Domenico Bertoloni Meli's new book begins its account of mechanics in the late sixteenth century and culminates in the work of Isaac Newton. The author's previous studies of Newton's mathematics and mechanics are fittingly complemented here by an extensive and detailed treatment of the traditions, theoretical and practical, of which Newton was the inheritor. But Thinking with Objects attempts to do more than simply survey that ground; as his title indicates, Bertoloni Meli also wishes to restructure our understanding of what seventeenth-century mechanics was really all about.
While Alexandre Koyré famously stressed mechanics in this period as an intellectual enterprise rooted in Platonic assumptions about the relationship between mathematics and nature, Edward W. Strong's Procedures and Metaphysics (Berkeley, 1936) emphasized mathematical studies of nature as having been rooted in practical mathematical procedures more than in metaphysical considerations. Bertoloni Meli, although not engaging explicitly with Strong's book, seeks a via media. He stresses ‘objects’ themselves, by which he generally means material objects such as pendulums, balances and fluids, but also, sometimes, geometrical and quasi-geometrical diagrams. While Bertoloni Meli's idea is not elaborately theorized in the book, one might say that, in his view, all such objects are, to paraphrase Clifford Geertz, ‘good to think with’. Experience of manipulating objects, thinking about them for both practical and mathematical purposes – the latter perhaps involving the extension of exemplary problem solutions in a Kuhnian sense, for example – enabled the growth of a broad field of ‘mechanics’ by the end of the seventeenth century that involved many more kinds of phenomena than had been the case in the late sixteenth. Thus the story begins, fittingly, with Benedetti, Guidobaldo dal Monte, Galileo and others in Italy, as well as Simon Stevin in the Low Countries, tentatively approaching questions of local motion, a province of Aristotelian physics, from a broadly Archimedean statical direction, augmented by approaches gleaned from the pseudo-Aristotelian Questions of Mechanics. The general storyline at the outset is hence one familiar from Stillman Drake and I. E. Drabkin's Mechanics in Sixteenth-Century Italy (Madison, 1969), from Drake and Paul Lawrence Rose's study of the Questions of Mechanics in this period (in Studies in the Renaissance (1971), 18, 65–104), as well as from more recent work by scholars such as W. R. Laird. Bertoloni Meli wishes, however, to uncover more than the intellectual antecedents to Galilean mechanics.
Guidobaldo's work is exemplary for Bertoloni Meli's argument. By showing how Guidobaldo insisted on vindicating his theoretical ideas in precision instruments that would exemplify them with exactitude, the book moves away from a Koyréan idealist picture of its subject matter to stress engagement with things themselves. ‘Rather than considering a simple theory–practice dichotomy, it is more useful to adopt a three-way partition involving mathematical theory, the tools and instruments of everyday experience, and the precision instruments from the Urbino workshops aimed at minimizing or even abolishing the effects of the imperfections of matter’ (p. 34). This trichotomy does not carry through the book as a whole, however. Instead, a wide array of issues, all converging on and constituting a new science of ‘mechanics’, which included not just the extension to local motion but also such matters as oscillation, strength of materials, the motion of waters and, at last, celestial mechanics, are treated each in its own fashion rather than conformed to a single interpretative template. Thus, in introducing his discussion of projected and orbiting bodies in the work of Borelli, Huygens and others, Bertoloni Meli speaks of ‘the interplay between cosmological and technological implications’ (p. 190). The form of the book is that of a succession of case studies concerning particular problem areas in the development of mechanics, and as such it is full of interest. The miscellaneous character of its interpretative apparatus can, however, lead to an occasional loss of focus; there is too much here to encompass in a single narrative account.
The centre of Bertoloni Meli's interests is clear, however. Tabletop demonstrations and experimental ingenuity receive particular attention, together with mathematical acuity; Christiaan Huygens is perhaps the book's ideal type in that respect. But the treatment of Newton is perhaps the high point, and the most historiographically instructive: Bertoloni Meli notes that (certainly since I. B. Cohen's ‘two Newtons’) it has been usual to see the Opticks as Newton's ‘experimental’ work and the Principia as representing his ‘mathematical’ side, but Book II of the Principia is full of experimental arguments – exemplifications of Newton's ‘experimental philosophy’. Pendulums, ‘objects’ that appear frequently throughout this book, serve in Newton's arguments as experimental devices that provide his central evidence against a Cartesian-style aether. Bertoloni Meli's stress on the importance of engagements with materiality in the development of seventeenth-century mechanics thus achieves a spectacular vindication in demonstrating the full meaning of Newton's pretensions to be contributing not just to ‘mathematics’ in the Principia, but to natural philosophy itself.
