There is no shortage of edited collections in this world. A question that springs to more cynical minds when confronted with a new one is: ‘What was the excuse for this one?’ In the present case the answer is fairly heartening: long-standing expertise in legal anthropology, leavened with a sharp eye for issues of contemporary significance, unleashed at an international conference in 2006 on ‘Law and Governance’.
Keebet and Franz von Benda-Beckmann are legal anthropologists with extensive field experience in South and Southeast Asia who currently head a project on Legal Pluralism at the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology. They have previously adopted the edited collection format to track law’s increasing plurality in a footloose world (with Anne Griffiths, Reference Benda-beckmann, Benda-beckmann and Griffiths2005) and its reflexive relationships with space (also with Anne Griffiths, Reference Benda-beckmann, Benda-beckmann and Griffiths2009), reviewed elsewhere in this special issue. In Rules of Law and Laws of Ruling they return to the theme of legal pluralism, this time marrying it with the theme of ‘law against the state’, the field of expertise of their co-editor, Julia Eckert, another Max Planck Institute legal anthropologist with fieldwork experience in India and Afghanistan. Here, they explore the dynamics of governance, defined in a ‘functional’ (as opposed to ‘normative substantive’) sense as the ‘administration of access to and provision of rights, services and goods’ (pp. 1n2), whether by government or non-state actors.
At the heart of this volume are, the editors suggest, two current trends in governance: first, that a de-regulatory agenda has, paradoxically, led to re-regulation; second, that this re-regulation is increasingly conducted by a plurality of non-state actors (p. 1). As the editors acknowledge, neither trend is entirely fresh. Furthermore, and as the editors do not spell out, both have been discussed extensively in the mainstream regulation literature and beyond (see, for example, Majone 1990; Ayres and Braithwaite, Reference Ayres and Braithwaite1992). The editors do not specify precisely how their volume justifies a re-exploration of well-trodden paths. Nevertheless, it does in fact take the debate forward somewhat, empirically, normatively and analytically.
The empirical value of the volume is both methodological and substantive. With respect to methodology, it showcases to a wider audience ethnographic techniques such as interviews (for example, Nuijten and Lorenzo) and participant observation (Nelken) that are bread and butter to critical legal anthropology but may be exotica to others. The substantive empirical value of the collection is somewhat obscured by the fact that the editors place their collection in the ‘descriptive and analytical’, as opposed to ‘policy-oriented’, strand of the study of governance (pp. 1–2). But it is important to highlight to the potential purchaser that the volume contains empirical material that is likely to be of interest to those policy-makers and implementers – for example, departments of defence (Sidakis’s analysis of private military companies and state sovereignty), social workers (Griffiths’s and Kandel’s assessment of the treatment of Scottish children) or university managers (Nelken’s exposition of Italian academic appointments) – who wish to critically reflect upon their work in a broader context.
As another reviewer of Rules of Law and Laws of Ruling has remarked, ‘[s]ome stories are more compelling than others, but each chapter has one’ (Breslin, Reference Breslin2009, p. 882). For me (and my abiding interest in the World Bank), the most engaging of these empirical contributions is provided by Tania Murray Li and entitled ‘The Law of the Project: Government and “good governance” at the World Bank in Indonesia’. It is well documented that the Bank is barred by its own constitutive documents from ‘meddling’ in the internal affairs of its client states, but that it exerts a substantial influence nonetheless. The originality of Li’s piece is that she highlights just how long, deep and powerful a game the Bank is playing. She shows that the Bank can and does ‘use project rules … not as a sovereign uses law, to secure conformity, but as a tactic to educate the desires and reform the practices of the target population’ (pp. 237–38). In one of those delightful occasions on which high theory and gritty reality are successfully married, she exposes the Bank as engaging in Foucault’s concept of ‘government’ – that is, ‘the attempt to shape human conduct by calculated means’.Footnote 2 The aim is not to ‘discipline’ the population, to ‘coerce every individual and regulate their actions in minute detail’, but rather to ‘educate’, ‘configure’, ‘incentivise’ (p. 238). So ‘freedom is not the converse of government, it is its instrument’ (p. 253). Li draws on the observations of sociologist Niklas Rose to explain that ‘government in a neoliberal or advanced liberal form’ relies heavily upon the notions of ‘choice’, ‘competition’ and ‘market’ mounted on a background of game theory. Although neoliberal theorists would have you believe otherwise, the task is not to set free ‘an existing set of market relations from their social shackles’ but rather to organise matters so that a market can exist (pp. 238–39).Footnote 3 The bulk of Li’s chapter is devoted to demonstrating how the Bank ‘governed’ Indonesian villagers with respect to the ‘culture of corruption’ and to conflict management. She concludes that the ‘desirability of the ends sought by the Bank’s social development programmes was simple common sense: who would not prefer a well-built bridge to one built with inferior materials’ (p. 254), would not value the chance ‘to hold authorities accountable’, would not appreciate clear rules? In short, she acknowledges that the Bank’s projects were a success. But this is not her (Foucauldian) point. What matters is not ‘good or bad intentions’ or outcomes but ‘understanding the kind of power exercised by experts who set out to transform society by design’ (p. 254). Li shows that power to be deep, effective and not explicitly reflected upon by those who hold it.
