The disastrous invasion of Iraq has shed a stark light on the limitations of military interventions. Much of the ensuing skepticism is quite healthy. But there is a risk that “the lessons of Iraq” will be learnt to the exclusion of lessons that can be drawn from the more than two dozen other interventions of the post-Cold War era.
All states face a fundamental dilemma when they intervene to impose political order in weak and failed states. They can choose to accommodate all armed groups in the target state in a powersharing arrangement. Alternatively, they can attempt to enforce their preferred political order, either by ensuring the military victory of their preferred faction or by deploying their own forces to create a demilitarized space in which broader political participation and the rule of law can—in theory, at least—evolve. All of these alternatives present characteristic trade-offs. The first option presents the lowest risks to intervening forces but tends to yield unstable regimes in all but the most benign environments (Roeder and Rothchild 2005). The second option—backing a proxy—commonly produces regimes that are more stable but often highly repressive.1
On the consequences of outright military victory in civil wars, see Licklider (1995).
Hegre et al. (2001) argue that mature democracies are the most peaceful and stable regime type.
My research suggests that nearly every instance of significant democratization during the course of a military intervention has occurred during an enforcement-type mission—that is, an operation in which intervening forces have the authorization and capabilities to use force to ensure the success of their mission.3
Enforcement operations can be contrasted to consensual peace operations, such as the multidimensional, traditional, and observer missions in Doyle and Sambanis' (2000) typology.
Understanding these trade-offs is critical for understanding the likely consequences of a future “Iraq Syndrome” parallel to the “Vietnam Syndrome” of a generation ago. In particular, if overdrawn, the “lessons of Iraq” may have two negative effects.
An “Iraq Syndrome” presents a second risk in the context of counter-terrorist operations. In the wake of the Vietnam War, the United States adopted a policy of arming and funding American proxies throughout the world, regardless of their political legitimacy or human rights records. Abandoning a quixotic quest for democracy promotion with limited means and with little attention to local contexts would clearly be a welcome turn for U.S. foreign policy. But if the alternative to liberal internationalist “nation-building” is a realpolitik “nation-building” that supports repressive, autocratic forces around the world, then democracy promotion might not turn out to be the most pernicious American policy of the post-Cold War era.
The Iraq fiasco returned a critical dose of skepticism to American debates on intervention. The challenge now is to integrate this skepticism with a recognition of the limits inherent in alternative strategies of promoting relatively benign political orders in weak and failed states.
Author Bio
Stephen Watts is currently a research fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs of Harvard University and a visiting scholar at the Centennial Center. He will begin as an assistant professor in the department of political science at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst in fall 2007.
