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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 November 2004
This is a densely packed analysis of the development of the Israeli political-party system focusing on the period since 1965. Jonathan Mendilow, a professor of political science at Rider University in Trenton, New Jersey, previously wrote studies of British and French political thought. His familiarity with other political-party systems is evident throughout the book. Mendilow does not subscribe to the view that Israel is sui generis. He sets his analysis of the Israeli party system in the context of comparable developments in such other diverse cases as India and France, about which more will be said later in this review. Notably, he is thoroughly familiar with Israel and Israeli parties and political history and has produced an informative and insightful study.
Mendilow is particularly interested in understanding the formation of party groupings or alliances, a process that resulted in the formation of the center-right Gahal bloc and the center-left Labor Alignment in 1965. He distinguishes party clusters such as these from the formation of party blocs in the late 1970s and 1980s (Likud versus Labor). Finally, he examines the impact on the party system of the direct election of the prime minister, a reform initiated in 1996 and repealed in 2001. Throughout the analysis, attention is focused on models that seek to explain the phenomena under study. Mendilow finds two models of party change in the general literature on comparative politics, which he applies to Israel. The first is the “purposive action” model, in which change is driven by “calculated leadership decisions” (p. 12). The second is the “adaptive-organizational” or “social structure” model, in which the socio-economic environment is the root cause of changes in parties and party systems. These are not treated as mutually competitive but, rather, as complementary. Mendilow emphasizes that parties may lose votes because of changing environmental conditions, but they cannot adapt to the changed circumstances unless party leaders make appropriate and deliberate decisions. Thus, although the Herut Party, which became the dominant factor in the Gahal bloc and later in Likud, has been led by Ashkenazic (European-origin) leaders throughout its history (Begin, Shamir, Netanyahu, Sharon), it responded to the changing electorate by successfully appealing for the support first of voters of Asian African (Arab) origin, then those of Russian origin.
Mendilow sees the 1981 election as a turning point in the evolution of cluster party competition into “structural polarization.” The electoral competition was not only fierce but subject to wild swings. He reminds us that at the beginning of the campaign in January 1981, the Labor Alignment outpolled the governing Likud by 58 percent to 20 percent, only to barely hold its own (48–47%) in the formal election just four months later, largely a result of “election-economics” policies enacted by the government in an apparently successful effort to woo the electorate. Mendilow sees this election as inaugurating a more competitive bipolar party system, paradoxically one in which the two parties were so evenly matched that they had to choose after each election between the options of forming a narrow coalition of like-minded partners or forming a “national unity” government with their opponents.
Mendilow also sees this stiff competition between equally matched contenders as leading directly to the misconceived “reform” of direct election of the prime minister inaugurated in 1996. Although he tries to draw comparisons between this extraordinary system, which provided for separate election of prime minister and Parliament, and political systems adopted in such other countries as France and Germany, the fact is that the Israeli reform was unique. In Germany, a two-ballot system combines the single-member-district (or first-past-the-post) electoral system with the proportional representation system. But the German system does not involve a separate ballot for prime minister, or chancellor, and thus is not comparable to the Israeli concept. Fifth Republic France bears a superficially greater resemblance inasmuch as it provides for direct election of the president and a separate election for the Parliament. Unlike in Israel, however, the French president is not required to organize a governing coalition within the Parliament. He appoints the prime minister, who has that responsibility. The difference may appear to be slight, but it is important: the president in France stands above the partisan fray once he is elected and is not required to risk personal embarrassment by engaging in parliamentary horse trading. Moreover, if the prime ministerial candidate fails to organize a parliamentary majority, the president has greater opportunities to dissolve the Parliament and call for new elections. Both Mitterand and Chirac demonstrated the effectiveness of this power. However, if the president's party does not constitute a majority in the Parliament, he is required to enter into a co-habitational arrangement with the opposition. In Israel, the prime minister was constrained to work with the parliamentary distribution of seats as he found it, even if his own party had smaller representation than the opposition. Notably, even though this was the situation more than once between 1996 and 2001, no national-unity government was formed during that period.
The Israeli prime minister thus had less room to maneuver. Mendilow, who provides an inordinate amount of detail about the electoral campaigns of the 1990s, shows clearly how Israeli political leaders—instead of being empowered, as the authors of the reform expected—were badly hobbled. He shows how two successive office holders (Netanyahu and Barak) fell from positions of apparently unassailable power to ignominious defeat within the span of only a few years. Granted, Netanyahu barely eked out an electoral victory over Shimon Peres in 1996. But Barak won a clear majority over Netanyahu in 1999 and suffered a humiliating defeat barely two years later at the hands of the belligerent Ariel Sharon. In both cases, the Israeli–Palestinian conflict was a major factor. In 1996, the introduction of suicide bombing in Israel helped push the electorate into the arms of the more militant Likud candidate. In 2001, the failure of the Camp David peace process and the outbreak of the al-Aqsa Intifada helped seal Barak's electoral fate. At the same time, the two major parties suffered a devastating decline in parliamentary strength. Their combined representation, which had dominated the Parliament throughout most of the period of statehood, sank to well below 50 percent. The result was that the prime minister could boast of overwhelming mass electoral support but had great difficult cobbling together a working parliamentary coalition. This is as true of Ariel Sharon today as it was of his two predecessors. Small wonder that the direct election of the prime minister was quietly relegated to the dust bin of history in the wake of the 2001 election. It is too early to determine the effect that this reversal will have on the party system.
Mendilow has produced an interesting study of the Israeli party system. It should be of interest not only to students of Israeli and Middle East politics but also to students of comparative politics on a broader front. If there is a flaw in this volume, it is due mainly to what appears to be careless editing, resulting in a number of spelling errors, awkward word choices, and clumsy phrases.