The Occupy protests around the nation that peaked at the end of 2011 provide an appropriate backdrop for this new book by John Hagan. The protests, as viewed on television screens, through YouTube videos, or by firsthand account, brought to the forefront the frustrations of many Americans from what they perceived as careless and callous business practices that allowed the 1% to get ahead at the expense of the 99%. The protesters' frustration extended to President Barack Obama and the federal government for protecting and bailing out many of the offending corporations. Numerous questions abounded: Who is responsible for the market collapse? Why did no federal regulatory agency become aware of the crisis sooner? And finally: How are the people responsible for the financial destruction of so many not held accountable for their careless actions? The answers, Hagan explains, can be found partly in a long trajectory of presidential administrations that fostered reckless business practices and coddled those at the top of the economic hierarchy.
To be clear, Hagan's book is about criminals—individuals who currently fill America's prisons and the individuals who sit in lavish Wall Street offices—and the political climate that has allowed for this divide. It is a rare book that seeks to question who we identify as criminals and what actions should be criminalized. The author does this by providing an analysis of the political background behind the war on drugs and the recent financial market collapse. Most book-length studies up to this point have chosen to focus solely on the drug war or on the financial crisis. The strength of Who Are the Criminals? is that Hagan shows the reader that they do not exist in separate spheres and are interconnected. Although the author is a sociologist and a criminologist, this book should appeal to political scientists—especially those who are concerned about political framing and the building of the criminal justice state.
The book begins with an account of President Ronald Reagan's suppression of a crime report by an advisory board that revealed street crime to be in decline and questioned the growing reliance on prisons. According to Hagan, this was a huge failure in frame construction for Reagan and his close advisors, who had pursued more punitive crime policies and viewed the report as undermining a key administration goal. Not surprisingly, then, it becomes clear that Reagan, when faced with the truth of declining crime rates, chose to look the other way and base his punitive crime policies on fear of crime instead of actual crime. While Reagan is certainly the center of Hagan's book, he is placed in a longer trajectory of punitive crime policies and deregulation that harkens back to President Franklin Roosevelt. But for Hagan, the Reagan administration is really where everything becomes unhinged; he writes that “the age of Reagan politics reversed course, demanding increased imprisonment of street criminals and a reduced scrutiny and enforcement in the financial sector” (p. 2). The author argues that during the age of Reagan, there were two parallel frames in operation: one about increasing control of crime on American city streets and another about deregulation of business.
Chapters 2 through 4 provide context for a larger discussion of crime by taking the reader through a journey of the relevant sociology and criminology literature that sought to explain crime during the Reagan and Roosevelt years. Chapter 2 centers on understanding the occurrence and distribution of crime. Hagan points out that public fear plays a critical role in determining what we count as crime. In particular, fear of crack cocaine led to the disproportionate increase in African American young men in prisons during Reagan's presidency. Chapter 3 takes a step back and examines classical theories in criminology during the age of Roosevelt (structural functionalism, symbolic interactionism, and conflict theory) and concludes with the finding that all of these theoretical traditions declined considerably by the time we get to Reagan's presidential administration. And in Chapter 4, the changing terrain of criminology in the age of Reagan, with an emphasis on chronic street criminals and mass imprisonment as opposed to corporate crimes, is explained. To anybody who works in this research area, this information will not be new but will likely serve as a nice refresher. As someone more concerned about the larger political framing story and the connection between street and suite crime that Hagan introduces in the first chapter, I found this section of the book a bit drawn out and the least interesting. However, to those who are less familiar, these chapters provide an excellent primer on the most important crime-related studies.
The next section of the book is where Hagan's research really shines, so much so that I wish this section had been longer. The first page of Chapter 5 has an ominous warning: “The policies of the age of Reagan may have led Americans to fear both too much and too little” (p. 137). The author juxtaposes Reagan's approach to the handling of “streets” to those of the “business suites” in which stark differences emerge. His finding that Reagan instituted harsh drug policies, which vilified street offenders, is hardly revolutionary, but his linking of it to the favorable framing of business is an important contribution. In other words, Reagan's attempts to deregulate America's business practices were buttressed by the advocacy of more severe punishments for street crime. It becomes painfully clear how fear of street crime provided a diversion to surveillance of business suites and gave individuals a false sense of security.
The abysmal level of scrutiny of the business suites had its most detrimental impact on those who were the most vulnerable. Indeed, Hagan documents how minority communities, already weakened by high levels of incarceration, were victimized even further “by evolving forms of financial manipulation, including subprime mortgages and similar kinds of lending arrangements for credit cards, cars, and related loans” (p. 211). In great detail, he explains how the banking and credit crisis reached such epic proportions and how the federal government protected the culprits at the center while at the same time pursuing low-level street offenders with a vengeance. The absurdity of the benevolent frame for the business suites and the hyper-dangerous frame for street crime is laid bare at the end of this chapter and leaves the reader properly infuriated.
In the final analysis, Hagan argues, policies that were implemented in the age of Reagan are still in place in the age of Obama. However, he provides hope that not all is lost and that it is possible to reframe our understandings of the feared and of the criminal, of the overregulated and of the underregulated. The key is to become aware of how the situation got to where it is and, in this regard, Who Are the Criminals? is an important step in this direction.
