, it raises questions about what relations make the sacred and the secular distinct yet inseparable, and what forms of authenticating signs and agency are required to inhabit and exceed this liminal space?
The notion of the ‘sacred’ implicates concentration of divine power in objects, people or places. Charles Taylor describes this as the condition of fullness that unsettles the “ordinary sense of being in the world”.Footnote 9 The profane, in such a condition, is read through a different repertoire of signs revealed to the subject of divine experience that transforms ordinary things into sacred. Yet the unsettling of the ordinary is more than an individual act; it is co-produced within a social setting once the signs of the sacred become legible to others. The co-production of the sacred is an everyday process performed in public space, and reified through ritual protection of the sacred from secular defilement so that its purity and sanctity is maintained in everyday life.Footnote 10 Implicit in this process is recognition of the validity of these signs not only by those who practice the rituals but also those set to be excluded in the course of such practices. However, this understanding of ritual boundary-making does not consider how the social landscape might look like if others fail, or simply refuse, to recognise the signs. Or if the rituals are appropriated and replicated outside their natural domain. These questions are central to any exploration into the making of martyrs in post-revolution Iran where the tradition of martyrdom has assumed institutional forms.
The most spectacular sign of the act of martyrdom is the corpse left behind in profanity. The vexing task for many Islamic scholars has been how to differentiate sacred corpses from ordinary corpses. Through various historical periods, different registers of signs were elaborated to isolate the martyr's body. In early Islam, a variety of deaths, besides those on the battlefield, were seen as path to martyrdom for Muslims. These included eight different ways including death due to plague, drowning, pleurisy, defence of one's property, childbirth, accidental death while engaged in jihad, as well as falling off the mountain top, being eaten by lions and death in building collapse.Footnote 11 Death was seen as an act of mercy to those Muslims who died while still firmly in belief of God's will, and for whom the gates of paradise would open up. Later, death incurred on a battlefield became the prime mode of gaining martyrdom, and bodily-wounds and blood-stained clothing served as material evidence of self-sacrifice.Footnote 12 The martyred body, therefore, was buried unwashed so that the proof of self-sacrifice remained intact and continued to bear testimony.
However, not all deaths on the battlefield were seen as martyrdom: those looking for earthly rewards, displaying their bravery, or warring just for the sake of warring were not to be considered martyrs. The intention behind self-sacrifice formed the key difference: desire to seek unity with God that was not informed by profane considerations. The martyr's death, thus, is often signalled before it takes place and it leaves divine signatures such as dreams, premonitions, smells and unusual occurrences that augur its arrival. Once the sign is revealed, it is consummated through mediation within the public space so as to form collective remembrance of the act of sacralisation. The mediatory role is usually performed by agents of various interest groups, sometimes referred to as ‘reputational entrepreneurs’, who seek to further their cause by weaving the dead body into specific narratives.Footnote 13 The ritual mourning sessions, public commemorations and circulation of visual imagery of the dead in public spaces convey the event of a divine death.
In post-revolution Iran, these signs have been subsumed under one overarching symbol, that is, the state that has appropriated the power to isolate the sacred death from the secular. A centralised governmental agency - the Foundation of Martyrs and Veterans Affairs or Bonyad-i-Shahid va Isaargaran - is invested with the authority to classify, name, regulate and commemorate the dead as martyrs. The signs of impending martyrdom – premonitions, miracles and extraordinary events – are no longer rooted within the popular domain alone; they are systematically produced, circulated and documented by the agency. The Foundation was established in 1979 upon the directive of Imam Khomeini to support the families of revolutionaries who had sacrificed their lives during the anti-Shah struggle. The mass casualties suffered in the eight-year Iran-Iraq war then produced an even larger constituency of the dead that had to be governed effectively by the revolutionary state. The agency became responsible not only for ritually disposing of the corpses, but also for the welfare of the families of dead soldiers through various provisions such as employment, pensions, legal services, higher education, interest-free bank loans and exemption from military service. The wide range of benefits includes even half-price air tickets and financial assistance on the occasion of the marriage of the offspring of the martyrs. The Foundation is also responsible for the upkeep of the Martyrs’ Cemetery outside Tehran where thousands of bodies of revolutionaries and soldiers are buried. Though the bodies lie far outside the city, their affect is reproduced through the imagery of martyrs in public spaces and institutionalised through museums and exhibitions that narrate the biographies of martyrs. The martyr's body is the most important sacred object administered by the Foundation that re-narrates the history of Shi'a persecution even as it evokes passions deeper than the narratives of oppression and resistance.
