Why did their bodies matter for nineteenth-century British natural philosophers? The last decade or so has seen a surge of interest in understanding the historical relationship between scientists' bodies and their science. It is an interest that would certainly have appeared more than a little outré to historians of science of a little more than a generation ago. It would almost certainly appear a little strange to most contemporary practitioners as well. Science, after all, is meant to be disembodied. It should have nothing to do with the corporeal self. The sociological and anthropological turn in more recent approaches to understanding science, with its emphasis on science as embodied practice, has changed all that. We now care a great deal about practitioners' bodies and what they might tell us about the ways in which their science is produced. In this book, Elizabeth Green Musselman points out that many nineteenth-century natural philosophers would, by and large, have agreed with their twenty-first-century historians that bodies do indeed matter. In doing so, she sets out to redraw the ‘nervous map’ of nineteenth-century British science. However much nineteenth-century natural philosophers may have revelled in the robust masculinity of their science, they were also, Green Musselman points out, acutely tuned to their own bodily and nervous failings. This book starts with some simple questions, then: why were so many of these men ill and why did it matter for their science?
In the first half of the book, Green Musselman sets out her scheme of nineteenth-century embodied epistemology. Nervousness has usually been understood as a feminine characteristic. For most nineteenth-century commentators, hysteria was an unambiguously female disease. As Elaine Showalter argues, it was the quintessential female malady. Rationality, by contrast, was just as unambiguously masculine, and for its nineteenth-century practitioners natural philosophy, by being the epitome of rationality, was the epitome of robust masculinity as well. Green Musselman suggests, however, that a slightly closer and more nuanced look reveals a rather different picture. She skilfully unpeels the cultural meanings of the nervous system for eighteenth- and nineteenth-century natural philosophers, looking both at how the philosophy and physiology of the nervous system was understood and at what the significance of the healthy body and nervous system was for practising natural philosophers. What is revealed by this analysis is another, complementary set of attitudes towards nervousness, standing behind and slightly to one side, as it were, of the conventional picture. She looks at the ways in which natural philosophers regarded subjective experiences (illnesses, illusions, disorders of mind and body) – their own and those of others – both as obstacles to rationality, to be overcome and disciplined, and as sources of insight. Natural philosophy for much of the period, she suggests, might be understood as a way of attempting to standardize experience with a view to circumventing both individual nervousness and social disorder.
In the second half of the book Green Musselman takes the reader through a number of more detailed case studies, looking at the particulars of nineteenth-century nervous and disordered conditions and their cultural significations. The first, and probably anecdotally best known, of her examples is colour-blindness. The Quaker chemist John Dalton's colour-blindness is a familiar story to historians of science. Green Musselman turns it, however, from an interesting but ultimately unrevealing quirk of ocular physiology into something rather more revealing about the nature of natural philosophy. Colour-blindness, she suggests, was a sign of provincialism. Dalton's colour-blindness, therefore, for nineteenth-century natural-philosophical commentators, stood for a geographical and mental isolationism and gaucheness that the great chemist had to overcome and discipline before finding his place in the pantheon. Green Musselman's second case study is hemiopsy. Sufferers, who tended to have nervous headaches and visual distortion, included not only George Bidell Airy, the Astronomer Royal, but David Brewster, John Herschel, Charles Wheatstone and William Wollaston. Dissecting hemiopsy provided its sufferers with a tool with which to interrogate problems of management – of society and of self. Similarly, discussions of illusions and hallucinations provided a way of talking about rationality and physically embodied epistemology.
This is a fascinating and illuminating, if occasionally frustrating, book. There is a wealth of information and detail gathered here that in itself makes it an important addition to our understanding of nineteenth-century scientific culture. As Green Musselman shows, Victorian confidence in science and its institutions was recognized by some of their most ardent promoters as resting on some pretty shaky foundations. It was precisely because modern rationality was so fragile that it needed such careful management. One of the reasons the new telegraph system so quickly became a universal metaphor for the nervous system, Green Musselman suggests, was because it provided a model for nervous management as well. There are some points in the narrative where the argument falters. At times, the connection between what Green Musselman wants to argue and the evidence upon which her assertions rest seems at best a little obscure. Nevertheless this is an important revisionary work that casts nineteenth-century British natural philosophy and its practitioners in an unfamiliar but ultimately rather revealing light. It should be on the shelves of every historian of nineteenth-century culture (and not just those of historians of nineteenth-century science).
