The trinitarian theology of Gregory of Nazianzus is an important topic in patristic studies which is too often ignored by modern scholars. The aim of Beeley's book (like that of John McGuckinFootnote ²) is to deepen the study of this theologian who became very important for the later Orthodox tradition. Beeley wants to view Gregory not simply as one of the three Cappadocians or to make a short systematisation of the Theological Orations (or. 27–31), but rather to see his theology as a whole in its historical context. This makes the work an important contribution to historical studies in patristics, and I have learnt much from reading this book. The following remarks, even when critical, are intended to raise new topics for discussion, though controversial in some aspects.Footnote ³

Details

Even if the book is a revised version of the author's Yale dissertation, a second edition of the book should improve some details, especially in the use of primary source editions and a fuller bibliographic account of secondary literature. For Gregory of Nazianzus, the new edition of Tuilier/Bady of the personal poems (2.1.1–11) is missing.Footnote ⁴ For other authors one could note: Albinus (it should be the new edition of Alcinoos by Whitaker);Footnote ⁵ Aristotle (of course this should be the Bekker edition or the Oxford texts, not Loeb library – this applies also to Plato); Athanasius (the new editions should be used for the Orations Against the Arians, The Letter to the Bishops of Egypt and Libya, the Letter to Jovian and the Tomus to the Antiochenes Footnote ⁶); Basil (the right edition of ep. 38 by Forlin Patrucco is missing as well as the Naldini edition of Address to Young Men Footnote ⁷); Gregory of Nyssa (the sermon On the divinity of the Son and the Holy Spirit or On Abraham, and On Holy Pentecost – instead of the old title: On the Holy Spirit, or on Pentecost – but also the Life of Moses Footnote ⁸); Ignatius of Antioch;Footnote ⁹ Plotinus (the edition of Henry/Schwyzer from 1977–82Footnote ¹⁰); Socrates (there is a new edition in GCSFootnote ¹¹). Other sources which I expected are completely missing. There is no Porphyry, no Iamblichus and no Numenius. Does this mean that these authors can be neglected for the trinitarian thought of Gregory of Nazianzus? For the ecclesiastical figures, I would like to see mentioned: Cyril of Jerusalem, Eustathius of Antioch or Marcell (the new discussion about the order and the content of fragments is missingFootnote ¹²).

Regarding the secondary literature, I appreciate that Beeley uses French, German and Italian literature. But, of course, I have to wonder about a footnote like p. 271, n. 1, according to which ‘a surprising number of major patristic figures still lack comprehensive doctrinal studies’ – and the footnote adds: this is the case for ‘Origen, Athanasius (whose critical edition is finally under way again), Didymus the Blind, Epiphanius, Gregory of Nyssa, and to a lesser extent Basil of Caesarea’. This is surprising because, for example, important monographs about Athanasius, by Annick Martin and Xavier Morales, Uta Heil and Annette von Stockhausen, are missing, as is the study by Oliver Kösters about Epiphanius.Footnote ¹³ For Gregory of Nyssa I would like to mention the Lexicon Gregorianum, the works of Lilla, Ludlow and Enrico Peroli, and finally the Acts of the Gregory of Nyssa-Colloquia, although these are not monographs.Footnote ¹⁴ For Basil, the monographs of Koschorke, Girardi, Pouchet and Gain are missing as is the modern discussion about the creed of Nicaea 381 and even my own monograph about Basil's trinitarian thought (but of course an author always thinks his own books are the most important ones that should be quoted, so let's forget this).Footnote ¹⁵ The point here is not that sometimes articles or even important monographs are neglected by an author, but that before it is stated that specialised monographs do not exist at all, bibliographical research should be done and important monographs should be mentioned.

