Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 April 2005
The central question of this book, whose title can be translated “The Arab East at the American Hour: From the Gulf War [of 1991] to the Iraq War [of 2003],” is as follows: what happened in the Arab East, including Egypt, during those years, and what role did the United States play? Henry Laurens, who is a professor of history at the Collège de France in Paris, has attempted to write a contemporary political history of one of the world's most contentious regions.
Although developments in most countries of the Arab East are discussed in this book, the author focuses on two important relationships during this period. The first is Iraq and its relations with the United States, and the second is the Palestinian relationship with Israel and the United States. The advantages of this approach are clear. It allows the author to trace the course of events, tensions, and conflicts surrounding each case during these roughly fifteen years of history. Laurens tries to do justice to the multifaceted nature of the Arab East as a region by not offering a political, economic, or any other kind of theory to explain the history of this region. Nor does he hold any particular party as being responsible for all the mishaps of the recent past.
Perhaps the section that deals with Israeli–Palestinian relations is the most rewarding. Laurens divides the post–Yitzhak Shamir era into periods beginning with that of Yitzhak Rabin (June 1992–November 1995), which coincides with the peace process between Israel and the Palestinians as envisaged by the United States. The author summarizes the weaknesses of the Oslo Agreements (pp. 57–58, 133–35), such as the fact that it did not freeze settlement activities in the occupied territories.
The second period corresponds to the reign of Benjamin Netanyahu (April 1996–May 1999) and saw the peace process being paralyzed. Laurens maintains that it was U.S. President Bill Clinton who succeeded in pushing Netanyahu and Yasir Arafat into signing the Wye Plantation Agreement (October 1998), which further transferred territory to the Palestinians and settled many security issues. He rightly affirms that the Israelis' stress on security and attachment to the land of the forefathers largely serves to unify an increasingly “multicultural” Israel. It is precisely these elements, however, that constitute the main obstacles to peace, as well (p. 107). The author maintains that Israeli policies of closing off roads in the territories, and thus communication and supplies—all carried out in the name of measures against terrorism—are in fact also meant to press the Palestinian population to surrender in a war of attrition. Contrary to the expected outcomes, these measures have incited Palestinians to engage in protests, disturbances, and suicidal attacks. In this connection, Laurens manages to analyze the respective assumptions of Israelis and Palestinians with regard to “rapprochement” (pp. 133–37) and reminds us that Ehud Barak's ideas at the time that he ascended to the leadership of the Labor Party did not differ much from those of Netanyahu (p. 99).
The period of Ehud Barak (May 1999–February 2001), who wanted to push on to the final phase, led to the failure of the peace process, which was later sealed by his successor, Ariel Sharon. Still, a memorandum of agreement was signed in Sharm al-Shaykh (September 1999) that set 13 September 2000 as the deadline for the definite final agreement followed by Arafat's threat to proclaim a Palestinian state if no agreement had been reached by then. Alas, the final negotiations organized at Camp David were badly prepared for. They were also held against the will of the Palestinians and did not lead to the hoped-for definite agreement. As a historian, Laurens mentions various reasons for the failure (pp. 143–49, 162–64), such as the more positive but ineffective parameters of Clinton (December 2000) as well as the nature of the discussions in Taba (January 2001) as reported (not accepted by Israel) by the European Union's delegate, Miguel Angel Moratinos (pp. 157–62).
As is well known, Sharon's visit to the Esplanade in Jerusalem (September 2000), the subsequent violence, and the second intifada and suicide attacks led to his being elected prime minister (February 2001). For him, the only solution is a military one. As a result, all of the parties are now “imprisoned in violence” (p. 165). Laurens repeatedly refers to the disproportionate suffering of Palestinians compared with that of Israeli civilians. All of this, in the end, goes back to the policy of colonizing the occupied territories as pursued by all Israeli governments since 1967 (pp. 87–97).
Something similar holds true for the United Nations' embargo of Iraq, which began in 1992 at the insistence of the United States. As with the Palestinians, a military option was chosen in Iraq that effectively rendered the civilian population into hostages. In neither case, however, was there proof or even the probability that this option would lead to the desired outcome. Instead, it suggests a worse-than-colonialist attitude toward the people concerned and a simplified, utterly wrong conception of who was considered the enemy. One can conclude that this type of approach is less than intelligent and finally self-destructive.
This is a timely book that invites the reader to engage in historical reflection. It does not read the past according to a preconceived scheme or judge it from an established perspective. Rather, it enables the facts to speak in a human context. It suggests that only tenacious historical research will establish the right connections and measure the extent to which everyone concerned, inside and outside the region, has been misled about what has been going on. Finally, it must be said that while this book primarily addresses the nonspecialist reader, it also poses serious questions to specialists. The statistical tables, along with statements and documents that are often quoted in full, further add to the value of this book.