As Reynolds Salerno has suggested, the Mediterranean was an important theatre for the formulation of great power strategies in the run up to the Second World War.Footnote ¹ Salerno's perspective, however, remains confined to that of the great powers. He disregards small powers although their choices were not unimportant in the developments leading to the war. This article examines the evolution of Greece's foreign policy from a position of relative detachment to increasing involvement in Balkan and Mediterranean affairs that eventually led to Greece's realignment with Britain during the Abyssinian crisis. It is argued that Greece's foreign policy shift came as a response to the perceived threat of Italian revisionism and the changing international situation as was particularly reflected in the Mediterranean. This shift, however, cannot be understood unless one also considers the domestic political dynamics that led to the political eclipse of Eleftherios Venizelos, who initiated Greece's bourgeois modernisation in 1910 and commanded the undisputed loyalty of the republican camp for more than two decades. His eclipse was followed by the restoration of the monarchy and the rise to power of Ioannis Metaxas. The evolution of Greece's foreign policy also needs to be examined in relation to British influence in Greek affairs.

Greece's foreign policy after independence, in 1830, was subject to external influence. Independence would have been inconceivable had the great powers not intervened in favour of the Greeks. The kingdom was weak in both the financial and military spheres but at the same time ambitious, as it was seeking to extend its territory so that all Greeks of the Ottoman Empire were found within it. During the course of the nineteenth century, it became evident that Greece's foreign policy should take account primarily of the will of Britain, the naval power that was dominating the Eastern Mediterranean.Footnote ²

Greece's involvement in the First World War was the most important case sanctioning the rule of naval supremacy in Greek foreign policy making. Two mutually exclusive strategies clashed and created a national schism that would last until 1936. King Constantine I (1913–1917, 1920–1922) broke his father's pro-British tradition and supported neutrality during the war. Dynastic bonds and personal inclination were the subtext of his preference, whilst it is undeniable that the king was convinced as well that Germany would prevail, so making it imperative for Greece not to alienate Berlin. Strong military factions in support of Metaxas, a German-trained officer of the general staff, being the most notable case, supported the king's view.Footnote ³ The king was also supported by anti-Venizelist parliamentary elements which saw in this rift an opportunity to revive their declining fortunes. Opposed to the king were Venizelos and the Liberals, constituting a powerful popular and parliamentary majority after 1910, the landmark of the entry of the middle and petty bourgeois class in the political arena.Footnote ⁴ Venizelos held the view that Greece should side with the Entente, for the western powers would eventually win and Greece should be found in an advantageous position to attain its irredentist goals. He reminded the crown that it was a doctrine of Greece's foreign policy that the country could not oppose the naval power that dominated the Eastern Mediterranean. His doctrine was affirmed by subsequent developments, since Britain and France were gradually able to infiltrate their armies in northern Greece. Thessaloniki became the seat of a Venizelos-led government which split the country and challenged the authority of the governments appointed by the crown in 1916–17. King Constantine abdicated in May 1917 after the British imposed a naval blockade upon continental Greece, with the Germans incapable of militarily protecting their ally. Venizelos returned to Athens in June 1917 as the head of a unified government and carried Greece to the war as an ally of the Entente.Footnote ⁵

Greece's irredentist foreign policy suffered a major setback in Asia Minor in 1922.Footnote ⁶ The Turkish nationalist movement under Kemal Atatürk was able to defeat the Greek army in Asia Minor. After the Lausanne peace treaty of 1923, Greece followed a status quo policy. Having a long border to the north with Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, Athens’ main concern was to prevent the South Slav countries from securing an outlet to the Aegean.Footnote ⁷ Athens was concerned over French and British relative indifference towards the Mediterranean. It was, moreover, disappointed by the failure of the League of Nations to provide the collective security system it had promised. The Italian occupation of Corfu in 1923 and the League's inability to impose a principled policy upon a great power would validate the view that conforming to power realities was the best method to secure a small country's interests.Footnote ⁸

After Venizelos's return to power in July 1928, Athens undertook an active policy of reconciliation with its neighbours without committing itself to a great power. Its relations with Italy acquired unprecedented importance, since Rome was the rising power in the Mediterranean. Moreover, its foreign policy was revisionist as a result of Italian grievances against the territorial settlement of 1919–20 and the proclivity of the fascist regime to pursue an expansionist policy in the Adriatic, the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean.Footnote ⁹ Greece's interest as a status quo power was not compatible with Benito Mussolini's proclivity to encourage claims retained by the regional revisionist powers, in particular Hungary and Bulgaria. The Balkan landscape was quite complicated, however, and Greece a rather weak country. Serbia was the main beneficiary of the Great War in the Balkans, expanding its territory to the former Habsburg lands of Slovenia and Croatia. The new kingdom, a privileged ally of France, was too powerful for Greece, as Athens lacked the balancing support of a great power. Italy was a suitable partner for Greece in this respect, as Rome was in competition with France and Yugoslavia. Simultaneously, Venizelos was careful to avoid undue closeness with France's system of alliances in east-central Europe.Footnote ¹⁰ Venizelos strove also to normalise relations with Turkey and in particular to prevent a policy of Greek–Turkish antagonism in the Aegean.Footnote ¹¹ Turkey's orientation to the territorial status quo while Kemal pursued a vigorous programme of modernisation provided the common ground for the two countries.Footnote ¹²

