This is the story of a betrayal. During the twentieth century, the American Constitution, which the Founding Fathers, inspired by the doctrines of Immanuel Kant and Adam Smith, had erected upon the principles of citizens’ equality, procedural justice, and impartiality, has been overturned by the combined action of self-interested politicians, narrow-minded economists, and myopic judges. Americans now live under what is read as a consequence-based, procedurally detached Constitution, the exact opposite of what the likes of Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, or George Washington devised it to be. A central role in this tragedy has been played by neoclassical economics. Its utilitarian foundations emphasize the wants and needs of individuals taken as autonomous selves, detached from their polity and devoid of any moral value different from the rational calculus of pleasures and pains. Consequentialism is the only dimension neoclassical economists recognize for appraising political decisions, and any rule can be justified, or discarded, on these grounds. The fundamental theorems of welfare economics (FTWE) thus provide the intellectual justification for an increasingly intrusive activity by government at all levels—executive, legislative, or administrative, state or federal—addressed at correcting market failures, in the spirit of FTWE1, or at allocating resources in the most preferred way, as of FTWE2. Politicians from all sides have greeted the economists’ validation of age-old practices. Legal devices to privilege one class of citizens—be they electors or donors—over the others could now be read as legitimate applications of welfare economics. The Supreme Court has eventually sanctioned government interferences with the economy, elevating the neoclassical recipe to constitutional dogma. Betraying the Constitution has not been without dire consequences, though. One of the worst has been the collapse in the citizens’ faith in those very republican values of active political participation that the Constitution’s original spirit intended to further. Most Americans feel de facto excluded from a political process that looks, to their eyes, essentially arbitrary and driven by special interests. Following James Buchanan’s leadership, public choice theorists have fought a lonely—and so far losing—battle within the economists’ community to denounce the betrayal and defend the true values of the Constitution.
The above summary is itself unfaithful to the wealth of insights and philosophical depth of Tim Roth’s latest book, Economists and the State: What Went Wrong. However, I hope it suffices to convey its main message and lure JHET readers into perusing it. Whether one agrees or not with Roth’s indictment of almost every component of modern American policy making—its theoretical foundations, social goals, legislative implementation, and judicial scrutiny—it is worthwhile to take the denunciation very seriously because of the crucial questions it raises.
The present reviewer appreciated the questions and, basically, also the answers. In particular, I fully agree with the author’s main thesis: that the American Constitution originally put at center stage values such as formal equality, hostility against privilege, and procedural neutrality that have been substantially downplayed, if not wholly abandoned, during the twentieth century in both policy making and constitutional law. In my view, the book—written as it is from an economist’s viewpoint—provides a welcome complement to the already large literature on “the lost Constitution” produced by law scholars and historians such as, to name but a few, Richard Epstein, Randy Barnett, James Ely Jr., or David Bernstein. The economist’s take on the subject is especially important because it highlights the role played by economic ideas in driving a process that apparently rested only upon political struggles and legal arguments. History shows that economics mattered a lot to legitimize the birth and expansion of the welfare and administrative state—i.e., of the two faces of the “monster” the Founding Fathers strived to keep at bay. Roth deserves only praise for having stressed its importance.
The book’s best comes precisely in the chapters dedicated to the constitutional implications of economic ideas. Chapter 2 explains how Kant and Smith deeply affected the drafters of the American Constitution—first of all, James Madison. Both their emphasis on the moral improvement of citizens and their consequence-detached, procedure-based theory of the state found direct expression in the foundational document of the new Republic. The true values of the Constitution thus reside in the procedural constraints that it formalized (Madison’s well-known “auxiliary precautions” against the prevalence of one power over the others) and the ethical commitment it embodied (the cultivation of the citizens’ morality via their active participation in republican life). Smith’s political economy perfectly symbolized this version of classical liberalism. Unsurprisingly, both the founders and the first constitutional interpreters read his Wealth of Nations into the Constitution. Chapter 4 illustrates how modern liberalism, grounded as it is on the principle of absolute free agency (the “transcendental autonomous individual,” as Roth calls it), naturally leads to a philosophy emphasizing economic growth (i.e., welfare maximization) and distributive justice (i.e., equal starting points). This approach finds its most concrete application in the principles and techniques of neoclassical economics, as embodied by the two FTWEs. Reading twentieth-century welfare economics into the Constitution thus represents the main path to achieve the goals of modern liberalism. Alas, the latter do not coincide with—indeed, betray—the classical ones.