In the Introduction (pp. 4–62), I found it convincing that the theologians such as Eunomius and Aetius should be named Heteroousians and not Anomoians (p. 21, n. 58) – this is one of the important advances which I learnt from the book, and I will integrate this proposal into my own language. The argument, that they themselves are speaking about the difference of the οὐσία, but not of its dissimilarity, is striking. But of course, neither Acacius of Caesarea nor Eudoxius of Constantinople are simply heteroousians, but the leading Homean and official bishops, even if they partially defended Aetius against the Homoiusians (pace Beeley, p. 21Footnote ¹⁶). And, of course, the assumption that there has been a debate between Basil of Caesarea and Aetius (p. 23) is based upon weak arguments (Philostorgius is not very trustworthy on this point).Footnote ¹⁷ The concept of ἀγɛννησία, however, is misleading, too. At least, Eunomius does not speak of ἀγɛννησία in his Apology or the certain fragments of his Apology of Apology (of course, we could assume that Gregory is using this term because Eunomius did in his response to Basil, but this remains uncertain).Footnote ¹⁸ The abstract noun ἀγɛννησία is not identical with οὐσία ἀγέννητος. The aim of Eunomius is that ἀγέννητος cannot be regarded as an accidental or mutable predicate of God, but must belong to his οὐσία (but of course, he is not declaring that God-Father exists simply as ἀγɛννησία).

I am not convinced that MeletiusFootnote ¹⁹ should be classified as homoiousian. This does not fit the oration of Meletius, preserved in Epiphanius, Panarion 73 (that is not ‘homoiousian’ pace Beeley, p. 27Footnote ²⁰). But Meletius is the most famous example of the point stressed by Brennecke that some members of the Homean party shifted to the Meletian camp after the reign of Julian.Footnote ²¹

In Beeley's view, the pneumatomachians appear only in 372 in Asia Minor according to or. 11.6 (p. 29, n. 88), but this is not very convincing, because 372/373 is the year of the conflict between Eustathius of Sebaste and Basil. This makes it implausible to include even Basil here as a fighter against the Spirit (p. 15). Beeley is certainly right in affirming that Gregory's remarks on the so-called ‘economy’ of Basil about the divinity of the Spirit are severely critical, but in 372/373 Gregory had no reason to go so far as to declare Basil a ‘Spirit-fighter’. Basil was fighting in Against Eunomius 3 not only against Eunomius, but also against pneumatomachian arguments, because it is clear that the arguments, quoted in Against Eunomius 3.6 (SC 305; p. 166, ll. 2–4) and 3.7 (SC 305; p. 170, ll. 1–4), do not derive from the Apology of Eunomius (witnessed by its own manuscript tradition). The arguments are, however, very close to those which Athanasius refuted in his Letters to Serapion; so a knowledge of pnematomachian arguments must be presupposed. The dating of Basil's Against Eunomius 3 to 363/364 is very questionable (I would prefer the time after 365Footnote ²²), and I would maintain my argument that Basil's pneumatology in this book is homoiousian (pace Beeley, p. 29). But even if the details of this analysis are not accepted, the fact remains that the pneumatomachians in Asia Minor are not a surprise occurrence of the year 372, but are already present there in the 360s. In my view, the break between Basil and Eustathius is quite important for the development of the years 372/373, and the aim of Basil's On the Holy Spirit cannot be sketched so as ‘to signal his break with Eustathius’ (pp. 29–30).Footnote ²³ Finally, a statement when and by whom the distinction between οὐσία and ὑπόστασις was developed is missing (in my view, Basil was responsible for this, developing it in 373Footnote ²⁴), and though the Tomus of 381 is lost, the report of Theodoret (Historia Ecclesiastica 5.9, cf. p. 53, n. 184) reports that only a couple of months later this distinction was accepted as the decision of the Council of 381.

Hagiographical elements

Beeley is not speaking of Gregory the saint. This would not be appropriate for a historical approach, because the estimation of Gregory as a saint is mainly the perspective of a later time. And of course, I can understand that Beeley, reading the works of Gregory, was deeply impressed, so Gregory became his hero. But Beeley does more than that. In his estimation, Gregory is the greatest Christian figure to write in Greek (perhaps Origen excepted). This is very close to hagiographical tendencies, perhaps hagiographical in itself.

