Chin Leng Lim’s Hague Academy lectures, later published as The Aims and Methods of Postcolonial International Law, trace the intellectual and doctrinal development of post-colonial international law. In this book, Lim offers a revisionist account of post-colonial international law.Footnote ¹ He traces its reformist ambitions from classical writings to the first generation of post-colonial lawyers and challenges the view of international law as a structure of domination.

Lim argues that “modern international law begins [with jus gentium] as a criticism of … colonialism” rather than as colonialism, enquiring into how its aims and methods have evolved since. He turns to the first generations of post-colonial international lawyers, examining their engagement with sovereignty, sources, and the economic order as representatives of newly decolonised states. Later, Lim addresses trade rules and arbitration as by-products of colonial contestations over property and contractual rights. He ultimately reassesses the current state of post-colonial international law, including the Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) movement, its practical aims, and the crises within its promise.

The central contribution of this book lies in its reassessment of the intellectual project of early post-colonial jurists. Lim contends that the first generation of post-colonial lawyers should not be understood as having failed to transform international law, but rather as having pursued a deliberate programme of doctrinal and institutional reform. Thus, post-colonial international law emerges as a reformist project within international law, rather than its rejection.

This reformist reading is most sharply developed in Lim’s engagement with contemporary post-colonial and decolonial scholarship, particularly TWAIL. While acknowledging its critical force, Lim challenges a strand of thought represented by Makau Mutua’s description of international law as a “predatory system” complicit in global inequality. Lim is further critical of what he terms a rejectionist tendency within TWAIL, which holds that international law is not merely imperfect, but is irredeemably compromised by its colonial foundations, leaving limited room for doctrinal engagement or institutional reform. This produces what Lim describes as a “curious ambivalence” within TWAIL, between the radical rejection of international law’s legitimacy and its selective engagement with particular norms and doctrines, a tension he identifies as central to TWAIL’s limitations.

Broadly speaking, Lim’s case for the reformist potential invites further reflection. While the book persuasively demonstrates that post-colonial jurists sought to reshape international law through its own language and structures, it remains open to question whether such reformist strategies can fully address the structural inequalities embedded within international law itself. The persistence of these inequalities suggests that the limits of reform may be more significant than the book acknowledges.

Furthermore, this book represents a thoughtful and substantial contribution to the field. It situates the reformist ambitions of post-colonial legal thought within the broader intellectual history, engaging directly with contemporary debates within TWAIL and decolonial scholarship. Finally, whether reform within international law can bear the weight Lim places upon it remains an open question, but the book makes a compelling case for keeping that possibility alive.