It is easy to blame George W. Bush for two military interventions which did not turn out as American foreign-policymakers would have wished. He was the President who took the country to war and it is right that he should be held accountable for his actions. As his “war on terror” unravelled his credibility was fatally undermined. It was a beleaguered Bush who, in April 2006, plaintively asserted, “I'm the decider and I decide what's best.” The human costs and the unintended consequences of America's involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq are testament to the poverty of that remark. A decade of fighting insurgents in both countries has yielded few positive outcomes.
Deepak Tripathi's book is no less an indictment of the consequences of Bush's decisions than it is a survey of how his administration came to believe that political problems can be solved by military action. It tells a familiar but still disturbing story. His concise narrative is supplemented with a series of useful appendices which include the statement of principles issued by the Project for the New American Century (PNAC), George W. Bush's Farewell Address to the Nation, and Barack Obama's Inaugural Address in January 2009.
Tripathi writes in a lively and accessible style, but his book is prone to polemical assertions. Was PNAC really “the ideological vehicle used to get George W. Bush elected to the White House in November 2000” (9), or did the ineptness of the Gore campaign, the tactical abilities of Karl Rove and the political persuasions of some Supreme Court justices have anything to do with the Republican victory? Is neoconservative “dogma” simply defined as the “enforcement of freedom, democracy and human rights, if necessary, by regime change from outside”? Indeed, is neoconservatism solely a mask for “America's twin interests – cheap oil and the defense of Israel” (18)? These arguments could be better nuanced. Tripathi is on firmer ground in suggesting that the ideological baggage carried by influential members of the Bush administration into the White House was packed and ready when they were confronted with the events of 9/11. Moreover, he argues convincingly that their response was not only predictable but also ultimately self-defeating.
A former BBC correspondent resident in Kabul, who also covered events in Pakistan, Syria, Sri Lanka, and India, Tripathi is most at home in describing the complex web of religious and political groups that opposed the United States military as it took action against al Qaeda and the Taliban. Bush's legacy – and Obama's inheritance – is an increasingly unstable Middle East and South Asia in which the multiple problems of conflict resolution, from Palestine to Kashmir, seem ever more intractable. Tripathi has written a timely reminder that overcoming the Bush legacy in Iraq and Afghanistan is a task that, if his successor can achieve it, would make Barack Obama indeed a worthy recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize.