The anti-Venizelist coalition's foreign policy

Venizelos's foreign policy was not seriously questioned until his defeat at the polls in March 1933 and the rise to power of an anti-Venizelist coalition. The People's Party under Panagis Tsaldaris was the major partner with the parties of Generals Metaxas and Georgios Kondylis as junior ones. Political change in Greece coincided with Adolf Hitler's advance in Germany and the intensification of pressures exercised upon the international post-war order, already under stress after the outbreak of the inter-war economic crisis.Footnote ¹³

The formulation of Greece's foreign policy during the deconstruction of the international order after the First World War was subjected to geopolitical considerations but it was simultaneously burdened by historically driven evaluations. It was also a highly politicised process, in the sense that internal political forces shaped the debate in a decisive manner with the politically fragmented military or the diplomatic bureaucracy as such playing a secondary role. This did not preclude able diplomats from influencing the foreign policy-making process but this was conditional on personal connections and political preferences. In the case of the anti-Venizelist coalition that ruled until October 1935, the diplomatic figure with influence was Panagiotis Pipinelis (1899–1970), who served as a director of the office of the foreign minister, Dimitrios Maximos.Footnote ¹⁴ A young diplomat and a royalist, Pipinelis held strong foreign policy views opposed to those of Venizelos.

The positions taken by the primary political actors that influenced the debate amounted to a reversal of alliances as they had crystallised during the First World War. Venizelos had become in the 1930s an advocate of a neutralist foreign policy, whilst anti-Venizelism – Metaxas and Pipinelis distinguished cases within it – adopted as a fundamental doctrine of Greek foreign policy the alignment with Britain. The monarchy had also shifted its allegiance. Constantine's successor, George II, abdicated in 1924 under the combined pressure of some elements from Venizelist parties and the military. The exiled king was closely connected to Britain, thus restoring the pro-British tradition of his house.Footnote ¹⁵

The developments related to the Balkan Pact, though symptomatic of the unravelling of the post-First World War order, were not central in the international politics in Europe as it unfolded in early 1934. The Balkan Pact was concluded in February 1934 between Greece, Turkey, Romania and Yugoslavia. Its rationale was to guarantee the territorial status quo in the Balkans, since Bulgaria retained its own revisionist aspirations. The Pact was partly a reflection of France's strategy to expand its system of alliances in east-central Europe and guarantee the status quo. Yugoslavia and Romania were integral parts of France's nexus of alliances and Greece and Turkey were increasingly concerned over Bulgarian revisionism.Footnote ¹⁶ However, the possibility of a Franco–Italian rapprochement remained alive from the beginning of 1934 until the Abyssinian crisis in mid 1935. The policies of France, Italy and Britain were not definitely irreconcilable at this juncture and the Pact did not undermine the prospects of Paris–Rome co-operation against Hitler's revisionism.Footnote ¹⁷ Seen from this perspective, the internal Greek debate over the Balkan Pact was rather exaggerated at least with regard to the European dimension of the affair.

From early 1934 until the spring of 1935, making the choice of an alliance with either Italy or Great Britain and France was not imperative for Greece. France wished to form a bloc with Italy so that resurgent Germany was contained. However, after the outbreak of the Abyssinian crisis it became evident that the Stresa Front was not viable, although the British still hoped that Italy might be drawn away from an alliance with National Socialist Germany. It was also evident that Greece could not escape its involvement in the European realignment of forces and, moreover, that the country was strategically important for Britain.Footnote ¹⁸

In this fluid context, the anti-Venizelist government formulated a policy diverging from that of its predecessor. As Pipinelis maintained in a long report after the fall of the Tsaldaris coalition,Footnote ¹⁹ Yugoslavia was paramount for Greece's security as it made possible defence against Bulgaria. Moreover, a good Athens–Belgrade relationship precluded a rapprochement between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria which would pose a geopolitically intolerable burden over Greece's northern border.Footnote ²⁰ Furthermore, the anti-Venizelists felt that Venizelos had aligned Greek policy with Italy too closely, provoking the diffidence of France and Yugoslavia.Footnote ²¹ Yugoslavia's participation in the Balkan Pact would prevent the eventual South Slav union and would thus relieve the geopolitical anxiety of Greece.

The British did not share Greek concerns. The formation of a Yugoslav–Bulgarian bloc was perceived as an ‘obsession’ of the Greek mind, London's priority being the inclusion of Bulgaria in a Balkan settlement.Footnote ²² The British foreign secretary, Sir John Simon, was wondering whether the signature of the Pact by the four alone would not appear to Sofia as the formation of a bloc against it.Footnote ²³ The Greek foreign minister assured the British foreign secretary that it was not in his intentions to exclude Bulgaria. To the contrary, he aspired to a five-member Pact that would secure existing frontiers. He was hopeful that King Boris of Bulgaria was positively disposed towards this Pact but he would move cautiously lest the nationalist element in his country were provoked. In this case Maximos felt that the four countries could sign the Pact and then wait for Bulgaria to accede at a politically more opportune moment. This line reflected the Romanian foreign minister's, Nicolae Titulescu, strategy formulated in October 1933 and accepted by the Yugoslavs, the Greeks and the Turks: Bulgarian participation was desirable but the conclusion of the Pact was not tied to its participation.Footnote ²⁴

