Is “coward” our most devastating term of abuse? Yes, says Chris Walsh, in this urbane and perceptive study. The term's power is precisely what motivates Walsh to object to simplistic and misguided uses of it. In interrogating cowardice, Walsh is a measured analyst, intelligently surveying diverse philosophical, medical, military, and therapeutic accounts. Focusing mostly on American history and political thought, Walsh's study conveys a powerful sense of the many-sidedness and instability of “cowardice” as a term of disapproval. In this respect, as in others, Cowardice follows the pattern of William Ian Miller's The Mystery of Courage (Harvard University Press, 2002), an equally lively account of courage and its numerous puzzles and obscurities. Walsh is better at describing cowardice than rigorously analyzing its core, but his book will not fail to provoke important questions about this central ethical idea.
Walsh persuasively advocates for those condemned by narrow-minded accusations of cowardice. Intriguingly, the words “cowardice” and “coward” appear in print (specifically in the Google books “corpus”) much less frequently now than in 1800. Walsh applauds this trend: “Good riddance, one might say. Cowardice is not the worst thing; reflexive contempt for it is. Too often, conduct is wrongly judged cowardly when it is really prudent or even courageous” (9). In subsequent analyses, Walsh subverts the familiar rhetorical use of cowardice either to motivate or to shame, by laying bare the hawkish, often punitive sensibilities of those enthralled by fantasies of unfettered agency and exalted machismo. From the American War of Independence to the Civil War to the Cold War and beyond, Walsh carefully documents the mischief wrought by the stigma of cowardice. He explains why we should question cowardice and strive to gain distance on our instinctive shame over the prospect of cowardice.
Yet Walsh's literary and historical nuance occasionally lead him to skim over philosophically significant questions. He assumes, for example, that cowardice and its associated behaviors and emotions are human constants, rather than historically variable traits. It is worth exploring, though, whether courage and cowardice are general attributes of human nature or, instead, dispositions specific to diverse political regimes and contingent upon geographically and chronologically disparate cultures. Did the United States make a special contribution to the understanding and practice of cowardice? Is there a distinctively American or democratic or liberal version of cowardice? While treating his readers to impressive erudition, Walsh fails to gain adequate traction on the complexities of his topic.
Even so, readers will learn much from Walsh's keen eye for detail, not to mention his probing reinterpretations of celebrated cases. Eddie Slovik, a private in World War II, was executed for desertion—the only American soldier to receive this punishment since the nineteenth century, a notable contrast with the many thousands of presumed cowards executed by Stalin and Hitler. Walsh examines Slovik's pitiable handwritten confession, along with the cinematic retellings of his story, with subtlety and compassion, wondering aloud how Vietnam-era Americans, the audience for the film The Execution of Private Slovik, dealt with the conflicts of military pride, questionably motivated wars, and evasions of duty (126).
It would be unfair to call Walsh an exponent of cowardice. Is anyone? Yes: liberal thinkers have often excused or even embraced cowardice. Samuel Johnson held that cowardice helps to keep the peace (cf. 173). Walsh rejects Johnson's provocation. While he does, like Hobbes, show sympathy for battlefield deserters, he differs from the Monster of Malmesbury in assertively criticizing moral cowardice, the “cowardice of silence” (177), the cowardice of those who refuse to fight injustice: “The worst moral cowardice may not be failing out of fear but instead not attempting anything at all” (175). As an example, Walsh cites Henry James's character John Marcher, who wastes his life waiting for a vague, but spectacularly compelling, event to occur, that is, the eponymous “beast in the jungle.” As Walsh shows, Marcher's status as a “spectator of his own life” (183) is not alien to us, but rather disturbingly familiar: he exemplifies the self-estrangement of those who, like Dante's cowardly “neutrals,” cannot take a firm stand or live their lives with commitment from within. Walsh's wide-ranging treatment demonstrates that an understanding of cowardice, in this sense, can inspire us to unmask the rhyzomatic pervasiveness of fear that often underlies our selfishness, xenophobia, and despair.
In the end, Walsh may go too far in endorsing the “existentialist view” that courage is the “ultimate virtue, and cowardice the ultimate vice” (189). This idea gives rise to two related challenges. First, insofar as it is based on fear, cowardice is a vice of weakness, rather than strength, as opposed to pride, injustice, and bullying, which are the characteristic vices of the powerful. Even if they are both equally vicious, the powerful, with their sins of strength, are more culpable than the weak, who are overcome by fear, lust, despair, and so on. Second, Walsh does not adequately explore whether courage and cowardice are (as John F. Kennedy thought) the most important virtues and vices or rather (as Plato and Aristotle taught) fourth among the virtues and vices. This limitation results from the book's focus on sizing up the questions and challenges raised by cowardice. Central philosophical issues are treated only superficially as readers are hustled on to the next anecdote or film clip.
Despite that reservation, Cowardice is an insightful book, one that ably complements political theorists' renewed interest in virtue and vice as useful explanatory categories.
