Roger Congleton's Perfecting Parliament is the latest entry in the attempt to explain the rise of the modern state. The current leaders in the field, Charles Tilly and Max Weber, are joined by many other legitimate contenders: Elias Norton, Michael Mann, and Karl Marx to name a few. It is a bracing contest, social science at its highest level of generality and interest. It is also a “pay to play game,” potential contestants must bring a lot to the table in terms of ideas, history, and an ability to integrate detail into coherent stories.
Congleton earns his place at the table. At over 600 dense pages, the two main parts of the book are an extended theoretical discussion of “shared sovereignty” and a 400- page history of parliamentary democracy in Britain, Sweden, the Netherlands, Germany, Japan, and the United States. The book also contains smaller pieces, which are scattered throughout, including an appendix, which may be the best place to start reading, for reasons I will explain shortly.
Congleton emphasizes three methodological points. First, that governments are organizations and must be studied as organizations with internal dynamics rather than single actor entities. Second, that gradual and incremental change occurs constantly, and while discontinuous or revolutionary change also occurs, we need to guard against explanations of change that rely too much on discrete revolutionary episodes. Third, we need to incorporate the dynamic relationship between economics and politics if we are to understand how modern parliamentary democracies came into being. For Congleton, the interaction involves ideology as well. I agree completely with each emphasis, and after the introduction looked forward to how Congleton developed these ideas.
The theoretical section builds on organizations. The state is conceived of as a large organization, which must develop an internal structure that combines leadership of the organization and representation of the constituent parts. Drawing on the theory of clubs and firms, Congleton's typical government is a “king and council” organization where the internal dynamic of shared sovereignty between the king (leader) and council (representatives of constituent parts) explains how the organization behaves and, significantly, how the organization develops over time. The “constitution” of the government organization is made up of the internal arrangements between the king and council, and the external arrangements embodied in rules about representation, as well as rules about suffrage. Tension between the king and council often centers on wars and revenues, with councils gaining a stronger position when they are able to exert control over taxes and other revenues.
The historical chapters build on the importance of incremental rather than revolutionary change. Each chapter sketches the history of a particular society, Britain gets two chapters, highlighting the origins of each country's king and council institutions and how they develop over time. The emphasis is on continuity (the fundamental conservatism) of institutions and gradual change. Several of the chapters provide succinct tables delineating the major institutional changes through time, which are very helpful.
The book also has several more independent pieces. The third section includes a chapter that presents quantitative evidence on gradual reform and a chapter outlining an analytical narrative approach and concluding thoughts. The appendix anticipates criticisms of the approach and defenses to possible critiques.
Interested readers might want to start with the appendix. The introduction promises a broad interpretation of the political and economic history of modern states: “the country studies demonstrate that new economic and ideological interests and preexisting institutions played important roles in the constitutional bargaining that gradually produced Western democracy” (p. 17). As I read, however, I found it was necessary for me to provide the broader perspective. Congleton begins the appendix with the statement: “The book attempts to develop and test a particular theory of constitutional design and reform, rather than to induce patterns from past experience. This is not because induction is logically impossible or without interest… Rather, it is because the main goal of this book is to advance constitutional theory.” Had that statement been developed in the introduction, I would have read the book much differently. To be fair, Congleton also says on page 17 that the book “attempts to develop and test a particular theory of constitutional reform.” As written, this is not a broad book, but one that narrowly focuses on constitutional issues, where a constitution is defined as arrangements within the government between the leadership and the representatives, and the extent of suffrage.
Constitutional issues are indeed interesting and well worth investigation, but alone they do not explain the emergence of modern societies. As a reader this doesn‘t pose a problem, as one remembers what is valuable and forgets the rest. But a reviewer can't ignore the claims a book makes and whether it lives up to them. The two sentences quoted from page 17 make very different claims.
Congleton‘s three methodological points help sort some of the problems understanding the book's aims out. There is a coherent theory of organizations, the king and council model, that provides a theoretical structure and a guide to the case histories. There is, unfortunately only one organization, the government represented by the king in council. Neither governments nor societies are conceived as organizations of organizations, and no explicit account of competition between organizations is given.
The emphasis on the interaction of economic, ideological, and political interests suggests a model in which economics and ideologies are endogenous with politics. The economic vignettes in the book, however, are brief and economic changes are completely exogenous to political events. There is no interaction between politics and economics. Even more troubling, violence and war are also exogenous, despite the fact that the interaction of kings and councils determines whether wars occur and drive the fiscal constraints that shift equilibria within the king and council model.
Congleton's major conclusion is that constitutional change is evolutionary and gradual rather than revolutionary and episodic. This is a true insight, but hardly a new one. There is an audience, including many economists and academics of all types, who need to learn that constitutional change does not just occur in discontinuous. That audience is unlikely to read this book, however. Few students of constitutions, like myself, need to learn that lesson and that is the audience for which the book seems clearly intended.
A careful reader can take away a great deal of value from this book, when it is read as a history of how the king and council form of constitutions developed in six countries, as well as a way to think about constitutional dynamics within the confines of king and council institutions. A careful reviewer faces a harder task, since whether the book succeeds on its own terms depends on which of its own terms it is evaluated by. In order to take on the more ambitious goals the introduction sets out, Congleton has to drop the inevitability of the king and council form; make the economy, ideology, war, and violence endogenous parts of the explanatory framework; and drop the insistence that all change is incremental and recognize that sometimes discontinuous change occurs and is very important.