The Italians, as it should be expected, were opposed to a Pact aiming to preserve the status quo although their reaction was not clear to the Greeks from the start. Maximos had gathered the impression that Mussolini would accept the Pact as a fact but an Italian démarche in Athens on 20 January 1934 dissipated Athens’ hopes.Footnote ²⁵ Contrary to the British, the French were in favour of a quick resolution of the Pact irrespective of Bulgaria's objections. French diplomacy was instrumental in persuading King Alexander of Yugoslavia to proceed quickly against the advice of military elements that supported a Yugoslav–Bulgarian accord. The French ambassador in Belgrade warned the king that a South Slav rapprochement would be adversely perceived by Athens and Ankara as a compromise drawn at their expense in the Aegean.Footnote ²⁶

Yugoslavia's policy was indeed ambiguous. In order to reconcile a status quo policy that served her interests with the need to pursue the rapprochement with Bulgaria, Belgrade proposed a general reference to the territorial status quo instead of the guarantee supported by the other three.Footnote ²⁷ Belgrade also wished the duration of the Pact not to exceed five years. On the face of the pressures of their partners it became clear, however, to the Yugoslavs that they could not appear to be jettisoning the tenets of the status quo that so well had served their fundamental interests. In the final days of the talks Belgrade successfully attempted to draw the maximum of advantage from the Pact, demanding a guarantee against both a Balkan and a non-Balkan power so that Yugoslavia was not left uncovered against a great power as had happened to the Serbs in 1915 in the context of the Great War.Footnote ²⁸

Although the Pact was concluded containing a military dimension, a major disagreement was evident among the allies concerning the application of military measures: the Yugoslavs and the Romanians were adamant that the Pact was an alliance extended to the military field whilst the Turks, already apprehensive of the Soviet reaction to the Pact, were, at least, ambiguous on this.Footnote ²⁹ The Greeks did not deny that the Pact had a military dimension although in public the government, under the attack of Venizelos, did not admit it. The discussion touched upon a crucial question. Was Greece able to avoid participation in a Balkan encounter that involved a great European power or, moreover, was the country able to stay neutral in a European war if it wished so? The British ambassador in Athens was not in doubt: ‘Maturer reflection on the geographical and political situation of Greece which necessarily exposes her to interference at the hands of any Mediterranean sea-power whenever the Balkans are disturbed, might have suggested that an embarrassment of this kind was inevitable.’Footnote ³⁰

Debating the Balkan Pact: geopolitical readings and domestic politics

The discussion of the Balkan Pact by a council comprising the leaders of the political parties, with the exception of the communists, revealed the reversal of preferences within the Greek political spectrum concerning the international orientation of Greece. Venizelos's argument was founded on the calculation of the balance of forces. He defined three tenets of Greek foreign policy since 1928: first, the cultivation of relations with Italy, the ‘great Mediterranean power’, analogous to those that Greece traditionally maintained with Britain and France; second, the restoration of Greece's good relations with Yugoslavia and Turkey; last, but not least, Greece's independence from any combination of great powers, particularly those seeking to influence Balkan affairs lest the country was found involved in a general European war against its interests and wishes. In Venizelos's thinking, two inter-related assumptions were preponderant: Greece was in a position to remain neutral in a general European war and the country could maximise its security through the manipulation of regional and systemic factors in a non-committal manner. Aversion to participation in a general European war originated from the belief, shared by the entire Venizelist camp, that since the country did not retain a major irredentist programme after the defeat in Asia Minor in 1922, it had to devote its effort to economic and social development and modernisation. That was the axis of Venizelos's programme after his return to power in 1928.Footnote ³¹ In his foreign policy programme the rapprochement with Turkey, entailing recognition of the existing territorial status quo as permanent and the commitment to avoiding a naval build up in the Aegean that would divert precious capital from development to armaments, was the most important manifestation of this status quo policy. Concerning independence and freedom of action, Venizelos emphasised his effort to refrain from a binding alliance with Italy, a proposal pursued by Mussolini during the Rome talks of 1928. The Greek premier was successful in signing instead a political pact that was helpful in persuading Yugoslavia to drop its claims for a free zone in the port of Thessaloniki and normalise relations with Athens for fear of a closer Greek–Italian relationship. Furthermore, Venizelos felt that close relations with Italy had been proved quite satisfactory for Greece in other respects as well. Greek–Turkish rapprochement in 1930 had been facilitated by Italy, Venizelos maintained, although Rome should not be understood as the driving force. Venizelos was adamant that the Balkan Pact constituted abandonment of the third tenet of Greece's policy, that of non-identification with a particular combination of powers. The Liberal leader thought that a non-aggression pact committing the parties to the peaceful resolution of their differences would suffice to stabilise the situation in the Balkans and, more important, would probably secure Bulgaria's participation in it.Footnote ³²

Metaxas's approach was geopolitically founded and more deterministic regarding Greece's ability to retain its neutrality in the event of a European war. Metaxas was not a lightweight compared to Venizelos. A German-trained officer, he had sided with the king in favour of neutrality during the First World War. In the 1930s he was convinced that neutrality was not a feasible strategy for Greece and his belief seemed to be the by-product of evaluating Greece's involvement in the First World War. Greece's geographical position, Metaxas, assumed, was two-pronged, Mediterranean and Balkan simultaneously. This dual dimension appeared in the First World War and reappeared in 1933–4. Greece sought to preserve its northern territory without colliding with the Mediterranean powers. No problem would arise if Italy and Britain were in accord with the Balkan Pact. But Italy was opposed to the Pact as it favoured the revision of the post-war status quo. Moreover, Britain's position was not known and it was a matter of doctrinal adherence that Greece was not in a position to run a foreign policy contrary to Britain's. On this Metaxas was clearly opposed to Venizelos, for the Cretan politician had already elevated Greece's relations with Italy on a par with those with Britain.