This tendency can be observed sometimes in short remarks. Gregory appears as the greatest spiritual theologian since Origen (cf. p. 273: ‘Gregory produced the most penetrating synthesis of Christian theology and spirituality since Origen’), and even better in his pneumatology than the Council of 381 (cf. p. 155). This tendency begins from the first sentence of the preface – ‘This book is a study of the greatest theologian of the Christian fourth century’ – and remains strong until the conclusion, which is a five-page characterisation of Gregory which sums up all the positive evaluations. Beeley therefore is dealing both with ‘the most powerful and comprehensive Trinitarian doctrine of his generation’, and with the figure ‘second only to Origen’. Beeley presents in his book a ‘remarkably original theologian’, who ‘perfected the fully Trinitarian and unitive Christological impulses of Eastern theological tradition’ and who was a ‘magisterial pastor’ – just to mention some positive expressions of the first of these five pages (p. 319).

The real problem of this canonisation of Gregory consists in the fact that Beeley does not hesitate to add comparisons with other theologians. Thus Basil and Gregory of Nyssa seem to be inconsistent and defective theologians compared with Gregory of Nazianzus. Beeley does not hesitate to justify the positive assessment of Gregory in the later Byzantine tradition. ‘As the fathers of Chalcedon, the early Byzantines, and many others have recognised, Gregory is one who consistently understands the meaning of all of existence in terms of the brilliant Light of the eternal Trinity, and who most adeptly articulates the orthodox faith’ (p. 323). This is not a historical result, but a personal high estimation. It could be interesting to raise the question why this is important for Beeley. Perhaps he just wants to give a new picture, stressing the importance, but even the impressive impact of Gregory? Perhaps he is even following a tendency in modern patristic scholarship according to which the great figures of the Orthodox tradition can only be understood properly by an Orthodox point of view? Both points break with an important presupposition of critical historical research, namely the sharp distinction between description, historical arguments and contextualisation on the one side, and evaluation, personal reflection and estimation on the other side. Of course, the latter is possible and can be given, but it should be well distinguished from the historical approach, marked not as a result of historical research, but as additional personal estimation or further reflection. Even the fact that a scholar is never uninfluenced by his sympathy or antipathy to the subject he deals with does not change the principal aim of this methodology. Beeley's book is, of course, not hagiographical as a whole, nor can it be said that his historical results are just dependent on his personal high estimation, but there is a tendency in the style of the book which links the impact of Gregory (which can be described in a nearly hagiographical manner) with the attention the reader is led to pay to the results of Beeley himself.

The context of Gregory's thought as sketched by Beeley

Beeley's book offers a voluminous chapter named ‘Conclusion’ which does not offer an extensive summary of the chapters given before, but rather places Gregory ‘among the Fathers’ (p. 271), starting with Origen. In the view of Beeley, Gregory is the second major figure after Origen. He sees in Origen and Gregory a ‘combination of dogmatic accuracy and spiritual power’ (p. 273). Beeley puts forward this ideal which becomes a kind of standard for him. But if we want to know which texts of Origen are crucial for this combination, we look for them in vain (pp. 271–3). We are simply left to agree with the affirmation that Origen had a theory about ‘the positive divine illumination revealed through Christ’ (p. 272) – even without detailed references. Of course, this is not totally wrong, but this may be true for Basil, Athanasius and many other theologians as well. This point, therefore, is not specific enough to establish a special closeness of Gregory to Origen. Only a detailed comparison of texts could help here. The idea of taking into account the texts of the Philocalia is a good one; but a detailed analysis of where Gregory takes specific thoughts of Origen is missing in Beeley's book. The comparison is based merely upon a general characterisation of Origen which we may believe (or not).