The sacred, here, is constructed, not only through elaborate socially-sanctioned rituals as Mary Douglas suggests, rather it takes place through the agency of the state and modern technologies of governance which enable its seclusion from the profane. The repertoire of signs, which are publicly recognised as those of martyrdom, now also appear within the governmental habitus: as marks of a sovereign state that governs both its living as well as its dead population. In short, the very idea of being a martyr has undergone a dramatic transition in contemporary Iran. In order to understand these historical transformations, we need to locate the ‘original’ act of martyrdom within Shi'a tradition that has been an object of simulation and displacement through the past centuries. Each subsequent act of sacralisation is a repetition of the original, and yet it creates its own difference and set of meanings. It is in this historical flux that the contemporary practices of martyrdom in Iran begin to make sense.
The Original Act
While Imam Hussein's death is not the first act of martyrdom in Shi'a tradition, it nevertheless remains the ‘original’ act that inspires intense passion and emulation.Footnote 14 His martyrdom conveys two classical senses of being a martyr or shahid - to bear witness and to sacrifice oneself in the path of God. The first meaning is fairly common in the Qur'an, in both an active and a passive sense, where Muslims are asked to be a living testimony towards the humankind, and can also be asked to bear testimony on the Day of Judgement.Footnote 15 Here, death is not a precondition for bearing witness, since the act of worship and good moral conduct make even living persons witnesses.Footnote 16 The second meaning – of ‘self-sacrifice’ – gained currency later to indicate deaths in the battlefield. Martyrs, however, are distinguished by their pure intentions to gain unity with God and witness truth rather than fame and worldly goods. This purity of intent is what makes Hussein the martyr par excellence who went to the battle of Karbala knowing that he would die and that only his bodily sacrifice would make him an immortal witness for the truth.Footnote 17 Hussein's martyred body forms the popular imaginary and imagery of martyrdom in the Shi'a tradition. It signifies the climactic moment in the ritual performances of taziyeh, the passion plays that use the dramatic effects of blood, tears and dismembered bodies to show the suffering borne by Hussein on his body.
The narrative of Hussein's martyrdom is woven around two central figures: Hussein, the charismatic grandson of Prophet Mohammad and considered by Shi'as to be his rightful heir, and Yazid, who used military might to wrest the Caliphate from Hussein in a battle at Kufa in 682 AD where Hussein's severed body was trampled upon while his head was taken as a trophy for Yazid. According to this narrative, Hussein's desecrated, bloodied and beheaded body appears as a site of humiliation and defeat for his Shi'a supporters. It is not only a loss of power in his epic struggle with Yazid, it is also his inability to nourish and defend his family and followers that is manifested. This is the defining event in the Shi'a faith and it is commemorated through passion plays every year. As each of the acts of desecration are recited and ritually performed in these passion plays, the audience weep in remorse that they could not come to Hussein's aid when he needed them most. A specific characteristic of passion plays is the relatively blurred lines between public/private, drama/reality, past/present and actor/spectator as the narrative is performed in spaces that do not separate stage from the spectator arena, contemporary props and costumes are used to don historical characters, and actors are not really actors, just ordinary people telling a story.Footnote 18 Most importantly, the performance is a cathartic moment, a passionate display of tearful remorse, mourning and self-flagellation in public spaces; when inner-self and outer-self are not buffered anymore.
The very acts of sacrilege on Hussein's body become symbols, not of humiliation, but of injustice and oppression at the hands of evil Yazid. Several traditions suggest that Hussein had foreknowledge of his own violent death and that of his fellow travellers, yet he continued toward Kufa in order to raise consciousness among Muslims. The reign of Yazid was unjust and corrupt, and the way to challenge it was not necessarily through military prowess, but through the spectacle of suffering and sacrifice of one's own body that would impassion Muslims and lead to moral awakening.Footnote 19 Suffering and sacrifice, then, become God's sovereign act performed on chosen bodies. Hussein's foreknowledge of dangers and his selfless resolve to continue nonetheless is what makes his death worthy of veneration and his martyred body enchanting and a venerated symbol of resistance across historical periods and in multiple locations. The religious category of martyrdom has been a defining element of the Shi'a faith, however it was with the advent of Islamic revolution that it took on an important political significance.