Metaxas, a distinguished strategist, though his party was a part of the governing anti-Venizelist coalition, was guarded towards the government's policy, as he saw in the Pact an alliance in the making against revisionist Bulgaria. Nevertheless, Metaxas failed to grasp fully the dynamics of the evolving international situation, for he was still rather relaxed on the prospect of a general European war and underestimated the aggressive character of the revisionist powers’ policies. Contrary to the former foreign minister of the Venizelos government, Andreas Michalakopoulos, who was particularly concerned over the possibility of a war emanating from National Socialist Germany's revisionist agenda, Metaxas did not think yet that Germany would lead Europe to a war. Neither had Mussolini, he felt, been proved too warlike in his policies. In general, he saw a tendency prevailing amongst the peoples of Europe to favour economic welfare. Last, but not least, Metaxas thought that the European powers lacked resources to such an extent that a war effort was unsustainable. He concluded by emphasising Greece's need to avoid the displeasure of both the Mediterranean and the Balkan powers. If he had to choose between the two nevertheless, Metaxas felt that the latter were rather manageable. Yugoslavia and Bulgaria could threaten Greece only in unison through an amalgamated state. That was out of the question for a long time, for within this state Bulgaria would acquire increased influence through the Macedonian provinces at the expense of the old Serbian element. This latter factor, entrenched as it was in the Yugoslav bureaucracy, the army and the monarchy, would react adversely and thus union was not a realistic prospect. Metaxas concluded his analysis by asking for the inclusion of a supplementary clause to the Pact that would permit Greece to stay neutral in the event of Italian involvement in a Balkan war by invoking the validity of bilateral pacts issued before the signature of the Balkan one. Moreover, he repeated that Greece should align, as a matter of necessity, its policy to the power dominating the Mediterranean.Footnote ³³ Thus Metaxas's difference from Venizelos did not concern the situation as it appeared in 1934 since they both wished Greece not to undertake obligations that bound Athens against Italy. Their difference had a strategic depth, however, as Venizelos advocated a policy of equidistance towards the great powers whilst Metaxas had accepted Britain's preponderance as a cardinal rule of Greece's geopolitical position.

Contrary to Metaxas and Venizelos, the formerly Venizelist general Kondylis, minister of the army, interpreted the Balkan Pact as a crucial step towards the emancipation of the region from great power tutelage. Kondylis's support was crucial for the anti-Venizelist coalition in power, for the general retained, apart from a few deputies in parliament, a degree of control over the Venizelist officer corps. He hoped that a pact gathering 50 million people and four nations, interconnected solidly at a later stage, would be respected by the great powers. Moreover, Kondylis thought that the Pact would offer a credible deterrent towards Bulgaria. Most interestingly, he believed that Greece neither could nor was it in her interest to stay neutral in a European war. The Macedonian question, stated Kondylis, would re-emerge as a result of the initiative of other powers and Greece would follow suit. Simultaneously, contrary to the estimate of the foreign minister, he did not think that the union of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria was a real possibility, sharing Metaxas's analysis of the Serbian element's tendency to preserve its preponderance within the structure of the Yugoslav kingdom. His assertion was an attempt to counter an argument elicited by the Venizelist camp that the Pact would eventually lead Bulgaria to Yugoslavia.Footnote ³⁴ This was elaborated fully by Georgios Kafantaris, an ally of Venizelos. Greece was able to defend herself against Bulgaria either alone or in alliance with Turkey. The Pact could only lead Bulgaria either to Italy's sphere of influence or to Yugoslavia after a long period of preparation of a union that would mature in some years’ time. The Pact per se would not prevent the preparation of the ground for a south Slav union.

With regard to the possibility of a European war and Greece's relation to it, the government tried to be reassuring. Prime Minister Tsaldaris thought that there was a slim chance of Greece to be engaged in hostilities with Italy as a result of the Balkan Pact, as France, in the event of a war between Italy and Yugoslavia, would probably enter the fray, leading thus to a European war. His utterance probably implied that Greece could not escape a general war but he explicitly stated that he did not think that a war was probable in Europe.Footnote ³⁵ That was the crux of the matter as seen from the anti-Venizelist side: Greece could not escape a general European war contrary to Venizelos's assertion that it could.

Alexandros Papanastasiou, leader of a small social democratic party allied to the Liberals, was opposed to the Balkan Pact, as it excluded Bulgaria. He thought that Sofia's revisionist agenda could be peacefully contained if its economic needs were met. The Bulgarians, Papanastasiou asserted, and especially the peasant movement, were interested in a form of economic integration in the Balkans and the possibility of the free movement of labour. An outlet to the Aegean could be provided in the form of free zones in important ports in the framework of a political settlement. Rearmament was not a major problem since it was understood that Bulgaria had already exceeded the limits stipulated by the Treaty of Neuilly-sur-Seine of 1919. As for the minorities, they should be dealt with in a wider framework of a political settlement.Footnote ³⁶ This social democratic agenda, promoted in the context of the Balkan conferences since 1930, would not provide a realistic platform especially after the military coup of the summer of 1934 that overthrew the Peasant government in Bulgaria.

