British historians will look hard to find in Charles Esdaile's book what they expect. Compared to traditional and classic histories of the Peninsular War, there is scant attention paid to Britain's political and economic history, let alone its diplomatic and military history. Esdaile cannot omit such discussions, but he uses them simply to provide some of the backdrop to the Iberian drama. This should not dissuade readers from taking up this extraordinarily interesting book. It is revisionism at its best, written by an historian at the height of his powers. Esdaile's view of the Peninsular War is that of the Spaniard, and he has managed it better than any Iberian has done, or perhaps will ever do because he has done so with a remarkably dispassionate eye. He sets to rest two centuries of mythology concerning this epic struggle—British mythology, French mythology, Portuguese mythology, but most of all, Spanish mythology.

In his analysis of the war, Esdaile proceeds in strictly chronological fashion, allowing military events to drive the narrative. He mobilizes a lifetime of work in the Spanish archives to make sense of the complicated political culture of Spain between 1807 and 1814. He makes clear from the outset that the story will not be simple and that the reader should purge preconceived notions concerning the Spanish effort. He begins with an examination of the Spain of Charles IV and Manuel Godoy, establishing for the reader the complexity of the political, social, and philosophical forces at work on the eve of the French coup d’etat. Esdaile informs the reader from the outset that countless factions will pursue objectives quite separate from broad national interests. The national insurrection following Dos de Mayo was not an indignant response to foreign arrogance but rather an effort to advance sectional aims, avenge perceived wrongs, promote personal agenda, and effect political change. Esdaile tells us that the Spanish were remarkably complacent about the French presence but that Dos de Mayo provided convenient cover for self-interested action. Thus, from the outset Spain's response to France lacked focus and would remain blurred throughout the struggle. There were, of course, patriots, but they constituted but a part of the action.

Aside from this clear and honest look at what transpired in Iberia, the great virtue of Esdaile's work is that he knows the personalities and parties (great and not so great) who participated in these events. His research is extensive and perhaps unequaled in its breadth and depth. He supplements the archival sources with an extensive reading of the popular press and in this way creates a composite that includes popular action and insider intrigue. Whatever the case, Esdaile is the first historian to do so in so comprehensive and cogent a fashion.

While not particularly sympathetic toward the British, Esdaile clearly appreciates the many frustrations they experienced in trying to mobilize and coordinate the Spanish effort. From the first days of the insurrection to the formation of the Central Junta to the creation of the Regency Council and the calling of the Cortes, no clear vision from Spanish councils emerged. Not surprisingly, ill will very quickly developed between these unlikely allies thrust together by the course of events. And the Spanish military proved no more able to define its role than the government. Here Esdaile identifies problems too numerous to mention, but, as in the case of the government, he finds sympathy through analysis while at the same time identifying the germ of future trouble. It is maddening at times to find the author describing in appalling terms the political and military behavior of the Spaniards and then railing at their British allies for their impatience and condescension.

The centerpiece to this book is the author's examination of the guerrilla movement that historians have long pointed to as Spanish nationalism made manifest. The sacrifices and courage of these intrepid bands of men and women, so the story goes, kept the French perpetually diverted from their task and assisted Wellington in his inexorable march from Lisbon to the Pyrenees. While Esdaile concedes that the guerrillas had a role to play and sometimes an important one, they were anything but the altruistic, selfless patriots of legend. More often than not they were brigands and common thugs out to loot and pillage anything and everyone. They were as likely to descend on their own countrymen and on British convoys as they were on the French. As Esdaile tells us rather tersely: “The evidence that the leitmotiv of the rank and file of the guerrilla movement was plunder rather than patriotism is overwhelming” (272). He does allow one to embrace some of the great guerrilla heroes, but his descriptions are sobering indeed. The best of the guerrilla bands were those consisting of regular soldiers, remnants from Spanish armies repeatedly routed by the French. No doubt Esdaile has had to endure a hostile reaction out of Spain to this interpretation, but his case is compelling, and there is no one in a position to challenge his assertion. No mean feat turning Napier, Fortescue, and Oman on their heads.

Esdaile is generous with Wellington, describing him as a general of true brilliance, but he maintains that Napoleon lost the Peninsular War rather than Wellington winning it. Time and again, according to Esdaile, Napoleon failed to take appropriate action for reasons that are inexplicable. The best that can be offered is that Napoleon never appreciated the difficulties his armies faced. Those armies, Esdaile describes as brilliant and maintains that their failure was strategic not tactical. Only Napoleon could control his talented marshals, and in his absence they were a quarrelling inchoate group. These arguments are less effective than those concerning Spain in that they are largely interpretive rather than based on hard evidence. The same is true of his analysis of the British government's support of Wellington, where Esdaile's conclusions are not only impressionistic but at time contradictory. This all points to the book's one limitation; it is essentially a book about Spain in the Peninsular War rather than a general history of that war.

That said, this is an extraordinarily important work, full of fresh ideas born from years of research and analysis. Though the ubiquity of “whilst” will grate on American readers, Esdaile's style is supremely readable, almost as if one is engaged in a long conversation with the author. This is a must read for anyone in the field.