Politics of Passion
The narrative of Hussein's martyrdom underwent a dramatic shift once it was performed in the political theatre of Iranian revolution in 1979. Michael Fischer calls the revolution the “ultimate passion play of Karbala paradigm” where real life became performance of a lifetime to undo the injustice committed in Karbala.Footnote 20 Hussein's passive form of self-sacrifice was given a more active interpretation. Here, the monarch Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi was conceptualised as a contemporary Yazid who with the aid of foreign powers was instrumental in oppressing his own people. This vision was not too difficult for Iranians to relate to as the Shah's regime was widely unpopular because of its dependence on his western allies such as the USA and Britain, its dreaded secret police SAVAK that had created a state of exception in Iran, and its attempts to filter Islamic tradition out of public spaces and to revise Iranian history into a secular narrative. In this new political context, the life and death of Hussein acquired fresh meaning and significance. The leader of the revolution, Imam Khomeini, now described Hussein's martyrdom as a “manual of action” for the revolution.Footnote 21 The emphasis shifted from passive witnessing of weeping to active witnessing of fighting and overthrow of oppression.Footnote 22 This conception of active intervention forms the third meaning of martyr that became particularly prominent during the revolution and immediately afterwards. In addition to the classical forms of bearing witness and of sacrifice, the active – the revolutionary became the new embodiment of martyrdom.
This view of martyrdom had its intellectual roots in the writings, among others, of Ali Shariati who transformed and redefined Islam through ‘scientific’ concepts employed in the modern social sciences.Footnote 23 In a series of celebrated lectures in Tehran, he offered a critique of Marxism from an Islamic point of view even as he found a common ground on concepts such as ‘class struggle’ and ‘imperialism’ by linking them to the teachings of Imam Ali and Hussein.Footnote 24 Shariati's narrative of martyrdom differed from the traditional ones as it took issue with materialist interpretations of the battle of Karbala, instead ‘reading’ it passionately as a revolution led by the weak against the powerful. Martyrdom, for Shariati, was a “mixture of a refined love and a deep, complex wisdom” that went beyond the rationalities of life and death to make the martyrs truly alive in the pursuit of justice and truth.Footnote 25 Here, the act of self-sacrifice turns powerlessness into a condition of strength for those without means. The gravity of Hussein's task, in Shariati's account, resonates with challenges faced by revolutionaries everywhere across the ages.
He is alone, unarmed. Opposing him is one of the most savage empires of the world that is being ruled by the most deceiving cover of piety, sacredness and unity that the ruling power possesses. All the defenders have either been killed or have run away. He remains alone, empty handed, without any possibility, surrounded by the enemy who caused others to surrender to the silence, to become indifferent and fall into ignorance.Footnote 26
Readers are reminded that Hussein does not possess an army to fight a victorious military battle, yet he has a sacred task that he has been chosen to fulfil. He resolves this dilemma by choosing death in a battle where the conqueror eventually becomes the loser as martyrdom is not to be considered a loss since “it is a choice, a choice whereby the warrior sacrifices himself on the threshold of the temple of freedom and the altar of love and is victorious”. Such a death is not an imposed one, it is “desired by our warrior, selected with all of the awareness, logic, reasoning, intelligence, understanding, consciousness and alertness that a human being has”.Footnote 27 Hussein's death becomes a desirable death as the body itself becomes a vehicle of active struggle by choosing its own death. The struggle here is double-edged, both inner and outer, that a martyr must confront, and only in his bodily death does he “throw his inferior being into the fire of love and faith and turns it into a divine being”.Footnote 28 The signs of desire for martyrdom are visible and legible for reading.
This activist interpretation of Karbala was to become the cornerstone of the Iranian revolution.Footnote 29 In fact, one of the most popular slogans of the revolution – “every day is Ashura and every place is Karbala” - radically invoked Hussein's martyrdom as a model for the anti-Shah struggle. Karbala was no longer a specific historical event; instead it became shorthand for struggle against oppression across histories and locations. Its political translation was contingent upon new forms of self-discipline in order to effectively mobilise support. The emulation of Hussein required overcoming one's inner fears of mortality and instead viewing one's own death as a necessary expenditure in the struggle for a just society. Body, here, was not only expendable but became particularly productive in its negativity. It was only in this vision of immortality, then, that ordinary people could be motivated to oppose fearlessly the Shah's authoritarian rule. Not surprisingly, the mourning rituals of Ashura – passion plays and Muharram processions marked by weeping and self-flagellation – became occasions for anti-Shah mobilisation, with Imam Khomeini calling upon his followers to keep alive the message of Karbala through mourning sessions.
