In his first book, S. N. Jaffe undertakes an ambitious and detailed study of book 1 of Thucydides's War of the Athenians and the Peloponnesians, focusing on the reasons for the outbreak of the conflict between Athens and Sparta and their respective allies. The author thus proposes a thorough analysis of what he calls the political psychologies of Athens and Sparta, reconstructing step by step the arguments, strategies, and discourses that the characters put forth in Thucydides's narrative.
Among the strongest points of the interpretation is the fact that the author reads Thucydides's History in its own light without any reference to sources not warranted by Thucydides himself. In a somewhat Straussian manner, he offers an internal reading of the text based on the premise that one should take Thucydides's intention seriously. This means accepting that his narrative is based on a conception of human nature, that the reconstitution and order of the speeches are deliberate, and that his depiction of the psychological traits of Athens and Sparta are at the root of the war's outbreak.
The first chapter begins with an analysis of the immediate causes of the war or the “manifest quarrel” between the Corcyreans and the Corinthians over Epidamnus and Potidaea. Looking at how both sides present their cases before the Athenian assembly, Jaffe demonstrates that the fundamental motives that incite to war—fear, honor, profit—are already at play in the very beginning of the narrative. Chapter 2 investigates the parallel debates unfolding on the Spartan side. The fundamental characteristics of Athens's and Sparta's political psychologies are presented as ideal types of “an acquisitive and a maintaining” power, respectively (67). Jaffe then turns in the latter half of the book to an analysis of the “truest” reasons for the war from the perspective of the Athenians and the Spartans. The book is structured so as to unravel the complex reasons and justifications that led to this conflict of an unprecedented scale, from the immediate impulses such as the desire for security to the fundamental motives inherent in cities and human beings, such as assigning blame for injustice and pursuing eternal glory. In particular, the theme of necessity or compulsion—and the justification actors provide for “necessary” decisions—runs throughout the book.
The core arguments of the book call for three critical remarks: first, on the author's analysis of the interplay between necessity and contingency in the History; second, on the author's reserved speech and normative intent; and finally, on the meaning of Jaffe's interpretive decision to focus on the beginning of the war rather than its unfolding.
First, Thucydidean necessity, the author insists, is psychological rather than causal: it is a nondeterministic view of compulsion. The argument goes as follows. In response to injustice, a city is compelled to pursue what seems to be the just cause, which “becomes a vision of the good in a quasi-Aristotelian sense” (6). Compulsion stands in relation to political beliefs about justice and blame: there are things a city ought to do in pursuit of what it considers to be most desirable. “In the simplest terms, the Peloponnesian War became necessary when the actors themselves saw no alternative to it” (201). One wonders what is left of actual compulsion if it only amounts to what the characters believe to be necessary. Did Alcibiades really think the war was necessary, or was this merely rhetoric on his part? The author does not clearly distinguish between actual necessity—what cannot be otherwise—and the appearance of necessity—what the actors present as the only possible decision or outcome in order to foster their own plans. The role of fortune in political life appears to be secondary to compulsion in his narrative. But good or bad luck is often one of the main factors in the unfolding of historical events. Thucydidean necessity is always combined with this other “principle,” according to which there is an irremediable gap between the actors’ intentions and the outcome of their decisions. If Thucydides has a political philosophy, it lies precisely in the idea that ignoring the power of fortune or expressing excessive confidence in one's capacity to overcome it leads to a distorted judgment and thus to political error. Conversely, awareness of contingency induces moderation.
The second critical remark concerns the author's intention. Jaffe draws on an impressive amount of secondary literature, discussed in depth in the text and the footnotes, so much so that the book may appeal more to specialists of Thucydides than to a broader audience. The analysis as such is almost faultless; the subtlety of his interpretation does justice to the complexity and ambiguity of the narrative. The author's way of writing mirrors Thucydides's reservation and gives room to the reader to come to her own conclusion. But while the notable absence of easy (and often misleading or inaccurate) parallels with present-day political issues is to be commended, the result is that it is more difficult for political theorists to assess the practical input of such a study. There is no doubt that Jaffe's book pursues a normative intention, but this intention is, in the words of Thucydides, the “least put forward.”
While Jaffe rightly seeks to understand what Thucydides meant before proceeding to evaluate his political theory, the reader is left wanting more normative flesh: Does the author agree with the Thucydidean vision of politics? To what extent does Thucydides's treatment of political affairs challenge the practice of political theory today? In the introduction, Jaffe warns the reader that “none of this should be taken to mean that Thucydides’ vision of political life is correct” (7). However, the book itself suggests that Thucydides's History still merits years of study; and the author's analysis relies on the idea that Thucydides expresses something fundamental about our political condition. It remains unclear whether Jaffe would endorse Hobbes's argument that political history instructs the reader more efficiently than does political philosophy. The author does not fully engage with the question of the status of political history and whether one can learn from the past, a question he can hardly avoid given the fact that Thucydides himself claims that his work is a possession for all times.
Finally, one is left wondering why the author made the decision to focus solely on the first book of the History. Apart from pragmatic considerations (the length of such a study), there is an important but implicit thesis here: that the beginning of the confrontation reveals something more than its unfolding. The “truest” reason for this book, the one that has been put forward, seems to be that the essential elements of wars lie in the beginnings of political events, in the preceding political psychology of political units.
We could even go so far as to argue that the ending of the war between the Athenians and the Peloponnesians does not matter much, not simply because Thucydides died before he could complete his account of the events, but because he does not attribute any retrospective broader meaning to what happened. In other terms, he does not have a philosophy of history: he does not think that this war would ultimately benefit the cause of humanity or would lead to greater moral progress. He believed in the perishability of all things human and in the fact that cities are bound to decay and disappear. The ending of the war is, as all endings are, without ultimate significance in the “grand scheme of things.” What counts is the beginning: this is where we can attempt to grapple with events as we manage to interpret history in the making. This is how, in my view, one could interpret Jaffe's analysis: as an effort to see in political beginnings their fundamental articulation.
Overall, Thucydides on the Outbreak of the War is an outstanding scholarly contribution that will be useful to specialists of classical thought as well as to political scientists who want to teach Thucydides in their classroom. Despite the reserved tone of the book, the conclusion highlights Jaffe's belief in the perennial character of the problems Thucydides raises. We still read the Greek historian today because he “brilliantly reanimates political reality itself” (210), with all its tensions, zones d'ombre, and contradictions. This is what, in the end, produces not simply a performance piece for the moment, but a lasting work of thought, and Jaffe's book confirms that achievement.