On the other side, for Gregory Thaumaturgos, we find a short report about central issues of the writing To Theopompus (pp. 275–6), and the result is that Gregory received the ‘unitive’ aspect of his christology from Gregory Thaumaturgos (p. 276). But again, the reader is left to make the comparisons himself. Additionally Beeley remarks that ‘it was the Apollinarians who first adopted Gregory Thaumaturgus as a patron’ (p. 277, n. 32). I would like to know by what evidence Beeley comes to this idea.Footnote ²⁵ Since Gregory Thaumaturgus is one of the major figures of the Origenistic tradition in Basil's On the Holy Spirit,Footnote ²⁶ which must be dated before 375, we need a datable witness for an Apollinaristic reception of Gregory Thaumaturgus before 375. I doubt there is one.

Let's come to Athanasius. Beeley does not simply state ‘there is or. 21, Gregory's eulogy for Athanasius, therefore we have to assume a strong dependence’, but on the contrary, he doubts any influence of Athanasius and affirms that Gregory probably knew only the Letter to Jovian and the Life of Antony. Perhaps the sceptical approach of Beeley is right here. This leads to a more general question, namely what impact Athanasius had on the trinitarian debate. Detecting a direct dependence, perhaps verbal quotations from Athanasius is one thing – and I think Beeley is right here, that we have no direct witness for such a verbal or direct use of Athanasius’ works. But being close to a certain profile of trinitarian thought, a kind of indirect influence or a link to a specific tradition are something different. In my judgement, it seems implausible to sketch a picture of the fourth century in which there are two, independent redetections of the ὁμοούσιος in the late 350s and early 360s, one local in Alexandria and Egypt, influenced by Athanasius, another in Asia Minor and Antiochia, which is at the most independent from Athanasius and initiated by an unknown figure. Already the synods from Ancyra, Seleukia-Rimini, Constantinople, and above all the synod of Alexandria 362 deal with the ontological terms, thus they also struggle with the impact of the Nicene creed and the term ὁμοούσιος. Of course, it is right that we should not concentrate exclusively upon the ontological terms (e.g. for describing Nicene theology), but it is clear that there is in fact a broad discussion about the possibility of using the ὁμοούσιος and the arguments against it (namely that this is not a biblical term). In my opinion, it was clear even to Gregory of Nazianzus that Athanasius is responsible for having introduced the ὁμοούσιος again into the theological discussion. Thus, even if he does not quote Athanasius’ On the decrees of the Nicene synod or On the opinion of Dionysius, it may be clear to Gregory of Nazianzus what the principal position of Athanasius was. In this sense, the Tomus to the Antiochenes, however, should perhaps not be excluded from the texts or traditions known to Gregory. Gregory did surely know that Basil accepted the strategy of the Tomus to the Antiochenes in his Letter 125 during his conference with Eustathius of Sebaste. That Gregory of Nazianzus simply by chance developed a quite similar strategy, ‘due to motivations independent of Athanasius and the Alexandrian meeting’ (p. 281), is unconvincing. The argumentum e silentio that the heresiological tendencies of On the synods or On the decrees of the Nicene synod cannot be found in Gregory's works should not lead us to the assumption that these works were unknown to Gregory (of course an argumentum e silentio cannot prove that), nor that Athanasius’ position in the trinitarian debate was insignificant for the Cappadocians (so that we should establish a new, ‘autochthon’ Nicene movement in Asia Minor which is independent from Athanasius). The few hints we have for the positions of Apolinarius, Marcellus, Paulinus and very few other people are no convincing witnesses for such an independence (on the contrary, all these people seem to have a link to Athanasius). This fits even Basil of Caesarea. Of course he discussed the meaning of the ὁμοούσιος (ep. 361 and ep. 9), he knew the argument that this is not a biblical term, and he knew the discussion about the struggle between the two Dionysiuses (ep. 9). Furthermore, the Nicene position of Apolinarius which can be seen in the letters 362 and 364 (and I judge them to be authentic) is close to Athanasius’ position, and the knowledge about Dionysius of Alexandria is an indirect echo of the discussion raised by On the opinion of Dionysius (this is especially true, if the passage containing the ὁμοούσιος is an Athanasian insertion as Heil arguedFootnote ²⁷). For Basil's Against Eunomius, I had the impression that there is some knowledge of the Orations against the Arians and perhaps even the Letters to Serapion, though no literary dependence.Footnote ²⁸ And Basil and Athanasius exchanged some letters which show that there was – in spite of the struggle concerning the see of Antiochia – a certain contact between them.Footnote ²⁹ Therefore, in my view, if Gregory of Nazianzus stresses the impact of Athanasius for the reconciliation of the Western and Eastern position (and ontological terminology), this is no proof against a knowledge of the Tomus to the Antiochenes, but a witness for the high estimation of Athanasius as an important bridge between Latin and Greek theology.Footnote ³⁰

