The second half of the twentieth century saw a huge change in attitudes towards new technologies. In the post-war period, something called ‘science and technology’ was seen as a ‘good thing’, producing antibiotics, colourful plastics, nylon, television, atomic energy, computers, and so on. In the 1960s and 1970s this attitude changed to one of suspicion.
Matthew Wisnioski dates the start of this change to 1964 – two years after the publication of Rachel Carson's Silent Spring and the year in which Ellul's The Technological Society appeared in English translation. He sees these two events as representing two strands of growing concern, with pollution as a side effect and with the system itself. This system was the aerospace industry that employed the majority of America's growing number of engineers.
To practical engineers, side effects such as pollution could be tackled both by better planning and by technological solutions to problems that still escaped the planning. The system itself led some engineers to question the value of their employment. With all that government money going into the Cold War, manufacturing was being neglected and growing social problems needed government funding for solutions.
As with all systems involving humans and their institutions, the way that events develop is far more complex than suggested by a simple two-strand thread. Wisnioski digs into this complexity through a very detailed study of the literature of the period (and that of the early 1970s), including papers and reports from the professional associations and pressure groups.
The book is structured by theme, with one theme per chapter. Within the chapters there are examples – detailed case studies. One such theme is the crisis in notions of professional responsibility (Chapter 4). Wisnioski claims that ideas established in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries – the engineer as a moral, responsible professional – were threatened by new ideas. Radical critics saw the engineer as a lackey of the military–industrial complex, whilst others claimed that technology was autonomous and beyond the control of engineers however responsible they believed they were: ‘How could engineers claim command over technology if they were beholden to its destabilizing forces?’ (p. 68).
The detail of this crisis is supplied through a study of the debate within the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME). By 1965 the ASME had 60,000 members. Its journal, Mechanical Engineering, published editorials, articles and a lively letters section, providing Wisnioski with a rich source of material. Some authors used analogies with other professions to argue their point. It was claimed that after the Second World War it had been established that ‘only obeying orders’ was not an acceptable excuse for members of the medical profession. Engineers should have the same responsibility to refuse to work on ways of killing people. Other contributors pointed out that the older professions of law and medicine had standards enforced by sanctions not applicable to the engineers.
There are chapters covering the themes of servant or master, technics out of control and the system. In addition there are two chapters describing movements beyond the contested ideas. Chapter 6, on new approaches to creativity, has three examples – ‘bridges’ – that tried to get beyond the drawing up of ethical codes for the profession by collaborating with other groups. These three are the appropriate technology movement, the Experiments in Art and Technology (EAT) network, and the Innovation Group.
Chapter 7 covers changes in the education of engineers in this period. The 20 per cent of course time that had been spent on non-scientific subjects – literature, philosophy and history of technology – became contested ground, with many different new approaches being tried. Wisnioski takes four cases to cover the details. Three of them, UCLA, Caltech and MIT, are better known than the fourth, Harvey Mudd College, part of the Claremont Colleges campus. Its course, combining science, engineering and humanities, was abandoned in 1974 when overworked teachers returned to seeking tenure and the comfort of a disciplinary identity.
The richness of Wisnioski's mining of the literature comes at a price. It leaves no room for other approaches. Wisnioski includes no interviews with the people involved. Plenty of people from that period are still around. There is no room for comparison with what was happening in Europe and technical literature outside engineering is excluded. For example, there was a separate literature on risk assessment on both sides of the Atlantic.
Three groups of people might read this book. First, those who were working in the 1970s and would enjoy some nostalgia, and second, those interested in the history of ideas. Wisnioski claims to show that American engineers used ideas from the new ‘technology and society genre’ (p. 42) leading to new words appearing in their discussions. Visual representations of ideas are given in the form of adverts, cartoons and so on. A third group is those facing similar issues in the present. The debates of the 1960s and 1970s are relevant today.
Since the period covered in the book, we have witnessed the Challenger disaster and Chernobyl – both in 1986 – and more recently the Fukushima failure. These events were influenced by decisions in which engineers knowingly took risks. In the case of Challenger, it was known that the Thiokol sealant in the booster engine might fail at low temperatures yet the launch went ahead in a freezing January. Would a code of ethics have made any difference? What would have made a difference?