Although the government retained a majority in the lower house of parliament, Venizelos's control of the upper legislature, the senate, which was constitutionally competent to ratify international treaties, permitted him to insert a clause that tied Greece to neutrality in the event of a Balkan war that involved a non-Balkan power. That, according to the government's thinking, amounted to Italy neutralising the political impact of the Balkan Pact and Rome acquiring a ‘dominating’ position over Greek policy.Footnote ³⁷ Thus, after a demand forwarded to him by Titulescu, Maximos assured his colleagues in the Balkan Pact in writing that the Senate resolution did not affect obligations undertaken by the Tsaldaris government. Greece would nevertheless, as a result of Venizelos's reaction, remain out of military agreements, its partners concluded in May 1934.Footnote ³⁸ Greece's refraining from military engagements did not concern very much the Turks, although Ankara was annoyed by the accelerated pace of Bulgarian rearmament in violation of the Treaty of Neuilly. As the Turkish foreign minister, Tevfik Rüştü Aras, confided to the French ambassador the Greek army was not very strong.Footnote ³⁹ This estimate was shared by the Greeks themselves who realised that the relative neglect of Greece military capabilities undermined its standing in the Balkans. Major rearmament would not be undertaken, however, before 1936.Footnote ⁴⁰ Still, the Turks were pleased by Greek participation in the Balkan Pact, as they were aware of Italian opposition to the Pact since November 1933,Footnote ⁴¹ and were concerned over Italy's encouragement to Sofia to stay out of the Pact.Footnote ⁴²

The Venizelist coup of March 1935 and its international ramifications

On 1 March 1935, a considerable part of the army and the navy revolted under the leadership of Venizelos. The Cretan leader and his supporters claimed that they acted so that a restoration of the monarchy was averted, but it was apparent that Venizelos had lost hope that he could return to power by constitutional means whilst his military supporters were apprehensive of their eroding position in the army.Footnote ⁴³

Questions over the connection between the outbreak of the Venizelist coup and Italian policy were posed by every interested factor. Belgrade was ‘unshakably’ convinced that Italy was ‘at least privy’ to the uprising. Venizelos's campaign against the Balkan Pact of the previous year was cited as an unmistakable sign that an understanding between him and Italy was in place.Footnote ⁴⁴

The British were far less certain over the question of Italy's connection with Venizelos's military move for lack of clear evidence. This lack of evidence led various sections of the British foreign policy establishment to various conclusions. The Foreign Office tended to disregard a foreign policy nexus in Venizelos's attempt to overthrow his opponents. The coup was seen in the context of a clash between the ‘ins’ and the ‘outs’ of Greek politics. The Venizelist coup was not particularly disapproved, for the anti-Venizelist government was thought to be ‘corrupt’ and ‘inimical’ to Britain's financial and commercial interests. Venizelos could scarcely be worse and might be ‘considerably’ better from the point of view of British interests if he returned to power. The Foreign Office's choice was the holding of a line of ‘strict neutrality’ to the extent possible.Footnote ⁴⁵ It was a line conforming to the conclusions reached by the Foreign Office on Greece's trade policy of the previous year. The British, emphasising the economic aspects of their relations with Greece, had felt that Greek trade policy was discriminatory against British commercial interests, as Athens, moving along the imperatives of the world economic crisis, concluded clearing agreements with Germany, Czechoslovakia and Sweden.Footnote ⁴⁶ Service of the Greek public debt at a reduced rate was also contributing to British displeasure.Footnote ⁴⁷ Moreover, the Cretan politician retained a degree of the prestige he had acquired during the First World War in Britain whilst Italy, though closely watched, was not yet seen as an irreconcilable enemy in the Mediterranean.

The British ambassador in Athens, Sir Sydney Waterlow, though not in disposal of convincing evidence, felt that the coup might be related to Italian policy designs. The causes of the coup, Waterlow admitted, were ‘primarily’ internal. But the coup would not have broken out at this particular moment if it had not been for some ‘pre-war tendencies and conceptions obsolete under modern conditions’, namely the persistent Italian policy to influence the Balkans and the exploration of an opportunity to detach Greece from the Balkan Pact, especially from Turkey and Yugoslavia. Venizelos's mentality was also a factor to be taken into account. This mentality had been ‘steeped’ in the tradition of revolution, which was practised with the support and sympathy of a great power. Waterlow admitted that the precise form of combination of those two factors was not known but he could not otherwise explain the ‘senseless’ character of events of 1 March 1935 but only hypothesise of some connection between them.Footnote ⁴⁸

Lacking conclusive intelligence, British policymakers attempted to formulate an ad hoc response to the ongoing situation. The Foreign Office tended to follow a course that would not implicate Britain in an uncertain outcome whilst the ambassador in Athens was prone to action in an effort to increase London's influence in Greek affairs.Footnote ⁴⁹ The Foreign Office's response was cautious. The situation was uncertain. If the government asked for mediation, then London would see whether Venizelos's opinion could be sought.Footnote ⁵⁰ On 7 March 1935 both Whitehall and the Quai d'Orsay decided to reject a possible mediation request. Furthermore, the British and the French came to the conclusion that a request for the provision of aircraft to the Greek government should also be rejected. There was a certainty in London that the Greeks could not hope for a speedy delivery of the requested aircraft from elsewhere, Germany, Italy and Czechoslovakia included.Footnote ⁵¹

