The arrival of the United States’ Great White Fleet in 1908, the appointment of the first non-Briton as Governor General—Sir Isaac Isaacs—in 1930, the Fall of Singapore in 1942, and Britain's entry into the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1972 were all touted at the time as dramatic and unexpected turning points in Australia's relationship with the mother country. Historians decades later almost invariably reveal that such events were not as dramatic as first thought but the culmination of long-term trends and events. Andrea Benvenuti's Anglo-Australian Relations and the “ Turn to Europe” is the first monograph to comprehensively investigate the effect of Britain's applications and eventual entry into the EEC and Britain's withdrawal from defense commitments “East of Suez” on Anglo-Australian relations. The work integrates diplomatic, military, and economic history into an easily accessible monograph that will become the standard text on the subject and will be consulted widely by historians and political scientists.

Building on his earlier articles, Benvenuti demonstrates that Anglo-Australian relations faced unprecedented challenges and underwent drastic changes in the 1960s because of Britain's “Turn to Europe,” which caused dramatic changes in Britain's foreign, defense, and trade policies as Britain sought a postimperial role that was less global in scope and more Eurocentric. The work is organized into nine chronological chapters that would be ideal as stand-alone readings for undergraduate courses. Benvenuti's tightly argued case based on a mastery of the existing secondary material and extensive archival research clearly shows that Anglo-Australian relations deteriorated not because of one dramatic event but because of four consecutive and sometimes overlapping crises: the 1961–63 Common Market Crisis, Britain's 1967 application to join the Common Market and the almost simultaneous announcement of the withdrawal of British forces East of Suez, and the 1970 application and 1972 entry of Great Britain into the EEC.

To support his argument, Benvenuti has reproduced and created several useful charts revealing the exact nature of Anglo-Australian economic links, which ensures that the complexities of tariff policy and the cost of British accession to the EEC can be easily understood. These charts reveal that Australia's economic dependence on Great Britain was overstated at the time and has continued to be overstated in general histories, particularly if Anglo-Australian trade is compared to Anglo–New Zealand trade. Benvenuti's charts make it clear that by the 1960s Australia was already a diversified economy becoming less and less tied to the mother country.

Benvenuti conclusively demonstrates that Australian objections to the “Turn to Europe” were doomed to failure. This is unsurprising, but he also reveals that Australian objections lacked the vigor of prewar trade disputes. Australia's attempts to use American diplomatic muscle on its behalf reveal a nation more sure of itself in international relations and possessing a clear appreciation of the nuances of international politics and the increasing importance of the United States in Australian and British foreign policy, a level of sophistication missing in Australian interwar foreign policy. There was nothing Australia could do to maintain its favorable trading relationship with the United Kingdom, a situation similar to earlier Anglo-Australian trade disputes. Benvenuti's argument would have been even stronger if he had considered how unsuccessful Australia was at influencing British defense and foreign and economic policy in the sixty years preceding the “Turn to Europe.” The “Turn to Europe” was merely the final break in a relationship that Australia had never been able to effectively influence let alone control. Britain's increasing focus on Europe did not originate in the 1960s as Benvenuti implies. Throughout the interwar period Australian policy makers had wrestled with Britain's continuing focus on Europe at the expense of Australasia. The ability to send a fleet to Singapore was always contingent on a stable Europe.

Benvenuti is also careful to place Anglo-Australian relations in a global context. He shows a nuanced understanding of events and the importance of other key players, especially the United States, which was supplanting Great Britain in strategic importance. The importance of the Vietnam War in Anglo-Australian relations, particularly defense ties, is highlighted, and Australia's reluctance to become involved in the Indonesian Confrontation demonstrates that a British military presence in the region did not ensure good Anglo-Australian defense relations.

There is room for a more thorough analysis of the relationship between Australian domestic politics and governmental attitudes and policy in response to Britain's “Turn to Europe.” One is left wondering, what did the Australian Labor Party (ALP)—the Opposition throughout the 1960s—think of the “Turn to Europe”? Benvenuti implies that the “Turn to Europe” caused the Whitlam Government to enact symbolic changes such as changing the national anthem from God Save the Queen to Advance Australia Fair to reflect the decline of Britain's economic and strategic importance to Australia, but without a more detailed study of the internal workings of the ALP and its policies while in opposition, this claim cannot be verified. The work would also have benefited from some discussion of what the Australian public thought of the “Turn to Europe.”

These are however minor quibbles. The only major drawback of Benvenuti's work was totally out of his control—the price—which will unfortunately restrict this book to major research libraries.