I skip Didymus (because of the many uncertainties of the authenticity and date of his works), and come to Apolinarius.Footnote ³¹ Beeley struggles here with a ‘textbook view’,Footnote ³² according to which Gregory's christology is deeply shaped by his anti-Apolinaristic letters. And of course, I would agree that Apolinarius is one of the important theological figures who influenced Gregory as well. But I think this is hard to establish in detail. There is, first of all, the problem of chronology. We have no idea, when Apolinarius started to put forward his specific christology. The chronology is very uncertain here. We have the condemnation of Rome 377, and we have the debate about Basil's contact with Apolinarius 375, that is only possible if Apolinarius was already widely accepted as a heretic at this time. But we have no idea what exactly Apolinarius wrote in these years.Footnote ³³ Only with the Antirrheticus of Gregory of Nyssa do we have, and perhaps only for the time after 381, his authentic words, though not the whole work nor even the detailed structure of it (the extent of the fragments preserved by Gregory and their order is uncertain). This makes it difficult to establish a strong positive influence on Gregory's thought.

Let's have a look at the points highlighted by Beeley: Gregory has a three-part anthropology (p. 289; this, of course, is not precise for Apolinarius, because for him the mind is simply the reigning part in the human being, linked to the unity of soul and fleshFootnote ³⁴), he has ‘a robust sense of the monarchy of the Father’ (p. 291; I am not convinced by this because monarchy is the principle of all other directions and an important impulse of subordination; only if monarchy is understood as reason for integrating the Son directly in the divinity of the Father (without any image or cause relation), is this distinctive, but I wonder if Apolinarius could be regarded as ‘monarchist’ in this sense), he declares that the three persons are one in essence, and the Holy Spirit is homoousion (p. 291; are these points in which Gregory is really dependent on Apolinarius?); the divinity of the Holy Spirit is discussed ‘from the standpoint of the sanctification of believers in baptism’ (p. 291; however, this fits not only Basil, but even the Origenistic tradition as can be found, for example, in the Second Creed of Antioch). In my view, it is not convincing to name Apolinarius as ‘a sort of incomplete Gregorian’ (p. 291). It is elucidating to turn around the normal relation, but of course, this does not fit the historical development. Gregory seems to be the standard here; and Apolinarius is judged to be deficient in comparison with him. But even if only the strong dependence is stressed, I remain doubtful. Neither the difficult theory of human pre-existence (fragm. 32 Lietzmann), nor the specific point for integrating the mind in the soul (cf. fragm. 26–31 Lietzmann), nor special points of the exegesis of Apolinarius (cf. e.g. fragm. 17.25.72 Lietzmann) could be mentioned for establishing such close links between Apolinarius and Gregory. In the case of Basil we have the correspondence with Apolinarius (if authentic, as I think), so we can, by comparison especially with letter 9 to Maximus, point to a specific point where Basil was supported by Apolinarius – a point which has nothing to do with the christological debate or the specific Apolinaristic points he was condemned for. But for Gregory we can hardly point to specific points of dependence. I would like to emphasise that the difficult problem here is not one of heresiology. Rather, the detailed textual evidence and the problems of chronology have led me to this scepticism.