This divergence of the embassy's analysis from the Foreign Office's was not entirely inconsequential. The Foreign Office was ‘detached’ during the rebellion, for London could not foresee who would eventually win. The Greek government, however, felt, as the Foreign Office noticed, that it was entitled to British and international support for it was the legitimate government of Greece. In this context, Waterlow had extended an expression of sympathy to the Greek government's effort to restore its authority. The latter was quick to present it as an official British endorsement lest it was thought that Britain supported Venizelos.Footnote ⁵² Still, the Foreign Office, not unambiguously, did not see a connection between Venizelos and Italy. It was not denied that Venizelos's foreign policy during his term as prime minister in 1928–32 and his stance towards the Balkan Pact the previous year, ‘what was in fact Italy's interest’, would support the suggestion that Italy was interested in seeing him in power again. However, Italy had remained ‘correct’ during the affair and whatever might have happened if Venizelos had been successful could not form an informed conclusion.Footnote ⁵³

Whatever the actual nexus between foreign and domestic policy, the Balkan Pact appeared strengthened as a result of Venizelos's failed coup. The Yugoslavs had clearly supported the government, providing material aid in the form of aircraft, which Britain and France had denied the Greek government.Footnote ⁵⁴ Furthermore, the Pact had for once worked to Venizelos's advantage for it had ‘strangely’ permitted him to act, since the Cretan politician was assured that Bulgaria would not take advantage of Greece's weakness as a result of the solidarity of its Balkan partners.Footnote ⁵⁵

The Abyssinian crisis, Britain's convergence with Greece and the restoration

Venizelos's defeat meant that the issue of the monarchy came to the fore, a development the coup sought to prevent. The monarchists were not numerous initially and the British ambassador believed that due to the ‘virulence’ prevailing in Greek politics the crown would not serve a useful purpose.Footnote ⁵⁶ Two months later he appeared as an advocate of the monarchy, warning of a possible slide by Greece to anarchy if the issue was not settled soon in favour of the crown. The Foreign Office did not share this view: there was no evident enthusiasm for the monarchy, the British ambassador in Athens did not cite a good reason for the restoration and the suggestion that Britain should influence events in favour of the monarchy was a cause of concern.Footnote ⁵⁷ Sir Orme Sargent did not see a way to support either the monarchy or the republic. Moreover he thought that it was ‘improper’ and ‘impolitic’ for Britain to present a preference publicly before the Greeks themselves decided. He did not, however, preclude entirely a possibility for Britain to advise key Greek factors on the issue although it seemed difficult enough to expect that the Liberal opposition would be influenced. On top of that, Sargent thought that the argument of ‘anarchy’, if the monarchy was not restored, was ‘exaggerated’.Footnote ⁵⁸

In July 1935, Waterlow's estimates of the monarchy's prospects were not very optimistic. As the Foreign Office noticed, the anti-Venizelist government had not backed the crown, affecting thus its popularity, whilst the volatility and instability of Greek politics did not make it certain at all that the monarchy would not be thrown out again.Footnote ⁵⁹ Waterlow was doubtful that the king would secure a majority even if Tsaldaris backed him. It was thus possible that the monarchy would be restored either by a coup or by a rigged plebiscite. The ambassador felt that under such circumstances the monarchy would be unstable and would not serve a useful purpose. Thus he advised the Foreign Office that the king should be warned to be cautious.Footnote ⁶⁰

Greece's importance for Britain increased during the summer of 1935 as a direct consequence of the Abyssinian crisis. Irrespective of Britain's proclivity to follow a policy of sanctions and still explore the possibility of a compromise with Italy, the change of circumstances and priorities was obvious from the British point of view: London did not see Greece as a relatively unimportant country but as a staging post in the Eastern Mediterranean. Britain's attention had shifted from its financial and commercial interests to strategic ones.Footnote ⁶¹

As Greece's importance for Britain increased, Athens displayed during the summer of 1935 a distinct tendency to neutrality. This tendency went in tandem with a loosening of Greek ties with its Balkan Pact allies. Foreign minister Maximos would bring to Tsaldaris's attention Titulescu's policy to connect the Balkan Pact with the Little Entente. The Greek government did not accept this linkage, as it was careful not to involve itself in central Europe and provoke Germany or Italy, manifesting this way its proclivity to follow in fact a basic requirement of Venizelos's policy. Greece, moreover, did not wish to undermine the possibility of a Mediterranean pact. The Mediterranean Pact was a French idea to stabilise the status quo in the Mediterranean. Reconciling Italy with Yugoslavia and Romania proved to be unattainable and the conclusion of the pact proved impossible despite the fact that the talks went on for several months in 1934–35.Footnote ⁶² Moreover, Maximos was apprehensive by what he described as Greece's diminished prestige in the eyes of its Balkan Pact partners as a result of Venizelos's opposition to the Pact, the military coup of March 1935 and the country's military weakness.Footnote ⁶³ Maximos's concern over Greece's inability to confront Italy was higher in August and led him to the conclusion that neutrality was the only way to retain the country's territorial integrity.Footnote ⁶⁴

