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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 04 May 2004
In Community as Healing, Micah Hester aspires to offer a bold alternative to the theoretical approach that has dominated bioethics since the 1970s. He begins by claiming that the concepts of individual patient autonomy portrayed in the well-known works of Tom Beauchamp and James Childress in Principles of Biomedical Ethics and H. Tristram Engelhardt in The Foundations of Bioethics are inadequate. As he states:
In Community as Healing, Micah Hester aspires to offer a bold alternative to the theoretical approach that has dominated bioethics since the 1970s. He begins by claiming that the concepts of individual patient autonomy portrayed in the well-known works of Tom Beauchamp and James Childress in Principles of Biomedical Ethics and H. Tristram Engelhardt in The Foundations of Bioethics are inadequate. As he states:
Patients are not empowered by the principle of autonomy; they are merely protected. Patients are not made participants in their own treatment but are only shielded from blatant forms of unconsented-to activity by health care professionals (p. 3).
Accordingly, he frames the general task of this book “to reconceive physician-patient relationships in light of a pragmatic understanding of moral intelligence and artistry performed by socially situated selves that develop into and arise out of an attitude of community as healing” (p. 5). Indeed, as a pragmatist, Hester wants to establish an experiential basis for his “community as healing” as a replacement for the prevailing abstract theories in bioethics.
In chapter 1, building the foundation of his pragmatist perspective, Hester launches an inquiry into the basic elements of the medical encounter and the ways physicians form their practice habits. Following Dewey, Hester accepts a broad view of how to understand “habits” that include our ideas, beliefs, and emotions, and, taken together, represent a repository of potential actions awaiting utilization in particular circumstances. Physicians may view the science of medicine from one extreme to the other—as a set of tools by which to better understand the individual patient, or as a rigid set of classifications and treatments in which the individual patient is lost. In the former manner, physicians artistically use their intelligence and their intelligent habits to craft the right therapy in an individualized way. In the latter, physicians perform patient care tasks as “habituations,” which means they rigidly follow a certain formula regardless of the particularities of the individual case, thus making them no different from a “mechanic.” In this light, if the medical encounter is to fully achieve its end of caring for a “particular” patient by physicians carefully attending to particularities of each patient, the science of medicine itself must have an “infusion of intelligent habits of community that treat patients, in their unique individuality, as members of the health care community” (p. 6).
Hester refers to the development of intelligent habits as “moral artistry,” a term taken from the work of Steven A. Fesmire. He aptly uses this term to drive home the point that human problem solving, including the moral deliberation necessary for moral problem solving, cannot be based on behavior that stems from mindless, engrained habits. Moreover, intelligent moral deliberation involves a “dramatic rehearsal” in which we rehearse the responses of others in a story-structured way to consider various alternative solutions. In pragmatic fashion, there is no single, pre-established, universal “right” answer or common understanding of “good” that must be followed. Rather, intelligent moral deliberation involves appreciating the various stories or narratives—our own and others'—that must be reconciled, which is the end of moral inquiry for pragmatists. Thus, moral problem solving, which is methodologically the same as all human problem solving, requires real imagination to forge acceptable, peaceful outcomes between people with various interests, needs, and values. The moral artist, who exemplifies imaginative, moral deliberation in her practice, is able to see each person in his unique complexity within his community, with his own story that must be told.
The influence of the insular, atomistic individual human from the Enlightenment, from Locke to Kant, has limited our ability to be moral artists, so Hester claims. Instead of seeing individuals as evolving and connected within communities, we risk seeing them as static and isolated or, as Dewey said, viewing them “in terms of liberties of thought and action already possessed by [them] in some mysterious ready-made fashion, and which it was the sole business of the state to safeguard” (p. 16).1
Dewey J. Liberalism and Social Action. Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books; 2000.