The public expression of grief was no longer an act of resignation rather “an outcry in opposition to the tyrants”.Footnote 30 The act of mourning had itself found a new meaning and political significance. The cycles of death and mourning are inextricably linked to the pre–revolution violence that destabilised the monarchy. The period 1977–79 was marked, on the one hand, by the intimidation and torture of the Shah's SAVAK forces and police action that claimed the lives of thousands of protestors, and on the other, by the anti-monarchy violence organised by Marxist guerrilla groups. In the popular narratives of the revolution, the political acts of protest and rituals of mourning often co-habit a blurred space where religious symbolism acquires an urgent political currency. The protestors sometimes wore white shrouds signifying their willingness to be martyred, while red flags carried by the marchers bore the dual symbolism of revolution as well as the blood of martyrs. This dual symbolism often confused the authorities who initially read ‘red’ flags as the sign of Marxist guerrilla groups whereas red flags were also associated with the martyrs, particularly Imam Hussein.Footnote 31
This blurriness of symbols and meanings reflected the heterogeneous landscape upon which the revolution took shape – the disparate social groupings as divergent as those of anti-Shah clerics and bazaar merchants, discontented youths, modern intellectuals, secularised middle class, and Marxist guerrilla groups. Some saw revolution itself as a collective moment of catharsis for the Iranian nation that had been purified by the spilling of blood.Footnote 32 The act of bodily sacrifice during the revolution in order to overthrow the monarch is what defined martyrdom now. As a consequence, martyrdom itself was no longer grounded in theological traditions alone. It was an indelible part of the politics of revolution that formed a new moral-political subjectivity, namely revolutionary martyrs, in the process.
As the revolution reached its crescendo at the beginning of 1979, Muhammad Reza Shah abdicated and left Iran while Khomeini returned from exile to lead a restive nation. He held his first speech besides the martyrs’ graves in Behesht-e-Zahra, or Paradise of Zahra, the largest cemetery near Tehran where the revolutionaries now lay buried. While commemorating the sacrifices, he assailed Shah for violently opposing people's will and asked if it was just that “when we want to name a government, we get a cemetery full of people”.Footnote 33 The symbolism lay not only in the speech where an incipient revolutionary government was legitimised through bodily sacrifices, but also in the choice of location – the Martyrs’ Cemetery – where this speech-act took place. At once, this population of dead revolutionaries, and their final resting place, was re-inscribed atop the new moral-political order shaping up in the final throes of the revolution. In fact, the martyrs in revolutionary Iran were soon to be organised as a governmental category with an entire institutional framework of its own that not only reconfigured the political sphere but also the sphere of the sacred. This constitutes the fourth meaning of martyr. That is, a martyr is not only one who makes bodily sacrifices to confront injustice and seeks unity with God, but rather it is one whose sacrifice is recognised and rewarded as such by the state power, as we will witness below.
Zahra's Paradise
Dear Shahroukh,
On your 28th anniversary. You look towards the face of Allah and fly towards him. Your martyrdom will be a lesson in patience and reveal the ‘munafiqeen’, the deceitful ‘Mujaheedin-i-Khalq’ (MKO)
(Letter to Sharoukh on cloth hoisted above his grave, 2006).“Shahid Shahroukh Tahmasbi. He was martyred at the hands of hypocrites MKO who tortured him mercilessly”: these words are inscribed in black on a white banner with green borders along with a portrait of the martyr Tahmasbi above his grave in the martyrs’ section of Behesht-i-Zahra. This agonisingly short letter addressed to him marks his death anniversary that his family, assisted by officials of the Foundation of Martyrs and Veterans Affairs, observes every year. The grave, bedecked with offerings of flowers and perfumed incense, is the centre around which family members as well as visitors offer prayers. In the open-space adjoining the row of graves, volunteers serve tea to the visitors while they listen to speeches made by Foundation representatives, fellow surviving soldiers, and occasionally, family members. The story of Shahrukh Tahmasbi is recounted by the speakers as well as whispered among the gathered crowd. He was tortured and killed by MKO (Mujaheedin-i-Khalq) activists, soon after the revolution, as tensions broke out between the revolutionary government and the MKO. During the anti-Shah struggle, the MKO, Islamists, feminist groups as well as communists had been united in their goal to overthrow the monarchy. However, ideological cleavages sharpened once the Shah had been exiled and the new political formations in Iran became a matter of contestation between the former allies. In this power struggle, Imam Khomeini's vision of an Islamic republic edged out others and the MKO was among those categorised as traitors to the republic.