The same hesitation towards undertaking commitments against Germany or Italy was evident in the Minister of War Kondylis's public utterances and his talks with Mussolini in Rome.Footnote ⁶⁵ Italian naval incursions in Greek waters and harbours during August and September 1935 exacerbated the military's fear vis-à-vis Italian capabilities.Footnote ⁶⁶ In their memorandum of 8 October 1935 the chiefs of staff addressed the question of Greece's military involvement in the event of an Anglo-Italian clash in the Mediterranean. They thought that Greece would be found at the centre of the conflict, since the British, powerful at sea, would undertake to cut off Italy from Libya and the Italians, powerful on land and air, to occupy Egypt so that the British were cut off from their Empire. Greece's shores would be the target of both, since the British would use Greece as a base of operations and the Italians would seek to deny Greek territory to the British. The chiefs of staff did not examine the possibility of Greece's alliance with Italy, for British naval supremacy in the Mediterranean precluded this. On the possibility of an alliance with Britain, the chiefs of staff pointed out that the country was in no position to be entangled in a war. Its northern border was vulnerable whilst the Italians were able to inflict heavy damage from the air.Footnote ⁶⁷

When the chiefs of staff made known their concerns the government had already abandoned neutrality in favour of a pro-British stance. On 21 September 1935, Maximos had told the British Minister for League of Nations Affairs, Anthony Eden, that Greece was favourably disposed towards Britain invoking old bonds between the two countries. On 29 September, he was more specific promising that Greece would impose sanctions and fulfil its obligations in the framework of the League of Nations. Maximos and his close associate Pipinelis felt that Greece was unable to prevent the use of its waters by Britain. Moreover, Greece was compelled by the League of Nations covenant to impose sanctions. The decision of the League of Nations, reflecting international legitimacy and the enforcement of collective security, retained under the circumstances a moral force which was not politically inconsequential. Maximos and Pipinelis were hopeful that even if a war broke out as a result of the crisis, Britain would prevail and Greece would be well positioned in the post-war situation having aligned its policy with Britain from the start.Footnote ⁶⁸ Thus, it was mostly power realities, as seen by Maximos and Pipinelis, not a preference based on old bonds with Britain that determined Greek policy.

Almost simultaneous with the outbreak of the war in Abyssinia, General Kondylis orchestrated a military coup that overthrew the Tsaldaris government, of which he was himself a member, and restored the monarchy through a rump National Assembly on 10 October 1935. The coup was a clear violation of whatever remained of democratic procedures and posed for Britain, already reluctant over the prospects of stability if the monarchy were re-established by non-democratic means, some problems. The Foreign Office, however, chose a course dictated by realpolitik out of international considerations. In other circumstances, Sargent noticed, we might wait how things developed, as the British ambassador in Athens, enraged by Kondylis's coup, suggested. But, under the present ones, that was impossible. In a Mediterranean emergency Greece's collaboration with Britain would be ‘of vital importance’.Footnote ⁶⁹ On top of that, Sargent could not see how Britain could advise the king against his return, a suggestion forwarded by Waterlow from Athens, as Britain had declined to do so in the previous July.Footnote ⁷⁰ The king would return anyway, the Foreign Office had already advised the foreign secretary, and Greece was behaving rather well trying to purchase aircraft in Britain for fear of an Italian attack against its territory. It was also evident that Greece would be a necessary partner in a new emergency.Footnote ⁷¹

With the Foreign Office's recommendation in mind, the foreign secretary expressed in a friendly manner to the restored king his worry over the problem of a monarchy that did not seem to be very popular and was dependent on a ‘handful of fanatics’ in the armed forces. These things made the British ‘nervous’ over the stability of the crown, the foreign secretary added. It was, however, for the king to determine whether he would return to Greece and he was promised that if he decided to do so the British in general and the embassy in particular would not make things difficult for him.Footnote ⁷² Consideration of stability seems to have played a crucial role in formulating Britain's position towards internal political developments in Greece. Simultaneously, the British wished to see the monarchy acquiring a degree of respectability and legitimacy and this presupposed the crown distancing itself from the military wing that had precipitated the restoration. The king was paramount in the British analysis but that seems to have happened after the restoration and it was not the result of British influence or action.

In December 1935, as the Abyssinian crisis peaked, the British asked the Greek prime minister, Professor Konstantinos Demertzis who had just been appointed by the king as a replacement of Kondylis, whether Greece would aid Britain in case of an Italian attack. Demertzis, and the king eventually, committed Greece to Britain's side. The British undertook vaguely to protect Greek territory during the crisis.Footnote ⁷³ It was an unspecified guarantee that sought to keep intact Britain's prestige in the Mediterranean countries. It obviously was not the guarantee that the chiefs of staff wished Greece to extract from Britain.

