Readers are invited to contact Greg S. Loeben in writing at Midwestern University, Glendale Campus, Bioethics Program, 19555 N. 59th Ave., Glendale, AZ 85308 (gloebe@midwestern.edu) regarding books they would like to see reviewed or books they are interested in reviewing.
Global Bioethics begins with a premise that is simple and obviously true, arguing in clear language that the premise is as it appears—simple and obviously true. This premise is wielded as a conceptual battering ram, with which the edifice of global bioethics is ceaselessly beaten. Almost every conceivable angle for approaching or explaining the premise is offered. And multitudinous examples are given of the nonsense that follows when people ignore it. The book says little that educated readers have not heard before, but it speaks in unprecedented detail and with uncommon clarity, challenging bioethics to abandon its childlike yet dangerous fantasies. In short, it is revolutionary.
The simple premise, restated and reframed throughout much of the book, appears on page 1, in the Introduction by editor H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr.:
It is not just that there is a failure of consensus on all the major issues of human life, ranging from the significance of human sexuality, human reproduction, early human life, the allocation of scarce resources, and the nature of governmental authority, to the significance of suffering, dying, and death, but that no resolution of our controversies appears in sight.
In other words, not only are the great issues of bioethics persistently controversial, but there are no available means for attaining a content-full resolution. Engelhardt imbeds these dim prospects in four striking features of contemporary morality: (1) “moral reflection is marked by prominent, indeed passionate disagreement,” (2) moral dispute is persistent, (3) it is impossible to resolve moral disputes through “sound, rational, secular argument,” and (4) despite the historical and conceptual intractability of moral disagreements, we frequently encounter “the studied pretense that the disputes do not exist or that they at least have no intellectual significance.”
For the most part, this book occupies itself with the study of that “studied pretense” as it appears in the rhetoric of global bioethics—with much debunking. Though the book is loosely organized in three-chapter blocks, each featuring two original essays and a commentary, it is the first four chapters after the introduction that address the book's premise most directly. These initial essays are so intricately argued, dense, and theoretically sophisticated that each deserves an extensive review of its own. I will not provide that, but rather note the appearance through the four essays of three central themes that interested readers will find challenging and enlightening—beyond the aforementioned major premise about the intractability of moral pluralism. First is the authors' tendency to deconstruct the consensus facade through the employment of historical-political-conceptual-sociological narratives that are almost genealogical in form and detail. Each interprets the Enlightenment project through its current remnants: Engelhardt wields Francis Fukuyama's own analysis to refute Fukuyama's attempts to articulate a content-rich global bioethics; Delkeskamp-Hayes challenges social rights claims in part by tracing their disastrous departures from Kantian roots; Cherry (in a commentary on Engelhardt and Delkeskamp-Hayes) narrates inconsistencies that develop as contemporary liberal cosmopolitanism appropriates and distorts the language of freedom and tolerance in its campaign to impose a secular worldview; and Capaldi, building on the others (especially Cherry), offers an abbreviated summary of the Enlightenment's axiology, its anthropology, and its totalitarian implications. Second, each of the authors subscribes to a content-thin, forbearance-based, procedural morality as a means of responding to destructive controversies. Third, each of the authors exhibits deontological commitments that facilitate a relatively hard-and-fast distinction between procedure and substance, upon which the aforementioned procedural moralities are partially founded. I would argue (but will not) that this distinction provides the most suitable purchase for a rebuttal.
In the next essay, Julia Tao Lai Po-wah describes and analyzes three familiar models for the treatment decision process (physician-centered, patient-centered, family-centered) and then contrasts them with a fourth, Confucian version that she calls a “shared-decision model” (p. 155). Though she joins with the previous authors in denying the existence or plausibility of a global bioethics, and in emphasizing “the peaceable collaboration of individuals embedded within competing moral narratives” (p. 177), her essay concerns itself largely with exhibiting the superior qualifications of her shared decision model, to which she apparently expects to win converts from competing camps.