This power struggle is clearly mapped out in Behesht-e-Zahra where thousands of dead revolutionaries and soldiers lie buried. The graves of martyrs, like Shahid Tahmasbi, are the objects of veneration: they are prominently located, and are regularly cleaned, decorated and visited. In contrast, the graves of MKO activists are located in an abandoned part of the graveyard, unattended, uncovered, and surrounded by overgrown bushes. Visitors rarely approach these graves as any association with the traitors poses a potential risk. The corpses continue to be a part of the political reconfigurations that underpin contemporary Iran. A walk through the cemetery is a walk through the history of the revolution where scripts of different battlefronts unfold. The personal stories of heroism and death, of martyrs who fought on the frontline, and of irregular forces mobilised to defend Iran, abound within the cramped graveyard space. Individual graves are often arranged around specific events – memorable battles - as if they are exhibits in a historical narrative of revolution and war. Such an arrangement of graves bears the twin logic of governance – legibility and unity. Firstly, the classification of death as martyrdom here depends on historically verifiable events – of struggle against injustice and oppression during the revolution and the war – that legitimise the maintenance of graves and distribution of a variety of resources to the martyr's dependents. Once the corpses are matched with historical events and displayed as such spatially, the classification becomes legible and authentic for administrative purposes. Secondly, this neat spatial arrangement creates a unified narrative of revolution and war where the martyr's bodies continue to amplify their given historic roles.
The corpses classified as those of martyrs are buried in graves largely of uniform shape, size and colour with low white marble rectangles placed side-by-side in long narrow rows. The monotony of the white marble is sometimes broken with the red, green and white Iranian national flag, representing the colours of the martyr's blood, Islam and peace, draped over the graves. Each grave is provided with a glass case for the deceased's family to beautify and thus personalise the uniform style of the structures. These glass cases are often a window of biographical display with photos of martyrs from infancy to adulthood and personal items of identification such as school certificates, notebooks, driving licenses, army badges and copies of the Quran. The inclusion of objects such as a mirror in the display suggests that the martyr had yet to fulfil the rituals of marriage, while married martyrs may sometimes have their family photos in the case. The cemetery is often decorated with colourful banners bearing motivational slogans, posters with appeals to keep alive the remembrance of martyrs’ sacrifice, and billboards with images of famous martyrs.
Examples of the glass cases which are an integral part of a martyr's grave.

Upon my first visit to the cemetery, I was struck, like most visitors, by the larger-than-life profile of a martyr on the threshold of martyrdom. His eyes were half closed and blood streaks flowed from his head wound down on his serene face, yet calmness, not pain, described him. The deathly wounds and oozing blood barely disturbed the contentment visible on the martyr's face. A small walk inside, another striking image awaited me – a soldier silhouetted against a blue sky lined with white doves breezing through a sea of red tulips. These images poetically visualised the idea of martyrdom as liberation of the soul rather than painful bodily death. While the first image conveyed the meaning of martyrdom through an artistic copy of an actual photograph of a dying soldier, the second used objects like red tulips to symbolise blood drops, doves to show a liberated soul and finally open blue skies as precursors of heavens beyond earth. These images were bound by one recurring, though discrete, motif – a white dove and a red rose – with which I had become familiar by now. It was the insignia of the Foundation of Martyrs and Veterans Affairs that appears almost like a seal of approval binding histories, biographies and images of martyrdom into a governmental frame.
The martyr's body, in this governmental frame, is an important material of evidence that enables the martyr's dependents to claim a variety of social services from the Foundation. Central to this claim is not just the act of sacrifice, but rather the act of recognition of that sacrifice by the governmental agencies. An allotment of burial space in the Martyrs’ Cemetery is a physical manifestation of this official recognition. Thus, the martyrs’ graves are more than private spaces where families mourn and remember their dead, they become objects of public veneration and sites of governmental intervention. These graves, at once, serve as a vital basis of negotiations between the families and the government, and as metaphor for unarticulated emotions of personal loss and resentment thereof.
Large billboard showing a dying soldier on the threshold of martyrdom.