The Balkan Pact and Greece's alignment with Britain

The issues concerning Greece's military obligations in the framework of the Balkan Pact remained obscure. As the Abyssinian crisis subsided the question arose after a Yugoslav request to clarify it. Waterlow believed that this issue was of an ‘academic’ nature. Greece was ‘obsessively’ fearful of Italy since the Corfu incident of 1923, precluding thus a policy that would take her against Italy. As a point substantiating his argument he cited Greek relief over Britain's withdrawal from the Mediterranean as a result of Germany's entry to the Rhineland. Britain's withdrawal permitted Italy a free hand in Ethiopia and the removal of the possibility of a clash in the Eastern Mediterranean.Footnote ⁷⁴

Waterlow's observation was an accurate reading of the prevailing mood in Greece. Italy's image as a militarily potent great power had not yet been tarnished, since the deficiencies of its armed forces were not common knowledge before the Second World War.Footnote ⁷⁵ In January 1936, the chiefs of staff, in a supplementary memorandum regarding the military situation in case of an Anglo-Italian war, were reaffirming their assumption that Greece's exposure to an attack from the North and its military weakness precluded participation in hostilities unless its borders were guaranteed. Greece was particularly vulnerable to an Italian attack from the air. To overcome her weakness Greece urgently needed British aid in the form of war material, British naval deployment in the Aegean and enhanced anti-aircraft protection. The chiefs of staff were by implication critical of the king and the government as they were emphatic in their opinion that it would have been extremely hazardous if Greece had undertaken a commitment towards Britain without the latter having undertaken the satisfaction of what were thought to be essential requirements for Greece's participation in the war.Footnote ⁷⁶

The chiefs of staff focused on the military aspects. Pipinelis, reviewing the Tsaldaris government's foreign policy in December 1935, articulated Greece's geopolitical position as a Mediterranean and simultaneously a Balkan power. The specific way of the connection between the two dimensions depended on the balance of forces in Europe and in the Mediterranean in particular. At this juncture, Pipinelis felt that Greece's territorial waters and shores were secured by Britain as a result of the latter's imperial strategy. He implied that thus no further guarantee of Greek security was needed. With regard to the Balkans, Pipinelis added, local combinations to secure Greece's borders were necessary and Yugoslavia remained crucial in this respect.Footnote ⁷⁷ It is obvious, however, from Pipinelis's analysis, and on this no Greek analyst or politician would disagree, that the determinant factor for the formulation of Greek policy was the Mediterranean and not the Balkans, for Greece felt on the former and not on the latter the pressure of great powers.

Venizelos's thinking still tended to disapprove of the undertaking of commitments in the context of the Balkan Pact. The Cretan politician was aware of the commitments undertaken by the prime minister and the king in December 1935, since he was indirectly informed by the prime minister. He was also aware that Demertzis's commitment was unqualified and was founded not only on obligations undertaken in the framework of the League of Nations but on the old Anglo-Greek friendship as well.Footnote ⁷⁸ Venizelos, nevertheless, when asked by Demertzis to offer his advice on the issue of Greece's military obligations in the framework of the Balkan Pact reaffirmed his position of 1934: Greece should not undertake an obligation to defend a co-signatory in the event of aggression from a non-Balkan country, Italy as a matter of fact, for it would not be able to fulfil it. Venizelos added that the contingency of Italy involved in a war against Britain and France in the Mediterranean was not related to the Balkan Pact and Greece should retain its freedom of movement as its interest warranted. Greece was a Mediterranean country whilst the other Balkan Pact members were mostly interested in central Europe. Venizelos was adamant that Greece should not succumb to Belgrade's ‘blackmail’ and sever its ties with Italy. He was certain that the Yugoslavs were not interested in Greece's military contribution, which was negligible at the time. He felt that Belgrade aimed to separate Athens from Rome and render thus the former pliable to Yugoslav patronage since Venizelos still perceived Italy as the necessary pillar of Greece's independence towards Yugoslavia. He retained, in other words, the essence of his foreign policy thinking of the previous years. It was true that Venizelos had hinted that it was a different matter if Greece was opposed to Italy as it fulfilled its obligations in the context of the covenant of the League of Nations. It was an indication of the moral force of the notions of international legitimacy and collective security.Footnote ⁷⁹ He restricted though his reference only to League of Nations’ related obligations and not to Greece's old bonds with Britain. Venizelos's stance should not be attributed just to the changed circumstances, as a result of the Abyssinian crisis, but also to his effort not to alienate the king. The Cretan politician had undertaken a patient effort since the restoration to reintegrate Venizelism in Greek politics and armed forces. The acceptance of Kondylis's resignation, the appointment of Professor Demertzis as prime minister and, furthermore, the conduct of fair elections were steps in the direction favoured by Venizelos. Restoration of discipline in the armed forces, as the royalist element was out of control, was the next step contemplated by Venizelos.Footnote ⁸⁰ He died suddenly on 18 March 1936 in Paris.

Unwilling to reinstate the army and the navy Liberal officers implicated in the March 1935 coup and uncertain of the discipline of his own supporters, King George II appointed Metaxas as minister of war on 5 March 1936 and as prime minister a month later on 13 April. The king would eventually approve the declaration of a dictatorship by Metaxas on 4 August 1936.Footnote ⁸¹ In the foreign policy field, Athens would redefine its orientation in a very clear manner towards Britain in May when Metaxas, very recently appointed prime minister by the king, stated that Greece would undertake military action under the Balkan Pact in case of aggression by a Balkan power only. If a non-Balkan power attacked a Balkan Pact member Greece would remain neutral but if a non-Balkan power were involved in a war with Britain and France along with Balkan Pact members, then Greece would consult with Britain on the way it would extend aid or participate in this war.Footnote ⁸² It is apparent that Metaxas's formulation was going much further than Venizelos's had even if it is assumed that the Cretan politician had acknowledged that international circumstances had changed fundamentally. This orientation reflected clearly the fact that Britain, as the primary power in the Mediterranean, was more important for Athens than Greece's Balkan neighbours.