Kurt W. Schmidt provides (through translation) commentary on the essays by Capaldi and Tao Lai Po-wah, at times also commenting on the other essays as well. His thesis seems to be articulated in the final sentence of his essay: “Like the free market has to be tied in the good life of the free citizen, the family has to be tied in the good life of the patient” (p. 202). Unfortunately, this prescription is not very helpful for those who are confused, or at odds, about the meaning of the good life of the citizen or of the patient. Schmidt presumes through much of the essay that government officials (aided at times by bioethicists) can accurately and seamlessly resolve such questions. For example, his favored method for “liberating every adult from being subjected to the actions of third parties” (p. 196) is to invoke beneficent government intervention—as if governments are so efficient at cultivating good lives that being coerced by the government should not count as being subjected to third-party action. Though the essay is ostensibly a rebuttal to anticollectivist themes in the former essays, Schmidt, through his employment of viciously question-begging arguments, constantly finds himself illustrating and reinforcing the view he seeks to rebut. For instance, in response to Cherry's analysis of the various and incompatible notions of dignity and the resulting folly of trying to resolve the debate about organ markets through appeal to a particular notion of dignity, Schmidt writes: “However, the refusal to consider the body as a merchandise seems to many members of the European Parliament an important part of European identity: it is against human dignity” (p. 184). Why Schmidt thinks this is an adequate response remains somewhat mysterious, but seems to hinge on an implicit claim about the moral authority of intuitions, whenever said intuitions issue from a certain, blessed subset of government bureaucrats and/or bioethicists. This inarticulate and dubious claim is, of course, just the sort of thing that the previous authors are accusing bioethicists of perpetrating.
The succeeding two essays, by Kurt W. Bayertz and Angelo Maria Petroni, provide a welcome, extensively detailed treatment of European bioethics—combined with the kind of conceptual sophistication we find in the first four essays. Indeed, Petroni's essay provides an excellent introduction to European health politics and has become required reading for my (mostly American) graduate students in healthcare ethics. Each of these authors further develops, in Western European context, the hermeneutic of moral diversity vis-á-vis the hunger for consensus and the quest for political influence. Ruiping Fan responds to these writers by criticizing the liberal and libertarian traditions of the West, upon which their accounts hinge, and proposing the superiority of a third, Confucianism tradition. He argues that a “thin principle” of Confucianism is a more adequate response—globally—to moral and bioethical dissensus. In the process, he offers an ingenious response to Engelhardt's libertarianism—arguing that it is practically self-defeating even if it is logically sound.
The final triad of essays, by Joseph Boyle, David Solomon, and (in commentary) Kevin Wm. Wildes, explores, according to the Introduction, “with particular attention the problem of bioethical globalization.” In fact, these authors, as much as the former, consider looming, general questions about moral diversity, moral imperialism, and the globalization of moral norms. As before, bioethical globalization is examined in this broad context. However, each of these authors is schooled in the Roman Catholic tradition, and Boyle's account is steeped in Roman Catholic natural law traditions even as it seeks to articulate a less content-rich, more general and widely applicable account.
In the last paragraph of Solomon's essay, he writes:
Perhaps, just as the Peircean notion of truth might guide scientific inquiry, the ideal of a global bioethics might guide bioethical inquiry. What we have raised questions about in this paper is whether programs of global bioethics containing substantive moral principles and goals can be reasonably promulgated in the current context of deep and apparently incommensurable disagreement among the moral conceptions available to modern men and women. This question must surely be answered in the negative. (p. 357)
There is, perhaps, a profound lesson in all of this. Bioethics has been bound through most of its history with progressive politics—rife with progressivism's emphasis on advocacy and reform and its penchant to disregard inconvenient truths. But suppose bioethics were to follow Peirce and strive to become a field of inquiry. Perhaps a modest version of global bioethics would eventually emerge, as an array of normative regularities (in practices, beliefs, conventions, concepts) took form. The conceptual barriers to certainty would, of course, still remain. But controversies would fade. That result is currently too distant even to vividly imagine. Yet if bioethics were about inquiry rather than advocacy, it is an imagining that could transpire without aspirations to power.