One often encounters this fragile territory of unsettled emotions of personal loss amidst the spectacle of martyrdom in the cemetery. Every weekend, the cemetery is visited by hundreds of visitors who seek blessings from the martyrs in their attempts to gain jobs, settle marriages and beget children, among other quests. While many visitors are family members who come to wash and decorate the graves, for others the journey is a pilgrimage comprising visits to the graves of legendary martyrs. As I wandered along the narrow row of graves, I met Reza who came every weekend to tend to his son Bijan's grave and spend the entire day cleaning, cooking and resting beside it. He told me how the young men were eager to go to the battlefield when Iraq's Saddam Hussein attacked Iran just after the revolution. The 20-year-old Bijan was among those who were killed in the very first encounters in 1980.
He died of bullet wounds while guarding his border post. People began visiting us all in large numbers as the news spread that there was a martyr's family in the neighbourhood. The Foundation officials brought meat and vegetables and organized the ceremonies. We had no strength left in us. Bijan's mother stopped talking to anyone. He was buried here with full honours.Footnote 34
While still coming to terms with the trauma of his son's death, Reza was offered compensation in terms of exemption from military service and a place at the university for his younger son. This was a rare opportunity for a poor family like his and a chance for his younger son to improve his life. He accepted it. Bijan's death had been a turning point for the family in many ways, particularly, in terms of the social respect they were accorded now. As he ended his narrative, I asked him if he was proud of his son's martyrdom. He kept quiet for some time, replying at last, “my son would have been 45 years old this year. I wish he had never left us”. This was an unexpected reply that articulated deeply personal emotions, disconnected from the logic of revolution, war and nation-making. In Reza's narrative, Bijan was always spoken of as his son and not as a martyr, thus reclaiming the father-son intimacy that had existed in his lifetime. Martyr Bijan, on the other hand, was a subject of public veneration whose life began at the moment of his bodily death and official recognition of his martyrdom. Reza's response was not so much about undoing this sacralised death, rather making sense of his son's death in isolation from bigger questions of martyrdom and nationhood.
Large poster depicting a soldier silhouetted against a blue sky with doves and red tulips.

Reza's unresolved emotions are neither a part of the official discourse defined by intent and courage to confront injustice. Nor is it part of the popular discourse which collates public veneration of martyrs with private resentment over availability of a variety of social services and privileges to their dependents. Often the narratives of martyrdom oscillate between sympathy for the dead and mockery of those seen as profiting from the tragedy, namely the dependents and the revolutionary state. I encountered this ambiguity almost routinely even within extended families where some members were eligible for social benefits while others were not. Ashraf, a mother of a teenage son, would often frame her worries about her son's future comparatively vis-à-vis that of her brother's children. Her sister-in-law had had three brothers who were martyred in the revolution and the subsequent war.
As if the death of her oldest brother was not enough during the anti-Shah protests, the family was broken again and again when Saddam Hussain attacked Iran. The second brother was recruited in the army at the age of 20 and was killed in the very first month on the battlefield. He was guarding his post and at dawn the enemy shot him stealthily. His youngest brother, then, wanted to avenge his brother's death and volunteered to go to the front. For many months, there was no news about him, and after a long wait his corpse came back home. It was, as if, the entire family was silenced at once.Footnote 35
As the family tried to come to terms with their loss, the Foundation came to their aid in terms of practical matters like arrangement of burials, pensions, as well as state employment for their only daughter. The loss that they had suffered had somehow gained them moral authority within their community and influence with the state authorities. Asharf described her sister-in-law as a powerful figure who could ‘fix’ things within the government apparatus like university admissions, scholarships and employment. Her brother's children, in her eyes, had a better chance as martyr's kin than her own children who would have to contest with millions of others in general competition. In Ashraf's narratives, martyrdom was disjointed from its usual theological content and transposed to a far more immediate and instrumental domain of state patronage. The biographies of the three martyrs in her account were at once layered with conflictive emotions of compassion, admiration and resentment. Ashraf's mixed emotions towards her sister-in-law were in some way located in how her own family viewed the institutionalised form of martyrdom. She told me of her oldest brother who had died in a car bomb blast engineered by Kurdish nationalists in Sanandaj many years before. They were visited by the Foundation officials soon after and were offered material support that comes with the official status of martyr. Ashraf's father turned them away and refused to accept their help as he considered it immoral. His stance stunned everyone and some even praised him for defying the state officials. Ashraf had also supported him then, but was not too sure anymore if his had been a wise decision. The material support could have, at least, helped her brother's widow and her young children even though she did not approve of the ‘gimmick’ frequently performed by the state.