It is in light of the perspective articulated so far that Hester goes on to provide a devastating critique of the “principles” of biomedical ethics, claiming “that any appeal to principles is vacuous or, at the very least, skeletal” (p. 21). In his lucid analysis, Hester critiques the general theories of both Beauchamp and Childress, and Engelhardt. Both theories, so he thinks, in their own ways begin and end with abstractions that ultimately do not help us solve the concrete, messy problems of ethical conflicts within community. To be sure, Hester does not wish to abandon the idea of moral principles. As a pragmatist, his goal is to make sure that we not distort them by disconnecting them from our basic human experience. Ethicists in medicine cannot navigate difficult clinical terrain without some guidance, some basic idea of what has worked in the past to effectively solve conflicts. But drawing guidance from moral principles in this sense is only to say that our moral principles are reflections of our habits of exercising our imagination in response to problematic situations. Principles then are a kind of “standing reserve of habits” (p. 33), neither static nor known outside our experience.
Hester is also getting at a key pragmatist claim that bioethics should fully digest: Moral principles are not foundational in that they are not permanent, necessary truths. Rather, they are reflections of habits that, like all habits, are continually evolving and finding new forms of expression. Experience constantly presents us with new occasions that challenge our habits to adapt ever anew. To reify moral principles and see them in isolation from our shared experience is to limit what we can see in and learn from our experience. It is also here that many critics of pragmatists worry that pragmatists are leading the field of ethical inquiry over a cliff, descending into the realm of moral relativism. This worry causes many with a nonpragmatist's bent to seek a more substantive, objective basis for right and wrong, good and bad. For a pragmatist like John Dewey, the full realization that no single, contentful objective morality is possible in a secular, democratic society is a source of liberation, not despair and worry. It marks the point at which philosophers and ethicists can give up empty quests and work productively with colleagues from a variety of empirically grounded disciplines. The pragmatist's goal is to make ethical inquiry an area of scientific investigation that begins and ends in real experience for the purpose of producing helpful recommendations that continually must be reevaluated and revised, just like any other branch of science.
Much of the balance of Community as Healing is a further detailed and compelling exploration of the limited view of the individual and the principle of autonomy in the modern philosophical tradition. As Hester states, “Enlightenment-based autonomy leaves us fundamentally divided from, and therefore at odds with, others as we seek to exercise control of the environment we find ourselves in—an environment that includes other autonomous individuals” (p. 44). As a way of proposing a viable alternative to contemporary bioethical autonomy theory, Hester draws from the pragmatist perspective of George Herbert Meade. Meade views the human self as social product with which Hester combines a narrative approach. Basically, instead of seeing the self as primary, Meade, as Dewey and William James (and others) would also agree, sees the community as primary and selves emerging in that process. Moreover, as all selves are situated in community, they each have individual stories of their experiences in their community. To respect individual selves requires listening to individual stories so as “to facilitate and enhance the particular social interactions that constitute that self” (p. 57). The physician as moral artist is able to get at a patient's story and craft a care plan that fits the needs, interests, and values of that particular patient. This can be accomplished in a physician-patient relationship that uses imaginative intelligence to create and pursue the ends that are best for that situation. Moreover, such a relationship as a medical encounter is an instance of real community life that promotes patient agency—that is, “participation in ‘community as healing’ ” (p. 68).
Clearly, there are serious obstacles to such community healing. Often caregivers and hospitals do not reflect healthy communities of healing. How do we get to a patient-centered, healthcare community that reflects a community of healing? Hester's use of the pragmatist perspective is a useful beginning to the necessary philosophical ground clearing and conceptual reform. John Dewey hoped for his pragmatic philosophy to become relevant to practical affairs. It is significant praise to Micah Hester that I see Community as Healing: Pragmatist Ethics in Medical Encounters as a compelling effort to realize Dewey's hope by bringing to bear the perspective of American pragmatism on the medical encounter and bioethics and setting the stage for important reform in medical practice. Of course, the next step will require the more empirical work of operationalizing concepts like “moral artistry” in medical education and bioethics, and further developing a detailed agenda for creating a community of healing.