Over the last several decades, the rise of China and fears about the relative decline of the United States have generated two parallel literatures. On the one hand, the end of the unipolar moment has seen a resurgence of new theoretical and empirical work on the politics of great power rise and decline. The 1980s, of course, gave us a broad literature on power transitions, suggesting that (1) power shifts resulted in part from unproductive investments and strategic overreach on the part of those powers in decline (Organski and Kugler Reference Organski and Kugler1980; Gilpin Reference Gilpin1981; Kennedy Reference Kennedy1987; Calleo Reference Calleo1987); (2) rising states and declining states were apt to come into conflict with one another as power changed hands; (3) there was at least some possibility that international institutions might cushion the transition and sustain some degree of cooperation even “after hegemony” (Keohane Reference Keohane1984; Webb and Krasner Reference Webb and Krasner1989).
China's rise has motivated a new wave of work that challenges and extends this older literature. It examines, among other things, the sources of rise and decline (e.g., Beckley Reference Beckley2018); the strategies of rising and declining states (e.g., Murray Reference Murray2018; Ward Reference Ward2017; Edelstein Reference Edelstein2017; Paul Reference Paul and Paul2016); and the consequences of these strategies both for the states themselves and “international order” more generally (e.g., Ikenberry Reference Ikenberry2008; Mearsheimer Reference Mearsheimer2010; Goh Reference Goh2013; Montgomery Reference Montgomery2016; Allison Reference Allison2017; Brooks and Wohlforth 2018). Though motivated by the current conjuncture, this work has drawn heavily on earlier power transitions—overwhelmingly European—and the lessons they may generate for the present.
At the same, scholars of East Asia have quite naturally worked along parallel lines while focusing on the particulars of the Asia-Pacific region. Major works, for example, have shed light on the causes of Chinese military and economic growth in and around East Asia (e.g., Fravel Reference Fravel2019; Ye Reference Ye2020), the responses (or lack thereof) among China's neighbors (e.g., Kang Reference Kang2007, Reference Kang2017; Samuels Reference Samuels2007), and the resulting effects on East Asia's economic and security arrangements (Foot and Goh Reference Foot and Goh2019). This work is by no means limited to Western voices, but includes pointed explorations on the part of Chinese scholars as well (e.g., Xuetong Reference Xuetong2019). Nor has it been limited to international dynamics; the domestic drivers and consequences of China's rise loom large in these accounts (e.g., Shirk Reference Shirk2008; Nathan and Scobell Reference Nathan and Scobell2012; Weiss Reference Weiss2014).
A number of scholars have sought to bridge these conversations. For instance, Steven Chan and David Kang have taken on power transition models frontally and challenged the presumption that US–China relations are on a path towards war as some IR theorists suggest (Chan Reference Chan2013; Kang Reference Kang2017). Likewise, several scholars have worked to clarify the extent of Chinese revisionism and assertiveness over the last decade (e,g., Johnston Reference Johnston2013; Chen, Pu, and Johnston Reference Chen, Pu and Johnston2013; Kastner and Saunders Reference Kastner and Saunders2012; Huiyun Reference Huiyun2009). The literature on American responses to the China challenge—both positive and normative, scholarly and popular–is now too voluminous to cite in detail, but also engages more or less explicitly power transition arguments (e.g., Friedberg Reference Friedberg2011; Christensen Reference Christensen2015; Pillsbury Reference Pillsbury2015).
Nevertheless, efforts to join theoretical and historical treatments of great power rise and decline with work on contemporary East Asia remain more limited than one might think. This roundtable looks to change this situation. In a precedent the Journal of East Asian Studies hopes to repeat, the journal invited three leading scholars of the international relations of East Asia—David Kang, Robert Ross, and Ketian Zhang—to review four new books on the rise and decline of great powers writ large and to consider the relevance of their findings with respect to China's rise. Kang, Ross, and Zhang have expertise on different facets of East Asian international relations, just as the books themselves—by Stacie Goddard, Paul MacDonald and Joseph Parent, Kori Schake, and Joshua Shifrinson—draw on different historical examples and build on distinct theoretical traditions. For precisely that reason, the conversation proved stimulating. It engages one of the most profound issues in the social sciences: how theory or empirical regularities drawn from a sample of cases can be tested, revised, or modified in the analysis of a particular case.Footnote 1
Each of the reviewers praises the works being discussed for advancing the state of international relations theory and bringing real insights for understanding China's rise. The enthusiasm is qualified, however, by theoretical and empirical concerns with the power transition approach. Kang is most critical. He contends that the power transition models that motivate the projects fit poorly with the current state of play in the Asia-Pacific. Kang's objections derive in large part from a belief that power transition models are attempts to generalize international politics from a relatively narrow set of Western European cases. He sees China's rise less in balance-of-power terms than from a longer historical lens in which China is rebuilding a traditional hierarchical system that governed relations in the region over millennia. In the absence of deep engagement with the region, such patterns are missed.
Ross and Zhang are more positive, though not uncritically so. Ross underscores the importance of geography in trying to understand contemporary East Asian dynamics. In Europe, great powers were closely proximate and thus posed more immediate existential, land-based threats to one another. The Asian theatre, by contrast, is far from the United States and is a maritime domain where such threats are less pressing. Partly as a result, the overwhelmingly pessimistic conclusions drawn by many IR theorists about China's rise—particularly around the prospects of outright military conflict—are unlikely to pertain. Rivalry, yes; war, no. As the responses suggests, Ross's point about the role of geography is consistent with many of the arguments in the books themselves, even if via different logics.
Zhang also raises a number of conceptual and empirical objections. Two are particularly notable. The first concerns the question of whether we are witnessing a power transition in East Asia at all. Reliance on aggregate indicators such as gross domestic product (GDP) may both overstate Chinese capabilities and underestimate the assets the United States—and its rich array of allies—bring to bear (e.g., Nye Reference Nye2015; Brooks and Wohlforth Reference Brooks and Wohlforth2015; Farrell and Newman Reference Farrell and Newman2019). If Zhang is right, we need to further theorize the differences between power shifts and full-blown power transitions, as well as the role that uncertainty plays in these processes.
Zhang further notes peculiar features of the contemporary international economic environment. As with other rising powers, China's ascent means it exerts a profound gravitational pull, leading to growing concerns over Chinese economic and political influence. At the same time, states—especially in Asia—are knit together not only by trade but by complex international production networks. As Zhang notes, this particular form of interdependence is historically novel and may moderate predictions drawn from different international political economy frameworks and conditions.
The authors’ responses highlight their recognition that theory takes us only so far. As they acknowledge, accounting for particular cases such as contemporary East Asia requires blending theory and history with the identification of contextual factors—often elusive—that could alter predictions from models drawn from quite different historical settings. And, as shown below, several suggest avenues for future research that could fruitfully engage theorists, historians, and regional experts. If this roundtable can spur such a conversation, it has more than served its purpose.