These private fractious sentiments are accentuated in a society largely defined by its youthful demography and resulting fierce competition in areas of employment and higher education.Footnote 36 The dependents of martyrs have an edge over candidates from non-martyr families in these situations, thus further confirming the view of martyrs as a governmental category. Here, the promise of heavenly rewards of martyrdom seem poetic and distant in comparison to the institutionalised disbursement of scarce resources to the kin of martyrs enabled by the revolutionary state. This institutionalised form of martyrdom in fact underscores the experimental nature of the revolutionary state that remains crucial to our understanding of the complex processes of transformation of accident victims into martyrs.
Experiments in the Sacred
One of the first acts of President Ahmadinejad upon his electoral victory was to visit Behesht-i-Zahra – an act that sought to legitimise his government through invocating the martyrs’ legacy. In fact, a key characteristic of his governance has been the highly publicised burial ceremonies of unknown soldiers from the war. The ceremonies are meant to retrieve the bodies of unidentified soldiers and give them a proper burial befitting their status as martyrs.Footnote 37 The ceremonies have also become a moving state spectacle drawing attention to the government's presence and resolve in different parts of the country wherever burials are conducted. Ahmadinejad often presides over these sombre moments that are then reproduced in the state-run media as evidence of his government's commitment to the struggle and sacrifice of ordinary people. The unidentified corpses, since they are not claimed by anyone other than the state, can be physically moved, re-modelled and imagined with appropriate biographies that befit the larger narrative of martyrdom. Thus, Ahmadinejad's intervention in the aftermath of air-accident in Tehran to claim corpses of accident victims as martyrs was hardly surprising.
His proclamation of martyrdom had two important subtexts. First, since the act of martyrdom is the work of God, the air-accident was a divine act and not a result of human mistake. A martyr's death is gained fighting injustice and oppression, and, in this case, the crash victims suffered from oppressive American policies that had imposed embargoes on the sale of spare-parts for the aircrafts. Thus, the responsibility of the accident did not lie with the Iranian state; it lay with divine forces. Moreover, the invocation of the narrative of martyrdom meant that the cosmic battle between Hussein and Yazid or good and evil could now be performed afresh on the corpses of accident victims, with Iran playing the former and USA the latter. Two, the President's announcement formally classified the victims as martyrs whereby their dependents could claim financial assistance and privileges in terms of employment and education. It was a symbolic closure to the accident once the dead journalists and their dependents had been assigned to a specific category and the privileges that came with it. This labelling of victims as martyrs was also meant to foil the government against protests and public critique.
However, this act of sacralising bodies did little to pre-empt widespread criticism of the government both inside and outside. The gravity of the situation became apparent when a group of 49 members of parliament moved a motion of impeachment against the Defence Minister Mostafa Mohammad-Najjar for his failure to prevent the crash.Footnote 38 They cited public interest as a motivation for impeachment in order to remove ambiguities regarding it. At the same time, 158 members of parliament signed a petition demanding immediate an investigation so that “those responsible for such a sad loss (can) be punished as soon as possible”.Footnote 39 In the face of growing demands, the government appointed a judicial commission to inquire into the crash's causes. The commission held fifteen court hearings and questioned among others eight officials to investigate “negligence, sabotage or violation of procedure”.Footnote 40 After two years, it made public its report that exonerated all the eight government employees. Its findings were received with protests from the families of the victims who appealed against the decisions.Footnote 41 Newspapers were once again covered with photos of young children, each carrying a portrait of their dead fathers in their arms. Two months later, the commission dismissed the appeal citing lack of evidence in ascertaining culpability of the suspects.Footnote 42
Clearly, on the surface, this confrontation seemed to have had little influence on the government's course of action, yet it revealed how the very depths beneath the surface had been rearranged significantly. The martyr's body was no longer a sacred object of veneration and emulation alone; it was also a site of contestation upon which the victim's families and the government were laying opposing claims. In fact, this change in the idea of martyrdom as sacred articulated the change in the practice of martyrdom. The ideas of martyrdom as sacred underwent radical transformations during and after the Iranian revolution whose very success and consolidation into state power was built upon hundreds of thousands of sacrifices. Dabashi argues that the inherent characteristic of passionate protest and self-sacrifice within Shi'a rituals of mourning can be a destabilising force but is useless in consolidating state institutions.Footnote 43 In Iran, this destabilising force was itself institutionalised as a governmental policy that