Basil: When I read the short footnote on p. 10 (n. 28): ‘the view that Basil is the major source for Gregory's work . . . must be thoroughly reconsidered’, I had the impression that Beeley also prefers a reversal here, so that Gregory is a source of Basil. This promises interesting, though difficult questions (and we could start with the problems of chronology again). Aside from some similarities between both thinkers which could stem from the common work on the Philocalia, Beeley stresses the differences, without any further arguments for a dependence of Basil on Gregory. Theology and economy, unity of Christ, the Spirit's full presence in creation and divinisation and the monarchy within the Trinity – these are the four points where Beeley finds Basil's theology incomplete or defective by comparison to Gregory's.

I do not think that Against Eunomius 2.3Footnote ³⁵ (pp. 295–6) is a good witness for establishing a principal distinction between θɛολογία and οἰκονομία in Basil's thought, because οἰκονομία means here simply the incarnation (not the whole of the economic activities done by the Logos as creation, redemption, judgement, etc. or those of the Trinity), so Acts 2:36 has to be referred not to the Logos as divine (and his generation), but to the incarnate. I cannot agree with the conclusion that Basil ‘lacks the fundamental sense of the unity of Christ’ (p. 296) (and there is no textual evidence or detailed argument in Beeley's notes on this point). That Gregory does not hesitate to call the Spirit ὁμοούσιον, while Basil did not, is known, and I would agree that the Origenistic-Eusebian tradition is responsible for the prudence of Basil;Footnote ³⁶ and yes, Basil was struggling with the idea that the Holy Spirit must be regarded as present even in the work of the creation.Footnote ³⁷ But I cannot understand why we should assume that Basil describes the work of sanctification ‘mainly in terms of the ethical perfection of Christians’ (p. 299). On the Holy Spirit, chapters 9, 15 and 18 are clearly speaking of more than ethics (cf. ch. 9: the goal is a kind of a view of the first beauty for becoming light; ch. 15: becoming similar to Christ and getting back into paradise; ch. 18: the way back from the Holy Spirit through the Son to the Father as θɛογνωσία). And I would even disagree with accepting Hübner's classification of Basil's concept of οὐσία as Stoic (cf. p. 302).Footnote ³⁸ Furthermore, saying that Gregory avoids ‘the trap of substituting an alternative metaphysic for the biblical doctrine of the Trinity’ (as opposed to Basil) is quite hazardous, because (a) the use of hypostasis in Basil is absolutely not technical, but differs often and develops gradually in his theology, (b) the principal aim of Basil's ontology is to explain the impact of the biblical names, both in Against Eunomius and in On the Holy Spirit. Footnote ³⁹ The development of Basil's thought is neglected in general, but the historical context of On the Holy Spirit should be kept in mind as well as that of Against Eunomius. The work of Basil is much broader than the analysis by Beeley shows.

For Gregory of Nyssa, Beeley concentrates upon the Opera minora dogmatica and Basil, Letter 38.Footnote ⁴⁰ Regarding the christology, I would add the end of the small piece To Theophilus (containing an early form of communicatio idiomatum). Regarding his trinitarian thought, I would prefer to take into account also Against Eunomius, and especially Gregory of Nyssa's thought of the infinite character of GodFootnote ⁴¹ – this could be an interesting point because Beeley is stressing the infinite character of God for Gregory of Nazianzus, too. I think that we should compare Letter 38 with the thinking of Basil – and I do not know what the exact argument is for Beeley's assumption that, according to Gregory of Nyssa, οὐσία is ‘more real’ (what is this in Greek?) (p. 308) than the ὑπόστασις. The mysticism of the Life of Moses is only mentioned shortly, but I doubt it is sufficient to call Gregory of Nyssa's way here ‘more apophatic than Basil[’s]’ (p. 308) – perhaps we should also take into account his Commentary on the Song of Songs. Footnote ⁴²