The introductory chapter promises: ‘Central in all chapters is the question of how these changing modes of governance affect social inequality’ (p. 2), and this collection makes a normative advance by shining a light on this issue. ‘Underlying’ or ‘relevant’ might have been more accurate than ‘central’, for the index reveals that the term ‘inequality’ appears only in the Introduction, where the editors identify only a handful of chapters in which inequality is addressed. For example, they note that a number of the case-studies disclose:
‘situations in which the seeming openness and flexibility inherent in the plurality of rules and governing bodies work against the weaker parties involved in the interaction.’ (p. 12)
And it gets more interesting:
‘sometimes weaker parties can use the contradictions in the rules established by a plurality of governing bodies and this may open up possibilities for circumvention’. (p. 12)
These complexities have been identified elsewhere. Indeed, Franz von Benda-Beckmann himself explained, under what remains my favourite ever article title, that:
‘state and non-state actors alike (ab)use law, treating it as a “scapegoat” – a reason why a certain course of action must or must not be pursued; and as a “magic charm”– a cure all.’ (Perry-Kessaris, Reference Perry-kessaris2008, p. 19 quoting Benda-Beckman, Reference Benda-beckmann1989)
The mainstream regulation literature has also taken note, describing regulation:
‘as a “two sided” process, in which state law is used by regulators “as a means of controlling”, and by regulatees as “a means of escaping control”.’ (Perry-Kessaris, Reference Perry-kessaris2008, p. 19, quoting McBarnet and Whelan, Reference Mcbarnet and Whelan1991, p. 848)
But the explicit emphasis on inequality, at least in the introductory chapter, is unusual and welcome.
Like most edited collections (and I speak from a glass house on this), the intellectual dimension on which Rules of Law and Laws of Ruling is weakest is the analytical. One determinant of the analytical worth of an edited collection – what makes the value of the whole exceed that of its parts – is the functionality of its introductory chapter: does it offer the reader a map, both internal, in the sense of connections between contributions, and external, in the sense of wider theoretical and practical context? In the case of the volume under review, there is certainly scope for a sharpening of the analysis on the external front. The weakness of the Introduction is apparent in the somewhat random flow of its (inadequately differentiated and correlated) headings: ‘New Constellations of Governance … Governance and Legal Pluralism … The Changing Role of the State … The Paradox of Deregulation and Juridification … Public and Private … Law, Pluralization and Inequality … Legal Responsibility for Acts of Governance’ (pp. 2–15). The effect is a little overwhelming and not very helpful.
To my mind, the most interesting analytical exploration in the volume comes from John and Jean Comaroff, who advocate the mainstreaming of ‘critical legal anthropology–one unafraid to take on Big Issues, even as it continues to interrogate small things’ (p. 56). They propose that we cannot understand ‘the contemporary global order’ without legal anthropology:
‘the latest chapter of the longue durée of capital, the chapter often titled “neoliberalism”, has led to a hyper-extended, often counter-intuitive deployment of legalities in the social, geographical, political, moral and material reconstruction of the universe, a process most usefully estranged and grasped by a critical anthropology.’ (pp. 31–32)
Their chapter circles around three, somewhat disparate, themes: ‘the fetishism of the law, ID-ology and anthropological criminology’. Of these, I found the first to have the most enduring resonance (although in the anthropological spirit I must confess my bias towards the study of law and economic liberalism). They argue that law has been ‘fetishised’ – not treated as the ‘abstraction’ that it is, but rather ‘objectified, ascribed a life-force of its own, and attributed the mythic capacity to configure world relations in its own image’ (p. 33). This ‘fetishisation’ is manifested (thinly) in the increasing adoption of constitutions, by state and non-state actors and (thickly) in the fact that those constitutions are increasingly ‘neoliberal’ rather than ‘state capitalist’. These new documents emphasise ‘the primacy of civil and political rights, the freedoms of the citizen, the limitations of state power, the tolerance of difference, and the rule of law’ rather than the old preoccupations of ‘parliamentary sovereignty, executive discretion, bureaucratic authority and cultural homogeneity’ (p. 33). As we increasingly recognise our heterogeneity, law becomes ever more attractive because:
‘legal instruments … appear … to offer a means of commensuration: a repertoire of standardized signs and practices that, like money in the realm of economics, permit the negotiation of values and interests across otherwise intransitive lines of difference.’ (p. 37)
As we increasingly ‘outsource’ the erstwhile responsibilities of the state to the private sector, the court becomes ever more attractive because it is:
‘the one institution still securely under the purview of the state, the one ostensibly capable of commensuration– … a utopic site to which human agency believes it may turn in order to pursue a widening horizon of ends.’ (p. 38)
Much of the Comaroffs’ chapter is peppered with a range of intriguing empirical titbits. The most fascinating of these is the story of Mrs Tumane, a widowed South African Jehovah’s Witness whom the courts refused to liberate from community-enforced ‘house arrest’ traditionally imposed on the bereaved (pp. 45–46). In the end the analytical and the empirical are not sewn neatly together but, judging by the authors’ relatively loose style of writing and their references to ‘intertwined pathways’, this is unlikely to be taken as a criticism.
So, Rules of Law and Laws of Ruling certainly has something to offer – empirical, analytical and normative. To conclude this review, it would seem churlish and inefficient not to offer support to the opinion of another reviewer, Beau Breslin, with which I entirely agree. He writes that the volume:
‘offers the sophisticated and serious student further insight into the complex, multi-dimensional relationship that exists between state and non-state actors, law and governance, violence and order. And yet its impact within that intellectual arena, and certainly beyond those narrow confines, is probably limited. [It] doubtless belongs in the library of those who are interested in these topics, but I suspect it might not be the first volume plucked from the shelves.’
(Breslin, Reference Breslin2009, p. 882)