One of the most neglected aspects of the economic history of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Britain is illicit trade. In most general accounts, it is completely ignored or simply mentioned in passing. Yet it was a massive problem for the evolving, revenue-hungry, British state and preoccupied politicians throughout this period. Indeed, such was the extent of this alternative economy that it exceeded the legal sale of a whole array of commodities, ranging from the new addictive delights of tobacco and tea to more traditional items like spirits and various textiles. One reason for its historical neglect is the lack of data charting its volume and extent. Invariably, for economic historians, where there are no numbers, there is no history.
We may lack the figures, but luckily, we have qualitative sources such as William B. Stephens's excellent overview of William Culliford's survey of the Western ports between 1682 and 1684. Culliford was a trusted employee of the king's Customs service, and his report is the only surviving one of this period. It is bound in two volumes at the National Archives at Kew. It is probably one of the most important and detailed accounts of illicit trade in the late seventeenth century.
The survey includes three of the most important provincial ports, namely, Bristol, Exeter, and Plymouth. Culliford had risen within the Customs to become one of the most important Customs officers utilized by the commissioners to investigate corruption. However, as was necessary for anyone in a prominent state position during this era, he needed patronage. In the case of Culliford, this came from his relation to the Customs commissioner, Laurence Hyde (later Lord Rochester).
Prior to commencing his digest of Culliford's survey, Stephens provides an extremely useful breakdown of the Customs anatomy in the provincial ports. This includes the various positions in the service, the social background of those employed, their forms of remuneration, and the way goods were taxed and recorded. Such was the complexity concerning the latter that it contrived to make fraud within the ports much easier. Stephens also provides a detailed account of the main trade in the ports and the amount of Customs revenue collected at each of them.
The early 1680s was a particularly thwart period, with the Crown still nervous in the aftermath of the Exclusion crisis and the prohibition of French goods generating a great deal of extra smuggling, particularly around England's southern coast. One of the tasks set for Culliford by the commissioners was to judge the capability of port employees and their ability to carry out their various tasks. As such, he frequently advised them on the need to raise the salaries of port officials and expand the number of people working there. He was also not afraid to amass evidence against corrupt employees and recommend their removal. Culliford goes into great depth explaining the various scams involved in things like drawback fraud, the veracity of officers weighing imported and exported goods, the purported definition and quality of goods, and the more mundane illicit landing or exporting of untaxed or prohibited items. It should be underlined that Culliford's report is one of the best sources available to historians wishing to understand the actual practices, organization, and intimidation involved in illicit trade during this period.
Entrepreneurialism among the free traders and port officials was extraordinarily impressive and incredibly widespread. These people had as much of a claim to fueling a consumer society as did legal merchants. The extent and regularity of smuggling and pilfering makes repetitive reading; however, it is precisely this regularity and repetitiveness that makes Culliford's account such a valuable resource. I strongly recommend this book to anyone interested in understanding the huge alternative economy that characterized late seventeenth-century England.