The following chapter about the Homoiousians concludes that ‘it can no longer simply be assumed that the Athanasian paradigm is the only viable standard for determining Trinitarian orthodoxy’. No longer? Is there a historical view of the fourth century of the last, say, forty years that does exactly this? Thirty-five years ago, Simonetti's Crisi ariana was published, and Harnack and Holl had already started from a different point of view.Footnote ⁴³ Of course, Athanasius is the exception, the disturbing factor. And the Origenistic tradition, as it can be found in Eusebius, is very dominant in the Eastern theology of the fourth century (even if we can only assume this on the basis of the creeds of Antioch and the development of the Homoiousians and the Homeans). This is not a new challenge, but only the confirmation of common currency. Of course, Eusebius himself was underestimated as a theologian for a long time and regarded just as an opportunist of Constantine's policy, but works such as the monograph of Strutwolf have shifted this considerably.Footnote ⁴⁴ We should keep in mind that even Athanasius was developing quite a bit. In his Orations against the Arians he used the word ὁμοούσιος only once, but preferred other expressions like οἰκɛῖος, ὅμοιος, ἴδιος etc., and even the term τριὰς ὁμοούσιος is not regularly used by Athanasius. So, taking into account the full scale of Athanasius’ theology could be as helpful as examining the influence of the Homoiousian tradition on Basil and Gregory of Nazianzus.

We should analyse in detail the individual approaches of each theologian along with his particular intentions. In my view these intentions are, in the cases of Athanasius, the Homeans, Basil and Gregory of Nazianzus, a better understanding of the biblical witnesses. Therefore, trinitarian thought cannot be understood as the ‘confession of the full divinity of the Son and the Holy Spirit and the unity and shared Divinity’ (p. 10, n. 27). This definition offers a wide range of problems: the meaning of ‘full’ in ‘full divinity’ is not clear. Any kind of subordinationism was driven by its aim to maintain the full divinity and not destroy it through a kind of partition or ontological generation or emanation; this was one of the starting points even in Arius himself which links nearly all theologians of the fourth century. But the solution of how full divinity should be expressed according to the witnesses in the scripture is the subject of the debate. And of course, ‘the unity and shared Divinity’ is a dangerous expression. I do not know if any theologian of the fourth century could have spoken of a ‘shared divinity’; unity, however, is not very helpful, because the kind of unity is already a subject of the debate. Therefore, in my opinion, ‘trinitarian’ is not a sufficient name for the theological profile of Gregory's thought.

Inspiring stimuli which arise from Beeley's representation

Beeley's book offers many interesting and inspiring points and perspectives, as well as questions and solutions. I would like to pick up the following three:

1. a) In a small remark in the conclusion, Beeley says that Gregory of Nazianzus is more apophatic than Basil (cf. p. 303). In my view of Basil, the apophatic tradition is indeed limited to the οὐσία of all things; not to predicates, qualities, actions etc. So this is not an exclusive thing in the case of God, but a general assumption, and it is restricted to the οὐσία itself – the normal apophatic tradition is wider here. And yes, after reading Gregory of Nazianzus again from this point of view, I fully agree: Gregory of Nazianzus has a wider apophaticism in his theology not only restricted to the substance. But, of course, Gregory is not always very clear on this point, sometimes he seems to have a similar distinction, for example, in the excursus about the divine names in or. 30.17–19, where Gregory distinguishes (1) the biblical names, given for the οὐσία, being God and (2) the other names, namely (a) the names of the ἐξουσία and (b) the names of the οἰκονομία (and here we have (i) the names for the economic activities ὑπὲρ τὸ σῶμα and (ii) the names for the actions as incarnate).Footnote ⁴⁵

