When and why do nation-states pursue diplomatic talks with the adversary during wartime? And what prompts them to shift from just fighting to “talking while fighting”? In this book, Oriana Skylar Mastro offers elegant and thoughtful answers to these questions. In doing so, she sheds new light on how states agree to negotiate peace, including critical decisions that shaped the unfolding of the Cold War around China's periphery. Her carefully researched case studies offer new insights into China's diplomacy in the Korean War, Chinese and Indian diplomacy in the Sino-Indian War, and North Vietnam's diplomacy in the Vietnam War. The research draws on archival research in China, India, the United States and the United Kingdom, as well as interviews in Vietnam and a range of other sources.
The book begins with a presentation of Mastro's theoretical approach. In essence, she sees leaders as preoccupied with how the adversary will respond to openness to diplomatic talks in the midst of war. More specifically, Mastro contends, leaders worry that the enemy will interpret openness to talks as a sign of weakness, and they also weigh how much capacity the enemy has to intensify its prosecution of the war in response to such an interpretation. As a result, states only agree to direct and unconditional talks when the “costs of conversation” are low. This is the case when leaders believe their states have shown sufficient resiliency to avoid conveying weakness and that the enemy has limited capacity to escalate the war. Overall, Mastro's theorizing is quite lucid, and it fills an important gap in the study of international security.
The theoretical framework also does much to illuminate the diplomatic decisions Mastro scrutinizes. In the Korean War, Mao refused talks initially, only to agree to direct talks in mid-1951 after the perceived costs of engaging with the US became low. In the Vietnam War, Hanoi also refused talks at the outset, only to agree to negotiations following the Tet Offensive in 1968. In the Sino-Indian War, China expressed a willingness to talk very shortly after the war began, since its military superiority made the costs of openness to talks low. In contrast, India refused talks through the entire war, since its military inferiority and poor performance made it deeply afraid of signalling weakness. While India's stance might seem remarkable, Mastro notes that at least one side refused to talk throughout the entire conflict in more than half the wars since the Second World War.
Mastro considers a range of alternative explanations for these various decisions. Some of these (such as the traditional bargaining model of war) are very appropriate. The inclusion of others is puzzling. Mastro notes that Mao's personal beliefs cannot explain the course of China's diplomacy in the Korean and Sino-Indian wars, for example. Yet theoretical arguments focused on ideology, personality and deep-seated beliefs are designed to explain why different leaders facing similar challenges respond in different ways, not tactical shifts in one country's approach in the midst of a conflict.
More generally, Mastro's work raises a range of questions, many of which are explored in a very thoughtful conclusion. One question concerns what “agreeing to talk” actually entails. During the Korean War, for example, did the US decision to accept (however reluctantly) the UN cease-fire group's proposal in January 1951 represent an agreement to talk? Mastro seems to believe it did not, but the episode is worth discussing in more detail. Another question concerns the way in which leaders actually calculate the costs of conversation. How much resiliency is enough? How much capacity to escalate on the enemy's part is too much? Mastro suggests that Mao's views on these questions were shaped in part by deep-seated beliefs regarding the use of force he derived from the revolution. If this is correct – and I think it is – this suggests that theories focusing on leaders’ beliefs and personalities complement Mastro's account, rather than representing a competing narrative.
Perhaps the most pressing question concerns the implications for the US and China today. Mastro offers a series of intriguing ideas in this regard, including a suggestion that these countries establish openness to wartime talks as official policy before conflict erupts. If they did so, national leaders would no longer have to worry that simply agreeing to talk might be seen as sign of weakness. Mastro also argues that powerful countries should re-evaluate their tendency to rely on coercion to get an adversary to the negotiating table. Far from driving the opponent to talk, such tactics are more likely to be counterproductive. All in all, Mastro's suggestions are quite provocative. But they also reflect a great deal of expertise and thought, and one hopes they will be taken seriously.
