The last three decades have witnessed a substantial shift in the global power balance, which G. Arrighi defined as the terminal crisis of US hegemony in The Long Twentieth Century. Emerging non-European actors developed their own strategies through the gaps in the system, becoming more active and visible. As a result, the current political systems literature focusing exclusively on the origins of European nation-state formation has come under increasing criticism. In order to comprehend the nature of non-European polities, critical and alternative studies have emerged in recent decades, and one such study is The Steppe Tradition in International Relations: Russians, Turks and European State Building 4000 BCE–2018 CE.
In this comparative historical study, Iver B. Neumann and Einar Wigen discuss polity building in Russia and Turkey in contrast with Europe. They examine the question of how Russia and Turkey forged their political practices in such a way that political life in both settings is still in the shadow of strong leaders, and a masculine, populist style of politics is all too visible. One main assertion of the book is that there is a “steppe tradition,” which constitutes an alternative repertoire of action for Turkey and Russia and distinguishes them from Europe. It claims not only that the effects of the steppe tradition on the political practices of the Ottoman and Russian Empires were noticeable until the early nineteenth century, but also that the remnants of the steppe tradition have continued to play an incontrovertible role until today.
Throughout the book’s five chapters the authors dig into history in order to track down the steppe tradition, and seek to reveal its main characteristics and effects on political practices. Through an interdisciplinary optic, the authors refer to secondary sources in archaeology, sociology, history, and anthropology. Theoretically, they adopt a Weberian approach by drawing on the concepts of ideal type, charisma, and patrimonialism, introducing Tillian arguments as well.
In the introduction, Neumann and Wigen explain the outlines of the steppe tradition, which had a significant effect on political organization from 4000 bc up until a few centuries ago, and from Europe and Persia to China. The steppe tradition, they note, constitutes a different rationality of rule when compared to the sedentary European states. Neither ethnicity nor language were decisive for this tradition; “it was rulers that defined empires.” The legitimizing principle of rule was based on the concept of qut, that is, the khagan had God’s grace. The khagan played a central role for the distribution among followers of the resources collected by raiding sedentary societies. The relations between nomadic and sedentary polities also had substantial importance for the steppe tradition, since these two polities hybridized through continuous interactions.
In order to employ the steppe tradition as a unit of analysis the authors suggest a “repertoire-based approach.” Accordingly, political actors (individuals or communities) select from within a repertoire that provides a possible set of tactics and constitutes familiar forms of action. Repertoires are not fully formed wholes but should be seen rather as ever restocked toolboxes, replete with concepts and practices. These do not persist through time unchanged but continue to exist by adopting new ways of doing things. The repertoire-based approach suggests that the steppe tradition has survived in two ways: first, as a hybridized practice of nomadic and sedentary tradition; and second, as a sedimentary repertoire of practices (substrate logic), reactualized during times of crises.
Chapter 1 demonstrates how the steppe disappeared from the nineteenth-century debates on politics and was overlooked in twentieth-century studies on state building. According to the authors, even Weber’s concept of sultanism or Tilly’s notion of tribute-taking empires ignored the effects of the steppe in both Europe and Asia.
Chapter 2 traces the emergence of steppe political organization at around 4000 bce and examines its main characteristics through an archaeological and historical lens. The chapter touches upon the social culture of the early steppe nomads starting from Proto-Indo-Europeans, and then brings under the spotlight great steppe empires such as Scythians (fifth century bce) and the Xiongnu (third century bce). At the end of the chapter, the authors examine the hybridization of sedentary and nomadic peoples through the relations between Huns and Romans, and Avars and Byzantines.