simultaneously meant secularisation of the sacred and sacralisation of the secular. The convivial duality of the sacred and the secular requires a two-fold preliminary explanation. Firstly, the very framework of government in revolutionary Iran is derived from Imam Khomeini's ideas of velayat-i-faqih, or the governance of the jurist, that authorises the jurists to provide legitimate governance based on the interpretations of Islam.Footnote 44 The Iranian state is, thus, not only inseparable from Islam, its very structural constitution is underpinned by Islam.Footnote 45 Secondly, this framework is contingent upon a distinct gap between sacred law (moral-political ordering based on Islam) and basic law (urban planning, traffic regulations etc.) that allows for sacralisation of the secular and secularisation of the sacred in everyday governmental practices.Footnote 46 In other words, Islam guides the principles of government, though the actual governance is often a matter of secular practices. The emerging blurred, albeit contentious, field is discursively linked to the modernity debates in revolutionary Iran. The ‘Islamic’ in Islamic republic is sometimes viewed as a sign of reversion to medievalism, while others see it as a product of modern political impulses that overthrew an absolutist monarchy and replaced it with a republic.Footnote 47 In contemporary Iran, this seeming contradiction to the viability of ‘Islamic republic’ is accepted as a specific ‘experimental’ characteristic of post-revolution state-making.Footnote 48 Thus, breaches and overlaps between the sacred and the secular are manifested in the way governmental policies are designed and practiced.
Put another way, the tradition of martyrdom informs core policy areas of resource allocation and distribution, while martyrdom itself has come now to be underpinned by a complex set of governmental practices of classification and regulation. However, the institutionalisation of martyrdom also means that the protective boundaries between the sacred and the secular have largely faded so that the sacred is no longer limited to ritual enclosures with its specific disciplines.
Conclusions
To conclude we may revisit the moment of ‘accident’ when the charred corpses were being retrieved from the crash site. The deaths had created popular concern and outrage, yet these deaths were a matter of private grief. The announcement by Ahmadinejad, however, transformed this moment by moving the corpses, materially and discursively, from the private to the public, and to a contested territory of political theology, namely, the making of martyrs through governmental mediation. It is in this liminal space between the sacred and the secular that we witness the transformative and transgressing nature of sacralisation in contemporary Iran. Three processes within the act of sacralisation of accident victims can be isolated.
The first process is revealed in the production of dead bodies that form the essential material basis of necropolitics.Footnote 49 During the revolution and the war years, the incessant production of corpses was a by-product that had to be dealt with effectively by the state. This was done innovatively through the institution of Bonyad-i-Shahid that braided the corpses into the genealogy of martyrdom, and thus, created an experimental emotive-political system of governance in Iran. In post-war Iran, dead bodies with appropriate biographies – of revolutionaries and soldiers – are not as easy to obtain, and, therefore, creative avenues are found to incorporate more bodies into the tradition in order to keep it relevant. Here, the bodies of accident victims became the raw material to perform the theatre of martyrdom upon.
The second process becomes apparent through the act of speech, when Ahmadinejad pronounces the accident victims as successors of Imam Hussein's legacy of martyrdom. At once, the repertoire of symbols that traditionally indicate martyrdom are subsumed under the sign of the state. The state agency becomes the arbiter and mediator of those symbols within public spaces. The rituals of burial, commemoration and everyday remembrance are performed within the institutional framework. The biographies of martyrs that hinge upon the subtle transformation of ordinary individuals into performers of extraordinary acts are now not only incorporated into oral traditions, but recorded, printed and authenticated by the state agency. The bodies and biographies of accident victims gain a fresh life –that of a martyr – once appropriated by the state.
The third process concerns the co-production of the moment of sacralisation and the subversions within. As argued at the beginning of this article, the act of sacralisation is not only subject to rituals of boundary making and maintenance of those boundaries as Mary Douglas suggests, but also to the recognition of those boundaries by others. In contrast the act of transforming accident victims into martyrs became the subject of ridicule and contestation within the public sphere. The deceased's families, journalists and policy-makers did not treat this transformation outside the framework of governance. Instead debates over culpability, responsibility, compensations and pensions challenged the attempts of Ahmadinejad to move the event into the sphere of the sacred. The process of elevating bodies was not observed through the lenses of the sacred, as the state intended; it was challenged and subverted within the public sphere. Thus the very moment of sacralisation also became the moment of subversion where the bodies were imparted and emptied of the sacred meanings simultaneously.