2. b) Beeley stresses the idea of monarchy. I would doubt that this is a specific point which distinguishes Gregory of Nazianzus from other theologians of the fourth century. The concept of μοναρχία, as Hippolytus tells us,Footnote ⁴⁶ is not very important here. All Greek theologians start from the monarchy, even Marcellus. And except Marcellus, all Greek theologians understand ὁ θɛός as God-Father, starting from him for their explanation of the Trinity. That God begets the Son and (thereby) causes him is stressed by such different theologians as Arius or Epiphanius. But I think one point in Beeley's chapter about the monarchy should be kept in mind. We cannot avoid a certain degree of subordinationism in trinitarian thought. That the relationship between Father and Son is an unchangeable order, a τάξις, is clear to Gregory. And I would add: Basil in Against Eunomius,Footnote ⁴⁷ also explains John 14:28 as meaning that the Son is caused by the Father. But this subordinationism does not imply that the Son is inferior in his substance, because the causing of the Son includes the idea that the Father gives his whole substance to the Son. On this point, I think, Beeley is right. The innovation in this point is considerable: being caused implies being greater in some sense – but this is not the case for the substance, the will or the dignity.

3. c) Beeley stresses the impact of the word for Gregory's understanding of pastoral ministry (pp. 259–70). I have learnt this from Beeley, and I am convinced by it. For Gregory the words are the most important thing that can lead human beings to Christ. That is why he carefully deals with Orations and Poems. This is important for our understanding of the theology of the fourth century: theologians like Gregory try to be good exegetes, because the preaching of the word is crucial for pastoral ministry and the church.

Aside from these three points, that may be inspiring stimuli for one's own theological reflection about trinitarian thought, I was even disturbed by several points of Gregory's theology as presented by Beeley. The most important of them is the idea of purification. Of course I would take into consideration that Basil tried to use Plotinus for his pneumatology, and even directly integrated the idea of κάθαρσις in On the Holy Spirit, ch. 9. But I am troubled by this, too. In my view, a theology based upon the idea of purification is quite a risky thing. Two things could happen: (a) a synergistic tendency: human behaviour is the condition of grace and spiritual perfection, (b) a moralistic tendency: inserting one's own estimation of what is ‘moral’/’amoral’ etc. into the idea of what is pure. Both things destroy the centre of the Christian faith. Only a description of purification as an effect of the Holy Spirit directly upon the decisions of the believer and his mind and heart could be helpful here. Of course, this is no historical observation, but only my opinion. But these points make clear why I would prefer to view Basil and Gregory not simply as authoritative figures for our theology or churches today (even if many aspects of their thought could be helpful for our theological thinking).

Finally, I was struck by the fact that Gregory remains quite often very unclear. Of course, I know, this depends on the literature he writes: Orations with short, rhetorically skilled passages, Poems which are often not very clear, Letters with personal allusions. In my view, this is an important aspect of Gregory's writing, but I am not convinced that we should conclude that Gregory's terminological imprecisions are a positive result of his ‘spirituality’. On the contrary, Gregory is a little bit weak in this. He avoids writing books against his enemies, and he avoids dealing with their arguments in detail. Instead, he uses sarcastic and ironic techniques. He does not quote his enemies verbally, but shortens their arguments considerably. And even his avoiding of ontological terms can be portrayed not as an important step, done by the great spiritual figure whom we have to follow as a saint, but could be regarded as done with a certain amount of fear. Or, to state it more bluntly: Gregory has no solutions for the problems he is dealing with, but he does not care. In his rhetorical approach he prefers continually to use new words and images to make clear what he intends. But he feels no need for further work on terminology and integration of different concepts. Theological discussion is not characterised by this approach, so perhaps it is not surprising that in 381/382 it was not Gregory of Nazianzus who was successful, but rather Gregory of Nyssa, who developed the concepts of his elder brother Basil.