Chapters 3 and 4 discuss in a comprehensive fashion two cases of hybridization: the Ottoman Empire/Turkey case, where a conquering nomadic polity came to dominate a sedentary state and hybridized with its traditions, and the Russian case, where a sedentary polity was hybridized by incoming nomads, and although the sedentaries continued to produce the rulers, the steppe tradition was influential in state making. While Chapter 3 explains how the Ottoman Empire, from its very beginning, syncretized Islamic tradition and post-Byzantine Christian politics with steppe tradition elements (pp. 149–61), the Chapter 4 shows how the sedentary Rus Khaganate and Kievan Rus were largely influenced by nomads such as Pechenegs, Kipchaks, and the Golden Horde, and how Muscovy emerged in the fifteenth century by heavily borrowing from steppe political practices (p. 187).
Chapter 5 first clarifies the ideal types of the steppe and European traditions. Ideal typical traits of the Eurasian and European traditions are compared according to income types, sources of legitimization, role of leadership in politics and warfare, relations between the emperor/khagan and middlemen, the principle of sovereignty/suzerainty, loyalty to the leader or polity, degree of institutionalization and the matrix of capital/coercion (pp. 203–9). Then it takes a closer look at the Russian, Turkish, and European experiences from the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries.
Neumann and Wigen put forth arguments in order to explain why Russia failed in becoming an economic and military powerhouse in the nineteenth century, by focusing on its tradition of “direct rule” originating from the steppe. With the Reformation and Enlightenment, the European mode of rule transitioned from police state to liberal state, namely to indirect rule based on social consensus (p. 220). However, the Russian polity, insisting on the leader’s dominance and on rule through shock and awe, did not undergo the changes that took place in Europe.
In the Ottoman case, Neumann and Wigen underline the impact on the political repertoire of significant sedimentary steppe practices, such as the naming of the polity after a charismatic leader, law-making power of leaders (the kanun laws), importance of loyalty and kinship rather than religious affiliation, motivation of conquest and plunder, distribution of resources through a patronage system, and property law in the form of the yurtluk-ocaklık system. They argue that steppe repertoires were reactualized by Ottoman rulers during moments of legitimacy and governance crises, such as the Russian war of 1774 and the Greek revolt of 1821. It is pointed out that even twentieth-century politics in Turkey struggled to reconcile the steppe and European repertories.
In the conclusion, the authors assert that even though the material conditions of steppe life have now disappeared, the sedimentary repertoire of steppe practices is still alive and well. In Russia and Turkey, the first indicator of the steppe repertoire can be seen in a cult of strong leadership: in Russia from Stalin to Putin, and in Turkey from Kemal Atatürk to Erdoğan. The second is the patron–client system whereby there are highly personalized ties between the leader and middlemen, and the third is their “top dog” perspective toward international relations, where both countries try to subordinate their neighbors.
With all of this, the book asserts the importance of the steppe tradition, ignored by Eurocentric and sedentary-centric perspectives. It is a fresh attempt to explain the differences in rationality between Eurasian and European polities. Nevertheless, as the authors compare these traditions they attach a positive meaning to an idealized liberal model found in Europe. It is argued that from the eighteenth century onwards, liberal forms of governance have gradually emerged to replace those of the police state and the state’s direct control over society disappeared (p. 219). However, colonization and dispossession practices, the formation of nation-states, the establishment of regular armies and police forces, and the centralization and sophistication of the means of violence contradict such a pure liberal model.
On the other hand, even if the authors argue that the book does not aim to build a multicausal explanation and rather tries to draw attention to the steppe tradition, there is little discussion of their methodological position. The answer to the question of why some political formations are more open to leader-centerd authoritarian tendencies is explained only by their peculiar cultural patterns/logic. It would have been helpful if the authors had established connections between structural phenomena such as neoliberalism and authoritarian practices, and engaged in a dialogue with the growing literature on similar authoritarian tendencies in countries such as India, Hungary, and Brazil. These would contribute to the contextualization of authoritarian political formations in Russia and Turkey.
Despite these criticisms, the book is a noteworthy contribution for understanding the polity-building tradition in Eurasian politics. It reveals the importance of a historical perspective for comprehending and explaining today’s political practices. It is also remarkable for showing how an issue dominated by nationalist approaches in Turkey can be analyzed in a fresh light.