While solidly argued, the book is far from perfect. Among the weakest parts, is the long—frankly, overlong—chapter 5, where the author provides evidence of how the federal legislative process has derailed from basic constitutional principles. Understandably from the viewpoint of an American scholar writing to shock his countrymen, plenty of pages are spent to detail cases such as the recent health reform, the TARP, and the pork barreling accompanying the approval of the federal budget. Each of these examples testifies to the distance separating the actual work of Congress from the principles enshrined in the Constitution. Yet, the third case—which captures a perennial feature of the legislative process—would perhaps suffice by itself to make Roth’s point.
Another weakness is the lack of any specific reference to the (admittedly intricate) history of neoclassical economics in the US. Ideas can’t walk on their own legs. Some information about the role of single economists or groups (say, the Gilded Age progressives, the Keynesians, the Chicagoans) in spreading the neoclassical gospel would have helped readers to better frame the path of economic ideas within the broader context of American history. Roth also fails to discriminate between the two basic notions of efficiency: the Paretian and the wealth maximization (or Kaldor–Hicks) principles. While the latter fully captures the neoclassical philosophy as depicted in the book, the former partakes of a principle that classical liberals would have surely appreciated: the intangibility of individual property rights. In a Paretian world, the only government interventions meeting the efficiency test are win–win ones: that is, interventions that (weakly) benefit everyone while harming none. While Roth correctly points at the logical inconsistency of the Pareto possibility frontier, we may still recognize that a classical, non-utilitarian liberal would have little to object against the notion of Pareto-improvements, while she would reject as unacceptable interference with someone’s right the explicit gain–loss rationale of the more frequently used Kaldor-Hicks alternative.
Still, the most sensible defect in the book—and my only serious motive of complaint about it—is the cursory treatment of the role of the courts. The above-mentioned literature on “the lost Constitution” has amply demonstrated how American judges resisted for decades against the rising tide of modern liberalism, with its attached utilitarian vocabulary of redistributive policies. The whole history of so-called laissez faire constitutionalism (the period of American constitutional law going from the 1880s to the mid-1930s) bears witness to this resistance. This was the era of Lochner v. New York, of freedom of contract, of substantive due process. Progressives depicted the courts, and in particular the Supreme Court, as stubborn defenders of an outmoded interpretation of the Constitution, one in which the principles of classical liberalism and classical political economy still held sway, despite the urge for their abandonment arising from the deep socio-economic transformations of the time. Jurists, economists, and large parts of the public opinion shared this negative image of arch-conservative federal judges. Yet, Roth criticizes the Supreme Court for having privileged federal over state powers (thereby undermining Madison’s original federalist edifice) and for slowly opening the door, if only implicitly or involuntarily, to the ever increasing interference of public powers with the economy. The point is that under the generic rubric of police power, state legislators of the Gilded Age were infringing constitutionally protected individual rights much more than Congress or federal authorities (rate regulation and corporate law being the most conspicuous examples). Federal judges were simply trying to minimize the damage by shifting powers at a more centralized, and supposedly less parochial, level of government. Moreover, from an historical point of view, most of the Supreme Court’s “creative” interpretations Roth so forcefully complains of (see especially chapter 6) came only since the late 1930s: that is, after the eventual capitulation of the last defenders of the classical liberal Constitution. One would expect Roth to at least acknowledge the hopeless battle these justices had previously fought in the name of that very interpretation of the Constitution he so forcefully—and persuasively—advocates in this thought-provoking book.
